



EUROPEAN PIRATE PARTIES AND THE POLITICS OF COMMUNICATION

RESEARCH REPORT ON THE PROJECT COMMUNICATION RIGHTS IN THE 2014
EUROPEAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN

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Abstract

This report presents the findings of a research project on communication rights in the Information Society. The project addresses the politics of European Pirate Parties in two parts. The first part of the research analyzes how debates on digital communication rights were represented in Pirate Party campaigns in the European Elections 2014. In the second part, the focus is on how questions of digital communication rights are currently treated in the political programs of five Pirate Parties. Pirate politics aims at policy reforms to strengthen personal privacy protections online from corporate and state surveillance activities but extends also to more broad notions of culture, participation, and self-expression. Despite that the Pirates face many obstacles in getting their message across to electorates they have already made an important contribution to European policy-making concerning digital user rights.

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1 INTRODUCTION

The specific nature of the Internet has allowed the global grass-roots dimension for questioning the basis of communication law and policy from bottom-up to gain force. The formation of Internet freedom advocacy organizations, cyberliberties and digital communication rights networks (Bennett 2008; Löblich & Wendelin 2012; Hinz & Milan 2011; Jääsaari 2012) indicates a changing political climate towards Internet policy-making, which has remained confined to experts and insulated from scrutiny by the public. Intensifying controversy about Internet censorship, net neutrality, intellectual property, privacy, surveillance and the role of Internet service providers have politicized a host of policy issues across or beyond the traditional left-right political spectrum (e.g., Dutton & Peltu 2007; 2009).

Mobilizations around communication rights are not new. Grassroots political activism has intermittently risen to demand more attention to the interconnection between media and human rights, most recently in connection with the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) during the mid-2000s (Padovani & Calabrese 2014). Pirate Parties are currently the most visible example of new communication rights mobilizations, focusing on digital user rights. Pirate Parties are the political incarnations of a wider movement dedicated to raising concern among the general public about violations of fundamental rights in connection with digital communication. Unlike Wikileaks and a host of other loose organizations, the Pirate Parties are trying to achieve their goals by the means of the established political system rather than through activism. Pirate Parties have set the agenda for public digital rights debates in many European countries for almost ten years, beginning in Sweden in 2006. This report presents the main findings from a study on communication rights activism related to Pirate Parties.

Until fairly recently the Pirate Party and other new Internet user rights and cyberliberties groups have escaped the serious attention of policy-makers, mass media and political scientists (see, however, Oscarsson & Persson 2009; Erlingsson & Persson 2010; 2011). This project has aimed to reduce this gap by addressing pirate politics in a two-part study a) as a political movement aiming to influence national and European politics and b) as a social movement with wider implications for cultural change.

The European Elections held 22-25 May 2014 and the preceding campaign offered a starting point for studying the Pirate Parties as a political movement, their goals and the campaigns to mobilize potential supporters. The first part of the research analyzes how the debate on digital communication rights is represented in the campaign of the Pirate Parties. The aim of the research in the second part was to contribute to a better understanding of the political, cultural, and social agency of the European movement for cyberliberties and freedom of expression in the digital age. This second part of the study concentrates on the question of digital communication rights. We will examine what the Pirates' current standpoint on these issues is and their impact on current European and national communication policy debates and take a look at how the Pirates have

responded to opportunities and challenges offered by inherited institutional structures and political perspectives.

This report is compiled by Dr., Docent Johanna Jääsaari and M.Soc.Sc. Jockum Hildén, University of Helsinki. Assistant professors, Dr. Patrick Burkart (Texas A&M University, USA) and Dr. Maria Löblich (Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Germany) have also contributed to the report. The authors also wish to thank Dr. Jonas Andersson Schwarz (Södertörn University, Sweden) for valuable comments.

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2 PIRATE PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2014

This section presents the findings of the study on the campaigns and electoral success of European Pirate Parties in the European Elections 2014. The research questions of this part of the study were:

- Q1. What are the various Pirate Parties' goals in the European Parliament? Who do the Pirate Parties claim to represent?
- Q2. Which policies and laws do the Pirates specifically challenge and aim to influence?
- Q3. How do they try to mobilize potential supporters and to reach the general electorate on the national level—which is by and large still indifferent to issues of communication policy and governance?

The research provides an overview of the participation of the Pirates in the 2014 European Parliament Elections. More in depth, the study examines the campaigns of three Pirate Parties, the Swedish, German and Finnish Pirate Parties that each in its own way campaigned seriously for seats in the European Parliament during January-May 2014. The research is based on empirical data (party documents, media coverage, and election statistics). Apart from documentary research, also observation and face-to-face interviews with pirate candidates, journalists and other informants have been conducted when available.

2.1 EUROPEAN PIRATE PARTIES: BACKGROUND

The first Pirate Party was launched in Sweden in 2006 following a protest against the raid of the file-sharing site The Pirate Bay by the Swedish police (Ilshammar 2010, 285). Soon after local parties were established in Germany, France, Finland and Denmark. Pirates started off opposing the 'Europeanization' of traditional national conceptions and legislation of public use and public space, fair use and copyright. In connection with the protest against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), Pirate Parties were activated especially in Eastern Europe. Pirate Parties have also formed an international clearing house, the Pirate Parties International (PPI). In September 2013, Pirates from 15 countries founded the European Pirate Party (PP-EU) in Luxembourg to organize participation of Pirate Parties across Europe in the European elections.

The goals that Pirates advocate are the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the digital age, consumer and authors' rights oriented reform of copyright and related rights, support of information privacy, transparency and free access to information. The name "Pirates" itself is a reappropriation of the title

that was given to internet users by the representatives of the music and film industry, and do not refer to any illegal activity as such according to the Pirates International (www.ppi.net).

The first real electoral success of the Pirate Party came in the European Elections of 2009 in which the Swedish pirates received over 7.13 percent of the Swedish vote and one seat in the European Parliament (Member of European Parliament Christian Engström). Another Pirate MEP, Amelia Andersdotter, from Sweden entered the EP after the Lisbon Treaty reform. The success of the Swedish Pirate Party was followed by another triumph in Germany in 2011 where the Pirate Party won 15 seats in the Berlin state parliament, and subsequently seats in three more state parliaments.

Although by the start of the European Elections 2014 campaign the Pirates had failed to win seats in national elections in EU member states¹, the hopes for a larger representation of Pirates in the European Parliament were high. Edward Snowden's exposure of the National Security Agency's (NSA) mass surveillance schemes had given rise to a public debate on privacy and surveillance, which was widely assumed to translate into increased support for European Pirate Parties (Öhrvall 2014; Putzier 2013). In the European Elections in May 2014 Pirates ran for seats in the European Parliaments in twelve countries. The Pirate Party competed for seats on their own list in Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. In Austria and Poland, Pirate Parties participated in coalition with other parties. In Estonia, The Pirates endorsed an independent candidate. The European Pirates agreed on a joint election program based on a common agenda in Athens in November 2013 (Leivaditis, 2013). All but the Swedish Pirates employed PP-EU's program for the 2014 European elections.

The high hopes for a Pirate Party victory dissolved, however. Only one Pirate, Julia Reda from The German Pirate Party, was elected to the European Parliament in 2014. The closest to gaining a seat in the European Parliament was the Czech Pirate Party, who received 4.78 % of the Czech vote, just a little short of the national five percent threshold.

Thus, we have been compelled to modify our original research questions from the beginning: How did the Pirate Parties try to mobilize potential supporters and to reach the general electorate on the national level—and why did they fail? This question is examined by analyzing campaigns of three Pirate Parties, the Swedish Pirate Party, the German Pirate Party and Finnish Pirate Party, which all had sufficient grounds for expecting a better turnout in the European Elections 2014. In the following chapters the campaigns of these three parties are described against the history of the parties and the political system and culture of their country of origin.

2.2 THE SWEDISH PIRATE PARTY

The first pirate activists were associated with the Swedish activist network the Piracy Bureau (Piratbyrå) that had initiated the torrent tracker the Pirate Bay (Lindgren &

1 The Pirate Party of Iceland won three parliamentary seats in the 2013 national election.

Linde, 2012, 149). As noted above, the Pirate Party was launched following the raid of the Pirate Bay, and although loosely affiliated with the Piracy Bureau, the Pirate Party was an independent initiative by IT entrepreneur Rick Falkvinge.

The party was formed to campaign for cyber-libertarian reforms within the formal political system (Andersson Schwarz, 2014, Burkart, 2014, Erlingsson & Persson, 2011, Fredriksson 2015, Ilshammar 2010, Miegel & Olsson 2008). The electoral success in the 2009 European Elections, in which the Swedish pirates secured a seat in the European Parliament, was a great surprise. The Pirates received another seat in 2011 after 18 MEPs were added due to Lisbon Treaty reforms. The strong result was largely thanks to the publicity The Pirate Bay (TPB) trial received in Sweden. The verdict saw a surge of over 35,000 new members, effectively tripling the member count of the party. The European elections were held three months after the verdict, much to the Pirate Party's advantage. Many, predominately young, Swedes supported the TPB founders and opposed criminalization of file sharing offences.

Despite high hopes, the pirates failed to muster support in the 2010 Swedish parliamentary elections. The PP-SE received only 0.65 % of the vote, far from the 4 % threshold to get a seat. According to Andersson Schwarz (2014, 144), the failure could partly be attributed to party leader Rick Falkvinge's unfortunately timed and blunderous statement on child pornography. Just a month before the parliamentary elections, Falkvinge stated that mere possession of child pornography should be decriminalized.

The result was a wake-up call for the party, who had relied on renewing their result from the European elections in the national one. After failing to get a seat in the Swedish parliament, the pirates realized that they had to broaden their scope if they wished to remain an active political force. In 2011, PP-SE leader and founder Rick Falkvinge stepped down to make room for Anna Troberg, who was the party leader until the end of 2014 when she decided to step down. The change in leadership also signified a change of focus. By 2011, streaming services were already gaining ground. Swedish start-up Spotify partnered with Facebook and jumped from 3 million to 5 million users (Van Buskirk, 2011). The file sharing question was no longer on the agenda and people's political concerns were elsewhere. Illegal file sharing had not disappeared, although new copyright enforcement legislation, such as the Intellectual Property Enforcement Directive (IPRED) had a deterring effect on file sharers (Svensson & Larsson, 2012, 1156). However, enforcement measures were targeted against hosting services and not casual file-sharers, which would help to explain why the PP-SE failed to engage voters. After a lengthy process PP-SE published a new party programme with a wider political focus in 2013.

According to one pirate activist and self-proclaimed liberal political commentator, Torbjörn Jerlerup (2012), the pirates failed to realize that the reason the PP-SE was successful in the 2009 European elections was not file sharing or data retention laws *per se*, but dissatisfaction with a state which was becoming more and more authoritative. Jerlerup claims that the protests against the data retention directive and file sharing trials were mere symbols for greater dissatisfaction with the way the state was trying to control people.

Although Jerlerups claims might sound credible, the facts prove him wrong. In 2012, the PP-SE's membership count jumped from 8,000 to 16,000 when a popular file sharing site, Tankafetast.se, was closed after the police had seized their servers (Carp, 2014). By October 2013, most of those members were already gone, as the member count had yet again fallen to 8,000. Most of the PP-SE's members are, it would seem, primarily interested in file sharing decriminalization and copyright reform; the 2013 Snowden revelations did not affect the member count in any way.

The Swedish Pirates in the European Elections 2014

The Swedish Pirate Party had three main candidates in the European Elections 2014: Anna Troberg, Party leader, Christian Engström (MEP) and Amelia Andersdotter (MEP). The party prominently supported all three candidates, but Party leader Anna Troberg had the most active campaign of the three. To advance their campaigning efforts the Swedish pirates opened a “pirate shop” with marketing materials such as flyers and posters. The kit was distributed free of charge and the purpose was to activate members on the ground.

The actual election campaign showed little signs of the Pirates' broadened agenda, as general social issues were essentially invisible. Instead, the PP-SE focused on data protection and privacy, often referring to the state surveillance schemes revealed by the NSA leak. The founder and former chair of the Swedish Pirate Party Rick Falkvinge (2014), advocated a party of designated information experts as the main reason for supporting the Swedish Pirates in the European Elections. During the launch of their election campaign the Swedish Pirates stressed that the reason people should vote for the Pirates is because of their knowledge of internet-related issues. In public appearances, prominent Pirates such as MEP Amelia Andersdotter often refrained from commenting on anything else than Internet-related issues, and when they did, they tried to do so by referring to examples from the internet sphere of policy-making. However, file-sharing and copyright reform were hardly addressed during the campaign. Party leader Anna Troberg (2014b) even expressed that she was “dead tired of discussing file sharing” and that file sharing is a “non-issue”, since it was “self-evident that copyright reform is needed”.

Throughout the election campaign the PP-SE struggled with a lack of traditional media presence. Retriever, a media analysis company owned by TT Nyhetsbyrå and Norwegian NTB, noted that even though the PP-SE has “more than double the followers on Facebook than the Alliance parties [the previous government] have together ... they remain almost invisible in the media” (Retriever, 2014). In fact, TNS Sifo even ignored to take PP-SE into account in their analysis of how major news outlets reported on the Swedish parties (Wennö, 2014). Swedish public broadcaster SVT also ignored to invite PP-SE to the last party leader debate before the European elections, arguing that the debate was for the party leaders of parties represented in the Swedish parliament (Troberg, 2014c). Several other news outlets also failed to include the Pirate party in their coverage. Troberg (2014d) commented on this lack of media presence in a long

blog post, in which she stated that “self-pity is not sexy” and that the Pirate party should not be pitied. Rather, it is the state of democracy that should be pitied, as voters do not have access to information on their decision-makers.

The campaign strategy to focus on data protection and privacy did not work, and the PP-SE ultimately failed to renew their seats in the European parliament. With only 2,2 % of the vote, the future looks bleak for the Swedish pirates who also failed to get a seat in the 2014 national parliamentary elections in September. Eventually, Troberg as well as vice leader Marit Deldén and party secretary Henrik Bränden stepped down from the party leadership in December 2014. The reason behind this resignation was only partly the election failures: Troberg publicly accused the Party Board for working against the party leadership (Troberg, 2014e).

From an economic perspective, the loss of seats is a devastating blow for the PP-SE, which will now have to rely on donations to finance the party’s operations. The failure in the European election shows that despite efforts to broaden the scope of the party, people still perceived the PP-SE as a party for file sharers. The NSA revelations did not affect the member count nor did it give the PP-SE the boost it needed.

The problem, it would seem, is twofold. Troberg is probably right in considering illegal file sharing a non-issue. Today, even fewer Swedes aged 15-25 regard online copyright infringements as wrong compared to 2009 (Svensson, 2014, cited in Lüning, 2014). Founding a political movement on copyright reform is no longer feasible. At the same time, however, the PP-SE struggles with convincing voters that the party has broadened its agenda. It would seem as if the party’s name would hinder the PP-SE from making any real progress on its rebranding crusade. This, of course, has little to do with the actual work the pirates have done in the European parliament or the contents of their party program. The PP-SE has clearly expanded their party program in the past years, but their external communication has failed to communicate the changes the party has made.

Since the PP-SE receives most of its votes from people under 30, it becomes clear that the PP-SE’s constituency is shrinking precisely because file sharing is regarded as a non-issue. It appears that the solution for file sharers is not political, but technical. Since IPRED was implemented, file sharers have started to use online anonymity services to a greater extent (Larsson et al., 2013).

Ironically, what the PP-SE would seem to need is another public antipiracy trial. The party which emerged as a reaction to “damage caused by technocratic controls on private life online” (Burkart, 2014, 11) has failed to extend people’s perception of its reflexive politics to other technocratic controls than those which relate to file sharing.

2.3 THE GERMAN PIRATE PARTY²

The German Pirate Party was founded in 2006 by a small group of people that was dissatisfied with the EU Commission’s proposal for a directive on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions and the reform of copyright law (COM(2002)92).

2 This chapter is based on a contribution by Dr. Maria Löblich.

It was based on the model of the Swedish ‘Piratpartiet’ (Miegel & Olsson, 2008). Until 2009, the German Pirates led a shadowy existence, remaining a comparatively small party. Its explosive growth in the following years, especially during the year 2009³) has to be seen in a larger context and as an overlapping of several developments.

Civil rights and other activist groups mobilized a whole movement in that year, protesting against increasing attempts by the state to restrict internet freedom. Their protest was particularly directed against two legislative initiatives: the national implementation of the Data Retention Directive, which was passed in 2007, and the law to combat child pornography in communication networks, passed in 2009. The movement succeeded in raising a lot of public awareness for their concerns (Löblich & Wendelin, 2012). The Pirate Party was not the initiator, but took part in that movement. It was especially concerned with intellectual property rights including copyright law and software at that time, whereas other groups had a strong focus on surveillance and privacy. Groups such as Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung (AK Vorrat), Chaos Computer Club and partly individuals played a key role in organizing campaigns and demonstrations such as the successful Berlin demonstration “Freedom not Fear” in which over 25.000 people took part in 2009. The Pirate Party profited from that surge of protest and contributed to it with its own campaigns. A leading member of AK Vorrat remembered that especially younger activists left for the Pirate Party being enthusiastic about having found a political harbour. Whereas the Pirate Party defined itself as political wing of the protest movement, key figures of the activist movement have remained aloof, however, and explained this attitude with skepticism regarding political parties in general (Löblich & Wendelin, 2012).

The development of the Pirate Party cannot be understood without the (temporarily limited) increase in the importance of ICT policy in federal politics after the debate about data retention and the blocking of websites in the context of the law to combat child pornography in communication networks. ICT policy had played a niche role in the 2000s, and the emergence of internet policy topics in the public discourse had a lot to do with the fact that 2009 was the year of federal elections. After the Pirate Party managed to gain more than two percent of the vote in the 2009 general election, other political parties quickly picked up ICT policy topics (Niedermayer, 2013). They started realizing that there is a considerable section of the electorate for whom the internet is a core issue. Some parties even declared themselves to be the original party of the internet, such as the Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen). For a while, the Pirate Party was certainly seen as a potential competitor, especially by the Greens and partly by the Liberal Party. In 2011 PP-DE famously entered the Berlin Landestag amid increased national and international press coverage. Since then the party succeeded in gaining seats in three other state parliaments, Schleswig-Holstein, North Rhine-Westphalia and Saarland. Between 2011 and 2012, the Pirates were elected in four state parliaments and as of June 2014 had circa 450 members in local, state and the EU parliament. No pirates have thus far entered the Bundestag, the national assembly, however.

The increase of importance of ICT policy led federal government ministries to organize round table discussions with different stakeholders from industry and civil

3 From 1000 members up to 10.000 <http://wiki.piratenpartei.de/Datei:Mitgliederentwicklung.png>

society in order to make first steps towards a more encompassing policy approach. The Federal Parliament established the Commission of Inquiry on the Internet and Digital Society (Enquête-Kommission Internet und digitale Gesellschaft) for advising future policy decisions. Whereas leading figures of Chaos Computer Club, netzpolitik.org and AK Vorrat were included in these high-ranking round tables because they had become accepted ICT experts and sought after interview partners in the media, the Pirate Party did not achieve this status (Löblich & Wendelin 2012). Unlike the other groups, they have failed to install leading figures that combine both a certain prominence and eloquent expertise. Those who could be seen as the exception, such as the former federal political director of the Pirate Party, Marina Weisband, gave up their functions after a while because of either lack of time and money or demoralizing internal debates within the party.

Whereas the Pirate Party first was perceived as an organization for promoting ICT, this issue later moved to the background. Transparency, participation and digital democracy became public keywords whenever the Pirates were discussed in the public sphere, partly as a result of the party bringing up the issues itself but this change of focus was also fostered by the mass media (Bieber 2012). Some observers have even criticized the Pirate Party for forgetting their original core issue, namely the reform of copyright law (von Gehlen 2011). Regarding the effects of the Pirates' participatory culture, authors have emphasized the "political learning effects" on the side of established parties: the increased use of digital communication technologies by individual politicians and by parties in election campaigns, a sudden emphasis of new forms of participation in party programs and the taking of (or at least reflection upon) member votes (such as the Social Democrats on the government coalition treaty 2013; Korte 2012; Niedermayer 2013; Jacobsen 2013).

Despite these discussions, the Pirate Party could not continue its trajectory of growth. They failed in the state elections and the federal election of 2013 and the total membership has decreased since the end of 2012. Whereas in September 2012 the highest membership was achieved (almost 35.000), in August 2014 there were 26.813 members, of whom 30% were paying members thus entitled to vote. Media coverage plays a role as well explaining the development of the Pirate Party from quick "digital start" to "analogue fall" (Klecha & Hensel, 2013).

The German Pirates in the European Elections 2014

In the European elections the German Pirate Party received 1,4% of the vote and was able to send one candidate to the European Parliament, Julia Reda. A precondition for this relative success was a decision by the German Constitutional Court, which had annulled the 3% EU Parliament election threshold. At a party congress in January 2014 members of the Pirate Party agreed on election candidates and program. The five top candidates were Julia Reda, Fotios Amanatides, Anke Domscheit-Berg, Bruno Kramm and Anne Helm. The main topics in the election campaign were: "democracy upgrade" for the European Union, asylum policy and migration, civil rights and domestic policy.

Their slogan was “Europe without Borders”. The main topics were defined both by federal board and candidates (democracy upgrade, asylum policy and migration) as well as by member survey (civil rights and domestic policy). Top candidate Julia Reda supported the charter of 10 principles developed by the EDRI network in order to put digital rights on the European elections’ agenda.

Internet policy issues did not play a role in the general EU election campaign in Germany which was bound to national topics. The Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party reduced their campaigns to the faces of the President of EU Parliament Martin Schulz and Chancellor Angela Merkel. As the other parties did not put ICT issues on the agenda, the Pirate Party alone was not able to raise broader public attention for issues such as TTIP, although it was very visible in street protests. Their posters also advocated for European integration in spite of financial and political crises. Moreover, they demanded more transparency in decision-making at EU level as well as more participation of EU citizens (PP-DE 2014).

Several events affected the German Pirates’ election campaign and the somewhat disappointing result. In an interview preceding the elections, MEP candidate Julia Reda had stated that the party would most likely receive two seats, but they received only the one. One of the most important factors that can explain the result is the division of the party into two camps: a left and a liberal wing. The left wing has been trying to broaden the issue spectrum of the party and include social policy issues such as the inclusion of a basic income guarantee and a higher minimum wage. The liberal wing has been calling for sticking to the party’s core issues such as open networks, internet policy and digital rights. This dispute has not been settled over the last years and has prevented the development of a clear party profile.

The “Bombergate” scandal, referring to a Femen-style protest action where left wing Pirate EP candidate Anne Helm was unmasked thanking the Allied for bombing Dresden in World War II (e.g., Reinbold, 2014) almost threatened to derail the campaign of the Pirate Party and further inflamed the relationship between the two camps. Helm had been identified as the masked woman posing with “Thanks Bomber Harris” written on her chest, which caused the voluntary technicians who took care of the digital infrastructure of the Pirate Party’s websites to go on a “strike”. Quarrels and internal fighting about a left wing bias within the party intensified, and “Bombergate” led to a wave of party members withdrawing their membership.

The party had also suffered from a lack of funds and decreased member activity. In the federal elections of 2013 the Pirates received only 2,2 % of the vote and failed to capture seats in the German Parliament. The result put a damper on party member motivation and engagement. Only 700 members attended the party congress in January 2014, whereas two years prior in 2012, 2000 members had attended. Not only the EU election campaign but also the Bavarian state election, which took place two months earlier, suffered from the problem to mobilize members for organizing election campaigns. This in combination with a lack of election campaign funds made the organization of an effective campaign difficult. The Pirate Party had around 300 000 Euro for its European Election campaign, which was half of the budget for the federal election of 2013. The party’s total budget in 2014 was ca. 800 000 Euro.

The disappointing election results, financial difficulties and infighting have led to the resignation of leading members of the party. Just two months before the election, in March 2014, three members of the federal board said they could not support the new line that parts of the party had taken and resigned. Although a temporary federal board was instated, it was unable to act and make decisions during the election campaign.

2.4 THE FINNISH PIRATE PARTY

The Finnish Pirate Party, *Piraattipuolue*, was founded in 2008 and formally entered into the Political Party Register in August 2009. The party organization and party program was initially modeled directly after the Swedish Pirate Party to take issue with Internet freedom, free sharing of information, privacy and openness. PP-FI is, however, not the first organization to champion pirate politics in Finland nor even the first party to be modeled after the Swedish pirates. Although the Pirates' predecessors, Tietoyhteiskuntapuolue (TYP) or 'The Information Society Party' in English and the Wikipuolue (Eng. 'The Wikiparty') never materialized as registered political parties, they offer a window into the evolution of pirate politics in Finland.

The Information Society Party was formed following a wave of protests in autumn 2005 against the amendment of the Finnish Copyright Act and Criminal Code, commonly known as Lex Karpela after the former Minister of Culture Tanja Karpela. The purpose of the amendment was to apply the changes required by the EU Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC to Finnish copyright law and to bring the legislation up to date according to the new digital environment. The amendment, among other things, introduced the idea of unauthorized, non-for-profit file sharing as a punishable crime into Finnish copyright legislation. It also declared downloading illegal copies and circumventing DRM for the purpose of copying – even for one's own use – illegal. Inspired by the founding of the Swedish Pirate Party, the opponents of the bill founded the Information Society Party in February 2006, but the ill-chosen name and poor organization failed to mobilize supporters. The party's efforts to collect the 5000 names required to be a registered party in time to take part in the 2007 national election fell short. The Information Society Party dissolved soon after (Hintikka 2008, Airo 2012). In February 2008 Matti Hiltunen set up a website and a community for persons interested in founding a Pirate Party in Finland. This time the effort received attention from the mainstream media and the new party was able to quickly collect the required 5000 signatures to become a registered party.

Closely associated to the Pirate Party, but not a part of its organization in any way, is Piraattiliitto or The Pirate League, a voluntary news and information service specializing in piracy topics. The Pirate League proudly displays the Pirate logo on its main page www.piraattiliitto.org, but declares its independency from the Party and asks "not to confuse the two organizations, thank you!". The days of its most intense activity are clearly over, as the latest news item on the website in 2014 featured Rick Falkvinge's and Peter Sunde's visit to Finland in April 2011. Nevertheless, the service continues to offer piracy-related FAQs, links and useful advice to wannabe pirates: "How to create

your own Darknet”; “How to circumvent the YLE (Public service broadcaster) tax” (piraattiliitto.org 2013).

The Wikiparty’s tale is slightly different as they never even attempted to become a political party in the traditional sense. Based on the ideals of open and direct democracy, it was founded in 2007 upon the idea of searching for new ways to participate in politics. The Wikiparty’s chief aim was to open the political process and to encourage everyone to take part, comment, and amend various programs, initiatives and debates using wiki platforms (Hintikka 2008, 73). Internet policy as such was not on the Wikiparty’s agenda, which remained unfocused and diffused.

Although registered membership in the Finnish Pirate Party has risen from 2500 in 2009 to over 3500 (Airo 2012, no current figure available on website), it remains one of the smallest political parties in Finland. PP-FI is organized into local chapters according to the voting districts in National Elections. The Pirate Party has both a student organization and an active youth organization, which is understandable as over 50 percent of its members are born after 1985.

The party’s youth organization, Piraattinuoret (‘Pirate Youth’), is at times more visible in public, especially in social media, than the main organization. Two young pirates, Ahto Apajalahti and Kaj Sotala published a 275-page pamphlet titled *Jokapiraatinoikeus* (2010), in English ‘everypirates’ rights’ in reference to the tradition of *allemannsrätten* or ‘everyman’s’ right to hike, camp, sail and gather mushrooms and berries on private land in Finland, Norway and Sweden. The aim of the pamphlet was to explain and clarify to the wider public the pirates’ standing on copyright and file-sharing, specifically pointing out that copyright is an issue with wider social consequences and ignoring these issues present a threat to basic rights. The authors go point-by-point through a number of cases of excessive copyright enforcement or measures to introduce them in Finland and elsewhere beginning from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In the Finnish context, in addition to Lex Karpela, the authors also present the Finnreactor case in 2004, where the administrators of a BitTorrent site became the subjects of a police investigation and trial resulting in thousands of euros in damages (Apajalahti & Sotala 2010, 27-33).

PP-FI has taken part in both local and national elections but so far has not been given a mandate. The party’s first attempt to political office took place in a local by-election in the municipality of Loviisa. In the first national election PP took part in 2011, it received 0.51 % of the vote, not even close to winning a seat but making it the largest registered party outside the Finnish Parliament and the ninth largest party in Finland.

The PP’s claim to represent internet users has been recognized by the government apparatus. The party has been officially invited to make a statement in the drafting process of new copyright legislation and information society legislation. It has also participated in expert hearings in the parliamentary committee for education concerning the renewal of audiovisual programs legislation.

PP-FI’s and the Pirate Youth’s membership and activities occasionally overlap with other digital rights organizations’ initiatives and campaigns, such as Electronic Frontier Finland’s campaigns and the Open Ministry’s citizen initiative “Put Some Sense into

Copyright Legislation”. The Pirate Youth has administered Wikileaks’ Finnish site wikileaks.fi.

The Finnish Pirate Party in the European Elections 2014

The Finnish pirates coordinated efforts in the European elections campaign with other European Pirate Parties under the newly founded PPEU’s umbrella. PP-FI maintained that the main rationale for voting for the PP was that during the next period the European Parliament will take issue with many important questions related to the wide-ranging EU-US trade agreements, which may have far-reaching implications for fundamental rights, copyright and patents. In addition, EU’s own copyright and privacy legislation is also up for review. According to PP-FI, “Pirates are urgently needed in the EP to ensure that the Union does not pass copyright legislation with undue restrictions to freedom of speech and privacy or other legislation incongruous to the information society”.

PP-FI appointed a full list (20 candidates) to stand for the European Elections in May 2014. The party leadership was optimistic in expecting a better turnout for the party because they had managed to recruit Peter Sunde, one of the founders of the Pirate Bay, on their candidate list. Although having lived most of his life in Sweden, Sunde, of Finnish and Norwegian background, was motivated to stand for election in Finland because according to him, there are no politicians in Finland who understand the issues of new technology (Halminen 2014). Although in the Finnish electoral system all candidates are on equal footing, Sunde was promoted as a lead candidate. The problem, however, was that Sunde was on the run from an international warrant for arrest and could not or did not care to campaign himself and few attempts were made to promote him.

On the public broadcaster Yle’s website and election compass, each candidate was offered an opportunity to participate in a four minute videoed interview. Also the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat featured videos on its election compass, but these were shorter, one-minute videos. Most of the candidates took up the chance to express their views. Sunde’s profile was missing from the Finnish media’s candidate selection compasses. Most of the questions in the compasses, did not deal with communication or digital rights or other ‘Pirate’ themes, but instead concentrated on the Euro, economy, agriculture, enlargement and migration. Uusisuomi.fi, an online and debate news site, had one question on net neutrality. Although the candidate selection compasses may be unsophisticated, they are important for parties in Finland because in the Finnish electoral system one votes for an individual candidate instead of a party list. The engines were important in the 2014 European Election in particular because most parties had had to slash their campaign budgets, according to a poll by Helsingin Sanomat. The Pirate Party did not respond to this questionnaire—another telltale sign that that there was no coordinated party campaign.

The entire Pirate campaign was overall further handicapped by the party’s weak media presence. A presence in dedicated social media is not a guarantee of public visibility. The FPP’s blog and news on the main website were also by and large inactive.

The blog was not updated and the latest news from the beginning of March 2014 related to legalizing cannabis – hardly a core issue for the European Elections.

The Finnish Pirate Party has also suffered from a lack of credibility. Although research shows that the supporters of the Party share values similar to the ones shared by supporters for the Left and Greens (Airo 2012), for voters it is difficult to judge what the party and its candidates stand for. Some party members have openly flirted in public with right-wing politics. One of the more well-known pirates, Jiri Keronen is also a member of the anti-immigration party Muutos 2011 and he has been a frequent contributor on the website of the True Finns party's anti-immigration wing. The Pirate Party leadership withdrew Keronen's candidacy in the European Elections, apparently for these particular reasons.

In the European Elections the Finnish Pirate Party received a total of 12 378 votes, of which Sunde won the largest number of votes, 2 911. At 0,72 percent of the national votes in the European Election, the result was slightly better (by + 0,2 percent) than the Parliamentary Election result of 2011. The Pirate Party was the largest of the parties outside the Finnish Parliament until the national elections of 2015 after which the Party was erased from the Register of Political Parties after failing to win a seat in two consecutive elections.

2.5 CONCLUSIONS

After the European Elections in 2014, the Pirate Party is only one of the many “fringe” parties represented on the margins of European politics (cf. Enyedi, 2013). The future looks bleak for the Pirate Parties. The election results were unsurprising, however. In Sweden, the Pirate Party had performed poorly in the polls preceding the election (Öhrvall, 2014). In Germany, the “Bombergate” scandal derailed the German Pirate Party's campaign into focusing on disputes and infighting within the party instead of the issues they represented (Reinbold, 2014).

These two examples also highlight the role of the media in lifting or downplaying communication rights issues. Despite their reliance on their own communication channels in mobilizing supporters, the Pirates have gained or lost votes in reflection of the interest the mainstream media has shown towards their politics from the start. In mediatized societies, media coverage helps to understand the influence a new political actor can exert. Small parties are particularly dependent on media coverage in order to become visible and to promote their agenda. They do not yet have the resources and the political standing of established parties and therefore have more difficulties in achieving news media's attention (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Rucht 2004). Journalists working in the same newsroom have never been competing to cover ICT issues because this policy field has been and is less important (and less prestigious) than many other policy fields. As a consequence, the same few journalists who had started covering the Pirate Party could considerably shape its framing. Media framing always develops within a process in which apart from journalistic orientation and co-orientation as well

as “frame sponsorship” (cf. Carragee & Roefs 2004), the media’s interaction with the actors they cover play an important role.

The German case is illustrative in this respect. While there were several leading news media who at first had pinned hopes on the Pirates as democracy reformers (though of course, the coverage has never been universally positive), the party has lost that sympathy little by little. Internal quarrel, organizational difficulties, inadequate behavior of leading pirates in talk shows, as well as the fragmentation into political camps became dominant topics in media coverage from approximately 2012 on (Hartl, 2012). The tenor became: The time of the Pirate Party is over. The party lacks an effective organizational structure and cannot solve their internal problems. In a gender debate, partly fuelled by some female Pirates, partly taken by journalists (especially in *sueddeutsche.de* and *Spiegel Online*) as an opportunity to critically examine male nerd culture, the party was accused of harboring ancient attitudes. The considerable news media attention from the beginning is diminished. Since their failure in the 2013 federal election, if not earlier, the German Pirate Party is rarely discussed in the media.

Also the Pirates’ democratic organizational principles intervened in the campaign in an unforeseen way. In Germany, for example, both journalists as well as communication coordinators for the Pirates complained that because of the “grassroots” principle, federal board members and press spokesmen were not given a chance to speak for the Party. Members would immediately outcry whenever an attempt was made to create more internal structure and hierarchy. Fluid organizational structures and the grassroots principle create difficulties because journalists expect contact persons who can provide them with consistent party positions. Pirates are notorious for not actively shaping one or having a professional campaign that would at least give an impression of one. Hence, the picture the media paints of the Pirates is often a haphazard one.

A further problem has been that some candidates dislike “established media” and were convinced that media coverage is expendable given the possibilities digital communication technologies offer, thereby overestimating the social outreach of those technologies. This was also highlighted by personal communication with Finnish informants. Upon asking where best to follow the Finnish Pirate Party’s campaign, the informant replied that it is carried out on “alternative fora”.

Media bias or missing and/or unsuccessful election campaigns do not of course fully explain the Pirates’ all but total disappearance from the political scene. In hindsight it is easy to point out that concentration on communication policy issues did not pay off. All but the Swedish pirates employed the European Pirates’ common election program based on a common agenda agreed by European Pirates in Athens, November 2013. European Pirates had to “cut a long story short” in formulating their program because the text was threatening to become longer than expected (Leivaditis, 2013). The final result focused quite strictly on core policies, such as Internet user-rights, access and privacy. As discussed above, the Swedish Pirate Party also concentrated heavily on these issues in their campaign.

The pressing economic problems, rising right wing populism and general sense of instability and threat have overshadowed pirate politics, which now seem frivolous or at best irrelevant in comparison. The Pirate Party, is however, the one single political

organization with communication as its core focus. Should the Pirates be headed for extinction in the near future, it is important for formulating alternative policies to document the main positions of a political program for communication rights. In the next section we will take a closer look at the issues the Pirates have advocating in recent times to provide an overview of its most central tendencies.

3 THE POLITICAL AGENDAS OF PIRATE PARTIES: PROJECTS FOR COMMUNICATIVE CULTURAL MODERNIZATION¹

3.1 INTRODUCTION

New technologies have created more interest in the relationship between movements and communication (Mosca 2014). Despite the breakdown of the Pirate Parties' hopes for a final breakthrough in the 2014 European Elections, the Pirate movement remains a unique effort in building collective action centered on communication, not only a movement that is capable of using new communication technology to its advantage.

Departing from recent studies on pirate politics, which in line with most studies of social movements which mainly focus on the mobilization stage, we analyze in which direction the Pirate Party policies have developed since their founding. In this second part of the study we take a look at the Pirates' cyberliberties policies in order to grasp what is it that they have attempted to change regarding the policies adopted by national and EU policymakers. In the following we present the Pirates' alternative vision for a society shaped and supported by information and communications technology, or if indeed such a unified vision exists.

Research questions examined in this part of the study are:

- Q1. What are the aims of the Pirates and how do they differ from related political and social projects? To which values are pirate policies based upon?
- Q2. How is taking part or aiming to take part in institutionalized politics transforming the Pirates' agenda in different settings?
- Q3. Can groups, organizations and networks for Internet freedom 'converge' to build a broad mass movement with the potential to transform the communication and cultural policy agenda? Will this take shape within the Pirate platform?

¹ Parts of this chapter have been published in the International Journal of Communication, Special section on Piracy and Social Change (Jääsaari & Hildén 2015).

3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

The analysis draws on qualitative documentary research based on data collected online in 2013 and 2014 from the websites of Pirate Parties in five EU countries, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany and Sweden.

The research follows the logic of analyses of similar processes and institutions in a limited number of cases selected for analytic purposes (Peters 1998, 10). Apart from evidence of actual participation on the political arena, the selection of these party cases intends to capture both variance according to cultural differences and consistency through diffusion, recognizing the beginnings of the pirate movement in Sweden.

By selecting the Pirate Parties in the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany and Sweden for closer analysis, we aim to highlight the central features of the European Pirate Agenda and to assess differences and similarities. The background factors in Table 1 summarize the characteristics of the information society and political-cultural environments of the five parties which programs have been selected for closer analysis.

Table 1: Case selection: information society and cultural indicators²

	Rank on Cosmopolitanism Index (2005)	Population in millions 2014	Internet access (Households) %, 2013	Broadband Download Speed, Mbps 2014 [*]
Sweden	5	9,7	93	41,93
Finland	8	5,3	89	28,85
Germany	14	81,0	88	25,61
France	17	66,2	82	30, 5
The Czech Republic	24	10,6	73	24,6

* Internet World Statistics <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm>; For France data is from 2011.

Culture is associated with the openness of national communication systems, which according to Norris and Inglehart (2009), fosters civic engagement. The Cosmopolitanism Index developed by Norris and Inglehart (2009), is based on the theory of cultural shift and provides a measure of cosmopolitanism. It measures the permeability of entire societies to information flows according to levels of globalization, media freedom, and economic development. It is no coincidence that Northern European countries, and especially Sweden rank high on the Index. The cultural shift theory (Inglehart & Baker 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2010) claims that the increasingly high priority mass publics, and especially younger generations, give to autonomy and self-expression in all spheres of life is born from the fact that an increasing share of the population has grown up taking survival for granted. Priorities have shifted from survival values, an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security, towards self-expression values, which place importance on subjective well-being and quality of

² Sources: Norris & Inglehart, 2009; Eurostat <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tin00134> ,

life. Self-expression values give also high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life. They are also heavily associated with an emphasis on secular-rational values as opposed to traditional, often religiously based values.

The emergence of the very first Pirate Party in Sweden can be understood in largely in these terms. The founding of the Swedish Pirate Party in 2006 coincided with the political development referred to as the post-consensual, post-social democratic condition, where the collective provides the means for the realization of individual freedoms (Andersson Schwarz, 2014, 125) Pirate politics can be seen as both a product of and a counterforce to this development, as it emphasizes globalism and anti-statism instead of centralized, state control in the context of information policy-making (Andersson Schwarz, 2014, 122). PP-SE's rise can be understood against the gradual erosion of the previously exceptionally high level of public trust in government and the state's capacity to solve problems of the welfare state. The political agenda is no longer steered by established institutions, the government, the traditional political parties on the left-right continuum or the mass media which creates a space for alternative, protest and single-issue movements such as the Pirates' file-sharing platform to appear and gain attention within national politics.

Also Finland places high on the Cosmopolitanism Index and testifies to similar developments. Finland is a country that in many terms is as close to Sweden as possible. Aside from sharing a border, many features of the society, economy, culture, politics and law closely resemble each other, not least because the two small countries were one for several centuries until 1809. Information Society policies have been prioritized but differences exist; Sweden opted to fund its broadband network using public expenditures, whereas Finland chose a market-led approach (Eskelinen, Frank & Hirvonen 2008). In these two sparsely populated countries, the consequences of these policy choices are seen in average broadband download speed (Table 1). Finland, on the other hand, was one of the first countries to extend universal access obligations to Internet Service Providers, a policy which has been referred to as a "right" to Internet access.

Sweden and Finland joined the European Union at the same time together with Austria in 1995. Germany and France, founding members of the European Community, did not emphasize what would become EU Information Society priorities in their own national policy-making. Expenditures in IT infrastructure and information services in these two large and powerful countries lagged considerably behind in the late 1990s, as compared to Sweden and Finland (Jorgenson & Wu 2001, 86). After adopting comprehensive digital strategies in the mid-2000s, they have since caught up their Northern European counterparts. Table 1 illustrates the correlation of Internet access and cosmopolitanism among the countries in our comparison.

The histories of the Swedish, Finnish and German Pirate Parties have already been described in the previous chapter. The French Pirate Party (PP-FR), also inspired by the Swedish pirates, was founded in 2006 only nine days before the controversial renewal of French copyright law DADVSI (*Loi sur le Droit d'Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la Société de l'Information*, 2006/961) was passed by the French Parliament (PP-

FR, 2012). The DADVSI law amended French copyright law to implement the European Copyright Directive (2001/29/EC).³ The founders of PP-FR were concerned that the new law would introduce fines for illegal file-sharing and challenge the right to make private copies of music and video. Although the law inspired activists to launch the French Pirate Party, the movement did not gain popular support. Between 2007 and 2009, two short-lived competing pirate parties were founded but were later included in the PP-FR. PP-FR was not officially registered as a Party until 2009, when they also participated in the regional elections in Yvelines, with little success.

The Czech Republic, until 1993 a part of Czechoslovakia, joined the EU in 2004. Like in other East and Central European countries, the development of telecommunications and the Internet in the Czech Republic has been uneven (Vartanova 2002). In recent years, however, access to the Internet has improved to reach nearly three quarters of households, slightly below the EU average of 79 % (2013). Of the former socialist societies, the Czech Republic ranks the highest on the Cosmopolitanism Index (24th), although Hungary is close behind (26th).

The rapid dissemination of ideas through the Internet has allowed for the take-up of Pirate ideas outside Northern Europe in less cosmopolitan and less open societies. Czech Pirates came closest to gaining a seat after the German pirates in the European Parliament. The Czech pirates received 4.78 % of the vote, just under the national five percent threshold. On the other hand, the success of the PP-CZ has been enough to qualify for public funding. PP-CZ was registered in 2009 after having assembled in just two days over 1,000 names needed to qualify for registration as a political party. The Czech Pirate Party entered state and regional elections campaigning for privacy and civil liberties. Support for the Pirate Party in the Czech Republic is, however, often attributed to a general disillusionment about politics among young people rather than identification with pirate issues (pp-international.net, 2010).

The brief overview above shows that, despite local and national factors shaping the emergence of Pirate Parties, the tightening copyright enforcement regulation required by European Directives has been a common denominator in the policy environment which informs the founding of the five Pirate Parties in our case study. In the following sections we will analyze whether file-sharing and demand for copyright reform continue to be central information policy programs for the Pirate Parties, and how privacy, surveillance, and anti-censorship have competed for attention among a host of other policy problems.

3.3 MATERIAL AND METHODS

Political parties as groups do not hold values as such to be measured. They do, however, as organizational actors possess principles, beliefs, doctrines, taken-for-granted cognitive structures, scripts and schema which can be analyzed (Scott 2014). Principles and beliefs held by political parties are commonly expressed in party manifestos or programs. In the sense that Pirate Party manifestos are developed and

3 The Copyright Directive is also known as the Information Society Directive.

approved by consensus, unlike most research relying on interviews they can be treated as representative. As most of the programs are available online and might be revised on the basis of regular meetings, the dates of publication indicate when the core of the program was accepted by the members.

The analysis of the programs and other research material combines features of positivist, interpretative and critical approaches to the analysis of documents (Jupp & Norris 1993). First, the empirical analysis is structured according to the thematic content of the programs, in other words, the enumeration of the core issues mentioned in the programs and presented in the next section. Secondary sources are used to interpret and critically evaluate the various meanings inherent in the documents regarding the issues mentioned, which are treated as products of social construction and the interplay of social and cultural conflict, power, control and ideology. These secondary sources are previous research, in particular Burkart's (2014) comprehensive research on pirate politics, news media articles as well as online documents, such as blogs and interviews, and campaign material related to the 2014 European elections.

3.4 BASIC FEATURES OF PIRATE POLICY PROGRAMS

The programs of the Pirate Parties vary in structure and length. In most cases the core concerns are spelled out in a separate manifesto or declaration of principles.

The Swedish pirates' program consists of two parts: the program of principles (*principprogram*) and the party program. The program of principles is the party's ideological guide. It is highly technocratic and focuses heavily on information technology and its supposed democratic potential. Instead of focusing on a broader set of principles that would also extend to the online sphere, the principles are primarily focused on internet issues, such as the right to privacy online and access to knowledge and culture, which can also be applicable to the offline world. The three main topics listed in the program of principles are the right to privacy, the right to free culture and equal participation.

Also the Finnish Pirate Party spells out its values in a one-page general program of principles. According to the most recent manifesto at the time of research (7 July 2014), PP-FI is a party with a focus on information society topics. The complete party program is divided into five parts, a general manifesto, an individual rights program, an information society program, an economic and social program as well as a program for European affairs. According to the broad party manifesto, the party values openness and liberty and defends the freedom of speech, privacy and justice. The party wishes to promote freedom of information by removing excessive copyright restrictions, abolishing the current patent system and by promoting the spread and openness of government and scientific data.

The German Pirates display their principles in the preamble of their program: "Informational self-determination, free access to knowledge and culture, and privacy protection are the pillars of the information society of the future. Only on this basis can a democratic global order emerge that guarantees social justice and self-determination."

PP-DE sees itself as part of a global political movement that wants to shape the above mentioned order to the benefit of all.

The Czech Pirate Party's program (2014) is divided into specific theme headings of which freedom of information seems to be most central. Citizen's rights and freedoms include privacy and freedom of expression, end of surveillance, transparent government, direct democracy, and abolishing monopolies. PP-CZ freely admits on their website that important parts of their program are directly copied from PP-SE.

In the introduction of what the French Pirate Party (PP-FR) stands for the party's top priorities are listed as 1) copyright reform and the free diffusion of culture as well as patent reform, 2) the right to privacy and data protection, 3) freedom of expression and 4) increased democratic transparency with the help of new technology. Apart from these primary areas of concern, the party stresses civic liberties. The party programs clearly demonstrate that while the Pirate Parties have chosen to broaden their agenda, their core interests still lie in advancing communication rights (see Annex I).

In the following chapter we present an overview of the key features of the Pirate communication policy platform as it is constructed from the political manifestos of the five Pirate Parties. (A more focused comparison of the programs in relation to the unity of digital rights is presented in Jääsaari & Hildén 2015).

3.5 KEY ISSUES: COPYRIGHT, PATENTS AND FILE-SHARING

IPR and copyright reform has often been defined as the most central concerns of pirate politics. The propositions for IPR reform could be divided into three different categories: copyright, patents and file-sharing. The Pirates' stand on these issues form the main dimensions of the Pirates' access policy.

According to the programs the Pirates' starting point is that all forms of IPR are violations of the principle of freedom of information. The exception to the rule is the protection of author's rights. The Pirates accept the idea that ideas also have "authors" who should be credited, but reject that someone could profit and claim ownership over an idea. For example, the Swedish Pirate Party still recognizes authors' rights, but they wish to limit the protection of those rights up to five years, renewable up to twenty years (PP-SE 2013, 54). Other reforms that the Parties make regarding copyright include the automatic release of economic rights if the right holder fails to use them after a specific time period and the rejection of restrictions to copying, including the use of DRM and other copy protection technologies. Pirates are for the removal of the so-called cassette levy, which was an innovative European policy solution to 'illegal' copying.

Prior to the formation of the party, the activists associated with the Swedish activist network the Piracy Bureau (Piratbyrå) broadened the agenda from file-sharing to the detrimental effect of patents (Lindgren & Linde 2012, 149). On the one hand, patents were seen as an example of Western neo-colonialism, especially so in the case of pharmaceutical patents. On the other hand, the dismissal of patents is perceived as a way to promote disruptive innovation in software and science communities. The

first line of argumentation follows a humanitarian logic while the second one is more associated with the pirate constituency who supports the idea of open source software.

The Pirates oppose the current IPR regime and its national and international implementations. As already noted, file-sharing was a founding issue. The Swedish Pirate Party, which all of the current Pirate parties are more or less modeled upon, was formed as a protest against criminalizing online file-sharing (e.g. Ilshammar 2010). It may be noted that there is some disagreement as to what extent illegal file-sharing can be defined as copyright infringement on a commercial scale (Agarwal 2010, 798).

Moreover, a shift in emphasis on file-sharing has taken place and it no longer occupies the central stage. Interestingly, the PP-SE has distanced itself from piracy in the original sense; the party prefers to talk about “culture sharing” instead of online piracy or even file-sharing. This does not apply to the other Pirate Parties but nevertheless file-sharing is only one issue among others. Regardless of slight differences in emphases on specific policies, the Pirates demand a wholesale reform of the current IPR regime. The Pirates advocate the institutionalization of crowd and open source licensing where copying and sharing for non-commercial use is allowed for if compensated. (Jääsaari & Hildén 2015).

3.6 RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The right to privacy became a policy landmark in the various Pirate platforms. Over time, it became clear that few people were actually going to be prosecuted because of file-sharing offences, and rights holders rarely targeted casual file-sharers. The battle against surveillance for private purposes had not ceased, but building a political agenda on the opposition of an idea without factual examples to oppose proved difficult. To some extent, the advent of the so-called FRA law in Sweden (2009), which allowed for state surveillance of internet traffic (among other things), created a new platform for pirate politics. The right to privacy was no longer simply threatened by invasive copyright enforcement, but also states that wished to control their citizens. What is also noteworthy is that the Pirates in Sweden, Germany and Finland focus to a lesser extent on copyright enforcement or even online privacy, and increasingly emphasize general privacy rights without online applications.

The Pirates have raised the question whether the state is acting in the best interest of its citizens. In the Nordic countries, expectations of privacy and protection of personal data guaranteed by the state still prevail, even though they have proved to rest on a partly unrealistic basis. Pirates and other digital rights advocacy groups along with data-protection authorities have raised these issues, but the general public has not demanded prompt action. The situation thus far has not created a strong incentive for governments concerned about competition to actively influence digital privacy policy formation on the European Union level on behalf of their citizens. This has left the stage open for corporate lobbyists. The strong cultural industries present in France and the U.K have undoubtedly influenced stringent national copyright enforcement policy in these countries as well as on the European level. The indifference of policy makers

in the face of digital privacy issues until Snowden's revelations has paved the way for pirate politics.

Pirate Parties could have addressed privacy and especially the issue of state surveillance at a much earlier stage. The European Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), which required the retention of telecommunications metadata, came into force already in 2006. However, the Directive did not give rise to widespread protests until national implementation was an issue, which exemplifies how pirate politics to a large extent are country-specific, despite claims to be a global movement. Also noteworthy is that the Swedish Pirate Party is the only party which has expressed its concern with how today's social networking sites (SNS) and smartphone applications collect, use and sell data on their users.

3.7 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

According to Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2012/C 326/02) "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. 2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected." Despite the strong protection freedom of expression enjoys in European and national constitutions, the Pirates see that this right is not respected. There are some differences as to whether freedom of expression is approached in terms of an overriding principle or more in terms of concrete policy demands - or both. Nevertheless the freedom of expression is one of the core values of Pirate policies.

Pirates fiercely oppose all attempts to restrict freedom of speech, especially by the state. The Internet has become the most important tool for the application of freedom of speech and therefore all restrictions on freedom of speech are rejected as a rule. The Parties are against censorship, which is defensible only in cases where individuals are under serious threat, as explained by the Finnish Pirate Party . However, the German Pirate Party program is less explicit on freedom of expression than PP-FI. Instead, PP-DE stresses freedom of culture and knowledge. PP-DE states that access to digital communications is never to be inhibited, and like the Czech and the Finnish demand that adequate quality and speed must be ensured as a prerequisite. Targeted blocking or bandwidth restrictions impose unacceptable restrictions on both service providers and customers.

Freedom of expression is inevitably tied to concerns about privacy, which is in turn often connected to copyright enforcement issues. This is apparent in the programs of the Swedish, French and the Czech Pirates. While the Swedish Pirates make a special mention of protecting freedom of expression as a means to assure that everybody can get their voice heard, also anonymously, promoting the technical means of communication and the protection of privacy come first (PP-SE 2012). Following the condemnation of whistleblowing sites by governments, leading to the extended retreat of Julian Assange and Edward Snowden, each of the parties demand protection of whistleblowers. The

Swedish Pirates advocate the immunity of hosting services (mere conduit) and an extended impunity of transmission (*meddelarfrihet*) also to bloggers and citizen journalists.

The Czech Pirate Party in turn pays homage to pirate practices flourishing in times of communication scarcity, propaganda and censorship during the socialist era. They advocate the freedom to study information share it and process it, and share the acquired knowledge. PP-CZ (2014) sees that the Internet contributes to the gradual transformation of individuals from “passive person-receivers to person-transmitters.” According to their own analysis, Pirates have completed this transformation leading to active information seeking from independent sources and sharing. PP-CZ interestingly also takes issue with media diversity, declaring that publicly funded media should represent all points of view and not only those of the politicians sitting on their boards (PP-CZ, 2014).

In terms of more concrete policies, unrestricted access to Internet, net-neutrality and anonymity best ensure freedom of speech according to European pirates. The Finnish Pirates, for example, state that the principle of net neutrality should be maintained and operators should not be forced to police Internet use (PP-FI, 2013b). Net-neutrality is also important for the German Pirate Party: all users and services must be treated equally to allow use of the Internet to the fullest extent. According to the German Pirate Party’s manifesto, discrimination against individuals promotes the creation of monopolies and restrict the Internet’s innovative potential and lead to restrictions of free speech (PP-DE, 2012). PP-DE specifically demands a prohibition of Deep Packet Inspection.

3.8 AN EXPANDING PLATFORM

The Pirates have often been criticized for their narrow focus on Internet issues and their technologically determinist view of society. On the other hand, the deliberate and consensus-seeking form of decision-making easily contributes to the broadening of the programs. While the mainstay of the political platform is still clearly communication rights and the right to privacy, the Pirates place more importance on culture and individual autonomy. The emphasis on individual freedom and an anti-authoritarian attitude expressed in the policies for copyright, privacy and freedom of expression extends from anywhere from decentralizing energy-infrastructure to relaxing drug and alcohol legislation.

The expanding platform threatens on occasion to dilute the focus on digital user rights. The Pirates take issue on a range of topics that can only be understood from a pragmatic necessity to respond to a wider set of political problems than was the case when Pirates made an entry to the political scene (see Annexes II and III). Apart from the aforementioned core issues, the political programs of the five Pirate Parties address a wide number of topics ranging from education to health care, some of which are only relevant in the national context, such as the Czech Pirate Party’s proposal to implement a new governance structure for publicly financed media in order to combat corruption

and bias (PP-CZ, 2014), and the Finnish Pirate Party's initiative to abolish compulsory military service (PP-FI, 2013b).

3.9 CONCLUSIONS

Despite variations in structure and length, the party programs display the core issues of the Pirate movement. Both pirates and their critics have operated on the presumption that the three fundamental components of digital rights, free speech, privacy and access form a single unity (Burkart 2014, 151-152). As we have confirmed in a previously published article (Jääsaari & Hildén 2015), these three issues are still an important part of European pirate politics. Nevertheless, Pirates in different countries are departing from these and other foundational issues and seeking a broader profile. Today, the political agenda of European Pirate Parties is a wide program for modernization going beyond previously narrow technical policies. While traditional Pirate issues—file-sharing, intellectual property and copyright questions, privacy and data protection—remain on the agenda, national Pirate Parties are connecting them with a general cosmopolitan defense of civil liberties and human rights on the one hand, and with particular national and local concerns, on the other hand (Jääsaari & Hildén 2015).

The analysis of policy platforms shows that the focus of the five Parties in question is drifting away from emphasizing single issues like copyright towards more embracing goals related to self-determination, such as privacy, freedom of communication and promotion of cultural expression (Jääsaari & Hildén 2015). According to their own understanding, Pirates have never promoted the total abolishment of copyright but aim for a more just and fair system that does not criminalize technological innovation, creativeness and sharing for private use, and does not penalize the widespread cultural practices of an entire generation (e.g., Apajalahti & Sotala 2010). Pirates see themselves as a civilizing movement: their mission is to alert and educate citizens and policy-makers in recognizing that the freedoms of civil society are useful and meaningful also in cyberspace.

The cultural shift theory provides a compelling explanation for the strengthening emphasis on such non-Internet related issues such as social welfare, drug policy, LGBT rights and education in the party programs not only in Sweden but also in the other countries that were the focus of this research. Analysts of the pirate movement have emphasized the cosmopolitan sentiments that its supporters share, going against the grain of certain nationalist, anti-Europe, and anti-immigration attitudes prevalent in Europe politics in recent years (Andersson Schwarz 2014; Burkart 2014).

The manifestoes reflect the concerns of the predominately young and well-educated leadership of the Pirate Parties. Pirates have been included among the transnational movements which have been labeled as “rooted cosmopolitanism” (see e.g. Tarrow 2005). Pirate Parties have been treated as an extension of a social movement which in their focus on “cultural environmentalism” can be compared to the Greens in their early days (Burkart 2014). Like the Greens, participation in national elections has shown

the Pirates that they need to address a wider range of issues to attract voters. The question is whether the broadening of the Pirate agenda reflects political shrewdness, a maturing of the parties and or simply indecision about which way to take. Placing more emphasis on the promotion of vaguely defined areas such as culture is a reflection of this ambiguity.

As proponents of the cultural shift theory remind us, however, modernization is not linear, and economic factors contribute to the shaping of individual values (Inglehart & Baker 2000, Inglehart & Welzel 2010, Welzel 2013). The present economic downturn may affect the outlook of the young generation and strengthen more conservative values. The conflicts relating to the line of the party as in the German case outlined in the first section may be an indicator of this change.

4 DISCUSSION: THE PIRATE PARTY IS DEAD: LONG LIVE PIRATE POLITICS?

The Pirate Party, first launched in Sweden in 2006, has grown into a global network of organizations championing digital user rights and freedom of information. Today there are national Pirate Parties on all continents, and an international clearing house, the Pirate Parties International (PPI) (PP-International.net, 2009). European Pirate Parties have formed a European Pirate Party (PPEU) (PPEU, 2014).

The support for the Pirate Party in the late 2000s has demonstrated that participation in music and media sharing contains a political ideology with a force to mobilize a generation of Internet users in several countries (see, e.g., Miegel & Olsson 2008; Andersson & Snickars 2010; Löblich & Wendelin 2012; Burkart 2014). However, it is far from clear if this is enough to sustain a long-lasting political movement.

Although the Pirates achieved wide publicity with their new political agenda focusing on access, freedom of speech and information privacy during the late 2000s, the novelty of these issues soon waned and the Pirates have had to fight for publicity. Despite the urgency concerning fundamental rights in the digital realm, and also of the fact that a growing number of citizens are critical of private and public surveillance policies, widespread concerns about safeguarding privacy has not translated into support for Pirate Parties. As the result of the European Elections 2014 and national elections demonstrate, information issues are not first on the minds of European citizens anxious about declining economy and safety.

A comprehensive focus on digital rights has been both a weakness and a strength of Pirate parties. By taking part in elections Pirate Parties have forced the responsible news media to acknowledge their political goals and take them seriously at least on some occasion. Overall, however, the Pirates operate in the margins of mainstream publicity and are confined in their own communicative spaces. Some Pirates prefer it that way as shown in the case of the Swedish Pirates who chose to appeal to voters on the grounds of (technical) expertise instead of ideology.

Regardless of their rejection by European voters, Pirate Parties have nevertheless already made a significant contribution to information and communication policy-making in Europe. The Pirate Parties have politicized issues that have previously been considered outside politics (Fredriksson 2015). The contribution of pirate politics to European information society policy has been raising awareness of privacy gaps in information and occasionally, providing alternatives for erasing them. Pirate Party members and pirate activists in Sweden, Germany and Finland have contributed actively to mainstream public debate with books, critical opinion-pieces and appearances on television and radio. Pirate Party members have raised issues of information society

and digital rights into the mainstream news from the economy and technology sections where they were previously discussed only by experts among themselves.

Pirates have raised awareness among policy-makers across the political spectrum as well as among the general public about the excesses of copyright enforcement and the pitfalls of policy laundering. The questions that the Pirate Parties have campaigned for, such as freedom of speech, net-neutrality and copyright reform have been taken up by decision-makers, courts and mainstream political parties (Geere, 2014; Markakis, 2014). The Pirates' proposal for copyright reform was adopted by the Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament as its group position in September 2011. On the national level, the Pirate Parties have pushed established political parties especially in Northern Europe to rethink their positions and practices regarding Internet governance and regulation. There have been many cases of this, such as the data retention protests in Germany, the opposition to the implementation of graduated response (the 'Three Strikes Rules') in France, The Pirate Bay trials in Sweden, opposition towards new copyright enforcement and privacy legislation in Finland (Löblich & Wendelin 2012; Burkart 2014; Miegel & Olsson 2008; Hintikka 2008; Jääsaari 2012).

The wave of protest against ACTA, which spread through Europe in winter 2012, brought attention to the proliferation of groups and networks organized around Internet freedoms and Internet user rights. Protecting openness and free speech online is a moral and political project for the Pirates, which they share with cyberliberties and communication rights activists, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Internet Society, European Digital Rights Initiative (EDRI), La Quadrature du Net, Chaos Computer Club and many others (e.g., Mueller, Kuerbis & Pagé 2007; Mueller 2010; Burkart 2014). Thus pirate politics refers to but is not limited to the Pirate Party. Pirate politics can be viewed more broadly as a movement to confront and challenge the basic values and guiding principles underlying present legislation and policy-making. Piracy is a spontaneous response to a malfunctioning market that embodies a potential critique of that market and the property regimes that it upholds (Fredriksson 2015). The Pirates' cultural defense of digital user rights has parallels with questions that media and communication policy researchers are grappling with.

Academic researchers have discussed the emergence of a new policy paradigm in recent years which emphasizes industrial policy instead of social and cultural policy goals typical for the old normative "public service policy paradigm." This involves subordination of political and cultural issues to considerations of technology and economy (van Cuilenburg & McQuail 2003). Communication scholars have often seen themselves as among the few left defending a public interest oriented approach where democratic and cultural values are safeguarded against significant state and market intervention.

The analysis of the party manifestos in the second section indicates that academics are not alone in their defense on culture and public policy, although the Pirates do not express their alternative policies in those terms. The Pirates' political platform that on the one hand stresses the need for culture sharing and education and on the other hand emphasizes technological expertise reflects the changing relationship between the pragmatic and the normative. The quest for solutions for the dilemmas of the digital

age makes the legacy of the Pirate Party an interesting and relevant focus of continued research on the emergence and transfer of ideas on the policy agenda.

The European Science Foundation (ESF 2014, 39-40) lays out privacy and intellectual property issues as among the key research questions for the future:

What are the implications for privacy and the principles of democracy of the increasing use of new media technologies to facilitate everyday social transactions?

To what extent do different intellectual property regimes facilitate or impede different forms of creative agency?

Traditional Pirate issues—intellectual property and copyright questions, privacy and data protection and transparency are highly topical issues for media and communication research. Further research into pirate politics and other manifestations of digital communication rights is needed to shed light on the interaction of the pragmatic and the normative in media and communication policy making.

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Annex I: Party programs of the Swedish, Czech, French, German and Finnish Pirate Parties: communication rights.

Party	Filesharing	IPR and Copyright reform	
PP-SE	Decriminalize file sharing of copyright content, Publicly funded arts and media should be digitalised and shared. Culture as a public good: strong case for libraries, mandatory school libraries, a national digital library, "remixing" of culture".	Patents dismissed completely. No copyright for publicly funded work. Standard copyright protection period 5 years, possible to extend to 20. No copyright levy. Prohibition against DRM technologies. Quotes, remixes and parodies allowed for in music and film (similar provisions apply to texts).	
PP-FI	Filesharing without commercial intent should be unrestricted and not penalized, but encouraged. Culture is created through interaction - insane to claim that sharing is harmful. The value of culture is increased through sharing - so do creators ' opportunities to earn a living by producing culture.	Copyright law should encourage the creation of new culture. Abolish copyright levies. Make infringement damages reasonable. Copyright protection max 10 years. Move toward crowd and open access licensing, commercial use OK for paid compensation. Easier access to orphan works, republish works 15 years and older in archives. Patents: abolish current system. No to gene patents.	
PP-DE	No direct reference made, implied in copyright policy for non-commercial purposes	No restrictions on copying or use Rejection of DRM and copy protection technologies. Copying, providing access to, storing and using creative products for non-commercial purposes not just legalized, but actively promoted. A fair framework for the reintroduction of creative products into the public domain must be created: drastic reduction of copyright periods, far below the periods specified in the TRIPS agreement. Reform of the patent system.	

	Privacy and data protection	Freedom of expression
	<p>Abolish mass surveillance schemes (such as the FRA law).</p> <p>No CCTVs in schools.</p> <p>Foreign entities cannot handle sensitive information.</p> <p>Biobank information can only be used for its original purpose</p>	<p>Immunity of hosting services</p> <p>Extended "meddelarfrihet" to bloggers and citizen journalists.</p> <p>A new "whistleblower" law, which requires public officials to report maladministration to their supervisors as well as a separate authority.</p>
	<p>Raise level of privacy, confidentiality and anonymity in electronic communications to that of print communication.</p> <p>Right to privacy is a cornerstone of the constitution</p> <p>No to mass surveillance of citizens, including bioidentification registers. Existing registers not to be used in criminal investigations.</p> <p>Protection of communication privacy and potential misuse of data under data protection laws should be taken up in trade negotiations.</p> <p>The EU should protect a high standard of communication secrecy.</p>	<p>Everyone has the right to act anonymously or use a pseudonym instead of real name. Private services may restrict this, but not the state.</p> <p>Strong protection of sources.</p> <p>No to internet censorship by the state except under serious threat to individuals.</p> <p>Internet connections cannot be blocked without court order with sufficient cause.</p> <p>No restrictions on freedom of speech based on morality, religion or ethnicity.</p> <p>Voluntary age limits.</p> <p>Protection of net neutrality.</p>
	<p>Against a "monitored society"</p> <p>Right to privacy a crucial foundation for a democratic society.</p> <p>Right to anonymity: under no circumstances must the state be allowed to share personal data with private enterprises.</p> <p>Monitoring of citizens allowed only under evidence of crime to be committed.</p> <p>Privacy of mail correspondence must be expanded to include all forms of communication.</p> <p>Mass surveillance is a greater threat than terrorism.</p> <p>Centralized databases containing information on biometric data and genetic tests must be avoided.</p>	<p>Access to digital communications should never be inhibited.</p> <p>Adequate broadband quality and speed must be ensured.</p> <p>Targeted blocking or bandwidth restrictions impose unacceptable restrictions on service providers and customers.</p> <p>All users and services must be treated equally (net neutrality)</p> <p>Discrimination against individuals promotes the creation of monopolies, which restrict the Internet's innovative potential and leads to restrictions of free speech.</p> <p>No to DPI by state and operators</p> <p>Protection of whistleblowers</p>



Party	Filesharing	IPR and Copyright reform	
PP-FR	<p>Decriminalize filesharing without commercial goals.</p> <p>Public access to scientific results is strongly supported.</p> <p>Remove the graduated response mechanism (terminated in 2013).</p> <p>Unused works should be made available without copyright - if a rights holder does not make a product available within a time limit the rights will be lost.</p> <p>Remove the private copying levy (cassette levy).</p>	<p>Copyright reform and free diffusion of cultural goods.</p> <p>Renew the licensing system and make private copyright collectives public.</p> <p>Prohibition on patents on: algorithms and math, scientific methods, software, DNA, patented GMOs, drugs.</p> <p>Authorize "jailbreaking", including DRM technologies unless it compromises the safety of the appliance.</p> <p>Separate counterfeiting from other infringements of copyright.</p> <p>Create a separate law for plagiarism, independent of copyright.</p> <p>Create a collective licensing system.</p>	
PP-CZ	<p>"The illegal sharing of information has been very important in our history as it disrupted the monopoly on information of the totalitarian regimes."</p> <p>Freedom of information includes freedom of sharing</p>	<p>No explicit reference. Under international relations: "We will commence the negotiations with view to exit from the global treaties which enforce dysfunctional monopolies at the expense of developing countries as well as of our freedoms (ACTA, TRIPS). We will initiate a transparent re-examination of all other international treaties and obligations."</p>	

	Privacy and data protection	Freedom of expression
	<p>Preserve the right to anonymity and pseudonymity. Render the right to be forgotten effective. Remove the legal exception that prevents citizens to be removed from the French DNA database used by law enforcement. Solely the judiciary can approve of surveillance. Legalize all modes of encryption.</p>	<p>Access to the internet should be a fundamental right. Prohibition of internet filtering by intermediaries. Prohibition of automatized deletion of files.</p>
	<p>The Pirate Party concedes the natural right for private communication, its anonymity and encryption. Information saved about specific users should be provided to third parties only with permission of the user or on the base of court decision. Promote the concept of voluntary and free digital identity allowing to step out of anonymity Digital identity (e.g. an electronic signature or openID) simplifies the dealing with offices, signing petitions, shopping, on-line discussions and enable elections via Internet.</p>	<p>Freedom to study and put knowledge to use, share and process information and share the processed information No blocking, no filtering. Preservation of anonymity. Protection of whistleblowers.</p>

Annex II: Party programs of the Swedish, Czech, French, German and Finnish Pirate Parties: Democracy, Environment & Economy.

Party	Democracy and public administration	
PP-SE	<p>Stronger access to information rights</p> <p>Replace the 4 % threshold with a 2 % threshold in the voting system</p> <p>Vote eligibility at 15</p> <p>Lower the state subsidy threshold for political parties from 2.5 % to 0.3 % of the vote in the parliamentary elections.</p> <p>Research and work funded with public funds should be made accessible to all.</p>	
PP-FI	<p>Transparency, equality and autonomy are the key to good government.</p> <p>ICT offers excellent means to lower the threshold to participation in decision-making.</p> <p>Cut bureaucracy and the power of public authorities and give people more choice in their lives.</p> <p>Change system of party subsidies to one according to votes instead of number of MPs and extended to parties outside of parliament.</p> <p>Promotion of participatory democracy, lower the no. of signatures for citizen initiative to 20 000 (from 50 000).</p> <p>Introduction of citizen question/inquiry in parliament and district council.</p> <p>Change freedom of association law, government officials may reject an associations' statutes only in clearly illegal cases.</p>	
PP-DE	<p>Broad participation of all citizens in the design and supervision of social processes.</p> <p>Transparency of state and all government processes.</p> <p>Open contracts with businesses.</p>	
PP-FR	<p>Governmental transparency through technological means.</p> <p>The FPP uses liquid democracy, based on the system introduced by the German pirates.</p> <p>Calls for stronger democratic involvement, anti-MNC</p> <p>Remove voting machines.</p> <p>Limit the amount of successive mandates in politics as well as being elected on several levels (local, national, European).</p> <p>Information on public officials' expenses should be published.</p> <p>Adopt the Swedish right of access to public information.</p>	
PP-CZ	<p>Direct democracy: direct election of high level state officials and managers, citizens' legislative initiative, binding referenda.</p> <p>Assisted public administration centres, support also personal meetings of engaged citizens.</p> <p>Promote the concept of voluntary and free of charge digital identity which can be used in e-elections</p>	

	Environment	Economy
	<p>More research on biofuels. Stronger protection of rain forests. Technique neutral electricity production; i.e. No ban on nuclear power. Cheap power for consumers instead of profits for state-owned corporations. More public transportation.</p>	<p>Abolish import tolls in Sweden and the EU Increased responsibility of banks Mortgages should be repaid Regulate concentration of online service providers. Better infrastructure: should be owned by the state but services provided by commercial operators. More resources for research.</p>
	N/A	<p>Balanced state budget. Abolish most direct subsidies to industry and agriculture. Simplify taxation - less deductions. Reorganization of service infrastructure for health and social services, from municipality towards a regional service. State-funding not to be used for blackmailing universities.</p>
	<p>Sustainability, renewable energy in decentralized energy-infrastructure, 'Driver-licence free' society Better public transport networks</p>	<p>An economic order based on liberty, fairness and sustainability instead of solely growth indicators. Consumer protection: oblige producers and service providers to publicize information on products and production processes.</p>
	<p>Sustainability, critique against the capitalist exploitation of natural resources and unlimited consumption. Favour alternatives to nuclear energy and renewable energy in general.</p>	<p>Keep internet infrastructure and hosting services separate</p>
	<p>Involve citizens in making decisions about environment by means of direct democracy. Recycling development of public transport innovative and decentralized energy policy valuation of mineral resources, ecological development of towns and villages. Targeted value-added tax for negative impacts Tax exemptions for frugal technologies such as recycled packaging, electric cars.</p>	<p>Not available in English. Includes "business freedom", educational economics, financial system, taxation system and agriculture Investments in internet infrastructure, quick and affordable Internet connection.</p>

Annex III: Party programs of the Swedish, Czech, French, German and Finnish Pirate Parties: Health, Employment, LGBT and Other issues.

Party	Health care	Employment and Education	
PP-SE	<p>Health care for undocumented immigrants</p> <p>Freedom of choice between healthcare providers</p> <p>Increased resources to psychiatric care;</p> <p>Right to access healthcare data and data access logs available to patients,</p> <p>Right to refuse medical treatment.</p> <p>More resources for elderly care.</p> <p>Non-medicinal circumcision of infants should be banned.</p>	<p>Study grants for unemployed</p> <p>Financial assistance for employers that allow for paid further education</p> <p>All benefit systems should be under the state and gradually the system should move towards basic minimum income.</p> <p>Possibility to do voluntary work without running the risk of losing unemployment benefits.</p>	
PP-FI	<p>Freedom of choice for the individual</p> <p>Relax alcohol and drug laws, lower the taxes and introduce alternative schemes for reducing harmful effects on society.</p> <p>Privacy must be protected.</p> <p>Good death -allow passive euthanasia upon individual's request.</p>	<p>Basic income model.</p> <p>Employment for youth.</p> <p>Education should remain free</p>	
PP-DE	<p>Centered around patient benefit.</p> <p>Efficient organization of health care system, financed through solidary contributions.</p> <p>Drug and addiction policy based on guidance and help instead of punishment.</p>	<p>Goal of full employment outdated.</p> <p>Promote a legal minimum wage on the federal level.</p> <p>Abolishment of compulsory membership in chambers and associations.</p> <p>Stronger rights in the global market for people in less industrialized countries.</p> <p>Pension reform.</p> <p>Extensive educational policy: free access to educational institutions, media skills should be taught</p>	
PP-FR	<p>Preserve the right to abortion,</p> <p>Guarantee equitable health care</p>	N/A	
PP-CZ	<p>Widely accessible healthcare</p> <p>transparent financing (corruption biggest problem with healthcare),</p> <p>Cooperation between institutions, schools, public research institutes, insurance companies.</p> <p>Privacy protection</p>	N/A	

	LGBT	Other
	<p>Same sex marriages in Sweden and the EU, Abolishment of forced sterilisation in order to do a sex change, Abolish sex as a legal term, LGBT couples should be given equal access to in vitro fertilisation and the right to adopt. Polygamy should be allowed.</p>	
	<p>Gender neutral marriage. Abolishment of gender categorization in law -right to self determine and change gender or refuse to define gender. Abolish forced sterilization connected with sex change.</p>	<p>Voluntary conscription/military service extended to all regardless of sex or religion. Legalize prostitution</p>
	<p>Promote self- determination of gender and sexual orientation, also world wide. No to collection of gender information, Abolish law requiring to give children gender-specific names, Routine sex assignment surgery for intersexual children to be prohibited.</p>	<p>Give all people the chance to participate in culture, free of financial, social, geographical, demographic, intellectual or physical barriers. Culture as a pluralistic, participatory good which arises from collaboration and multiple, equally valued influences.</p>
	N/A	N/A
	<p>Free self-determination of gender and sexual identity. Abolish the requirement to declare one's gender on official documents whenever it is not relevant. International decriminalization of homosexuality.</p>	<p>The right to broadband ought to be included among basic human rights.</p>

