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Riina Yrjölä

The Global Politics of Celebrity Humanitarianism

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is a critical examination of discourses surrounding Bob Geldof's and Bono's humanitarian action in Africa. Rather than examining whether or not this celebrity humanitarian activity is instrumental or detrimental to African development, the purpose of this study is to bring into fore how the contemporary celebrity humanitarian intelligibilities and imaginaries are premised upon a violent colonial impulses that limit, distribute and govern African space, bodies and history with overdetermining constitution of identity/difference.

To inaugurate this critical methodological and theoretical framework that historicizes and politicizes celebrity humanitarianism discourses, I turn towards Michel Foucault's and Frantz Fanon's writings on violence/representation and freedom/thought. First, engaging with Foucault's formulations of critique as a historical method of inquiry, outlined both in his archaeological and genealogical analysis, representations and discourses are identified as complex spatiotemporal technologies of normalization, intervention and governance. And second, by exploring Fanon's conceptualization of colonialism as pure violence that operates through monopolized and universalized Western humanity, post/colonialism is addressed as intelligibility that conditions and effects overdetermined difference at the level of African subjectivity and reality.

The work argues that Bono's and Bob Geldof's humanitarian agency and subjectivity is underpinned with particular reproduction of Westerner's racial superiority - capacity and ability to master themselves and others. This negotiation of identity culminates in the cementation of celebrities and "Africa" into assumed spaces and subject positions in the world politics. In these humanitarian imaginaries "Africa" emerges at the same time as a place of Hell where the humanitarian values that underpin the progressive and modern liberal societies are not applied, as well as Westerners' naturalized Home, constituted with nostalgic discourses of shared "pastness" and harmony.

The work offers the first empirically grounded analysis to the celebrity humanitarian representations in Africa. Furthermore by revealing how celebrity humanitarian representations are underpinned with the violently overdetermining colonial intelligibility and imaginary, it presents sustained critique that calls to question the emancipatory potential of this activity.

Keywords: celebrity, humanitarianism, Africa, colonialism, discourses

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Hongkongissa, 20.4.2014
Riina Yrjölä

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

> Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very strong. When they are presented with evidence that works against that belief, the new evidence cannot be accepted. It would create a feeling that is extremely uncomfortable, called cognitive dissonance. And because it is so important to protect the core belief, they will rationalize, ignore and even deny anything that doesn't fit in with the core belief
> - Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*

In the past two decades, several Western celebrities have become a visible part of various development and humanitarian advocacy campaigns aimed at eliminating, or rather ending, the widespread and deepening poverty in the African continent. This humanitarianism that today constitutes a central part of the mediatised humanitarian imaginary**,** is not an entirely new phenomenon, but is in keeping with the trends of post WWII liberal internationalism and development. Indeed, already in the 1950s the United Nations (UN) began to use Western celebrities like Danny Kaye and Audrey Hepburn as its "goodwill ambassadors" and "messengers of peace" to advocate the universal validity of the liberal values of openness, responsibility and democratic peace, in order to create a more peaceful, prosperous and just World.

Today, not only are several Western celebrities affiliated with the UN or the campaigns of other Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but they have also begun to set up their own organizations, academies and projects aimed at bettering the lives of "the impoverished and disadvantaged" in Africa. These projects include, to name a few, U2 singer Bono's economic initiative "Product Red" which "fights" AIDS in Africa through private sector engagements, Madonna's "Raising Malawi" project which "fosters change" in that country and Oprah Winfrey's "Leadership Academy for Girls in South Africa," which aims to develop a new generation of female leaders who, "by virtue of their education and service, will lead the charge to transform themselves, their communities, and the larger world around them" in South Africa.[1]

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1 www.joinred.com,www.raisingmalawi.org/pages/about; www.owla.co.za/values.htm

This celebrity ”diplomacy”, ”politics”, ”activism” or ”advocacy” (e.g. Cooper 2008; Street 2004; Tsaliki, Frangonikolopoulos and Huliars 2011) has also received increasing attention in recent years among political scientists who have argued on the positive role and function of celebrities in the framework of global activism, or criticized the accuracy, accountability or legitimacy of the developmental policies they promote towards Africa. Questions have been raised over whether celebrities are qualified political actors or not. Do their campaigns, like Live Aid and Product Red, do more harm than good? Are their efforts sincere or are they merely seeking positive publicity by plunging into philanthropic fads?

These polemical questions regarding whether celebrities should or should not speak of African problems, or whether some are more qualified than others and why, have often been backed up by normative assumptions on how the world system operates and what is the best course of action for its improvement.

Moreover, within this oppositional for-or-against setup, it is not just celebrities that are subject to evaluation; rather, these problematizations also involve processes of subjectivization (cf. Butler 1997: 107), not only on the suitability of celebrities as political actors, but also concerning the authentic status quo of the African Other. For example, Easterly (2007) has asked whether celebrities can “really explain Africa,” as they “like to portray it as a basket case, but ignore its very real progress.” On the other hand, coming from a more positive angle, Andrew F. Cooper has argued that celebrity diplomacy “emphasizes global reach in terms of problem solving, pushing for activity when and where is needed” (Cooper 2008: 3).

Preoccupied with mainstream Anglo-American research methodologies’ search for ”truth”, the contemporary debate, in which celebrities have been seen as either instrumental or detrimental to African development, is at an impasse. This deadlock, I argue, relates essentially to the absence of critical investigations into the ways celebrity humanitarian representations condition, shape and effect intelligibilities within the wider discursive structures of Western spectacular and compassionate humanitarian world politics (cf. Aaltola 2009). Exemplified by mainstream political research methodologies that equate knowledge with external appearances, it is in fact the case that no empirical research on celebrity humanitarian representations and their unfolding imaginaries and intelligibilities on Africa exist today. It seems, then, that as these campaigns are perceived as fundamentally moral, questioning the justness of this humanitarian action seems difficult, if not impossible – not only for the general public, but for the majority of political scientists as well (cf. Douzinas 2007: 19).

Consequently, not only is celebrity humanitarianism often framed as beneficial practice in contemporary research, even though the debate on “correct” betterment of life prevails. But also, by validating Westerners as naturalized world leaders who take action when and where it is ”needed,” and in so doing reducing Africans to invisibility, the research has been itself partly complicit in reproducing the colonial logic of exclusion and opposition through which celebrity humanitarianism has become depoliticized and de-historicized.

It is this prevailing academic standoff and its limited vision of the ”political” which has failed to address the subjugating and overdetermining celebrity humanitarian African representations infused with constitution of identity/difference, this thesis aims to address, examine and reveal. In order to establish this methodological and theoretical challenge to the “colonial IR” (Agathangelou and Ling 2004) and its source of knowledge production that underwrites the majority of celebrity humanitarianism research today, I formulate two critical openings. Firstly, harnessing Michel Foucault's writings on the interlinked relations between violence and intelligibility, I approach the representations and discourses associated with celebratity humanitarianism as complex spatiotemporal technologies of normalization, intervention and governance. And secondly, by exploring Frantz Fanon's descriptions on colonialism as pure violence, I address (post)colonialism as a contingent intelligibility, a discursive practice that conditions and effects overdetermined spatial and temporal differences at the level of African subjectivity, agency and reality.

In this regard, instead of searching for the truth of celebrity humanitarianism, in this thesis my aim is to historicize and politicize the celebrity truth itself by exposing how this humanitarianism, as a moral economy, in underscored and haunted by colonial logic of difference. Therefore, at the heart of this reading is a consideration of how celebrity humanitarian representations limit, distribute and govern spaces, bodies and their histories. Accordingly, by analysing ”matters of borders and territories, identities, voices and bodies and their positions in space and time” (Opondo and Shapiro 2012: 4), to disrupt the narrow scope of the political found within the dominant thought-worlds of contemporary celebrity humanitarian theorizations.

The case studies in this thesis are Bob Geldof and Bono—two of the most prominent and celebrated contemporary celebrity humanitarians in the Western media. My research material consists of the salient media articles between January 2002 and December 2008 which reported on their humanitarian work in Africa, searched using the keywords “Geldof Africa” or “Bono Africa.”[2] In addition, some other articles outside this time period have been also quoted, specifically regarding news that reported the actions and arguments of Western politicians pertaining to African issues. For the primary media sources I selected two British news publishers: the *Daily Telegraph,* which is the leading daily broadsheet in the United Kingdom, and *BBC Online,* the most popular news website in the UK. In addition, *TIME* magazine, although it is a US source, has been in-

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2 In total I gathered 1,029 articles: 540 from the BBC Online (318 Geldof / 222 Bono), 139 from TIME (45 Geldof / 94 Bono) and 349 from The Telegraph (221 Geldof / 129 Bono). These numbers overlap, however: in many articles both Bono and Geldof were mentioned. As the material was gathered using separate search words for both individuals, several articles appear twice in statistics. Moreover, in many articles (especially in The Telegraph) Geldof's or Bono's activism in Africa was only briefly mentioned, constituting only a sideline of the overall story. These articles were included into the statistics, but excluded from analysis, if Geldof's and Bono's views were not quoted. For the final analysis, I selected 92 articles (66 BBC, 18 Telegraph, 8 TIME) that I felt encapsulated the main debates surrounding these two celebrities, especially with regards to their values, views and arguments, as well as assumptions ascribed to them.

cluded because it is one of the leading news weeklies in both the United Kingdom and Europe[3]. Furthermore in order to give due space to the voice and vision of Bono and Geldof, I have also included three books into the analysis: *Geldof in Africa* (2005), *On the Move* (2006) and *Bono on Bono* (2005)[4].

Analysing this material with the aim to reveal how contemporary celebrity humanitarian representations intersect with and appropriate violent cartographies, or "historically developed socially embedded interpretations of identity and space" (Shapiro 1997: 18), I examine two specific questions. Firstly, how Bob Geldof's and Bono's – the two most visible spokespersons representing Africa in the Western media – humanitarian agency and legitimacy is constituted in the Anglo-American media, and secondly, how "Africa" as a place and a purpose in the world system becomes produced through these discourses.

In particular, as a critique aimed to challenge institutionalized ways of knowing, using techniques of distancing and defamiliarization, this entails turning towards the conditions of possibility of the humanitarian subjectivity, agency and authority of these two celebrities: the particularities, characteristics and capacities of their authenticity, autonomy and humanity from which their legitimacy to act as global voices and faces of the African poor derives and develops. Accordingly, discussing how these celebrity humanitarian representations and discourses predicate ahistorical and depoliticized self-intelligibilities of Westerners eternal ability and need to support the weight of civilization and humanity within which Africa is appropriated and locked into a hellish cycle of disapproval and desire, anxiety and nostalgia.

I argue that the Bono's and Bob Geldof's humanitarian agency and subjectivity is constituted with historically embedded intelligibilities and imaginaries of identity/difference that are underpinned with particular reproductions of race, class and gender. On an individual level, these subjective characteristics reaffirm and propagate mythical imaginaries of Westerners' superior capability and duty to act as protectors and promoters of global humanity. On a global level, they define not only specific accounts of who can represent global humanity, but also how true humanitarianism is constituted. This negotiation of identity culminates in the cementation of celebrities and "Africa" into assumed spaces and subject positions in world politics. In these humanitarian imaginaries, "Africa" emerges at the same time as a place of Hell where the humanitarian values that underpin the progressive and modern liberal societies are not applied, but also as Westerners' naturalized Home that by stressing roots and

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3 To examine the most widespread discourses on Bono and Geldof, I gathered material widely, from the most popular quality media in Britain. The Daily Telegraph is the leading broadsheet in the United Kingdom, with a circulation of 578,774, and BBC Online has the most widest coverage of all news websites, with some 45.8 million browsers a week (source: ABC Audit, Average Net Circulation 30 Sep 2013—27 Oct 2013, BBC Trust Service Review May 2013). TIME magazine, in contrast, has a European circulation of 500,235, of which 135,145 (27%) is in the UK. This makes TIME magazine the leading news and current affairs magazine in Europe, and the second most read weekly magazine in the UK (Source: ABC Statements 2013).

4 The first two books are written by Geldof and Bono respectively, while the last title includes a collection of Bono's interviews conducted by journalist Michka Assayas.

longing nurture imaginaries of Westerners' eternal rightful belonging on the continent. Subsequently, these intelligibilities and imaginaries not only end up maintaining and legitimizing Westerners' agency in Africa, but they are also instrumental in evoking compassion for the contemporary world order by sustaining the fantasy of the humanizing, civilizing, liberating West.

1.1 Postcolonialism, Poststructuralism, Celebrity

As already mentioned, not only has celebrity subjectivity has been left unproblematized in contemporary research, but the interlinked historical relations between humanitarianism and colonialism have also been sidelined. Filling this gap in the contemporary research requires stepping outside the "colonial household of IR" and its unified and commonsensical knowledge production by engaging with innovative and interdisciplinary thinking (Agathaangelou et all 2009; Shapiro 2010).

To detail the limits of contemporary scholarship, in specific in international relations and development studies, I turn to various critical insights on celebrity, humanitarianism and cultural governance formulated in film, cultural, critical humanitarian studies. With these theoretical engagements, my aim is not only to problematize the celebrity subjectivity as an embodiment of a discursive battleground on the norms of individuality and personality within their culture (Marshall 1997: 65), but also to unravel how these subjectivities operate as an important practice of liberal governmentality, not only nationally, but also globally.

This multidisciplinary writing and thinking entails first considering how celebrity subjectivity is conditioned and effected by historically situated cultural discourses through which individual and social ideals, norms and values are debated, negotiated and organized. These insights work to identify fame as inseparable from the history of humanity and its imaginary. As a result, not only is fame historicized as a discursive formation and a practice through which individuals identify themselves into their communities and their places in the world (Rojek 2001: 14; Giles 2000: 12; Dyer 2008: 2, 7), but, moreover, celebrity subjectivity becomes politicized as entity of governance, a relation of power, through which particular subjectivities, communities and agencies are legitimized, constituted and organized with specific historical, cultural and social attributes.

It is exactly these explicit insights into the ways in which these Western celebrity discourses and representations condition and govern life with universal notions of global humanity that have escaped explicit contentiousness within contemporary celebrity humanitarian studies. These maps of meaning structured with celebrated human subjectivities, essences and their possibilities through which individuals are located into specific agencies and histories, obligations and capacities, I argue, are important rather than irrelevant sites of contemporary humanitarian world politics. As instances of international relations,

celebrity humanitarian representations not only articulate specific humanitarian aims and policies, but by managing realities, shaping appropriate affects and formulating imaginaries in concrete space and time with their visualities and constituted sentiments, ”borders of the historically inherited and geographically and imaginatively incarcerated selves” are managed (Muppidi 2008: 293). Indeed, neither humanity or humanitarianism have any intrinsic normative value, but rather they are continuously mobilised at the level of representations – public faces of development - that today operate at the centre of global governance (e.g. Aaltola 2009; Cronwall and Brock 2005: 15-16; Douzinas 2007: 5-10; Soederberg 2006; Duffield 2001, 2002; 2007; Rojas 2004; Smith and Yanacopulos 2004).

By highlighting the discursive nature of celebrities and their constitutive role in shaping life worlds – beings, belongings and becomings – an alternative perspective on how celebrity humanitarianism translates into postcolonial governance unfolds. In other words, to be a member of celebrity humanitarians' particular humanitarian world family, one needs to be located in a particular history which is not universal or global, but is constituted with a movement between past and the present, ”traditionalism” to modernity through which different cultures are marked by subordinations, retrospective relations to linear time.

Mapping out these violent cartographies, articulated with historically developed, socially embedded interpretations of identity and space (Shapiro 2009: 18), thus requires close consideration of how celebrity humanitarian representations move bodies into spaces and histories. To formulate these new encounters, it is essential to theorize historically, and to think politically. In the context of celebrity humanitarian present, this entails formulating a broader historical framework that enables to examine how in the contemporary celebrity humanitarian representations ”history is peopled,” that is, ”people are trapped in history, and hisotry is trapped in them” (Mayer 2002: 295).

As a specific kind of problematization underpinned with criticism and curiosity towards all our natural streets, environments, maps of navigations and techniques that limit our thinking, seeing and being, at the core of this reading is thus a challenge to the world of certainty and its singular truth. Hence, rather than seeking nostalgic comfort and security in the familiar interpretations in which the Westerner's truth is perceived as ”neutral”, ”universal” and ”eternal”, my aim is to ”think differently”. Inspired by Michael Shapiro's insights that aesthetic intervention constitutes political intervention that maps or unmaps what is visible, what can be said about it, and who is entitled to speak about it, (Shapiro & Opondo 2012: 3) this thinking necessitates not only engaging with different thought-worlds and imaginaries on what and who we think and claim to be, but it also necessitates confronting what we claim we no more are within our celebrity humanitarian present. Ultimately, pointing and leading towards a different condition of possibility to address our Western humanitarian subjectivity, humanity, life and truth not as essential and absolute, but inadequate and dispensable.

1.2 Critique as Method

To constitute my critical approach, which encompasses Western celebrity humanitarian discourses both historically and politically, I engage with Michel Foucault's formulations of critique as a historical method of inquiry, outlined both in his archaeological and genealogical analysis.

However, it is important to note that Foucault never proposed a systematic methodological definition to his archaeology or genealogy, but insisted that his writings be used as "a kind of toolbox in which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area" (quoted in o'Farrell 2005: 50). By rejecting clear methodological pronouncements, as Johanna Oksala has argued, his work presents a multilayered critical practice of thinking that questions the timeless and inevitable character of practices and forms of (Western) thinking (Oksala 2007: 46-8). Indeed, as Foucault himself pointed out, for him critique did not "consist in saying that things are not good as they are," but aimed to rethink the historical condition of our present by reviewing "what kinds of self-evidences, liberties, acquired and non-reflective modes of thought, the practices we accept rest on" (Foucault 2002c: 456). Subsequently, consituting critique as an instrument of resistance, struggle, refusal —a "processes of conflict and confrontation" which challenges what is by "showing that things are not as obvious as people believe" by "making it so that what is taken for granted is not longer taken for granted" (Foucault 2002f/1980: 236; Foucault 2002c: 456).

Foucault's relevance for critical social theory lies in transforming critique into social and historical analysis, characterized by revealing the historical, discursive, and practical conditions of things, values or events (Mahon 1993: 130-1). By critically examining historical and practical conditions of existence, what is at the bottom of Foucault's historical critique as a method is hence opposition to all commonsensical ways of thinking and knowing. It is this encountering thinking which targets thought in its historicity, and culminates in a "refusal of what we are, not only our past but also our present in such a way that we might come out of it transformed" (Foucault 2002e/1978: 242) that links Foucault's archaeological and genealogical approaches together.

Foucault's archaeological critique needs to be situated within historical and practical discursive rules and conditions of systems of thought through which experiences are organized and regulated. So conceived, as a form of historical analysis of discursive systems and their unfolding systems of thought, it aims to make a difference by analysing thought itself as an object (Foucault 2010b/1969: 226). By rejecting all original ideas, totalizing meanings and formalizing approaches, archaeology is not a formalizing or interpretive method (Foucault 2010b/1969:151), but rather a description of discourses that aims to make visible the historical and practical conditions that underpin the ways of thinking, saying, knowing and being. Effectively, archaeological critique is "nothing more than a rewriting" or transformation of what has been already

written (Foucault 2010b/1969: 156), an attempt to identify the "historical a priori" that operates through "a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative function" (Foucault 2010b/1969: 131).

Indeed, as Foucault's archaeological analysis unravels, discourses do not signify nor represent, but rather operate as violent excluding practices of power that define and condition reality and thought by making certain things visible, while marginalizing other intelligibilities or imaginaries. Considered in this way, the changes in discourses presuppose not a new mentality but rather transformations in their conditions and rules in their given historical moment. Uncovering thought and knowledge as historical practices, forms of action and conduct through which conditions of possibility to relate to oneself and others are conditioned, affirmed or limited.

Concerned as it is with the historical conditions of experience, which is dependent on specific historical discursive practices that allow ideas, worldviews and rationalities to surface, archaeology's force emerges from the recognition that the empirical is the product and not the principle of the order of knowledge, as Colin McQuillan has explained (McQuillan 2010: 44). For Foucault there is no ahistorical or neutral way of seeing, being or knowing rather, all intelligibilities and subject positions are governed by systems of discursive rules and constraints. Or in other words, the ways of thinking and being are rooted in the discursive conditions through which imaginaries and intelligibilities are regulated, encouraged or limited through formulations of in/difference.

If for Foucault the task of archaeological critique is to reveal the effects of discursive limits upon knowledge, genealogical critique, on the other hand, subjects discursive limits to radical historical questioning which illustrates how discourses are tied to power relations. As Foucault maintained, his criticism was genealogical in design, and archaeological in method (Foucault 1991b/1984: 46). In this sense, as Michael Mahon writes, if the role of genealogical critique is to reveal that our present thought and values are historical and discursive, this task also entails archaeological interrogations of its discursive rules of formation. In this sense archaeology provides the framework, or material, for the genealogical critique that, by orienting towards the contemporary limits of the necessary, analyzes "how discursive events determine or constitute our present and what constitutes ourselves—either our knowledge, our practices, our type of rationality, our relationship to ourselves or to others" (quoted in Mahon 1993: 135). As a consequence in aim to show that things are not as obvious as people believe (Foucault 2002c: 456) by revealing the systems and relations of subjection that permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, genealogy not only presents an alternative way to understand the past, but also changes the way we see the present (Oksala 2007: 48, 54).

In the aim to displace the institutional forms of Western thinking and knowing that underpin contemporary research methodologies and theories on Western celebrity humanitarianism, in this thesis I follow Foucault's suggestion

that "we must escape from the historical and moral confusionism that mixes the theme of [Western] humanism with the question of Enlightenment" (modernity, rationality, liberty and reason) (Foucault 1991b/1984: 45). By problematizing Enlightenment as a set of complex historical processes, and approaching humanism as a practice of differentiation, Foucault's critique constitutes a radical affront to Western humanism and its claims of progress, maturity and universality. Indeed, by fiercely rejecting universalism, origins and the totalizing thought-worlds of Western humanitarianism and truth, his critical thinking points towards encountering "how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known" (Foucault 1985/1984: 9). Inviting us to consider "something altogether different" by encountering and revealing how the interconnected axis of knowledge and power "bear upon a material, an epoch, a body of determined practices and discourses" (Foucault 1991d/1971: 78; Foucault 1991b/1984: 48-49).

Subsequently, engaging with Foucault's critique as a specific kind of intervention contributes to my broader methodological as well as theoretical framework: it provides me with both the means to formulate a political and historical perspective towards celebrity humanitarianism as well as the tools with which to begin my critical journey and exploration beyond mainstream political sciences' institutionalised methodologies' ways of understanding the 'political'. In accord with Foucauldian critique that encounters the historical conditions and effects of Western humanitarian thought, moving beyond the contemporary "for" or "against" academic debate – which centres on the "truthfulness" of celebrity humanitarian activity – requires approaching Western humanitarian thought as a political and historical practice, as discursive violence applied towards different ways of knowing and being. This necessitates encountering the celebrity humanitarian present historically and politically by approaching celebrity discourses and representations as spatial, temporal and historical practices that "lead us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are thinking, doing and saying" (Foucault 1991b/1984: 46).

As a wider project of "undefined work of freedom" that aims for disruption and alterity at the level of thought through critique, this entails, firstly, examining celebrity humanitarian rationality, knowledge, truth and humanity as relations of power - violently ordering practices that are infused with the constitution of dominating difference between the Western self and other. And secondly, accounting for the celebrity humanitarian present historically by viewing it as a reflection of the "connections, encounters ... plays of force, strategies and so on that at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary" (Foucault 2002f/1980: 226-7).

As such, it is essential to historicize and politicize the timeless character and the ahistorical forms of thinking and being manifested in contemporary celebrity humanitarian subjectivity, reality and truth. This requires examining the relations between words, images and reality—or, as Foucault argues, encountering how the name of an object can take the place of an image, or a word can take the place of an object, or an image can take the place of a word (Fou-

cault 1982/1968: 38). On the level of the visual, this entails critical problematizations on "how we see, how we are able, allowed, or made to see, and how we see this seeing and the unseeing therein" (Foster 1988: ix). But equally important, as Gillian Rose argues, is to investigate the compositional and social modalities of images: that is, how images produce and reproduce visions of social difference in relation to words (Rose 2007: 12-3). In short, it is vital to reflect critically on visual and textual associations, meanings and interpretations, through which our notions of saying, thinking, knowing and being are conditioned.

Testing the limits of celebrity humanitarian subjectivity and reality requires engaging with celebrity representations of themselves, which means asking questions including the following:

- What are the conditions of possibility of the contemporary Western celebrity humanitarian subjectivity, agency and legitimacy, and how are these particularities mobilized at textual and visual levels?

- What historical configurations of identity/difference, sameness/otherness celebrity humanitarian discourses and visualities perpetuate, mobilize, authorize and encourage at the level of African reality and being, existence and essence?

Accordingly, by bringing celebrity representations into the centre of the political, this reading aims to disrupt the commonsensical and ahistorical ways in which celebrity humanitarianism is researched and conceptualized today. Ultimately, presenting a counter-narrative to the celebrity humanitarian present by exposing how celebrity humanitarian intelligibilities and imaginaries are underpinned with violently ordering, erasing and reversing colonial thinking, characterised by Westerners' exceptional, unquestionable and overdetermining universal humanity, truth and reason.

1.3 Foucault and Fanon: Conceptualizations and Analytics

Hence, rather than following specific or straightforward political science guidelines or methodologies for understanding the world, my approach is inspired by Foucault, who argued that he was "not a theorist [who] constructed a general system, either deductive or analytical, and applied it to different fields in a uniform way," but rather "an experimenter" whose aim was to "write in order to change [him]self and in order not to think the same thing as before" (Foucault 2002e/1978: 240). Following this idea of writing as experiment and transformation, a practice of "instrumental and tentative" thinking that entails "a transformation of the relationship we have with our knowledge" (Foucault 2002e/1978: 240, 244), in this work I too depart from prescriptive and generalizing methodologies of mainstream political science.

Before I proceed to address the interlinked relations between violence and representation, freedom and thought formulated in Michel Foucault's and Frantz Fanon's writings, detailed in chapter three and four, I should pause to explain my decision—a risky endeavour, some might say—to render Fanon and Foucault together. During my studies, I felt this this anxiety culminating in recommendations that I should avoid placing these two men alongside each other. Some have explained that Foucault's and Fanon's philosophical engagements, backgrounds and objectives are incompatible. Others have argued that their essential difference is race: simply, the concrete difference between Foucault to Fanon is that Foucault was a white man.

These comments that relate to the wider criticism on Foucault's silence on the colonial condition in his studies, as well as his Eurocentric philosophical thinking in general, are valid considerations as they direct attention to the limits of his thinking. However, this anxiety of academics has not only intrigued me, but also kept me going. What is this uneasiness among Western academics, and where does it arise? To me, in general, it relates to the problematic relationship, or confrontation between post-structuralism and postcolonialism in which the latter has not only been characterized as intricately connected, or dependent upon post-structuralism, but also it has been widely understood as a theory about the African experience (cf. Ahluwalia 2010). This hierarchical division in scholarship has not only disregarded the centrality of the colonial encounter in producing the conditions of possibility for the emergence of post-structuralism, but also, as Pal Ahluwalia has argued, it has failed to recognize the fluidity of boarders that have rigidly been imposed between the postcolony and the metropole.

Similarly, today not only are Foucault's and Fanon's theorizations still non-existent in celebrity humanitarian studies in general, but, moreover, within political science they have often been approached and placed into total opposition to each other. Thus rather than aiming to think with them, or through them, by paying close attention to the sensitivity and fluidity of their thinking with regards to discursive violence or and their formulations of freedom as practice of thought - insights that would further the possibilities to think historically and politically about our present humanitarian conditions of possibility - somewhat fixed invisible borders have been erected between them based on their race, class, history or place through which this project has been deemed or denounced as impossible. It is this rejection, I want to suggest, that has obscured some productive similarities between their theoretical and ethical engagements, not only in their shared critique on Western humanism as a racializing and normalizing practice, but also in their formulation of freedom as a practice of alterity and its valorization at the level of self-imaginary and intelligibility.

Effectively, my reading entails a refusal to "not know" that Foucault was a "Western white man" and Fanon was not – an approach that rejects the idea that sharing a "culture" would mean automatically sharing a specific identity that is singular and stable. In the end, it all depends on how and where Fanon

and Foucault are localized, or where the boarders between them are erected. To begin with, Foucault lived in the "West" and Fanon in "Africa", but this reading masks the diversity of alternative locations Foucault occupied as an academic that rejected the dominating academic Marxist analysis in the 1960s, or as a homosexual outside the hetero-normative French society. On the other hand, Fanon did not belong, per se, to "the wretched of the Earth" which he wrote about. Rather he came from a middle-class family, and was educated at one of the most prestigious lycees in Martinique. Later, he studied psychiatry at Lyon and Saint Albans, one the famous psychiatric hospitals in France. Thus, Fanon, rather than being the over-determined "negro" he wrote about, held a somewhat more ambiguous and paradoxical position in the colonial world, both as a marginal outsider and as a privileged insider whose subjectivity and agency was both limited and enabled with complex lines of exclusions and inclusions.

Moreover, each encountered their own particularity that led to their refusal to be "governed in a certain way" - Foucault during his work in Tunis between 1966-68 (Young 2001: 397) and Fanon when in service in the French army during World War II. Consequently their critical thinking can be linked into their own encountered and recognized otherness that arose from their experiences within colonial surroundings, be it in France, or in North Africa, or both. It is indeed this "in-betweenness", a constant search for otherness and openness within, while rejecting the weight of history and its "truthfulfulness",that connects their critical thinking. As both insiders and outsiders of their own societies, they wrote not only from intersectional, or borderline places within their societies, but also with the aim to give voice to the margins and marginal, highlighting the importance of the particular in relation to the universal by drawing attention to the limits of language and representations. In an attempt to make the invisible visible by rejecting all oversimplified notions of being and belonging that characterized Western polarized thought, these interrogations entailed constant engagement with the unthinkable, to notice the unnoticed, and to speak of the unspeakable. In other words, encountering the prevalent violence embedded in the normalized ways of thinking, being, belonging and becoming.

Therefore, as important and fashionable as it would be to read these two men against each other to highlight the differences of their thinking, it is equally vital to think about Fanon's and Foucault's resonating insights that emphasise the need to question and attack Westerners' normalized selves, colonized and constituted with singular truth and overdetermining reason. Yet, by doing so, my aim is not to homogenize their thinking into some monolithic entity. Nor is my wish to "rescue" Foucault from his post-colonial critics. Rather, my humble aim is to highlight that although Foucault never explicitly analysed the colonial question in depth, his work—namely, his engagements with various problematizations of liberal violence, his formulations of liberal war as a question of discourse, representation and intelligibility, and his notions of freedom as radical counter-hegemonic deconstruction of historical thought—resonate with Fanon's conceptualizations of colonial violence and freedom as practices

of thought, as explicated in his books *Black Skin White Masks* (2008/1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (2001/1961).

Consequently, by bringing Foucault and Fanon together, my objective is not to enter a new theoretical argument into the existing and extensive literature on their work. Instead, as argued previously, I wish to use their ideas as theoretical and methodological avenues, allowing me to historicize and politicize the mentalities and discourses of celebrity humanitarianism as violent practices through which African subjectivity and reality is managed, governed and negated at the level of thought. In other words, to render a broader historicized and politicized perspective regarding the Western humanitarian knowledge and truth through which colonialism is conceptualized not as historical period of the past, but as an over-determining, self-referential intelligibility and imaginary of Westerners' superior and universal humanism.

1.4 Outline of the Thesis

The thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter Two, while engaging with insights that have emerged outside political studies – namely from cultural, film and critical humanitarian studies – I will discuss and detail the existing research on celebrity humanitarianism, paying close attention to the prevailing limits of this scholarship. I argue that significant considerations—historical and political problematizations regarding the ways in which discursively constituted celebrity subjectivities, agencies and imaginaries operate in the wider contexts of world politics—are still being disregarded in contemporary studies. My most extensive critique targets Andrew Cooper's book, *Celebrity Diplomacy* (2008), which is the first and currently the only monograph on the topic published within the study of international relations (IR). The purpose of my criticism is not to dismiss Cooper's arguments as less important or correct than my own. Rather—by interrogating Cooper's writing, while engaging with alternative insights on celebrity, humanitarianism and cultural governance which arise outside International Relations (IR)—my goal is to open up alternative thought-worlds and perspectives which will enable us to encounter celebrity humanitarianism both politically and historically.

In Chapter Three, to initiate this methodological and theoretical intervention, I turn to Michel Foucault's problematizations on liberal violence and war as historically contingent discursive practices through which subjectivities, intelligibilities and imaginaries are conducted and governed. Instead of concentrating only on Foucault's formulations of discourses and violence, my aim with this reading is to interrogate how throughout his writings Foucault engages with problematizations of violence as a practice of thought that conditions and effects difference at the level of thinking, being and becoming. To do so, I read Foucault's texts chronologically. I start with Foucault's archaeological investigations on the limits and rules of thought, followed by his genealogical studies, where he elucidates the violent materialization of modern Western humanism

at the level of subjectivity. With these investigatations on the violent limits that govern thinking and being, a broader historical framework is unfolded within which liberalism is seen as a practice that governs through life and living. Liberal war is exposed not only as a grid of intelligibility—that is, as an ongoing discursive battle aiming to normalize and govern life itself—but moreover also humanism is rendered as a biopolitical domain of violence and subjugation through which bodies are racialized, governed and ordered by universalized characteristics and properties of life. Ultimately, constituting Foucauldian freedom, as I discuss in the last part of the chapter, not a politico-juridical concept, but rather a practice of resisting thought that aims towards self-determination and invention: alterity, multiciplicity and otherness at the level of thinking and being.

From these insights on violence and war as practices of normalizing thought that conditions and governs life at the level of intelligibility and imaginary I move, in Chapter Four, to examine Frantz Fanon's descriptions of colonialism as "violence in its natural state" as well as his specifications on decolonialization as "a programme of complete disorder' effected through "absolute violence" (Fanon 2001/1961: 27, 29). With this investigation into Fanon's writings on colonial violence as a practice interlinked with Western humanity, and his depictions of decolonialization as practice of freedom that involves self-distancing, transformation and constitution, I will demostrate and discuss how Fanon problematizes colonialism specifically as a grid of intelligibility, that is, a fixing and negating practice of seeing, being and knowing that conditions and governs Africa's existence through negation at the aesthetic, affective and discursive level.

To unfold this intelligibility, I begin with Fanon's descriptions of the colonial world as absolute difference effected through "lines of force" which delimit "fences and signposts" (Fanon 2001/1961: 29, 190). Colonialism, as Fanon outlines, operates specifically through spatio-temporal structuring through which the colonized is "classified" and "tucked away"—walled into his inferiority with white histories and mythologies, interwoven with a "thousand details, anecdotes and stories" (Fanon 2008/1952: 84-5). As a practice of overdetermining thought which constantly questions the native's humanity and capability through a circularly constituted imaginary and intelligibility, in this space, "divided into compartments," "camps" and "zones," with a language of pure force, the native is a comparison and a negation of the white man (Fanon 2001/1961: 29-30; Fanon 2008/1952: 83). Subsequently, not only does colonialism racialize natives' bodies through negation, in relation to the normative superior whiteness with "a hellish cycle of permanent self-referential Western dialogue" (Fanon 2001/1961: 253)—but it also constantly empties and dislocates the colonized existence by failing to recognize his/her being. Problematizing colonial violence not as imposition, but rather as ongoing conditioning—a "definitive structuring of the self and of the world" (Fanon 2008/1952: 83).

By detailing how post/colonial governance takes life as its essential reference point, akin to Foucault's problematization of liberal governance, Fanon

exposes post/colonialism as a contingent discursive battle through which natives' being and becoming is governed through practices of organizing and excluding thought. Not only is racism linked, in Fanon's assessment, with the universally applicable representations of Western humanity through which belonging to a given race is constituted, but as a practice of subjugation it constitutes an ongoing battle that manages the existence of the colonized with a "multiplicity of nuances of proclamations of mindkind's [Westerners] outstanding dignity" (Fanon 2001/1961: 113, 131). Rendering racism neither ideological nor exceptional, but rather as a condition of possibility for Western humanitarianism and its life-fostering interventions and supervisions that call for constant self-development, actualization and betterment to operate.

As racism is a spatial and temporal practice that asserts, marks and governs the natives "black" inferior existence, essence and agency, freedom from colonial subjugation requires a much more drastic, and painful "tearing away" at the level of intelligibility (Fanon 2001/1961: 175). As Fanon argues, overcoming colonialism is not a "treatise on the universal," but an abolition of the lines of communication through an "untidy affirmation of an original idea propounded as an absolute" (Fanon 2001/1961: 31). In consequence, by advocating spatial and temporal openness that unfolds multiple possibilities of belonging and becoming, decolonialization requires complete and permanent disorder and confrontation "on the phantasmic plane" (Fanon 2001/1961: 43). Entailing "alterity of rupture, of conflict, of battle" at the level of intelligibility and imaginary, it enables "human reality in-itself-for-itself", an existence where the native is no longer to be sealed or colonized into "here and now," but rather exists "for somewhere else and for something else" (Fanon 2008/1952: 169-73). By rejecting the present as "definitive," it brings time into the native's existence and introduces "invention" into colonized existence (Fanon 2008/1952: 176, 179). Subsequently, for Fanon decolonialization is closely linked to self-formation: through "recapturing and scrutinizing the self," he writes, the colonized becomes "his own foundation" (Fanon 2008/1952: 180-81). Effectively, establishing freedom as ownership of one's own truth and reality: an ability to condemn, constitute or validate one own past, present and future through one's own choices (Fanon 2008/1952: 177).

By approaching colonialism as an overdetermining practice that conditions and governs Africa's subjectivity and reality through constant negation at the level of intelligibility and imaginary, in Chapter Five, I turn to examine how Bob Geldof's and Bono's humanitarian subjectivity and agency is constituted in Anglo-American media discourses. I argue that the contemporary humanitarian agency is underpinned with a particular reproduction of Westerners' incontestable capacity to master themselves and others. In media discourses, Bono and Geldof are not only framed as counter-hegemonic truth-tellers who battle against the Western politicians with courage and consistency; but moreover, their depth of knowledge and capacity to bring results for Africa is a subject of constant celebration. Accordingly, Western humanitarianism is constituted as apolitical and neutral, and "Africa" is naturalized as the Westerner's ahistorical

destiny, his burden and mission: his endless odyssey filled with "annihilation or triumph" (Fanon 2008/1952: 178).

These subjectivations and the physical realization of these roles are not only instrumental in propagating a world view of the west's universal moral and heroic leadership in world affairs, but through these discourses "Africa" and its "reality" are also created with complex reifications of space and time that privilege difference and its singularity. In Chapters Six and Seven, I detail and explicate these African imaginaries by analysing the Western media discourses, alongside with Geldof's and Bono's books *Geldof in Africa* (2005), *Bono on Bono* (2005) and *On the Move* (2006).

In Chapter Six, I analyze first how through Bono's and Geldof's on-going assessments and problematization of the unachieved "universal" justice and humanity in Africa, formulated with historical memorizations of the Holocaust, Cold War and contemporary War on Terror, Africa becomes constituted not only as a contemporary Hell that fundamentally threatens the foundations of the liberal world order, but also as a space of grave danger to its future development and security. I argue that in these discourses of the exceptional moral actions of Westerners against Evil in the world, formulations that link Africa's present to Westerners' moral past, saving Africa through Western aid and trade is framed not only as an act of justice and fairness, but also as the only optimal process to revive and heal the continent and move it towards "normalcy" – that is, towards self-governing and progressing entrepreneurial existence. These intelligibilities not only frame Western aid and trade as a positive force, a catalyst for African self-transformation, or rather, Westernization; but in addition, rather than it being the West's unpaid debt, aid is constituted as their selfless deed through which the great crusade to end African hunger, culminating in "wretchedness, death, war and famine", is yet again organized and launched (Fanon 2008/1952: 147).

It is in these historically sedimented, de-historicized and depoliticized reiterations about propertied "Europe" and "Africa" as either a helpless victim or potential enemy—where the interventionist humanitarian agenda that aims to transform the dependent and immature Africa into self-governing cultivated subject coincides with the colonial intelligibility of Africa's fixed abnormal difference—that calls for Westerners' eternal protection and betterment are voiced. Ultimately, repeating and reaffirmimg the colonial intelligibilities of the "inert, brutal and uncivilized" Africa that can only find her progress and maturity through and with the presence of the Westerner, the white man (Fanon 2001/1961: 130).

In the seventh and final chapter, I shift from these notions of Africa as a space of failure, menace and danger, to an examination of the nostalgic and desiring imaginaries of Africa that emerge from Bono's and Geldof's corporeal and sensory encounters within the vast landscape of Africa. I argue that when Bono and Geldof are on the continent itself, a transformation occurs. Instead of the catastrophic space filled with horror depicted in the Western media, Africa emerges as peaceful and spectacular, unfolding a nostalgic and desiring imagi-

nary of shared "pastness," harmony and homeliness where everybody remains in their naturalized "places." Characterized by exotic localism and signs of "progress", this description of communality in which Africa remains either as domesticated and desired exotic curiosity, or responsibly advancing other, turns however quickly into condemnation, anxiety and grief when things do not follow the historical progressive path planned and paved by self-certain Westerners. Indeed, only a certain kind of difference is acceptable for the African others: that is, otherness that does not critically challenge the foundational humanitarian existence and essence that constitutes the Westerners agency not only in Africa, but also in the wider world.

The chapter ends with Fanon's final prayer, "on becoming a man who always questions"—a call that is carried into my conclusions as the most potent strategy against the colonizing fixed intelligibilities and imaginaries of "our" Africa propounded by celebrity humanitarian, where the continent is and remains locked into existence as Westerners' historical Home or inexpressible inhuman Hell.

2 ADDRESSING AND RESISTING THE PREVIOUS INSIGHTS ON CELEBRITY HUMANITARIANISM

> I represent a lot of people [in Africa] who have no voice at all…. I now represent them. They haven't asked me either. It's cheeky but I hope they're glad I do, and in God's order of things, they are the most important.
> - Bono discussing his involvement on Jubilee 2000 campaign (Assayas 2005: 149)

> I say again that no speech-making and no proclamation concerning culture will turn us from our fundamental tasks: the liberation of the national territory; a continual struggle against colonialism in its new forms; and an obstinate refusal to enter the charmed circle of mutual admiration at the summit.
> - Frantz Fanon (2001/1961: 189)

2.1 Celebrities as Politicians, Diplomats and Humanitarians

In light of the changing faces of democracy and citizenship in late modern societies, the role of entertainment, advertising, media and consumption in shaping and organizing public life, its values and meanings have been widely recognized (Kellner 2003; 2009; Van Zoonen 2003, 2005; Corner and Pels 2003; Louw 2005: 154-163; Street 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). With these entwined relations between politics, entertainment and media that today construct political authenticity, aesthetic stylisations and image management have been brought into the centre of contemporary politics. Accordingly, today liberal Western democracies are visually stratified public domains of appearance and performance through which public life, its character and meaning is constructed and structured. As a result, gaining and maintaining political power and authority is increasingly dependent on the imaginary and emotional resonance of political character and personality which through recognition and performed authenticity directs the attention to self-actualisation and emancipation (Giddens 1991; Bauman 2001; Beck 2001).

Indeed, as Douglas Kellner argues, media culture today operates at the centre of politics within which "celebrityhood" - dependent on both constant media proliferation and its implosion - has emerged as an important aspect in politics (Kellner 2010: 121-123; Kellner 2009: 716). Within these contexts of mediated politics, celebrity politicians (CP2)— entertainers who use fame, media visibility or celebrityhood as a political strategy to articulate political messages without seeking an actual political position—have received increased attention both in the media and in political studies (e.g. Louw 2005: 172-193; Street 2001: 187-192, 2002, 2003, 2004; Kellner 2005, 2009, 2010). As John Street (2004) in his inaugural article on celebrity politics argues, this new phenomenon is an integrative and legitimate part of modern emotional politics, and thus does not fall outside the boundaries of contemporary political representation. Consistent with a liberal political ethos that is centered on choice, equality and personal freedom, celebrity politicians embody personal and social identities, as well as exhibiting morally accepted views and lifestyles to Western citizens. Alongside with celebrity politicians (CP1), they use their status to bring media attention to their causes and interests, attention which both the media and politicians provide them. This constitutes celebrity politicians (CP2) as significant emotional proxies through which the sentiments of the people are embodied - a central part of wider cultural and political discourses of liberal governance through which publics involve themselves in political processes in non-traditional platforms of politics. Thus, the phenomenon of celebrity politicians can be seen to signal the emergence of a new global political order where celebrities' role in contributing to the progress of global citizenship and democratic participation, in order to achieve a more just international economic order, is becoming increasingly central and important (Bennett 2003: 146-7).

By reorienting the notion of the political into experiences and imaginations, these style-bound perspectives on celebrity politics challenge the naturalized divisions between politics and popular culture, reason and emotions which the conventional perspectives of political science tend to promote. Thus, by heeding greater sensitivity to the discursive, symbolic and imaginary aspects of mediatized politics is employed, the very realm of modern politics is relocated into media representations and mediations (Corner and Pels 2004: 3-5). Nevertheless, even in these studies, aesthetics has been acknowledged as an inherently political exercise, and the scope of empirical analysis has remained in explaining the "celebrity turn" (CP1) and its effects in national/domestic politics. Consequently mainstream political science's worldview, in which states and official politicians are perceived as the fundamental actors in politics, also prevails in the study of celebrity politics. This leaves critical questions on how celebrity politicians (CP2) or humanitarians representations condition and effect the sensible and thinkable less explored.

However, this does not mean that celebrities' role in humanitarian contexts has been totally sidelined. For example in media studies, concentrated on analysing the ways how news media constitutes, stages and frames global crises and humanitarian emergencies, the increasingly prominent role of celebrities

has been acknowledged (Cottle 2006, 2009; Cottle & Nolan 2009; Pantti, Cottle and Wahl-Jorgensen 2012). As Simon Cottle has argued, global crises today — which summon pathos and support—are increasingly visualized through news reports that roam quickly from one disaster to another (Cottle 2009). Within this 24/7 media logic, humanitarian organizations, which co-exist and compete for media attention and donor funds, are increasingly required to tailor and package information and images in accordance with the media's predilections. It is against this backdrop of media and marketing logic assimilated by NGOs and their "bring back home" reports, as Cottle and Nolan argue, that the rise of celebrities in NGO's humanitarian campaigns needs to be read (Cottle and Nolan 2009). In other words, not only are NGOs increasingly dependent on mainstream news media channels, but, moreover, their campaigns are increasingly constituted with personalizing messages which, by enacting tragedy and trauma, channel public emotions towards solidarity, imagined communities and/or political contestation and dissent (Cottle 2009: 146-7).

However, while in media studies the role of celebrities has been elaborated, situated and analysed in light of the interrelated developments between Western NGOs and news media, within international relations (IR) and development studies the research has concentrated on the policies and solutions that various celebrities promote. Criticism has emerged concerning celebrities' lack of legitimacy and accountability in humanitarian politics, as well as the effectiveness of the aid policies they promote in Africa. As Dietter and Kumar (2008) have argued, Bono's and Geldof's "development buzz" oversimplifies development politics into soundbites and one-dimensional messages that disregard the historically unsuccessful experiences of aid development, as well the multiple nuances of development. As a consequence, they argue, Bono and celebrity activism in general might in fact do more harm than good to the situation in African poor.

This view is reflected also in Dambisa Moyo's argument that Western countries live in "a culture of aid" where pop culture promotes the misconception that aid is the only way to progress development in Africa (Moyo 2009: xviii). In her book, *Dead Aid* (2009) that concentrates on the history of aid practices in Africa, Moyo argues that Western aid has not only failed to work, but has also compounded Africa's current problems. Akin to Dietter and Kumar, she also questions the positive effects of incremental development aid by arguing that it has made the poor poorer, economic growth slower, and corruption rife in Africa. However, her criticism goes further, beyond celebrity politics or their policies. As she argues, it is paramount to destroy the myth that aid works. And this, she writes, is only possible by reformulating a new policy regarding the continent which entails increasing private sector investments, fair trade and micro-finance arrangements that will regenerate the continent and promote prosperity and good governance.

Moyo's recommendations and insights do not, however, fall far from Bono's or Geldof's campaigns to "save" Africa through commercial means. Indeed, as Richey and Ponte (2008) argue, it is exactly this new turn in celebrity devel-

opment strategies within which consumption, trade and aid are today closely bound together. In their analysis on Bono's Product RED campaign, they conclude that this awareness and money-raising effort, which weds dying Africans with designer goods through consumption, trade and aid, masks the social and environmental relations of trade and production. Consequently, as Richey and Ponte write, Product Red contributes "to uphold[ing] a myth that there is no real linkage between the rich and the poor, between the entrepreneurs and Africa, or between capitalism and disease" (Richey and Ponte 2008: 713). Moreover, they argue that this commercialization of the distant others through compassionate consumption also impacts the question of "development" by advocating a policy that suggests that global problems can be solved through shopping and corporate social responsibility (CSR). In terms of framing, this effects not only particular subjectivities but also enforces policies—that is, "truths" on who the legitimate beneficiaries are and how they should be helped (Ponte, Richie & Baab 2009). Consequently, by legitimising CSR without challenging any of its actual operations or practices, Product RED has a more profound effect than just sales figures or funds collected for the African poor.

This privatization of aid has also been highlighted in Karin Wilkins and Florencia Enghel's (2013) study on the construction of development problems in Bill and Melissa Gates Foundation's Living Proof campaign, which is promoted by Bono. Paying special attention to the role of communication and media, they argue that this media-driven campaign, which legitimizes and privileges the ethos of privatized development, individual empowerment and happiness as the most effective approaches to bringing about social change, is underpinned with neoliberal impulses. Accordingly, the dominant theme of the Living Proof campaign is individual success, accomplishment and perseverance, which are defined in terms of finding economic independence and social confidence rather than succumbing to government assistance or aid (Wilkins and Enghel 2013: 176). Within this conceptualization, which focuses on narratives of triumph over tragedy and promotes consumption as the path to social change, all structural factors behind poverty are sidelined. Ultimately, the campaign ends up enhancing the productivity of global capitalist industries that are increasingly setting the agenda for global development which benefits a few, at the expense of the many (Wilkins and Enghel 2013: 179).

In this sense, as Harry Browne (2013) notes, Bono's activities and discourses can be broadly characterized as conservative, Western-centric and procapitalist. In other words, Bono speaks not against power, but in the name of the power (Browne 2013: 5-6). Moreover, as Zine Magubane (2008) adds, this Western celebrity action—which sells suffering as an adventure and spectacle—sidesteps uncomfortable questions of race. In contemporary celebrity rhetoric, Magubane writes, Africans remain not even a memory, but rather a vague genetic trace and remnant of Western personal history and experience (Magubane 2008: 102.21 - 102.22). Consequently, as Africans are only spoken of in absentia, the contemporary celebrity advocacy denies all coevalness between Western and Africans subjects.

Indeed, as media scholar Lilie Chouliaraki (2012) in her analysis of the confessional discourses of Audrey Hepburn and Angelina Jolie argues, celebrity humanitarianism with its theatricality of pity encourages a narcissistic disposition of voyeuristic altruism, rather than a commitment to critical justice. In similar ways, Ilan Kapoor (2012) asserts that celebrity humanitarianism transforms questions of social justice into technocratic problems to be resolved by managers, experts or humanitarian celebrities (Kapoor 2012: 3). As he continues, celebrity humanitarianism is "deeply contaminated by personal, institutional, commercial and geopolitical interests," that are integral to advancing postdemocratic liberal governance and neoliberal capitalism (ibid: 3, 5). Hence, rather than doing good for the African others, celebrity humanitarianism operates as an ideologue that humanizes capitalism by deflecting attention away from the inherent structural inequalities of the global capitalist order (Kapoor 2012: 115).

However, these more disabling views on celebrity politics in the context of international development have not been shared by all. For example, Louise Davis (2010) has called for a move beyond the narrow and naïve critique of "Leftist intellectuals" and for recognizion of the fact that celebrity activism, with all its downfalls and ethnocentricity, has created "a revolution" and contributed to positive outcomes in Africa. Similarly, Noland et al—in their analysis of celebrity involvement in the AIDS movement over the past 25 years—have argued that celebrity action may be the best alternative to make any sort of headway in global HIV prevention (Noland et al. 2009). On this view, what the critics of this activity have failed to recognize, is the pleasure that these celebrity texts elicit in audiences, as well their ability through ethical consumption to construct "global subjects and agents of change" which create "shared bonds" between the Westerners and the Africans (Davis 2010: 112-4). In other words, they ignore the fact that celebrity activism, through its consciousness-raising possibilities, provides charities with unparalleled possibilities for garnering support. Furthermore, it provides new avenues for aid donors to participate, as members, in the global community. In this respect, as Mark Wheeler writes, celebrity politicians may provide the basis for citizens to act, in terms of their own political efficacy, to define a wider sense of the common good (Wheeler 2013: 171).

Thus—even considering problems that relate to oversimplification, political messages, and questions of legitimacy and ethicality—celebrity advocacy, as Noland et al argue, "may be the best hope for authentic, sustained leadership in the HIV/AIDS pandemic" because "celebrity brings attention *not to illusionary progress, but rather to the realities of AIDS"* (Noland et all 2009: 206, 208, emphasis added*).* Davis also remains optimistic that with increasing education about celebrity activism, it can become a more effective as well as ethical practice. As she concludes, it is important to remember "that many in both the West and the Third World are also finding sustenance as a result of celebrity activism and ethical consumer practices" (Davis 2010: 115).

In the very first book analysing the role of celebrities within international relations (IR), Andrew Cooper (2008) also argues that several "celebrity diplo-

mats" have become enormously successful in mobilising, channelling and mediating their causes into international public policy. His argument, like that of Davis, is targeted at the "radical left in the UK" and the prevailing academic "one-image-fits-all perspective" which, he claims, in its simplicity, has missed the complexity of celebrity diplomacy and its benefits (Cooper 2008: 13; Cooper 2008b). Indeed, for Cooper "celebrity diplomats" are innovative practitioners of unofficial public diplomacy who provide a "different script" of global affairs by raising the level of expectations. As important global agenda-setters who "break down the barriers between domestic and international politics", he writes, "the boundaries of the possible" are tilted "against the proverbial windmills with repect to the ever-present myopia of ideas, interests and institutions in world politics"(Cooper 2008: 127-8). Constituting celebrity diplomacy, Cooper writes, "the art of the possible" (Cooper 2008: 128).

Cooper's research does not escape criticism, even though he concedes that more detailed research on celebrity politics should be conducted, specifically regarding how, why and which celebrities engage with global diplomacy on issues relating to Africa. While he acknowledges the central role of celebrity diplomats in the contexts of international governance, his book is more like a normative policy document, or a simple list of "good" and "bad" types of celebrity humanitarianism, rather than a critical and in-depth analysis of the phenomenon. It is indeed Cooper's "will to truth", that is, his equation of knowledge with external appearances which results in a depoliticized and ahistorical analysis, that disregards the wider political conditions and effects of celebrity humanitarianism. In general, his analysis lacks critical insight into the ways in which contemporary development and humanitarian practices operate as part of global liberal governance (e.g. Duffield 2001; Laakso 2009; Murphy 2005; Barnett and Weiss 2008; Barnett 2011; Rojas 2004). Moreover by naturalizing celebrity diplomacy as counter-hegemonic practice "that pushes for when and where it is needed", Cooper fails to acknowledge that resistance is not a separate ontological category outside global governance (Cooper 2008: 3). Or as Ian Clark has argued, "there is no simple tug of war between governance and resistance, but instead ... multifaceted interaction involving a complex array of actors" (Clark 2003: 79). Accordingly, political contestation and resistance are integral, rather than an external practice of global governance through which broader normative principles, memberships and entitlements are negotiated and defined. Thus, resistance is constituted as a significant aspect of the modern form of management and legitimisation, which operates not only through domination and silencing, but also through communication, encouragement and habitual tokens of appreciation.

2.2 Rethinking Humanitarianism, Culture and Global Governance

Rather than conceiving of celebrity resistance or humanitarianism as good/progressive, as Cooper does, the constitution of difference and its specificity needs to be recognized. Indeed, neither humanity nor humanitarianism have any intrinsic normative value, foundation or definition, but rather they are continuously mobilised, framed and constituted by various campaigns, development buzzwords and moral statements of missions and purpose (Cronwall and Brock 2005: 15-16; Douzinas 2007: 5-6). Humanitarian agencies and actors—the latter of which celebrity humanitarians now make up an increasingly visible part — are not only imprinted upon Western culture, but are also the carriers of its messages and principles, generating humanitarian obligations, identifying development problems and providing judgements and solutions to overcome them. The various problems celebrity humanitarians put forth on African "reality" do not simply exist as objective or neutral facts, but are effects of specific problematizations that speak directly to the question of the authority and legitimacy of those "to whom the international belongs." Hence, by carrying considerable normative power, these problematizations do much more than just provide directions. Indeed, as political practices themselves, these intelligibilities and imaginaries lend legitimacy to particular political actors to take action in the name of the poor "as guardians of rightness and champions of progress" (Rojas 2004; Cronwall and Brock 2005: 15).

As Michael Dillon has noted, the global governance of human life through ideas of universal humanity is closely linked to cultural governance, making the latter vital terrain for national and international governmental interventions (Dillon, 2003). Over the past two decades, in the realm of development and humanitarianism, there has been a noticeable shift from hierarchical relations of government to more non-territorial and networked relations of governance, of which NGOs as well as global celebrities form an increasingly visible part. The value base of this humanitarian regime—now expanding to all aspects of culture and politics—draws on the principle of humanity, inspired by an allegedly apolitical commitment to alleviating the suffering and poverty of people still outside "universal" equality. Relying on moral responsibility, purpose and agenda, this humanism calls for a radical transformation of societies and individuals as a whole, through increasing participation, cooperation and harmonization between the Global North and South (Soederberg 2006; Duffield 2001: 257-59; Barnett and Weiss 2008). These contemporary development and humanitarian policies, armed with unimpeachable moral authority and pragmatism, are warmly persuasive, filled with grand policy statements of missions and purpose - sense of purposefulness and optimism—in which care and control, emancipation and empowerment overlap. In this respect, purporting an agenda for a just, democratic and equal world, evoking an imaginary of a governable,

regulable and controllable world where no one goes hungry, and where opportunities exist for the poor (Cornwall and Brock 2005: 1-2).

Today, humanitarian aid operates at the centre of global liberal governance, through which intervention and change are sanctioned (Duffield 2001; Duffield 2002; Hynek and Chandler 2011). Indeed, in recent years, as Costas Douzinas has pointed out, "humanitarianism has arguably turned into the ultimate political ideology, bringing together the well-being of the West with the hardships of the global South" (Douzinas 2007: 11). However this commonsensical shift towards societal reconstruction, backed up by narratives of moral responsibility, should not be perceived as an apolitical process, but as the politicization and radicalization of development and humanitarianism themselves, particularly after 9/11 (Laffrey and Weldes 2008; Soederberg 2006; Roberts 2010; Duffield 2002). In other words, the contemporary humanitarian paradigm—as an essential expression of what is meant by the international community and the contemporary world order behind it—extends from suffering bodies to the suffering of the liberal world order itself, in which the poverty-reduction agenda is subordinated by Western security concerns regarding unmanaged, underdeveloped and unsecured life (Aaltola 2009; Chandler 2007; Duffield 2001). Ultimately, humanitarianism, instead of revolving around "help" per se, aims at incorporation, interdependence and interaction through new types of engagements and obligations.

Although these critical studies have examined human security, development and social justice as power-relations, the central role of popular culture, or celebrity discourses in particular, in constituting a sense of the world has not yet been analyzed. Indeed, just as policies promoting social change and human development in the "Third World" are abstractions underpinned by ontological and epistemological assumptions of world "realities", so too are celebrity humanitarians inextricably bound up with the cultural, social or political spheres in which they operate; and thus, they do provide more "truthful" or "authentic" representations of the "realities" of Africa.

Indeed, popular culture, of which celebrities form a central part, does not reflect, but rather contributes to the formation of world politics by shaping ideas of being and belonging (Grayson, Davis and Philpott 2009; Shapiro 1997, 1999; 2009; Weldes 1999, 2001, 2003; Neumann and Nexon 2006; Gregg 1998; Philpott and Mutimer 2005; Hjort and MacKenzie 2009). As such, contemporary celebrity humanitarians—who negotiate, embody and articulate historically specific "universal notions" of human nature in the terrain of global politics—do not stand outside the world they are aiming to heal; rather, they are embedded within the structures and processes of liberal global governance that operates through the global imaginaries, mental environments and mediascapes through which the imagined world order is produced (Oliver 2001: 555). Focused around ethical duty and moral-aesthetics, through these acts of political compassion, individuals are linked into the political bodies through multiple flows of sense-making, mediated through visual rhetoric, icons and sacred symbols, that narrate compassion as morality (Aaltola 2009: 27-8). Thus, celebri-

ty humanitarians participate not only in specific humanitarian causes, but also in the larger structures, relations and processes of world politics.

These insights raise critical questions regarding the meaning-making processes, understandings and interpretations that celebrities provide through their representations in the wider domain of world politics. However, these problematizations—for example, how humanitarianism operates as a practice of liberal governance, or how it is linked to the wider security-development nexus of Western governments, aimed to keep potentially instable regions contained—are not examined or even mentioned in the analyses by Cooper, Davis or Noland. Rather it seems that, for Cooper, global governance is nothing but a wholly positive and progressive process that helps to create a more just and democratic world.

Indeed, for Cooper in these benign contexts of global governance, celebrity diplomats "with an appreciation of universal or cosmopolitan values" champion a new, creative global humanitarian force which is "exciting and often commendable" (Cooper 2008: 2, viii). This framing of celebrity humanitarianism as incompatible with global power politics, ends up depoliticising the activity itself by sidelining all critical insights about how celebrity humanitarianism normalizes, neutralizes or legitimizes specific humanitarian interventions, policies or world-views (Soederberg 2006; Roberts 2010).

With his ahistorical approach to celebrity diplomacy alongside his conceptualization of global governance as cooperation, coordination and consensus that neglects the question of power, Cooper fails to engage with several critical questions with regards to this activity. These questions go beyond the what, who and how questions which Cooper is keen to analyse, and concern the issue of how celebrities are constructed and legitimized as "diplomats" or voices of global humanity. Indeed, throughout Cooper's book, a naturalized assumption prevails that celebrity humanitarianism is a counter-hegemonic action which contradicts official governmental statements and policies. For example, for him, Bono is "an outsider" and "master manipulator" who has "exploited the fascination of political leaders with popular culture." (Cooper 2008: 42, 38). Bono's truthfulness and authenticity are effectively described as innate characteristics, rather than discursive constructions of "human value" which are conditioned, modalized and operationalized though "individual identifications, social differences and distinctions, and the universality of personality types" (Marshall 1997: 7, 65). Arguably constituting celebrity not as an attribute, but rather as a political and cultural practice through which capacities, values and meanings are constructed and privileged through complex configurations of affect and meaning.

2.3 Interruptions: Encountering Celebrity Subjectivity and Agency Politically and Historically

Indeed, rather than taking celebrities' humanitarian essence as inherent, or their representations as neutral, celebrities themselves need to be approached as practices that are subject to social and cultural discursive conditions and effects. As has been argued both in film and cultural studies, surfaces of reflection as well as investments in particular identities, potentials and possibilities become constituted through celebrity discourses, in which ideals of personal freedom and public responsibility intertwine (Marshall 1997; Dyer 2007, 2008; Rojek 2001). It holds then that the authenticity, fame, or authority of celebrities comprise historical constructs, in which selected words and images do not merely describe nor represent, but rather construct, authoriticize and legitimize their subjectivities and agencies.

Cultural and national identities that reflect historical experiences and shared cultural codes are a "matter of becoming, rather than being" - subject to the contingent "play" of history and identification (Hall 1990: 223-55). Thus, by expressing specific cultural values and human ideals, the modern celebrity who embodies the empowerment of the people through which public spheres are symbolically shaped, operates as a discursive battleground for the norms of individuality and personality within a culture (Marshall 1997: 7, 65, 242). At the level of shared intelligibility, by reframing forms of experience and social belongings that are both historical and political, these discourses locate individuals within specific histories and spatialities, essences, obligations and capacities that are deeply invested in the constitution of difference. Celebrities are thus constituted as part of a highly political field of power relations through which certain social and historical meanings are embodied and secured while others are displaced (Dyer 2008: 7).

It follows, then, that the increased visibility of celebrities today reflects broader social and cultural shifts in how public life in the West is constructed through negotiations of the emotional, personal and affective (Marshall 1997: 73-4; Rojek 2001: 14; Turner 2004: 26). In other words, celebrity subjectivity, which projects an exemplary "natural" self—adorned with the liberal values of individual equality, self-truth, conformity and self-actualization—has rendered celebrities the lingua franca of modern identity politics in Western capitalist societies (Marshall 2006: 3). As both Chris Rojek and Richard Schickel argue, celebrities have become crucial sites through which feelings of community and togetherness are built and maintained in contemporary Western societies (Rojek 2001; Schickel 1985). And hence, inasmuch as the modern subjectivity is a discursive formation, in the late-modern era celebrities have become major sites where this essence is debated, negotiated, organized and produced (Marshall 1997: 65, 72-3).

Indeed, throughout Western history, celebrities have acted as emotional processes through which the public's feelings and attitudes have been struc-

tured and maintained. Personal attributes and public virtues do change throughout history, of course, but their function—as supporting accepted social identities that bolster the legitimacy of a specific social order and human essence—has for centuries been the key characteristic of fame and also its force (Braudy 1986: 585). Within these historically and culturally situated discursive subjectivities— formulated with national and individual ideals and virtues— spaces are opened and offered for individuals to imagine an identity and a history for themselves (Dyer 2007, 2008; Giles 2000: 5, 12). The endless stories and images of famous individuals in the media can thus be defined as wider historical and political discourses through which individuals identify "what's present within what's past" (Braudy 1986: 15).

Celebrity discourses thus operate as a symbolic force of cultural memory and social cohesion through which maps of meanings of human possibilities and histories are shaped, recalled and lived. Indeed, being or belonging is never static, but rather subject to various types of governance and organization through which individuals form and manage their subjectivities in relation to themselves and others (Foucault 2010c/1982). It follows then that celebrity humanitarian subjectivities, intelligibilities and imaginaries function as internalized moral, aesthetic and political practices of distinction and exclusions. Indeed, celebrity humanitarian representations and truth-claims are involved in the construction of specific public faces of development, humanity and humanitarianism; but also, through them, moral geographies and historical worldviews are described, located and asserted. In other words, celebrity humanitarians are engaged in "systems of meaning production [which] are intimately related to practices of power—the power to define and defend "reality" (Shepherd 2006: 21). With these representations, biological bodies are forged into social bodies by foregrounding certain connections between knowledge and the forms of human community – of ways of being and belonging into the world.

These relationships between knowledge and power, emotions and transformations have been—historically speaking—strategically mobile. As contingent practices concerned with the historical truth, they have involved both the memorization of the collective past, as well as amnesia or, as Smith has argued, "getting one's own history wrong" (Smith 1996: 382). In this regard, as Edward Said has argued, the power to narrate or block other narratives from forming and emerging has been one of the primary mechanisms for controling cultural encounters (Said 2003: 3). Indeed, throughout the centuries, as much as by brute force, Western hegemony in the lands of the "Others" has been constructed through various representational practices that have aimed to shape the behaviour and orientation of Western citizens. During colonialism and imperialism, fictional narratives were at the heart of the construction and management of Africa. Forming and shaping realities with imperial and anti-imperial attitudes, the stories told by explorers, novelists and missionaries constructed Africa as a dark continent—savage, different, dangerous—which justified Western intervention in the name of progress, reason and civilisation. From these stories, "Africa" emerged as a continent empowered by the West: either as a helpless

passive victim, or a dangerous, chaotic, viral ground which provided Western citizens with a widely shared view of their role in Africa, demanding that they take action on moral, religious or nationalistic grounds (Mayer 2002: 256-91; Hawk 1992: 9). Culture spoke with one voice: there was only one "civilization," one "progress" and one "true" religion (Brantlinger 1986: 185-6). Consituting Empire as a vivid and credible lived experience: a national duty, a deed to be done (Mayer 2002: 107).

Engaging with the governance of temporalities as well as spatialities, geographical imaginaries and historical memories, these elaborated arrangements of truth have historically been vital and active instruments in the creation of Westerners' imperial landscapes through which an order, a history and a narrative of progress, of self and another, has been produced (Rabinowitz 1994: 12). However, these critical historical insights are still non-existent in contemporary political research on celebrity humanitarianism. Andrew Cooper's work, for example, does not engage with such historical reflections on how intelligibilities belonging to race, religion or citizenship have operated as "tense and tender ties of Empire" (Stoler 2007: 3). Rather, by depicting celebrity humanitarianism as "diplomacy", and urging the public to embrace emerging counterparts to this "project" from the South in the name of "values," "sustainability," "legitimacy" and long-term "viability", Western humanitarian values are universalized as norms of the international community.

This view of celebrity humanitarianism as moral and universal is based on unproblematized presumptions of what "universal humanity" consists of, as well as whose responsibility it is to govern in the first place. As a consequence, by naturalizing this activity as self-evidently moral and humanitarian in essence, all traces of the political are erased. In such arguments, which regard this humantarian activity as diplomacy or advocacy, Africa's future is framed as the eternal benevolent deed of Westerners. As Cooper writes, "paradoxically the call for celebrity diplomats from the South to take a bigger role on the global stage may increasingly come from the North" (Cooper 2008: 112). And therefore, he continues, to avoid "a possible blacklash", "universalism in intent must be matched by universalism in personnel, as any prolonged disconnect between object and subject undermines the foundational value and sustainability of celebrity diplomacy as a viable project" (ibid).

It is indeed these "white mythologies", centring on the foundational and universal values of Westerners, through which Western power over "Others" has historically operated. As Robert Young (2004: 5) has eloquently argued, it has never been "the case that the subaltern could not speak: rather that the dominant would not listen." By providing no space for African alterity in his "global diplomacy", or even a recognition of the global politics of humanitarianism, Cooper's research, which celebrates the rise of celebrity diplomacy, ends up participating in the reproduction of the colonial intelligibility in which Western values are defined as universally ethical and progressive. Ultimately, Cooper—wittingly or unwittingly— is complicit in the historical processes of

"cognitive imperialism," in the way he encodes bodies and territories into their space and intelligibility with self-evident practices of IR (Shapiro 2004: xi, xv).

Not only do Cooper's arguments on the beneficent nature of celebrity diplomacy presume that celebrity representations on Africa are mimetic and authentic, but he also perceives the possibility to take ethical action or cultivate oneself as universal and limitless. If celebrity humanitarianism stands for "authentic leadership" that creates global subjects of change through truthful representations of Africa's reality, then who are these "global citizens of change," and what does this global citizenship require? Indeed, the practices enacting ethical action involve not only oneself; they also involve mastery and exercise of power over others (Foucault 1990/1984; Foucault 2001/1983; Foucault 1997/1980; Foucault 1984/1997b). In other words, being an authentic truth-teller requires a particular position and a specific kind of self-awareness which is linked to knowledge, indispensable attachment, and access to "truth."

What Cooper fails to remember is that historically the highest values of Western civilization and humanity have been deeply complicit in the violent history of colonialism and its ideologies. Indeed, the notions of freedom, liberty, order, civilization and human progress have been instrumental in helping the West dominate and restructure the world to its liking. These (re)articulations of sameness and difference, or the logic of "almost the same but not quite" (Bhabha 2004: 122), express varying dominant ideological stances and breaks through which the positional superiority of the Westerner has been performed and maintained with various differentiating practices of othering.

In the context of Africa, these representations have been eminently recoverable and variable and such they tell more about the nexus of Western interests in African affairs, or their imaginations of themselves, than they do about Africa and the Africans (Coombes 1994: 3; Landau and Kaspin 2002: 2; Said 2003: 12; Hawk 1992: 7). The contingent nature of these artificial "Africas" is apparent in analyses given by museums and colonial exhibitions, photographs, novels, advertising, Hollywood movies and media images (Chouliaraki 2006; Landau and Kaspin 2002; Mayer 2002; Ryan 1997; Ramamurthy 2003; McKenzie 1984; Hall and Rose 2008). These different African representations are not mimetic mirroring, or reflections of "reality." Nor are they "merely false images" (Eisenstein 1996: 22). Rather, they can be seen as historical event-makings, as "ambivalent texts of projection and introjection … displacement, overdetermination, guilt [and] aggressivity" through which Westerners have read themselves into other people through processes of self-recognition (Bhabha 2004: 82; Rabinowitz 1994: 51).

Indeed, colonialism has never operated as straightforward domination. As Anne McClintock has argued, the legitimization of imperial power in the colonies and Western metropoles, emerged from a "constellation of processes, taking haphazard shape from myriad encounters with the alternative forms of authority, knowledge and power" (McClintock 1995: 16). Ultimately then, imperialism and colonialism was fundamentally lived, performed and embodied world engagement through which Westerners constructed their historical selves

and subjectivities through the pronounced performances of humanity and progress. As an articulation of corporeal time and place, this colonial subjectivity was not only formulated through specific affective responses towards the African landscapes, but moreover, it was a specifically lived, performed and corporeal self-imagination and intelligibility (Foster 2008). In other words, in the construction of homely Empire and imaginary Africa, the interplay between the private and public, domestic and the imperial were constructed through various articulations, engagements, performances and analogies of race, gender and class – the intimate relations between power and resistance (Stoler 1995; McClintock 1995; Boisseau 2004).

Consequently, Western agency and authority have been historically constructed using various differentiating practices of othering: performances of self-mastery, displays and assertions of Western constancy and deportment in the empty lands of Africa. These cultural encounters and judgements of spaces of sameness and otherness are closely connected to historical knowledge, constituted with contingent ways of seeing, saying and sensing. It is indeed these historical insights that have in the contemporary research on celebrity advocacy, politics or humanitarianism been sidelined. The injustice and inequality of celebrity humanitarianism function not only at the level of ideology—by promoting neoliberal economics, advancing the global capitalist system through the trivialization of global development (Kapoor 2012; Dieter and Kumar 2008; Browne 2013)—but also through modalities of knowledge through which historical subjectivities, agencies and realities are re-constructed and legitimized (Weber 2006). Ultimately, global governance is not only an unfolding of official economic politics and practices into the social. Rather, it also includes broader cultural processes through which subjectivities and "realities" are constructed, mobilized and negotiated (Weber 2006).

By emphasizing these shifting, adapting and incorporating boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, new angles from which to investigate and locate the complex and violent significations of celebrity humanitarianism emerge. If celebrity diplomacy is "the art of the possible", as Andrew Cooper argues (Cooper 2008: 128), what kind of possibilities and truths do celebrities create, and which do they invalidate? Furtermore what are the conditions of possibility to become a "global voice of humanity" or "ethically" engaged world-citizen?

It is only by unsettling the processes that control "who is qualified to speak about what", and by challenging the normative ways in which we should interpret the social and political world, that new voices, visions and perspectives beyond the narrow scope of contemporary IR can emerge (Shapiro 2010). That said, if we wish to start to think of how celebrity humanitarianism translates into global politics, intellectual and creative engagement that distances itself both from commonsensical understandings of the compassionate nature of contemporary global humanitarianism, as well as the mimetic approaches of IR, is urgently needed.

To begin this journey one needs to attend to deeper historical trajectories of thought by examining the existing aesthetic patrimony of imaginaries and

intelligibilities, as well as their historical evocation of violent encounters (Shapiro 2009: 18). Ultimately, it is only by theorizing through history—that is, rendering celebrity humanitarian thinking peculiar and historical—that the violent nature of the contemporary Western celebrity humanitarian can become visible, and painfully thinkable.

2.4 Conclusions

> Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
> And sorry I could not travel both
> And be one traveler, long I stood
> And looked down one as far as I could
> To where it bent in the undergrowth;
>
> Then took the other, as just as fair,
> And having perhaps the better claim,
> Because it was grassy and wanted wear;
> Though as for that the passing there
> Had worn them really about the same
>
> And both that morning equally lay
> In leaves no step had trodden black.
> Oh, I kept the first for another day!
> Yet knowing how way leads on to way,
> I doubted if I should ever come back.
>
> I shall be telling this with a sigh
> Somewhere ages and ages hence:
> Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
> I took the one less traveled by,
> And that has made all the difference.
>
> - Robert Frost (1916) The Road not Taken

In this chapter, by examining the prevailing limits and silences within contemporary celebrity humanitarian studies, my aim has been to open up alternative thought-worlds and perspectives in order to encounter celebrity humanitarianism politically and historically. By engaging with various critical insights formulated in film, cultural and critical humanitarian studies, this reading has entailed detailing how celebrity discourses operate as emotional spaces though which the legitimacy of a specific social order, human essence and their possibilities are structured and established. In particular, by identifying fame as inseparable from the history of human ideals and virtues, it has also included elaborations of how celebrity subjectivities, intelligibilities and imaginaries, as symbolic forces of cultural memory and social cohesion, operate as important moral, aesthetic and affective practices through distinction and differentiation.

It is indeed these "historically developed, socially embedded interpretations of space and identity" that celebrity humanitarianism constructs in the contexts of world politics that have remained unchallenged within contemporary research (Shapiro 2009, 18). Encountering these imaginaries, intelligibili-

ties and subjectivities requires engaging with alternative and critical accounts of "who we think we were/are and who we wish we would never have been" (Weber 2006: 9). To begin with, this requires approaching celebrity humanitarian subjectivity not as natural or inherent, but rather as a normative, historical and political discursive entity. In short, turning attention towards the various ways in which these celebrity discourses of authentic embodied humanness - which constitute their legitimate agency as voices of universal humanity - condition and effect "African realities".

As Roland Bleiker in his criticism of the mimetic approaches of international relations (IR) has argued, innovative solutions to understanding the dilemmas of world politics cannot be found by sticking to the rigid, entrenched, disciplinary set of rules and orthodox methodologies found in conventional IR scholarship (Bleiker 2001: 523-4). Challenging the epistemological certainties and institutionalized ways of knowing which underpin the study of IR requires that attention be given to the inclusions and exclusions of knowledge production itself by composing a discourse of investigation that unbinds what are ordinarily presumed to belong together by encountering how knowledge and truth are conceived and limited through the organization of space and time, being and history (Opondo and Shapiro 2012: xv, 11). In other words, what is needed is a recognition of the dominant boundaries, limits and borders through which the commonsensical ways of knowing are governed and constituted.

As a result, instead of searching for the "truth" of celebrity humanitarianism, celebrity truth itself needs to be problematized by foregrounding the relations between aesthetics and politics through which representations are placed at the very centre of international humanitarian politics. Methodologically, this requires a critical analysis of the limits that celebrity humanitarian representations and discourses constitute at the level of imaginary and intelligibility. Theoretically, this necessitates historicizing contemporary Western humanitarian subjectivity, agency and truth. In sum, it requires encountering and revealing the singular, historical and normative modes of thinking, seeing and knowing that are embedded in these humanitarian intelligibilities, subjectivities, agencies and geographical imaginaries through which the possibilities for the "African Other" are elaborated, limited and governed.

3 VIOLENCE AND FREEDOM IN MICHEL FOUCAULT'S THOUGHT

> Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political 'double bind', which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures
> • Michel Foucault (2002/1982: 336)

> Humanity does not start out from freedom but from limitation …
> • Michel Foucault (1995/1964: 292)

3.1 Introduction

As argued in the previous chapter, a certain "trained incapacity" prevails in contemporary theories of celebrity humanitarian activity (Shapiro 2009: 5). Such limitations apply essentially to the methodological and theoretical approaches used within mainstream political sciences that have dismissed critical engagements with the aesthetic modes of this activity. That is, both creative and critical examinations of the ways in which celebrity humanitarian representations—as political and historical practices of thought—condition, shape and limit the world(s) of being, belonging and becoming.

To constitute a critical opening into the contemporary research on celebrity humanitarianism in this chapter, I engage with Michel Foucault's historical critique on Western modernity, humanity and reason. Foucault's historico-political analysis of the "critical ontology of ourselves"—grounded in the belief that we should examine "to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known"—inaugurates a profound critique of Western liberal humanism, truth, progress and freedom (Foucault 1985/1984: 9). As Colin Gordon has argued, Foucault's work marks a radical departure from the modern version of enlightenment, made up of morally and intellectually validated schemes of social improvement, therapy and order (Gordon, 2002: xvii). Indeed, rather than legitimating what is aldready known,

throughout his writings, Foucault aims to discredit, challenge and subvert Western truths, knowledge, humanity and progress by engaging and exposing their contingent relationships of power in relation to the subject and reality. By rejecting knowledge or truth as neutral, natural or objective entities, or trying to find some unsaid or unthought, he critically encounters the conditions and effects of historical thought itself through which the social, the present and the "real" is constituted, governed and determined through contingent relations sayable, thinkable and knowable. Formulating the central political question for him "not error, illusion, alienated or consciousness, or ideology," but the apparent neutrality and effects of "truth itself" (Foucault 2002d/1976: 133).

Foucault's insights into the relations between truth, power/knowledge and discourse are well documented in a series of methodology books on discourse analysis (Kendall and Wickham 1999; Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine 2008; Howarth 2000; Mills 1997). In general, the starting point of discourse analysis is that language does not reflect the world, but rather operates as an active practice in creating it. However, Foucault never discussed "discourse analysis" as a specific methodology. Rather, by depicting discourses as "violence that we do to things, or at all events, as a practice we impose upon them," his aim was to explicate the dominating mechanisms, relations and domains of liberal power, in all their complexity and diversity (Foucault 1981/1971: 67; Foucault 2002e/1978: 284).

Consequently, Foucault conceptualizes violence as reaching well beyond the social processes and practices of language. He writes that what is "most dangerous in violence is its rationality […]. The idea had been that if we live in the world of reason, we can get rid of violence. This is quite wrong. Between violence and rationality there is no incompatibility" (Foucault 1996/1980: 299). As such, he links violence to wider practices of rationality and truth which operate not only through saying, but—as discussed later in this chapter—also through ordering and overdetermining acts of seeing.

Today, little attention has been given to Foucault's problematizations of violence in relation to power/knowledge. The prevailing reading of Foucault is that for him violence and power are inherently separable and different—"the former presupposing a situation of physical determination and the latter connoting a relation of conduct" (Hekman 1996: 224). Yet, as Johanna Oksala argues in her book *Foucault, Politics and Violence*, one of Foucault's most important contributions to political thought was his observation on the incompatibility between violence and rationality, an insight through which violence is problematized as historically specific, context/dependent practice (Oksala 2012: 6, 9).

Oksala's insights provide groundbreaking openings into the ways violence is conceptualized in Foucault's thinking, particularly her examination of violence's meanings and specific forms, which aims to rethink the relationship between violence and power. However, Oksala's objective is to show that violence is an eliminable part of politics, through readings of Foucault's writings against Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Chantal Mouffe, Giorgio Agamben and Slavoj Žižek. My aim in this chapter, conversely, is to discuss violence in Fou-

cault's thought, but not with the aim of developing any original philosophical position with regards to nonviolent ways of governing. Rather, my engagement with violence in Foucault's analysis of power/knowledge is purely instrumental. In other words, his insights operate here as critical tools which guide my reading of Frantz Fanon's writings on the postcolonial condition, as well as my empirical analysis that aims to reveal how celebrity humanitarianism engages with post/colonial governance, characterized by overdetermining and self-referential rationality of Western humanism and reason.

To grasp the dominant nature of celebrity humanitarianism, it is essential to engage with Foucault's view of violence as a practice linked to intelligibility and imagination, through which thinking, being and becoming are conditioned. In his writings, it is not only discourses (linguistic or visual) that are located at the centre of the political, but moreover also humanitarian intelligibilities and imaginaries are problematized as technologies of liberal war. This ultimately constitutes a critical perspective regarding practices of liberal governance, which predicates difference at the level of what is seeable and sayable.

My investigation into Foucault's thinking—which reveals modernity as a dominating attitude and liberal humanism as a biopolitical practice of racial enactment and identification—begins with his early archaeological investigations into the histories of thought and the discursively constructed and conditioned violent realities, truths and knowledges (Foucault 1982/1968; Foucault 2009/1966; Foucault 2010b/1969). From these problematizations, through which representations are constituted as contingent relations of violence, that is, techniques and practices which regulate, condition and limit modes of thinking I continue to examine Foucault's writings on modern institutions of liberal healing – the madhouse, asylum and prison in which he reveals further how liberal control and domination operate through spatial control, constituted by the surveying gaze and subjugation through normalizing truths (Foucault 1991/1975; Foucault 2009b/1961; Foucault 2010/1963).

From these technologies of life, which detach materiality from normalizing and fixing thought—that is, tacit and partisan discoursive identifications which limit, block and condition ways of seeing, knowing and being—liberal war unfolds as a dominating intelligibility through which life is managed and regulated (Foucault 2004/1976). Ultimately, problematizing liberal governance as a silent battle which produces, controls, orders and governs life through a "logic of relentless manipulation and re-formation" (Dillon and Reid 2009: 21).

Foucault's investigations draw attention to the relations between truth, knowledge and discourse, through which liberal thought and its humanity is rendered as a historical and political practice, characterized by a domination which limits and conditions possibilities of being, thinking and knowing. By approaching thought as a particular, historical and political form of violation, through which relations to oneself and others are defined and managed, violence is exposed as an ineliminable part of thinking and being.

As I will briefly discuss in the final part of the chapter, it is against these historically constituted singular and linear intelligibilities and imaginaries—

which collectively govern ways of knowing, seeing and sensing—that Foucault's later writings on self-constitutive practices of freedom need to be read (Foucault 2010c/1982; Foucault 2011/1983; Foucault 1991c/1983; Foucault 1997/1980; Foucault 1984/1997b; Foucault 1988/1982; Foucault 1988b/1982). Indeed, for Foucault freedom has to be situated in relation to the historical truth and knowledge of violently dominating liberal thought, which is embodied, performed and inscribed. For him, freedom does not therefore entail the elimination of violence. Neither it is something that can be given, or granted. Rather, as a critical practice at the level of thinking which aims to create "unforeseen places that disperse one towards a strange and new relation with oneself", freedom—by encountering who, where and what we are or claim to be—is embedded in self-criticism (Foucault 1991e/1984: 339). Interlinked with alterity at the level of knowing and being, this self-criticism—by going beyond categorical and normalizing thinking—entails not only problematizations of the violent limits of one's own thought, but moreover requires constant self-reflection upon one's present. This reflection brings about "a change, a transformation of the relationship we have with ourselves and with the world, where, up to then, we have seen ourselves as being without problems" (Foucault 2002e/1978: 244).

Effectively, as a practice of self-problematization, for Foucault freedom relates closely to one's capacity to reinvent and facilitate one's own truth by resisting the subjugative normalizing truth which governs and determines the relationships individuals have with themselves. Accordingly, freedom entails not liberation, but rather the aesthetics of existence: that is, plurality, alterity and difference at the level of oneself and one's present. This amounts to constant detachment, resistance, renouncement and disjunction, and the critique of all normative and fixed ways of relating, being, thinking, sensing and knowing, which allow "a step back from that manner of doing or reacting"(Foucault 1997c/1984: 117).

Methodologically engaging with Foucault's historico-critical thinking within our present context of celebrity humanitarianism—constituted as it is by violent differentiation between self and other—necessitates approaching celebrity humanitarian thought as a political and historical practice of domination, which is applied towards different ways of thinking, being and knowing. To begin with, in aim to move beyond the contemporary "for" or "against" academic debate that centres around the truthfulness, accuracy or accountability of celebrity humanitarian activity, this entails presenting the celebrity humanitarian truth itself as an object of thought, and by reflecting on it as a problem through which the ontology of ourselves and our present is governed and predicated at the level of intelligibility and images (Foucault 1997c/1984: 117).Ultimately, by locating and explicating the historical conditions of possibility of this activity and agency, inaugurating new ways of understanding towards our humanitarian present by recognizing "that we can do by ourselves the largest possible share of what is presented to us as inaccessible" (Foucault 2002c: 458).

3.2 Reassessing Violence as Practice of Thought

Today Foucault's writings on power, knowledge and subjectivity have become so influential that it is almost impossible to imagine critical political theory without them. In contrast, less attention has been devoted to his thinking on violence, which is often considered to be in opposition to power. While Foucault himself paid less explicit attention to violence in his work, he did problematize violence within the social nexus of liberal societies and their conducting strategies of life. This thematization of the essence and practices of violence differs from his earlier and later work; yet it would be an overstatement to claim that there were substantial or drastic changes in Foucault's thinking on the subject. In Foucault's writings, violence—like his theorizations of power—remains largely a nominal idea, conceptualized as a relationship which determines the material through forceful "repression," "totalization," "coercions," "constraints" and "investments" (Foucault 2009b/1961: 149 Foucault 2010/1963: 36, 155; Foucault 1991/1975: 29, 138).

Because Foucault does not describe violence in a consistent manner, it is not quite possible to distinguish between his notions of power and violence. Sometimes, particularly in his earlier work, he refers to violence as a physical force which acts upon bodies; on other occasions it is seen as a discursive practice—an appropriation of subjugative rules, truths or knowledges (Foucault 2002/1982; Foucault 1981/1971: 67; Foucault 1991d/1971). It should be noted, however, that violence was never a key interest for Foucault. Rather, as he stated, he always felt "diffident" to any notion of repression that conceived of it operating as a "chain": a formulation which had to be "considerably modified if not ultimately abandoned", or at least "submitted to closer scrutiny"(Foucault 1980/1976: 92, 98).

Foucault never attempted the task of critically thinking violence itself, but instead turned to problematize the relationships between power, knowledge and subject by analysing the circular techniques and tactics which operate through net-like organizations outside the form of sovereignty (Foucault 2002d/1976; Foucault 2002/1982; Foucault 1980b/1977: 121). This approach, and his conceptualization of power—not as repression, but as a productive regime which controls the conduct of others—nevertheless involved some rethinking of violence (Foucault 2002d/1976: 111-133). Indeed, in his early analyses of modern institutions of correction and treatment, as discussed later in this chapter, Foucault closely interwove violence with power as a systematic paradigm towards the body—a formulation which, however, he later saw as a "confusion" of mortifying cultural totality (Foucault 2002d/1976: 114-5; Foucault 2010b/1969: 18). As he clarified, power operates through freedoms—that is, the management of possibilities and "conducts of conduct"—while violence, at the opposite pole, can only lead to passivity (Foucault 2002/1982: 326-48).

This approach characterizes the relationship between power and violence in specific ways. As Foucault assesses, "power relations are possible only inso-

far as the subjects are free" (Foucault 1997b/1984: 292). The nature of power does not thus fold back into its violent essence, "its permanent secret or last resort," but presupposes that its objects have space to manoeuvre and act (Foucault 2002/1982: 340). Accordingly, power relationships entail that individuals are recognized as subjects, with the capacity to act upon themselves within "a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behaviour are available" (ibid: 341). In power relationships, possibilities to act exist: power incites, induces and seduces by conducting actions, while violence "forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes off all possibilities" (Foucault 2002/1982: 340).

This conceptualization of the relationship between power and violence does not, however, explicitly renounce the idea of violence as part of productive power. While Foucault never argues that violence is or could be productive—as this would throw his theory of power into disarray—he does maintain that neither violence nor consent constitute the primary nature of power (Foucault 2002/1982: 341). Rather, he argues, for power to be exercised, both consent and violence, freedom and domination, are needed: "the exercise of power can never do without the one or the other [consent or violence], often both at the same time" (Foucault 2002/1982: 340-1). And therefore, he continues, the primitive notion of violence is not satisfactory, because "it allows one to think that the physical exercise of an unbalanced force is not part of a rational, calculated, and controlled game of the exercise of power" (Foucault 2006/1973: 14). Problematizing violence not as a specific physical act, but rather as a strategy and tactic of power through which bodies, realities and meanings are determined and imprisoned at the level of thought.

Hence, for Foucault violence, alongside consent, is not opposite to power; rather—linked as it is to specific reasoning, rationalization and conditioning—it is power's instrument, condition and effect, which governs the field of possibilities (Foucault 2002/1982: 340-1; Foucault 2002b/1973: 9). Effectively, as an agonistic practice of thought—a mode of fixing, excluding and appropriating, which confines and limits possibilities at the level of thinking and being—violence is an innate and endemic part of human thought and reality. Indeed, not only is violence inextricably linked to power, it is also a historically contingent and contextual practice of thought, instinctual to human experience, subjectivity and intelligibility. As Foucault states: "what is most dangerous in violence is its rationality. Of course violence itself is terrible. But the deepest root of violence and its permanence come out of the form of the rationality we use. The idea has been that if we live in the world of reason, we can get rid of violence. This is quite wrong. Between violence and rationality there is no incompatibility" (Foucault 1996/1980: 299).

These various histories of order, rationality and knowledge, which arise from contingent discursive rules, breaks and changes, constitute the core of Foucault's archaeological studies (Foucault 1982/1968; Foucault 2009/1966; Foucault 2010/1963). In *The Order of Things* (2009/1966), he details the discursively constituted and conditioned relationships between knowledge and

reality by concentrating on three epistemic systems—or different relations of knowledge—that have existed in the Western world during the renaissance, the classical and the modern periods[5]. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (2010b/1969), he develops his criticism of linear, causal history by exposing the complexity and density of discursive systems not as aspects of a gentle, silent or intimate

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5 Foucault argues that during the Renaissance the order of the world was designated through resemblances—by the non-distinction between seeing and saying. The ordering practice was therefore one of similitude and resemblance of one thing to another, organized by visible marks. In this world of God, organized by the primacy of the written word, knowledge arose from interpretations of visible resemblances between things, and no difference between language and things existed. This world, in which knowledge was formulated through interpretations, slowly gave way to a classical system of representation in the 17th- and 18th-centuries, when representation took over resemblance as a foundation of knowledge. Through this reorganization of a conceptual space, the function of language altered. The relationship between words and things, objects and their representations changed into a new organizational model of rigid categorization of identities and differences. The sign and the signified separated: knowledge was no longer ordered by the natural, perceived resemblance between things, but through representations that now emerged as connecting and organizing forces between the signs and the signified. Subsequently a new relation between language and the world, or being in the world, emerged. In this new cultural space, organized by representations, classifications of difference became "tools of analysis, marks of identity and difference, […] keys for a taxomony" (Foucault 2009b/1961: 64). Analysis took the form of the examination of relations, where the space of order was now confirmed and formed by ordering practices. Language no longer interpreted, but rather confirmed various significations and affirmations of things according to their identities. Things and words existed in harmony: acts of naming operated as verbal affirmations, conjoining together things and words, language and reality.

In the classical age, the nature of language and its function remained unproblematized. Language, as Foucault writes, was "withdrawn from the midst of beings themselves and [...] entered a period of neutrality and transparency," leaving no gap between what is said and what is seen (Foucault 2009b/1961: 62). Only after the "death of God," at the end of the 18th century, did this pre-established harmony of correspondence between images and words begin to dissolve. In the modern episteme, knowledge could no longer be read from definitions given to appearances; instead, it emerged from the analysis of objects and their relationships. This required new ways of knowing through questioning, analysis and the revelation of the fundamental relationships between material things. New relationships between words, things and their order arose; Man, as an invention of modern thought, was no longer a spectator, but a subject as well as an object of knowledge—that "strange empirico-transcendental doublet" (Foucault 2009b/1961: 330-374).

While in the classical era representation provided the foundation of knowledge—organizing a mode of being through transparently affirming language—in modernity this bond breaks down. Hence, language no longer represents and confirms the object of representation, but emerges as just "one object of knowledge among others, on the same level as living beings, wealth and value, and the history of events and men" (Foucault 2009b/1961: 177). Language, as a practice that both belongs in and calls forth the world, escapes from classical representation and becomes the formal condition of knowledge itself. Consequently, in modern episteme, language reappears as a force that organizes knowledge, no longer through naming and ordering, but through a specific set of constitutive and determining discursive systems. Words no longer confirm, but rather penetrate into things, transforming the descriptive space of classical knowledge into a genealogical space where rational discourses not only create meanings, but also act as relations of control. Hence, intelligibilities no longer belong to the dimension of language or perception, but rather to the dimension of thought that transforms into violent and limiting action.

consciousness, but as an obscure set of anonymous rules, conditions and relations which, by imposing thought from the outside, constitute "the set of conditions in accordance with which a practice is exercized" (Foucault 2010b/1969: 230). And in this regard, revealing discourses as violent practices which entail "something other than to express what one thinks or to translate what one knows" (Foucault 2010b/1969: 230).

With this analysis of the discontinuity between historical knowledge systems, Foucault exposes how thinking and knowing are not reducible to a specific discovery or mentality, but are conditioned by a whole range of modifications at the level of discourse (Foucault 1980c; Foucault 1996b/1966). As he details, epistemic changes, or ruptures between systems of knowledge, do not arise from the progress of reason or accumulative truth, but from historical a priori changes in the redistribution of spaces that are structured by seeing and saying, the visible and articulable. As such, ways to know and be are both conditioned and effected by contingent orders of sayable and seeable, through which truths are redefined, limited and regulated. As Foucault cates, "there can be no relation of natural continuity between knowledge and the things knowledge must know"; "knowledge can only be a violation of the things to be known, and not a perception, a recognition, an identification of or with those things" (Foucault 2002b/1973: 9).

Foucault details and visualizes these discursive orders, which condition the possibilities of knowledge, in his reading of Diego Velázquez's (1599-1660) and Rene Magritte's (1898–1967) artworks (Foucault 2009/1966: 3-18; Foucault 1982/1968). What Velázquez's painting "Las Meninas" problematizes, Foucault argues, is the act of representation itself; it does so by revealing the "relation between language and image" as "an infinite," not because words are imperfect or inadequate, but because "neither can be reduced to the other's terms: it is in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we say" (Foucault 2009/1966: 10). Ultimately, what "Las Meninas" reveals, Foucault continues, is that representation is always re-presentation, a subjective perspective and projection onto the world. This culminates in the painting's spatial ordering, which destabilizes the relationships between subject and object, seeing and being seen, visible and invisible, interior and exterior, and by which the observer is caged into "complex networks of uncertainties, exchanges and feints" (Foucault 2009/1966: 5).

Without a foundational subject, the painting is "a void" (ibid: 18)—that is, a pure dislocation and projection, conditioned by displacements and exclusions, invisibilities and uncertainties. In other words, not only are representations conditioned by specific systems of seeing and presenting; they themselves operate as violent relational practices controlling the delimitation and designation of knowledge, "defined by the sequential elements of syntax" (Foucault 2009/1966: 10). As such, they provide no access to unmediated reality, or truth. Representations, by limiting visibility and knowability, are always subject to displacements and invisibilities—violent strategic relations which translate, add, condition, rule and transform imaginaries and thought-worlds.

These relations between the seeable and sayable, and the emerging role of language as the central organizing force of modern episteme, are further detailed by Foucault in relation to Magritte's artwork. Like Velázquez, who in "Las Meninas" reveals classical representation as pure dislocation, Magritte also problematizes the relationship between language and reality, by introducing non-affirmative language into a visual space—thus radically divorcing words from things. Indeed, in Magritte's art, words and images do not reflect each other naturally or neatly; rather, as Foucault writes, "between text and figure" there are "a whole series of intersections—or rather attacks launched by one against the other, arrows shot at the enemy target, enterprises of subversion and destruction, lance blows and wounds, a battle" (Foucault 1982/1968: 26).

Filled with "intrusions, brusque and destructive invasions, avalanches of images into the milieu of words, and verbal lightning-flashes that streak and shatter the drawings" (Foucault 1982/1968: 36), Magritte's paintings present images and language which constantly cancel each other out, exposing the contradictory and nonrepresentational relations between words and things, representations and reality. In other words, dissolving the link between reference and affirmation, Magritte's art reveals the violent nature of language—that is, its ability to limit and capture visualities and visibilities in a "stable prison" (Foucault 1982/1968: 17). By "exemplifying the penetration of discourses into the form of things [and] revealing discourse's ambiguous power to deny and to redouble," Foucault writes, his paintings expose the forcefully affirmative and dominating nature of language, which "can displace the image it stands for by taking the place of the original" (Foucault 1982/1968: 3). Consequently, problematizing modernity itself as a violent perspective, a conventional and singular attitude that pursues normalization at the level of thinking and knowing.

Through these interrogations into discursive formations and their conditions of possibility, Foucault problematizes representations not as mimetic insights into the real, but rather as subjective, conditioning and conditioned practices of thought that violently dominate and limit imaginaries and intelligibilites. Indeed, for Foucault not only are possibilities of doing, thinking and saying conditioned by ordering thought; moreover, modern man is split—a historically created entity of knowledge, born from ceaselessly modified perspectives, inscriptions and interpretations (Foucault 1996c/1969: 67). That is, eternally subjugated by fixed knowledge and truth, "doomed historically to history, to the patient construction of discourses about discourses, and to the task of hearing what has already been said" (Foucault 2010/1963: xvii).

Therefore, there is no ultimate foundation, original identity or secret truth to be found: all meanings, memories and significations are an effect of violent discursive battles and their complex epistemological, affective and aesthetic configurations. Accordingly, for Foucault, the starting point of critical thinking is not the unsaid or unseen, but rather necessitates an encounter with the violently differentiating limits and boundaries of thought through which possibilities of knowledge are conditioned, determined and effected at the level of intelligibility and the imaginary.

Within the realm of celebrity humanitarianism, this entails encountering the discursive limits which establish the phenomenon's intelligibility, activity and agency. In other words, placing the celebrity humanitarian thought itself at the centre of the political, and addressing it as a relation of force in relation to the spatial and temporal. To begin with, this means approaching celebrity humanitarian representations as acts of violence, through which the possibilities of seeing, understanding and relating to oneself and to the world is determined, conditioned and limited at the level of seeing and saying.

3.3 Governing Life through Difference

In Foucault's investigations into historically contingent knowledge systems, violence is conceptualized as a limiting practice that conditions the possibilities of thought itself. Consequently, for Foucault neither knowledge or truth are reducible to a specific "reality." Rather, out of spatio-temporal battles fought at the level of seeing and saying, knowledge and truth emerge as impositions and inscriptions that operate as "relations of violence, domination, power and force [...] a violation of the things to be known" (Foucault 2002b/1973: 9).

Foucault details the materialization of these relations of violative knowledge and truth, which condition experiences, subjectivities and possibilities, in *Madness and Civilization* (2009b/1961) and *The Birth of the Clinic* (2010/1963). These texts reveal how, in the liberal humanitarian paradigm, truth, reason and morality emerge as subjugative practices of authority and imprisonment, which capture and restrict imaginations, passions, desires or delirious illusions at the level of life itself. In these critical investigations, Foucault not only exposes Western humanism as a normalizing and totalizing practice of thought that operates through problematizations of life; he also problematizes humanism as a regime of truth through which liberal governance operates.

In *Madness and Civilization*, by paying close attention to the ways in which madness has been historically constituted, Foucault confronts the concept not as a natural phenomenon, but rather as a practice of difference constituted through a contingent discursive relationship between reason and unreason. Starting his analysis from the "feasts of fool" of the middle ages, which symbolized secrets and truth—"the dizzying unreason of the world" (Foucault 2009b/1961: 11)—Foucault describes how, in modernity, madness is exiled to the asylum, separated from its reason on medical and moral grounds, as symptomatic of a dangerous inadequacy and immaturity. In these organizing and intervening forces, which condition and effect madness as non-reason, Foucault examines the rise of a clinical gaze, and a regime of truth that orders, asserts, maps and masters life itself. As he writes in the preface to *The Birth of the Clinic,* in modernity "a new alliance is forged between words and things", through which individuals are enveloped in a collective, homogeneous space (Foucault 2010/1963: xiii). Through this "tacit form of violence", which "look[s] in order to know" and "show[s] in order to teach", the mad and the sick are organized

into the hands of the men of reason, converting medicine into justice, and therapeutics into a coercive morality which asserts the patient's limited rationality or humanity (Foucault 2010/1963: 102). Accordingly, liberal violence is not only situated in the ordered techniques which constrain bodies; it is also increasingly directed internally. As Foucault explains, the surveying gaze of the guard or doctor now penetrates deeper into the "abnormal" individual, who becomes "his own overseer"—an actor who exercises "surveillance over, and against himself" (Foucault 1980b/1977: 154-5). This transforms control into perpetual visibility, a form of rationalization and surveillance which pervades the body and life itself. "Not unreason liberated", Foucault states, but "madness long since mastered" (Foucault 2009b/1961: 239).

Ultimately, the modern world is organized by a penetrative gaze and capturing truth—through which the individual is established in his "irreducible quality" (Foucault 2010/1963: xv). With these ever-present exclusions and normative differentiating markings, diffused, anonymous, relayed and lived violence penetrates the social fabric and individuals themselves. Where the mad were previously expelled from society and released to the sea, in liberal modernity they are constantly required to deny their transgressive unreason: to discipline their excessively passionate mind with self-restraint (Foucault 2009b/1961: 236-7). To confess one's obscure guilt is no longer enough, for there can be no dialogue with abnormality. Rather, what is required from the discursively constituted "abnormals" is a constant awareness of their madness, a ceaseless acknowledgement of their strange essence and untruth. In the modern epoch, there are no more opportunities to escape into the freedom of unreason; rather than accepting difference, life and living are constituted now as responsibilities which entail constant moral improvement, betterment, progress and treatment (Foucault 2009b/1961: 236-7).

Operating through therapeutic and civilizing disciplines and their healing inscriptions, the material violence of earlier treatments—employing chains, irons and confinement—mutates into a wider network of subjugation, in which the human body is left free, but consciousness becomes colonized by constantly reinscribed truths and disciplinary morality. This ultimately transforms human oppression into the control of seeing and speaking, achieved through subjugative inscriptions and visualities; these govern life and subjectivity by constant therapeutic interventions and moral treatments, "systems of rewards and punishments" (Foucault 2009b/1961: 234, 237).

With these discursive limits, divisions, orders and hierarchies that emerge from violently exclusionary truth and knowledge, Western humanism unfolds as historical interpretation, a subjective and subjugative violent practice of generalized and tactical normalizing thought. Effectively, with his investigations into the liberal institutions of correction and normalization and their "humane" forms of healing, Foucault reveals how violence evolves from bodily harm into spatial and temporal configurations and arrangements, normalizing and fixing intelligibilities and imaginaries. Ultimately, in modernity life becomes governed through abnormality, constituted through scientific and moral formulations of

life. Hence, what culminates in the asylum and the clinic is not an increase in madness or disease per se, but rather a ”sovereign violence of return” through which the mad and the poor are imprisoned in a moral world as ”an experience of unreason” (Foucault 2009b/1961: 188; 256), becoming objects of perpetual judgement and paternal dismissal.

If Foucault's investigations into the clinic and asylum reveal the violently confining effects of modern humanism, by exposing the gaze as a means to sublimate dominating and ordering truths, in *Discipline and Punish* (1991/1975) he symbolically opens the gates of these corrective institutions, allowing the dominant gaze to encompass western societies. Starting from the public executions of the middle-ages – the spectacular barbaric torturous acts, Foucault explicates how by mid-18th century, torture and pain, the blood and the public body of the condemned as ”the anchoring point for the manifestations of power, and opportunity of affirming the dissymmetry of forces”, is transformed into a ”system of constrains and privatisations, obligations and phobitions” (Foucault 1991/1975: 55, 11). Building upon humanitarian demands for ”less cruelty, less pain, more kindness, more respect and more humanity” with these circular and indefinite obligations that situate individuals in a ”general cultural form, a political and moral attitude, a way of thinking”, a more internalized, articulated, widespread and detailed human control is permitted and constituted (Foucault 1991/1975: 16; Foucault 2007/1978: 45). As Foucault writes in *The Eye of the Power,* in modern disciplinary societies ”there is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze” (Foucault 1980b/1977: 155). In other words, the physical pain of the body is no longer an element of the modern penalty (Foucault 1991/1975: 11). Rather, in the place of the sword and guillotine, a new “indefinite discipline” and its “examinatory” justice is employed: “an interrogation without end, an investigation that would be extended without limit to a meticulous and ever more analytical observation, a judgment that would at the same time be the constitution of a file that was never closed” (Foucault 1991/1975: 305, 227).

Modern disciplinary societies are, as Foucault maintains, fundamentally arranged and maintained through supervision and assessment: the organization of visibilities and spaces through enclosures, rankings and serializations. It is from these forceful networks of power-knowledge relations —which limit possibilities of being and becoming—that the historically conditioned and constituted subject emerges: that is, ”the knowable man, his soul, individuality, consciousness and conduct” (Foucault 1991/1975: 305). In this respect, liberal institutions do not represent progressive development towards the emancipation of humanity. Rather, as Foucault writes, they epitomize a widening unfreedom—”a dark but firm web of experiences (Foucault 2010/1963: 246). Accordingly, for Foucault, the shift from torturous public spectacles to more humane forms of punishment epitomizes a turn towards deeper social control; this aims not to liberate the body, or to punish it less, but to punish it more effectively, in deeper and more encompassing ways (Foucault 1991/1975: 82).

Foucault's investigations into the histories of the clinic, asylum and prison and their conditions of possibility appropriate broader interrogations into the practice of human imprisonment, constituted by contingent relations between knowledge, truth and subject. Indeed, this peaceful administration of humanity which guarantees civil order, is the general foundation and strategic basis to accomplish the "military dream of society" (Foucault 1991/1975: 169). As Foucault writes on the final page of *Discipline and Punish*: "In this central and centralized humanity, the effect and instrument of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple mechanisms of incarceration, objects for discourses that are in themselves elements for this strategy, we must hear the distant roar of battle" (Foucault 1991/1975: 308).

3.4 Foucault's Omission on Liberal War, Race and Biopolitics

This distant battle, echoing from the walls of modern institutions of normative healing and correction, forms an essential part of the liberal war that Foucault sees as an invariable feature of liberal peace and Western humanity in general (Foucault 2004/1976; Reid 2006: 128; Dillon and Neil 2008: 6). As he argues in Society Must be Defended, wars in liberal Western societies do not take place in the battlefields - rather they transform into permanent and silent wars that are battled at the level of intelligibilities. Using knowledge, rights and truths as its strategies and weapons, hence, rather than being an exceptional event, for Foucault it is an ongoing battle of reality itself (Foucault 2004/1976; Foucault 2002d/1976: 124). Constituting war, as Foucault argues, both as a programme of political action, as well as an administrative discursive practice which is "at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its power and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality" (Foucault 1972/1969: 216).

With these discourses that perpetually reinscribe, modify and establish sanctions and disequilibriums, a broader liberal war against the human existence and essence is waged. As Foucault writes, "we are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions" (Foucault 2004/1976: 16). With this significant modulation of "peace as a coded war", Foucault diagnoses military strategies as central conditions for the liberal order (Foucault 2004/1976: 51). Consequently, liberal civil peace and its prevailing humanity—which subjugates bodies, directs gestures, and regulates forms of behaviour—constitutes nothing less than invisible warfare against alternative forms of being, thinking, behaving and feeling.

As deployments of normalizing knowledge, these strategies—which arise from the bloody terrain of military strategies and tactics—reside not only, or even centrally, in their violent ends (Reid 2006: 129), but also in historical knowledge established through the tactical deployment of rights and privileges (Foucault 2004/1976: 190; 55-57). Indeed, as Foucault argues in *Society Must be*

Defended, for centuries history has operated as a strategy and tactic of political struggle, "a mechanism of social warfare," through which "relations of force and relations of truth" have been established (Foucault 2004/1976: 60, 52). Accordingly, as he further points out in *Truth and Power* "history has no meaning", but rather operates as a form of warfare that sanctions memorializations by inscribing deeds, obligations and commitments (Foucault 2002d: 116; Foucault 2004/1976: 67-8).

There is no disinterested or universal human history. As Foucault writes, "the history of some is not the history of others" (Foucault 2004/1976: 69). Rather, through historical discourses which limit and guard memory and feeling, the wider liberal war operates as a battle for history. Throughout Western history, various wars—both counter-hegemonic as well as hegemonic—have been waged in the name of justice, humanity, progress, fairness and rightfulness. The weapons used are claims of truth, singular rights, deeds and obligations. Therefore, "history does not simply analyze or interpret forces: it modifies them" (Foucault 2004/1976: 171). In other words, history is never something that lies in the past, unmoved and still, disinterested and forgetful. Rather, as a strategic technique through which the present is governed, judged and legitimized (Foucault 2004/1976: 67-84), it is a general form and tactical practice (Foucault 2004/1976: 190) through which political authority operates and revitalizes itself.

Foucault's conceptualization of liberal war as a battle around knowledge, truth and history resists and rejects any "natural" reading of its essence, conduct or place. For him liberal war is not a physical battle, but a discursive practice linked to truth and memory - historical knowledge that is infused with recollections, memories and various rituals of memorialization. Entailing multiplicity of battles that are waged over history and through history, indeed, not only does Western humanity emerge from perpetual battle of historical knowledge and truth, but moreover, as Foucault implies, it is itself preconditioned and perpetuated by racism that takes and constitutes life as a phenomena to be intervened, improved or administrated (Rasmussen 2011; Macey 2009).

This theme of racism appears in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, in which Foucault shows how discourses of sexuality are closely linked to the construction of race (Foucault 1998/1976; Stoler 1995; McWhorter 2004; 2009; 2011) and the emergence of a biopolitical state. In this state, wars are "no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who needs to be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone: entire populations are mobilised for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of necessity", by the "managers of life and survival, of bodies and race" (Foucault 1998/1976: 137). This biopolitical governance of life, which operates through the protection and well-being of the people, also constitutes a central theme of *Society Must be Defended*; there, Foucault further examines how discourses of race have historically operated as dividing practices, through which binary divisions are established at the level of the intelligibility. Starting with the counter-hegemonic wars of the Saxons and Normans in which race referred to heritage or lineage, and continuing with

a discussion of racial ideology in eighteenth-century revolutionary wars, Foucault reveals how in modernity wars are "waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage" (Foucault 2004/1976: 61).

Ultimately, in modernity racicm is transformed into normative discursive practice, through which one race reproduces itself "against those who deviate from [its] norm" (Foucault 2004/1976: 61). This normalizing and "biologically monistic" racism, which functions through administrating life and its properties, is not preoccupied with the destruction of other races, but rather with protecting the life and boundaries of a single human race (Foucault 2004/1976: 80). Race, as a concept, becomes unified; life is now described in evolutionary terms, as something to be managed, protected, guaranteed and cultivated. Operating "at the level of life, the species, the race and [...] population," and invoking "the 'right" to life, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs", the discourse of race changes: modern racism aims not to kill, but to control all life, by eliminating human threats with "permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, health and everyday life" (Foucault 1998/1976: 137, 145, 149). Ultimately, racism is transformed into "a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die" (Foucault 2004/1976: 254).

Accordingly, these discourses—which create a rupture in the biological continuum—constitute the precondition of liberal biopolitics: a regulative mechanism of populations which, alongside individualizing disciplines, governs and invests "life through and through" (Foucault 1998/1976: 139). In other words, liberal racism does not exist as an exception or intrusion upon the liberal order and its governance of life. On the contrary, the normalization, peace and humanity of the modern liberal state is constituted by this indirect murder, which identifies abnormal others as threats to be eliminated for the improvement of the species or race (Foucault 2004/1976: 256). Foucault writes: "in normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable" (Foucault 2004/1976: 256). However, this killing is not a physical act, but is rather an "indirect murder" in which the individual is condemned "to political death, expulsion or rejection" through normalization (ibid). This constitutes racism as a contingent normative discursive practice which excludes and segregates, binding individuals to inferior, dangerous or threatening characteristics and particularities.

Foucault's writings draw critical attention towards the various norms that administrate, regulate and control life. Race, for Foucault, does not have a historically uniform configuration. As he states, the formulation of modern racist discourse in biological characteristics is just one "particular and localized episode in the great discourse of race war, or race struggle"; it is "a reworking of that old discourse [...] for purposes of social conservatism and, at least in a certain number of cases, colonial domination" (Foucault 2004/1976: 65). Moreover, modern racism does not operate solely through hatred or hostility, nor is it

bound up with mentalities, ideologies or the lies of power (ibid: 258). Rather, as a normalizing practice, it operates through affect, purification, procreation and regeneration; in this way, the relationship between "my life and the death of the other" is asserted (Foucault 2004/1976: 255). Racism, in other words, does not function through visible acts of discrimination, or overt language of intolerance. Rather, as Foucault writes, it manifests as "a positive relation" aimed to make "life in general healthier: healthier and purer" (Foucault 2004/1976: 255).

Accordingly, Western liberal peace emerges not from progressive humanity or a move from immaturity towards maturity. Rather, it emerges from wars that operate through a mode of regulation and normalization, being concerned with the purity, vitality and singularity of human life. When viewed as a model of battle that aims to foster life in the name of universal humanity and its singularity, the techniques and rationalities of racism are not so different from those of liberal humanism, which aims to guarantee the peace, civil order and vitality of life. Rather, humanism and racism are mutually determined entities which meet and operate around the violently limiting and fixing norms that promote singularity at the level of human life, its existence and essence. In other words, for Foucault liberalism, racism and humanity are historically co-dependent and mutual strategies. For humanity to operate, racial organization, violent exclusion, subjugation and confinement is needed. For racism to be able to "kill"—whether in the name of prevention, rehabilitation, or vitality—some ideal normative notion of humanity or the human is needed. This defines humanism always in relation to what it is not: a practice inseparable from the biopolitical racialization that, in liberal modernity, operates through the regulation, optimization and mobilization of human life. Effectively constituting liberal racism as an indispensable condition and effect of liberal humanism itself, which violently orders people into inferior and superior, into a "superrace and a subrace" (Foucault 2004/1976: 61).

Although Foucault does not explicitly analyse or conceptualize the relations between racism and humanism, his analyses of modern institutions, sexuality and race wars can be seen as broader investigations of the ways in which, in modernity, life becomes administered, managed and directed. Consequently, Foucault depicts and unfolds a wider imaginary which shows how racism, as a managing and normalizing practice through which a break in the domain of life is introduced, is intimately linked to the development of liberal modern humanism.

Western humanism is thus problematized as a violent practice through which individuals and populations are confined within different moral spaces and temporalities, producing hierarchized subjectivities, histories and essences. Hence, not only is Western universal humanism underpinned by racial enactment and identification; as a project aimed at transforming and optimizing life through supervising and intervening, individualizing and totalizing, excluding and including, and characterizing, it also comprises the foundation of a liberal biopolitics which governs through intelligibilities of livable life. Indeed, as Foucault argues in *What is Englightenment?*, humanism leans towards a certain con-

ception of man, which colours, justifies and obliges (Foucault 1991b/1984: 44). Hence the subject who calls for war in the name of universal humanity is always the enforcer of a violent racial subjectivity and imposing truth. And thus, as Foucault explains: ”Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at a universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; [rather] humanity installs each of its violences within a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination” (Foucault 1991d/1971: 85).

3.5 Freedom as Resistance, Refusal and Transformation

In his archaeological and genealogical studies, Foucault describes liberal governance as a normalizing technology; that is, a practice which regulates and dominates subjectivity, life and reality at the level of intelligibility and the imaginary. By reflecting critically on the dominating historical limits of thought through which relations between truth, reality and subjectivity are managed and determined, these problematizations reveal the omnipresence of liberal violence, manifested in “a certain objectivity, the development of a politics and a government of the self, and the elaboration of an ethics and a practice in regards to oneself” (Foucault 1997c/1984: 116-7). Furthermore, a wider critical framework structuring the conditions and possibilities of freedom within the violent subjugation of modernity is identified.

As discussed in the introduction, Foucault was fiercely opposed to giving authoritative recommendations, or taking the position of truth-teller. As he states: ”I have absolutely no desire to play the role of a prescriber of solutions”; instead, his role ”is to raise questions in an effective, genuine way [...] to pose problems, to make them active, to display them in such a complexity that they can silence the prophets and lawgivers, all those who speak for others or to others” (Foucault 2002e/1978: 288). ”In short”, he concludes, ”to be done with the spokespersons” (Foucault 2002e/1978: 289). Foucault thus fiercely rejects universalism, refusing to become the ”bearer of the universal”. Rather, what is needed is self-problematization, which cultivates the capacity to think differently. As he explains: ”my problem is not to satisfy professional historians; my problem is to construct myself, and to invite others to share an experience of what we are, not only our past but also our present, an experience of our modernity in such a way that we might come out of it transformed” (Foucault 2002e/1978: 242). In other words, challenging all forms of power, which ”tends to render immobile and untouchable those things that are offered to us as real, as true, as good” (Foucault 1988c: 1).

In *Structuralism and Post-Structuralism*, reflecting upon his earlier research, Foucault states that he has always wanted to say something about the ”relation of self to self and [...] telling the truth” (Foucault 1994/1983: 446). This consists not in a simple characterization of what we currently are; instead, by ”following lines of fragility in the present”, it aims ”to grasp why and how that-which-is

might no longer be that-which-is." Therefore, "any description must be made in accordance with these kinds of virtual fracture which open up the space of freedom, understood as a space of concrete freedom, that is, possible transformation" (Foucault 1994/1983: 449-50). As a result, Foucault explains, one of his central objectives has always been "to show people that a lot of things that are part of their landscape—that people think are universal—are the results of some very precise historical changes" (Foucault 1988/1980: 11). In this sense, all of his analyses "are against the idea of universal necessities in human existence", as they show "the arbitrariness of institutions and show which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made". Finally, he explains: "In my books I have really tried to analyze changes, not in order to find the material causes but to show all the factors that interacted and the reactions of people. I believe in the freedom of people" (Foucault 1988/1980: 14).

This conceptualization of freedom as self-transformation appears already in *The Order of Things* (2009/1966), in which Foucault attacks the modern human sciences and the humanism they are based upon, by depicting how the modern episteme has given birth to the figure of finite man, who is both an object and subject of knowledge. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Foucault uses this analysis of the foundations of European knowledge and its contingencies to denounce existentialist and phenomenological approaches, which emphasize the foundational and autonomous subjectivity of humanity, as well as its progressive history. Foucault insists that modern man, with his corporeal, working and speaking existence, is only a recent invention, derived from particular ways of seeing and saying; that is, from historically ordered forms and patterns of thought and knowledge, which limit human beings in their existence, life and subjectivity (Foucault 2009/1966: 402-4).

Foucault's invitation to erase man centrally aims at the Enlightenment-inspired progressive view of Western humanity, governed by "life, labour and language" (Foucault 2009/1966: 386, 418-9). As he writes in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, "it is vain to seek, beyond structural, formal, or interpretative analyses of language, a domain that is at last freed from all positivity, in which the freedom of the subject, the labour of the human being, or the opening up of a transcendental destiny could be fulfilled" (Foucault 2010b/1969: 126). Indeed, because modern man is an invention of language, knowledge and problematization, for Foucault man's "coming into the end" is not an "arrival to the very heart of himself", but rather one at "the brink of that which limits him; in that region where death prowls, where thought is extinguished, where the promise of the origin interminably recedes". In other words, "formless, mute, unsignifying region where language can find its freedom" (Foucault 2009/1966: 418).

Ultimately, Foucault's earlier studies are implicitly involved in elaborating and analysing the conditions of freedom, not as an affirmative or conforming action, but as an antagonistic practice which entails self-detachment and distance from the totalizing and individualizing liberal intelligibilities and moral imaginaries through which relations to oneself and the other are managed. Thus, these writings can be linked to his later investigations into the ethics and

aesthetics of existence (Foucault 2010c/1982; Foucault 2011/1983; Foucault 2005/1981), which explore "the historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth, power and ethics", aiming to open different possibilities for thinking, being and becoming (Foucault 1991c/1983: 351).

Indeed, it is against "the kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries", by refusing everything that was "given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory" Foucault's late engagement with ethics and freedom engage with (Foucault 1991b/1984: 45). As Foucault formulated already in the preface to the second volume of *The History of Sexuality*, "there is no experience which is not a way of thinking, and which cannot be analyzed from the point of view of history of thought" (Foucault 1991e/1984: 335). Consequently, transforming the normalizing thought-worlds that are constituted by contingent relations of "speaking, doing, or behaving in which the individual appears and acts as subject of learning, as ethical and juridical subject, as subject conscious of himself and others" cannot occur "except by means of a working of thought upon itself though critical activity" (Foucault 1991e/1984: 334-5).

These techniques are detailed in Foucault's late lectures *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (Foucault 2005/1981), *Government of Self and Others I-II* (Foucault 2010c/1982, 2011), and *Fearless Speech* (2001/1983), in which he focuses on particular Greco-Roman practices of caring for the self through truth-telling (parrhesia). For the ancient Greeks, he argues, to constitute one's subjectivity required the formulation of a specific relationship towards oneself, in which "the speaker used his freedom and chose frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy" (Foucault 2001/1983: 19-20). In this regards, truth-telling involved commitment and courage to "speak something dangerous – different from what the majority believes" (2001/1983: 15). Ultimately, as a specific relationship to oneself and one's truth, interlinking truth-telling with critique, commitment and risk.

With these problematizations of parrhesian self-practices—constituted by courage, critique and willingness to risk one's own life—Foucault reveals radically different relationship between truth, subject and freedom. In contrast to the modern truth which demands obedience, uninterrupted examination and submission to normative self-truth (Foucault 1997/1980: 81-85), for the Greeks truth-telling was not normative or conformist, but rather an agnostic and confronting attitude that aimed to "open up" a condition of possibility to "aesthetics of existence" which culminated in a different relationship to oneself (Foucault 1991c/1983: 356).

Ultimately, for Foucault it is this art of living and being—which centres around personal choice, self-mastery and creativity—that the modern imperative, with its normalized and universalized human intelligibility, has violently exorcised from life. As he reflects in *On the Genealogy of Ethics*: "What strikes me is the fact that in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is something which is special-

ized or which is done by experts who are artists. But couldn't everyone's life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?" (Foucault 1991c/1983: 350). He continues: "I think we have to get rid of this idea of an analytical and necessary link between ethics and other social or economic or political structures" (ibid).

For Foucault it is through this new relationship towards oneself that freedom is consituted: as an endeavour to "know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently", in order to "learn to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently" (Foucault 1985/1984: 8-9). Such thinking requires one to unlearn aspects of oneself: that is, to reject one's liberated human essence and existence by critically questioning their rationalities and truths. This allows a new and transformed relationship with one's truth, through which "new possibilities for movement backward and forward" at the level of thought are increased (Foucault 1997d/1982: 325-6).

For Foucault, these practices of freedom entail a "struggle against the forms of subjection—against the submission of subjectivity": a challenge to the relations of individualization and totalization that have been imposed upon the Western individual for centuries. In addition, they entail curiosity, courage and creativity (Foucault 2002/1982: 332). As Foucault writes, he dreams of a "new age of curiosity", that "evokes care one takes of what exists and what might exist; a sharpened sense of reality" […] "a readiness to find what surrounds us strange and odd; a certain determination to throw off familiar ways of thought and to look at the same things in a different way: a passion for seizing what is happening now and what is disappearing: a lack of respect for the traditional hierarchies of what is important and fundamental" (Foucault 1997d/1982: 325). Indeed, as explains in *Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual*, the "source of freedom—is never to accept anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or immobile". Rather, "one of the meanings of human existence" Foucault argues, is to rise up against all forms of power through "refusal, curiosity, innovation" (Foucault 1988c/1980: 1). This entails (1) the refusal to accept as self-evident the things that are proposed to us; (2) the need to analyze and to know, since we can accomplish nothing without reflection and understanding—that is, the principle of curiosity; and (3) the principle of innovation: to seek out in our reflection those things that have never been thought or imagined (ibid).

Aimed to formulate "a new impetus, as far as wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom", effectively, for Foucault practices of freedom are preconditioned with ethos, that is, a critical commitment to encounter the "contemporary limits of the necessary" that at the level of intelligibility and imaginary constitute the "historical ontology of ourselves" (Foucault 1991b/1984: 46, 43, 49). Thus, as an encounter of the historical discourses that "have led us to constitute ourselves and recognize ourselves as subject of what we are doing, thinking, saying", freedom essentially necessitates violent self-formulations and transformations: self-dissolution, erosion and rejection (Foucault 1991b/1984: 46).

Indeed, by interlinking criticism, freedom and self-mastery closely together, for Foucault freedom is not a project of radical global transformation, or a destination of stable existence. Rather, it entails attaining a new form of subjectivity through self-detachment and displacement: it demands resistance to the pervasive material, historical and discursive formations and practices which constitute violative and violated liberal subjectivities, their histories and thought-worlds, values and truths (Foucault 2002/1982: 336; Foucault 1997b/1984: 300-1; Foucault 2002c: 456-457). In short, resisting the the dichotomous and normative ways of thinking, being and living that underpin Western humanism in aim to generate radically different ways to relate to one's present and oneself. Effectively, problematizing freedom as an endeavour "to learn to what extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently"—which "enables one to get free of oneself" (Foucault 1985/1984: 9).

In the context of celebrity humanitarianism, Foucault's formulation of freedom impels us to recognise that freedom for Africa necessitates much more than Making Poverty History, with the help of Westerners. Rather freedom entails the possibility and capacity to constitute, represent and tell truth(s) about oneself, by oneself. Formulating the political question in the context of Western celebrity humanitarianism, "not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology," but the conditions and effects of its truth itself (Foucault 2002d/1976: 133).

3.6 Conclusions

> The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning
> • Foucault (1988b/1982: 9)

This chapter has examined Foucault's configurations and localizations of liberal violence and war as practices of intelligibility and the imaginary. With this reading, in lieu of any definite conclusion or closure of violence, my aim has been to engage with the various imaginaries and thought-worlds of Foucault: specifically, the militant roots of warring humanity and its ever-present embodied and embedded limits, which fix, order and determine human imaginaries, essences and experiences, beings and becomings, at the level of thought itself.

Consequently, by taking violence and war beyond their observable manifestations, Foucault exposes Western peace and humanity as contingent historical practices of thought that are entangled with spatial and temporal imaginaries, racial discourses and moral concerns. With these violent limiting relations of normalizing thought—which condition and limit alterity and freedom, self-determination and definition—Western humanism is problematized as one of the key pillars and warring technologies of modern biopolitics. Accordingly, liberal humanity not only emanates from contingent and changing histories of

racial domination that structures and value life at the level of intelligibility and imaginary, but moreover, as a technique which constitutes a normative and singular human existence and essence through its discourses "killing" (by regimenting and rigidifying life) is justified.

Foucault's inquiries, from his early archaeological and genealogical studies to his late writings on ethics, all engage with the violating limits of liberal thought, in short how possibilities of alterity are constrained and conditioned by contingent temporal and spatial discursive specificities, and conjunctures of exclusionary thought and will. By exposing human experience and essence as articulations of concrete historical experiences, constellations of relations and forceful boundaries that condition, manage and limit freedom at the level of thinking and being, Foucault's problematizations unfold broader historical landscapes into the liberal way of killing, which operates through humanitarian intellibilities and imaginaries.

Even though these humanitarian intelligibilities and subjectivities need to be recognized as historically specific and contingent, they are layered with historical thought, will and truth which violently restrict any possible movement towards alternative human worlds, existences, experiences and memories. Consequently, overcoming liberal domination and violence is not a matter of defeating visible totalitarianism or economic exploitation. Rather, freedom as a practice of thought entails criticism, vigilance and a constant battle against all the singular, universal and normative modes of thinking and knowing which underpin linear, celebratory Western history and its progressive, liberating and linear humanity.

Indeed, one of the key and consistent themes that runs throughout Foucault's works is the urgency of practicing critique: of finding room for choice, alterity and multiplicity at the level of self-intelligibility and imaginary, subjectivity and present, through which non-reductive subjectivities, relations and responses towards oneself and others are fostered and mobilized (Foucault 1997b/1984: 300). In this thesis, practicing this critical freedom requires historicizing and politicizing Western celebrity humanitarian subjectivity and its truth, by investigating the spatialities and temporalities, totalizing and excluding perspectives, intelligibilities, affects and sensibilities this activity conditions and effects. Ultimately, it is only through critically encountering the Western celebeirty humanitarian present and its history—by challenging all affirmations, eternal truths, fixing positivities and unities—that alternative thought-worlds towards Western celebrity humanity will unfold.

4 FRANTZ FANON'S PERTINENCE: COLONIALISM AS INTELLIGIBILITY

To speak means … above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization
- Frantz Fanon (2008/1952: 8)

The truths of a nation are in the first place its realities
- Frantz Fanon (2001/1961: 181)

4.1 Introduction

In line with Foucault's critical ethos that involves questioning and attacking the violative and dominating limits of Western humanitarian thought in an attempt to further the search for different ways of thinking and knowing this chapter turns towards Frantz Fanon's books *Black Skin, White Masks* (2008/1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (2001/1961). By exploring Fanon's problematizations of the colonial condition, my aim is not only to construe an alternative reading of colonialism as a grid of intelligibility, but also to draw attention to the similarities between Foucault's and Fanon's thinking with regards to violence and freedom.

Today their writings have rarely been analyzed alongside each other. There do, admittedly, exist real theoretical differences between them. To begin with, Fanon was influenced both by Sartre's existentialism and by Marxist phenomenology, stances which Foucault repudiated by insisting that there there was no authentic self to be found, or liberated from "error, illusion, alienated consciousness, or ideology" (Foucault 2002d/1976 133). This "anti-humanistic" stance, as Anthony Alessandrini has pointed out, has been placed time and again in opposition to Fanon's version of "new humanism" (Alessandrini 2009: 65). For example, Ato Sekyi-Out argues that Fanon would "have stopped short of assenting to the post-Foucauldian dogma – the new agnostic's creed – according to which the good is inexpressible" (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 239-40). Edward

Said, as well, maintains that while Fanon was committed to "revolutionary change, solidarity and liberation," in Foucault's thinking there is a "kind of quietism," a sense that "everything is historically determined, that ideas of justice, of good and evil, and so forth, have no innate significance, because they are constituted by whoever is using them" (Said 2001: 53).

However, as discussed in the previous chapter, Foucault explicitly rejected historically determined thinking. As he argues, "if I don't say what needs to be done, it isn't because I believe nothing to be done. On the contrary […] all my research rests on a postulate of absolute optimism" (Foucault 2002g/1978: 294). Indeed, Foucault never argued that good was "inexpressible", but maintained that instead of accepting truth or good as neutral concepts they had to be approached as political and historical practices, infused with forceful will and burrowing rationality. Moreover, by rejecting oppositional and binary thinking, he was also very clear that he believed in human freedom, which as a critical practice of thought meant "never […] accept[ing] anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or immobile" (Foucault 2002g/1978: 399; Foucault 1988c/1980: 1).

Indeed, this critical ethos, a search for a multiplicity of possibilities to relate to oneself and one's present pervades Foucault work. As he states, "my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism" (Foucault 1991c/1983: 343). Explicating further, he explains: "I don't believe we are locked into a history: on the contrary, all my work consists in showing that history is traversed by strategic relations that are necessarily unstable and subject to change" (Foucault 2002g/1978: 397)

The above arguments on the differences between Foucault's and Fanon's thinking interlink somewhat with the broader criticism within postcolonial studies on Foucault's Eurocentric focus. For example, Robert Young notes that the colonial world is almost deliberately absent in Foucault work, especially considering his awareness of France's policies in regard to its colonies and his having lived for an extended period in Tunis (Young 2001: 395-7; also discussed in Ahluwalia 2010: 148). As such, to Young, Foucault's work not only displays a "virtual absence of explicit discussions of colonialism or race", but moreover, as Naja Loomba argues, his theorizations are of "limited use in understanding colonial societies" (Young 2001: 395; Loomba 2005: 49).

True, Foucault never wrote about his experiences in Tunis, or about colonialism specifically. However he did mention that his experiences in Tunis had "greatly affected" him, and that country's student revolts were "a real political experience" - evidence of the "unbearable quality of certain situations produced by capitalism, colonialism and neo-colonialism" (Foucault 2002e/1978: 279-80). These experiences lead Foucault later to deepen his criticism towards the rigid theorizations and dogmas of Western Marxism, and also made it possible for him to revisit his earlier works, including *Madness and Civilization* and *Birth of the Clinic* (Foucault 2002e/1978: 280-1). Ultimately prompting him to denounce

the narrow conceptualization of power as an asset, and to turn to an idea of power as a practice that relates to the everyday ways of seeing, being, knowing and acting

Indeed, what Foucault seems to have recognized in Tunis was not only the dominating nature of Western knowledge, but also that the battle for freedom was not constituted by universal knowledge, rationality or truth. Rather freedom entailed radical spirituality - the ability and possibility to enthusiastically and fearlessly encounter one's own existence and present in concrete, precise and definite terms (Foucault 2002e/1978: 280-1). Hence, as he himself explained, after Tunis he tried to achieve things that required a personal, physical and real involvement—actions that addressed problems in concrete, precise and definite terms (ibid: 281).

It is this ethos, the belief that people must encounter their own present in their own terms, ways and voices, that Foucault's "Eurocentric" thinking needs to be read against. In the end, Foucault identified himself as a Westerner, and it was this subjectivity that he aimed to problematize by encountering and questioning Western history, rationality, humanity and truths. Moreover, as already mentioned above, he forcefully argued against the "universal intellectual" or "master of truth and justice," which relies on legitimacy that is denied from others. Instead of speaking universal truths on behalf of others, or pronouncing the global order of things, Foucault stressed the importance of local and specific struggles related to one's own subjectivity, truth and present (Foucault 2002d/1976: 131-2; 126-7). Self-constituting practices, as discussed later in this chapter, which also characterize Frantz Fanon's thinking in regard to colonial violence.

Effectively, the prevailing reading on the oppositional nature of Fanon's and Foucault's theorizations obscures some of the similarities and continuities between their theorizations, not only with regards to their shared critique of the sovereign subject of humanism (Alenssandrini 2009), but also regarding their problematizations of violence as an overdetermining practice of Western thought. Nevertheless, Foucault's thinking remains limited in regard to the colonial question. Hence, understanding what colonialism is and entails requires turning to Frantz Fanon's insights through which the postcolonial nature of celebrity humanitarianism can be encountered in concrete and historical forms.

I begin this chapter by discussing Fanon's problematizations of colonial violence in relation to experience and intelligibility, which he approaches with two questions – one that is political and the other which is ethical. The former addresses the logic and regime of violence that overdetermines the inferior existence and essence of the native through "definite structuring of the self and of the world" (Fanon 2008/1952: 83). From these engagements—through which colonial violence is constituted as a practice of thought that conditions and fixes intelligibilities at the level of the African subjectivity and present —the chapter moves on to examine Fanon's formulations on freedom as both a personal and social practice of alterity. I argue that, in Fanon's thinking, the political and the ethical are intervowen. Thus, fully comprehending Fanon's call to absolute vio-

lence—which entails "no more and no less than the abolition of one zone, its burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country" (Fanon 2001/1961: 31)—requires critical attentiveness to the colonial condition he describes: that is, to the dominating practices of Western thought itself. It is only through this close reading of the perverse and unquestionable colonial world, constituted through subjugative Western intelligibilities and imaginaries, that Fanon's call to "absolute violence" can be unravelled in its full complexity and abundance, well beyond its instrumental one-dimensionality as an aesthetic and ontological project of "freedom" at the level of self-imaginary and intelligibility.

So conceived, the colonial world of certainty – an intelligibility according to which the white man symbolizes universal humanity, purity, civilization and progress—cannot be overcome through a transition towards an imagined universal humanity. Nor does it entail liberating oneself from economic oppression or physical domination. Rather, as both Foucault and Fanon maintain, for freedom to emerge and flourish, what is needed is both ongoing critique and open-ended reflection against all mimetic ways of thinking and being—their fixing truth and penetrative, capturing knowledge. Ultimately, constituting decolonialization as a critical practice of though that expels, encounters and breaks up oppressive discourses and their imaginaries which in "systematic fashion" fix the native into his overdetermined binary existence either as helpless or dangerous other.

4.2 The Infernal Cycle of Colonial Violence

Historically, Frantz Fanon has been widely referred to as an apologist for violence, an advocate for death and destruction – a viewpoint that gets repeated even in contemporary encyclopaedic works, where he is listed as "militant author," "revolutionary writer" and "theorist of violence" (Kritzman, Reilly and DeBevoise 2006: 518; Miller and Coleman 1991: 147). However, this prevailing reading of Fanon's texts does conceal his dramatic narrative, which sets into motion changing circumstances and perspectives that are not discrete or conclusive, nor absolutely Manichean (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 5-6; Gibson 2003: 1-2).

Indeed, Fanon was never a revolutionary apologist of violence, but a "complex thinker" of violence whose greatest source of originality was in his ability "to secure and insulate the unique properties of the colonial experience from the generic properties of being human" (Sekyi-Otu 1996: 5, 20, 104). Lately, the complexity of Fanon's thinking on the colonial condition has become increasingly recognized in various formulations of his legacy, beyond Hegelian dialectical resolution, or the Sartrean transgressive model of history (see Gibson 2003; Alessandrini 1999; 2009; Sekyi-Otu 1996). As Nigel Gibson has noted, it is precisely because Fanon's Manichean colonial logic builds on violence which forecloses any recognition and reciprocity between colonizer and colonized that his theorizations specifically reject Hegelian dialectic resolution in colonial con-

texts (Gibson 2003: 33-37). Furthermore, he continues, although Fanon's analysis of an absolute divide between "White" (superiority) and "Black" (inferiority) appears to be in line with Sartre's critique of Negritude in *Orphee Noir*, for Fanon, negritude is not failed consciousness or a lack of self-authenticity (ibid: 28). Rather, what Sartre failed to acknowledge with his intellectualized approach, is that "black existence" is "walled in by colour," by multidimensional, historical, political, spatial, temporal and cultural lines.

Indeed, as Fanon argues against Sartre in *Black Skin, White Mask*, in the colonial world "the white man is not only the Other but also the master, whether real or imaginary", producing an existence that makes the black man suffer "in his body quite differently than the White man" (Fanon 2008/1952: 106). Consequently, for Fanon, the black man has no access to his own ontological truth which Sartre argues to be necessary for the acquisition of subjectivity. As Fanon writes, "the fellah, the unemployed man, the starving native do not lay a claim to the truth; they do not say that they represent the truth, *for they are the truth*" (Fanon 2001/1961: 38; *original emphasis*). And thus, as Fanon reminds readers: 'Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial situation' (Fanon 2001/1961: 31).

By rejecting the quest for universal, mimetic human existence and essence— Fanon calls for a recognition that "the Negro is not. Any more than the white man" (Fanon 2008/1952: 180). Accordingly, instead of positing timeless truths, for Fanon the colonial truth itself has to be put into the test, by problematizing colonialism as a specific violently conditioning practice of subjugation, through which the "Negro" is constituted and enslaved in his interiority and the white man into his superiority (Fanon 2008/1952: 3). In particular, this problematization involves accounting for and revealing the discourses, strategies, and relations that as spatiotemporal practices condition and determine the objectified inferior existence and essence of the colonized man. As Fanon writes, "the problem of colonialism includes not only the interrelations of objective historical conditions but also human attitudes toward these conditions" (Fanon 2008/1952: 62).

Fanon details these dominating localizations and configurations in *Black Skins and White Masks* (2008/1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (2001/1961), unfolding an imaginary into the colonial world, which is "divided into compartments" by "lines of forces" (Fanon 2001/1961: 29). In the colonial world— which Fanon describes as a motionless two-dimensional landscape organized with temporal and spatial relations—the settlers, who are white foreigners, masters of "civilization" and "progress", live in brightly lit spaces made of stone and steel. This is a space of order and freedom, which represents their essential reason and eternal ownership of humanity and purity – "all those values that call for many but choose few" (Fanon 2001/1961: 30 - 32). In opposition to this concrete zone of engagement, movement and progress—created with "ancestral customs" and "Mediterranean values"—the history-making and possessive knowledge of Westerners exist within the natives, "the wretched of the

Earth", in their zones of lack, fixed into immovable landscapes without possessions, spaciousness or history (Fanon 2001/1961: 40, 36, 30).

In this world of "exploitation and of pillage," where "to speak means to be in a position to use a certain syntax," Fanon writes, to be a human being requires not only "to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization" (Fanon 2001/1961: 39; Fanon 2008/1952: 8). Thus, for the native, walled into his "black truth" and inferior value with subjugating knowledge and a fixing gaze that constantly judges, differentiates and humiliates, there is no escape. Fanon writes, by "seeing only one type of negro", the native remains firmly walled into the infernal circle of unreason, without individuality or "subjective security" - culture, civilization, or long historical past (Fanon 2008/1952: 141, 164, 21).

Indeed, for Fanon, the colonialist and the natives are "old acquaintances," connected to each other by the colonizers' violent conceptualisations of knowledge and truth, formulated with the language of "pure force" (Fanon 2001/1961: 28, 29). With these gazes and inscriptions, which divide and fix, compare and disclose, the native is constituted as an eternal lack – reduced into unchangeable existence and non-existence, sealed into his crushing objecthood by notions of "Good-Evil, Beauty-Ugliness, White-Black" (Fanon 2008/1952: 141).

Hierarchized, ordered and governed through self-referential representations of the superior humanity of Westerners - self-referential interpositions and inscriptions of Western civilization, liberty and justice - the lived experience of the native is "overdetermined from without" (Fanon 2008/1952: 87). In this world of absolute difference, a space where speaking and representing "universal" humanity entails belonging to Western culture and civilization, the native's every position towards himself is conditioned with "relations of dependence, with the diminution of the other" (Fanon 2008/1952: 164). As Fanon argues, "every colonized people … "in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality - finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation" (Fanon 2008/1952: 9).

Formulated through circular discourses about the white man's role as an eternal protector of integrity and purity, the colonial logic is both "separatist and regionalist" – it regulates and inscribes through descriptions and definitions of what it means to be a living thing, a Man (Fanon 2001/1961: 74-75). The colonial settler is, as Fanon explains, "an exhibitionist," a man who masters through "flaunting violence"; fixing discourses and gazes that overdetermine the natives' existence and present (Fanon 2001/1961: 42, 34). Operating through biological, historical and cultural coding, declaring natives the "quintessence of evil," which represent not only an "absence of values but also the negation of them", the native is led, through these circular modalities conditioning possibilities, "in one direction"… "to admit that he is nothing, absolutely nothing" (Fanon 2001/1961: 32; Fanon 2008/1952: 12). Ultimately, as an object of the colonizer's violent truth, knowledge and reason, which conditions and captures

the native into his unbearable humanity, non-existence and self-worth through "the definitive structuring of the self and of the world," the native's the native is sealed into his anarguable "blackness".

With these insights which echo Foucault's formulations on violence as a subjugative practice that conditions the possibilities of thinking and being through racial formulations and transcriptions of livable life, Fanon problematizes colonial reality as an effect of ongoing conditioning, monitoring, marking and ordering that operates through capturing gazes and forcing normalizing language. Hence, colonial violence is not exceptional or spectacular, nor does it function in linear or rational ways. As Fanon writes: "colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties" (Fanon 2001/1961: 48). Rather, colonialism is "violence in its natural state" (ibid), sustained and generated by "lines of communication", that is, signification practices that operate as temporal and spatial dividing lines (Fanon 2001/1961: 31).

Europe is, as Fanon argues, "literally the creation of the Third World" (Fanon 2001/1961: 81). Indeed, colonialism is a deeply narcissistic, self-constituting project for the Westerner, who is preoccupied by the constant reproduction of his authority, agency and subjectivity through circular self-representation and determination, "a permanent dialogue with oneself" (Fanon 2001/1961: 253, 40). Consequently, the colonial world is not a static entity, but rather it is a spatiality that is constantly reworked, restructured, re-narrated and reproduced through totalizing intelligibilities and freezing imaginaries enacted upon the native's unreasonable and undesirable existence (Fanon 2001/1961: 32).

As a practice that totalizes and regulates through constant negation at the level of the native's life, questioning and marking, colonialism "calls halt to the native's culture in almost every field" (Fanon 2001/1961: 191). This freezing relates not only to the "humanist blackmail" that justifies the presence of the settler and blocks the native's possibilities for alternative futures (Fanon 2001/1961: 39). But moreover, with their "thousand details, anecdotes, stories", the Westerners construct themselves as eternal champions of "progress, civilization, liberalism, education, and refinement" in their task of bringing truth to the natives (Fanon 2008/1952: 84-5, 150). Constituted with fixed intelligibilities and imaginaries, the native is "a slave to his past" (Fanon 2008/1952: 175). Indeed, as Fanon continues, "colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content" (Fanon 2001/1961: 169). Instead, by a kind of pervasive logic, "it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures and destroys it" (ibid). Effectively, in this world where racism operates through "contempt" which by taking life as its reference object minimizes what it hates, the "alterity for the black man is not the black, but the white man" (Fanon 2001/1961: 131; Fanon 2008/1952: 72).

Through this constant display and monitoring, timeless truths and burning civility, which condemns the native to degradation with infernal circles of reasoning, the settler "makes history": his "life is an Epoch, an Odyssey" (Fanon 2001/1961: 39). Like Homer's *Iliad*, that "eloquent testimony of the mutual

implication of enlightenment and myth" (Adorno and Horkeimer 2002/1947: 46), these mythical stories constantly call for the presence of settlers to nurture and protect the damned African natives through affective identifications with the African landscape. Fanon writes that "the settler makes history […] He is the absolute beginning: This land was created by us […] If we leave, all is lost, and the continent will go back to the Middle Ages" (…) to "fall back into barbarism, degradation and bestiality" (Fanon 2001/1961: 39-40, 169).

By mapping the native's culture with "fences and signposts" through these self-referential imaginaries, constituted through a relentless chain of reasoning and objectifying gaze, the native emerges as the "spiritual experience" and "adventure" of the Westerner - his eternal task and duty (Fanon 2001/1961: 190, 250, 252). Indeed, as Fanon writes "the white man "makes history and is conscious of making it" (Fanon 2001/1961: 40). By walling the native into his inferiority, unfreedom, docility, deprivation, loss and lack through governing rationality at the level of his subjectivity and reality, with this history-making the settler constitutes himself as the continent's genesis, presence and future – a man whose journeys into savage Africa are legitimized through self-referential calls to duty, calls for graceful and necessary deeds to progress humanity, dignity and equality on the continent (Fanon 2001/1961: 190, 39-40). Unfolding a mythical fairytale in which the divine moral rights, duties or dignified ideals of the white man are claimed to be universally applicable.

As a self-constituted Westerners' fairytale, a "stupid game of the Sleeping Beauty" that aims to implant into the native's mind the belief that all essential qualities of the West remain eternal (Fanon 2001/1961: 84, 36, 73), the white man argues: "if you wish for independence, take it and go back to the Middle ages" […] "take it and starve" (Fanon 2001/1961: 76-77). Supported with Christian liturgies of God's will - the "fatality that removes all blame from the oppressor" – within these intelligibilities and their unfolding imaginaries on shared peace, prosperity, life and humanity, the native is told to "turn white or disappear". In short, to recognize his thingness and lateness in the world, where only the Western man can make history for him (Fanon 2001/1961: 42; Fanon 2008/1952: 75).

By claiming African history and its landscape as their own, by constantly referring to the natives' moral degeneracy, uncivilized existence, intellectual and moral inferiority, the natives' culture, once living and open to the future, is transformed into a lifeless and oversimplified totality. As Fanon explicates: in this world where "everything is anticipated, thought out, demonstrated, made the most of", "for the black man there is only one destiny. And it is white" (Fanon 2008/1952: 91, 178).

4.3 Problematizing Postcolonialism as Governance of Visible and Sayable

Fanon, like Foucault, approaches violence as a relational practice of overdetermining rationality that conditions and excludes possibilities at the level of intelligibility and imaginary. Accordingly, by paying close attention to the multiplicities of violence through which colonial subjects are interpellated and cemented into their inferior being and inaction, colonialism is exposed as a way of thinking that reductively simplifies, fixes and totalizes.

Indeed, for Fanon, rather than a specific historical event of exploitation and occupation, colonialism constitutes an overdetermining and capturing form of thought that governs and administrates life through entless differentiation constituted with gridding and ordering intelligibilities—white rationalities, demands, historical myths and truths. However, the violently monistic experience of colonialism is not just imposed upon the native; it also envolves self-surveillance and self-subjection through which the native rehabilitates himself from his "black" irrationality and immorality through assimilating himself towards "whiteness": that is, moderation, civilization and humanity. Only to find himself again and again rejected by his "indisputable complex of dependence on the white man" which repeatedly condemns him as inferior *(*Fanon 2008/1952: 168).

Consequently, by bringing into visibility the extensive and interlinked conditions and effects of Western' normative humanitarian thought, both imposed and embodied, colonial violence is conceptualized well beyond biological racialization. As Fanon argues, colonial existence and racist mechanisms and strategies are not always blatantly racist, but exist also in more subtle, obfuscated forms, through which the "character of man" is historically formed and limited. "The Western bourgeoisie," writes Fanon, "though fundamentally racist, most often manages to mask this racism by a multiplicity of nuances which allow it to preserve intact its proclamation of mankind's outstanding dignity […] by inviting the sub-men to become human, and to take as their prototype Western humanity as incarnated" (Fanon 2001/1961: 131). Thus, for Fanon, like Foucault, racism operates as a polyvalent and contingent discursive practice that creates a hierarchical division and order through formulations of livable, normalized life. In this respect, racism, as a regulatory practice of being and becoming, is an operational and on-going world-ordering, firmly embedded in gazes, interpretations and sensibilities through which "the other" is constituted as "a man of colour" through inscriptions of white, universal humanity.

Fanon asserts that "the truths of a [colonized] nation are in the first place its realities" (Fanon 2001/1961: 181). Indeed, colonialism operates through aesthetic, affective and epistomological modes; it is an interface with the world and experience, tied to representations and imaginaries through which the white man forcefully seals himself into his whiteness, and black man into his blackness. Subsequently, the departure of the colonialist does not automatically bring

freedom for the native. As Fanon warns, "violence used in specific ways at the moment of the struggle for freedom does not magically disappear after the ceremony of the trooping the national colours" (Fanon 2001/1961: 59). Rather, the colonizer simply changes his tactics. Or as Fanon writes "the wars of repression are no longer waged against rebel sultans: everything becomes more elegant, less bloodthirsty" (Fanon 2001/1961: 51-2).

Consequently, independence from colonial powers brings no substantial change for the native. Rather the violent subjugation moves into new demands formulated with calls to objectivity, neutralism and peace, those "democratic ideas which claim to be universally applicable" (Fanon 2001/1961: 131). In other words, the upbringing and future of decolonized African countries become issues of international stress, throwing the colonial world into the "middle of whirlpool," where the state of their well-being and their right to bread, liberty and peaceful coexistence constitute the new dominating discourse (Fanon 2001/1961: 60-1).

Effectively, the colonial war shifts to new fields of play; the battles against colonial subjects are now fought "with spectacular gestures of friendship, manoeuvres calculated to sow divisions and psychological action" (ibid: 108). The ex-settler, rather than physically settling a colony, continues his violent subjugation from a distance, by constantly observing, measuring and commenting on the newly-independent country's progress and humanity. Fanon writes,

> The photos which illustrate the article are simply a proof that one knows what one is talking about, and that one has visited the country. The report intends to verify the evidence: everything's going badly out there since we left. Frequently reporters complain of being badly received, of being forced to work under bad conditions and of being fenced round by indifference or hostility […] the nationalist leaders know that international opinion is formed solely by the Western press (Fanon 2001/1961: 60-1).

As a result, the colonial violence that operates through the vigilant f gaze and fixing words, through which the native is frozen into a racialized being, "a poor relative, of an adopted son, of a bastard child" (Fanon 2008/1952: 180), does not disappear when the settler leaves the continent. On the contrary, subjugation simply shifts to Western media representations: images and stories that with investigating gazes and condemning words "verify the evidence: everything's going badly out there since we left" (Fanon 2001/1961: 60).

With these reports that shape international opinion, the white man legitimizes the necessity and obligation for his return, repeating the colonial narrative whereby only with the help of the Western world, by following their examples and lessons, can the natives and their newly independent countries save themselves. In the name of "normality," stability and peace, alongside the new elites of de-colonized countries— the ex-colonialists demand "Africa for Africans," calling for "the right of all people's self-determination," and the right to freedom, wellbeing and bread (Fanon 2001/1961: 61-2). Calmness, dignity, and welfare are insisted on and celebrated with forceful voices, making the native "to feel that things are changing" (Fanon 2001/1961: 111).

"The native," writes Fanon, "must realize that colonialism never gives anything away for nothing" (Fanon 2001/1961: 114). Indeed, the exit of the colonizer comes at "the price of a much stricter control of the country's future destiny" (Fanon 2001/1961: 113). Hence, Western calls for the support of African liberation or African wellbeing, at the time of de-colonization or independence, are not to be understood as sincere pleas for African freedom (Fanon 2001/1961: 81-2). Instead, as Fanon warns: "war goes on; and the enemy organizes, reinforces his position and comes to guess the native's strategy (Fanon 2001/1961: 112).

Reflecting on the postcolonial condition, Fanon writes: "everything seemed to be so simple before: the bad people were on one side, and the good on the other" (Fanon 2001/1961: 116). Indeed, the objective of decolonized nations changes from independence to liberal peace, political stability and prosperity, which, as violent discursive practices aimed at obedience and discipline, continue to subjugate the native from above, imitating the colonial racism which operates through the superiority of the white man, constituted with his right and truth. In other words, the demands for homogeneity, neutrality, nonviolence, compromise and national harmony - the old rhetoric of colonialism aimed at social stability—remain firmly in the vocabulary of the Westerners, as well as in the speeches of newly selected politicians who, by claiming to speak for the new silenced nation, function to "turn the movement of liberation toward the right, and to disarm the people" (Fanon 2001/1961: 55). Effectively, the old colonial discourse that constituted the natives as completely irresponsible subjects is transformed into calls for natives "to understand everything and make all their own decisions" (Fanon 2001/1961: 74).

With these appeals to a shared human future, the natives are now mobilized into "exhaustion in front of a suspicious and bloated Europe" (Fanon 2001/1961: 77). Increasing demands are voiced for the natives to fight against poverty and under-development: to prove their capability to catch up with the old settlers, to demonstrate to them their capacity for transformation and progress. To achieve a healthy, productive and prosperous social body, the new national leaders "speak of strengthening the soul, of developing the body and of facilitating the growth of sportsmanlike qualities" (Fanon 2001/1961: 158). With "obedience and discipline" constantly demanded of them, the natives are now imprisoned into "sterile formalism" with the "values that preceded them" (Fanon 2001/1961: 146; 165, 78).

While their progress is endlessly monitored, the natives are now called on to maximise their potential by nurturing their capacities and cultivating their exceptional existence, with discourses that urge the natives to "kill" in the name of future life. As during colonialism, these discursive battles are waged against deviation: that is, against the uncivil and uneducated natives and their sick nations, which lie outside Western norms and benchmarks. Fanon writes:

> During the colonial period the people are called upon to fight against oppression; after national liberation they are called upon to fight against poverty, illiteracy and underdevelopment. The struggle, they say, goes on. The people realize that their life is an unending contest' (Fanon 2001/1961: 74).

Effectively, rather than constituted through a sharp divisition between Westerner/native, after independence the racist discourse now turns on biopolitically constituted difference, formulations in which the "negro has one function": he is the "symbol of Evil," or "wretchedness, death, war, famine" (Fanon 2008/1952: 145-7). Similarly to Foucault's disciplinary and biopolitical world where symbolic killing emerges through normalizing humanism at the level of life, Fanon argues that Western humanism, "amounts to nothing more nor less than man's surrender" (Fanon 2008/1952: 12). Indeed, Fanon's formulations on the unarguable inferior status of natives - eternal abnormality in the face of progress and civilization benchmarked against the Western "universalized" world - echo Foucault's notions of a liberal race war, which at the level of intelligibility splits a single race "into a superrace and a subrace" through a binary rift at the domain of life between those "who are to die and those who are to live" (Foucault 2004/1976: 61, 254). As Fanon argues, the colonial relationship is a "mass relationship" that "pits brute force against the weight of numbers" (Fanon 2001/1961: 42). He continues: "when you examine at close quarters the colonial contexts, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given species" (Fanon 2001/1961: 30-1).

With his words, Fanon unfolds an imaginary into the life-fostering topologies of postcolonial landscapes in which the natives are developed, secured and administrated through constant qualification, measurement, appraisal and hierachization (Foucault 1998/1976: 143-6). As in liberal governance, the vocabulary of which integrally revolves around species security and ideals regarding the future of the human race (Dillon and Reid 2009: 52), in the postcolonial world where everything is described as "very serious!" all forms of difference must be rehabilitated, treated and fixed – that is, eliminated. Consequently, the colonial intelligibility in which the native represents "not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values" (Fanon 2001/1961: 32) continues, and continues it indeed does. As Fanon reminds us, in this world of white mastery and sole ownership of humanity, a space where whiteness controls the whole field of history, "we can be sure that nothing is going to be given free. There is war, there are defeats, truces, victories" (Fanon 2008/1952: 172).

Recognized only with "indifference or paternalistic curiosity" (Fanon 2008/1952: 172), as an object devoid of correct values, ethics or skill, the native's self-constitution and determination is delimited by these circular descriptions. Fanon violently attacks these descriptions by announcing:

> Leave his Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe. For centuries they have stifled almost the whole of humanity in the name of so-called spiritual experience. Look at them today swaying between atomic and spiritual disintegration' (Fanon 2001/1961: 251).

For Fanon, the changes in the West's economic doctrines towards the continent—that is, it's kind "acts of attention or good will," courteous words and concerns that humanity will never give the native his freedom—can only lead

to defeat: "a blind alley," "the fancy-dress parade and the blare of the trumpets" (Fanon 2001/1961: 111, 172, 118). Instead to overcome this ongoing war that operates through thought, the Westerner has to be killed at the level of intelligibility. As Fanon declares, "if we want humanity to advance a step farther, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we must make discoveries" (Fanon 2001/1961: 254).

4.4 Decolonialization as a Practice of Self

> In this world through which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself
> • Frantz Fanon (2008/1961: 179)

Because for Fanon post/colonialism operates through fixing and dominating intelligibilities that administrate life at the level of the individual and population, destroying this world of certainty requires much more than simply throwing out the colonizers, or taking over their possessions. Nor does the end of colonialism emerge from reorganizing and establishing the "lines of communication" between colonized and colonizer with a "charmed circle of mutual admiration," or "a treatise of the universal" (Fanon 2001/1961: 31, 189, 31). Rather, to begin the process of overcoming the colonial world where the "truths of the nation are in the first place its realities" - an existence where "nothing is ever left to chance - "everything (needs) to be called in question" (Fanon 2001/1961: 181, 169; 183).

Such questioning entails an absolute and violent destruction of the colonial intelligibility and imaginary, which operates through "annihilation or triumph"—in a word, confronting the colonial binary worldview built with white humanitarian truths, knowledge and rationalities that imprison, immobilize and fix the native into his inferiority (Fanon 2008/1952: 178). As Fanon reminds us, "the former slave needs a challenge to his humanity, he wants a conflict, a riot" (Fanon 2008/1952: 172). In other words, natives' restoration into the world and into the field of history necessitates an absolute negation, a total and radical strategy of immediacy, through which the settler is taken "out of the picture" (Fanon 2001/1961: 34).

As a practice of recognized difference and its valorization that interrupts the colonizers' forcing dialogue and shatters his one-dimensional colonial reality of imitation into multiplicity, decolonialization entails then, above all, an ongoing aesthetic and ontological battle against the Westerners' superiority and certainty at the level of imaginary and intelligibility. As "an open conflict between white and black" through which the colonial thought-world is reorganized "from the bottom up" (Fanon 2008/1952: 169; Fanon 2001/1961: 27), it is thus: "quite simply the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 'species of men' […] "a total, complete and absolute substitution that puts into practice the sentence last will be first and the first last" (Fanon 2001/1961: 27).

For Fanon, decolonization, as the "disappearance of the colonized man," culminates in recognition that there are "no longer slaves, there are no longer masters" (Fanon 2001/1961: 198; Fanon 2008/1952: 171). Involving an an open-ended battle that brings an end to a specific history of Man, as a practice of freedom it entails a transformed intelligibility in which "negro is not. Any more than a white man" (Fanon 2008/1952: 180). Indeed, as Fanon explicates, independence is "not a word which can be used as an exorcism, but an indispensable *condition for the existence* of men and women who are truly liberated, in other words who are truly masters of all the material means which make possible the radical transformation of society" (Fanon 2001/1961: 250, *emphasis added).*

Consequently, decolonization—as a practice of critical thought that destroys both the settler and the native, by rejecting white liberty and humanity—is a painful "descent into a real hell," through which the native violently uproots himself from his fixed colonial existence of "here-and-now" and moves toward "somewhere else and something else" (Fanon 2008/1952: 2, 170). Thus, as a practice of self-making through which a different attitude towards oneself and one's present is opened up, it is preconditioned on a change at the level of self-intelligibility and imaginary through which the native transforms himself "in-itself-for-itself" (Fanon 2008/1952: 170).

This transformed existence is not solely a project for the native, but must also involve the colonizers. As Fanon argues, to rehabilitate mankind, or to make a man victorious anywhere, "the Europeans must *first* decide to wake up and shake themselves, use their brains and stop playing the stupid game of Sleeping Beauty" (Fanon 2001/1961: 84, *emphasis added).* Accordingly, as a counter-hegemonic discourse that turns the colonial intelligibility upside down by establishing a "fundamentally different set of relations between men", decolonialization is inevitably linked to dislocating the intelligibility of Westerners' self-referential dominating concept of humanity, through a radical and totalitarian strategy of immediacy (Fanon 2001/1961: 198; 105). Elaborating on these relations between violence, self-constitution and the other, Fanon writes:

> [F]or the colonized people this violence, because it constitutes their only work, invests their characters with positive and creative qualities […] The armed struggle mobilizes the people: that is to say, it throws them in one way and in one direction […] At the level of the individuals, the violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction: it turns him fearless and restores his self-respect (Fanon 2001/1961: 73-4).

Thus, gaining mastery over oneself is a precondition for freedom. Although a recognition of the Western man as "other" is central to this self-constitution, for Fanon the white man merely features as a means to an end in this new relationship where "there is no Negro mission: there is no white burden" (Fanon 2008/1952: 178). This new relationship opposes the primacy and privilege of the Other and stresses the individual's own responsibility to become his own foundation through care of self which determines and extends to the acts towards others (Fanon 2008/1952: 179-80). Ultimately, it is only by attacking the colonial

certainty, through which the difference between the native and the settler is made visible and thinkable, that freedom as recognized difference can unfold.

Consequently, as an "effort to recapture the self and to scrutinize the self" (Fanon 2008/1952: 181) Fanon's call for a new humanity, or the new history of man, is not a vision of transcendence by an improved humanity, or of a retun to an unspoilt, authentic historical existence. Rather freedom entails self-detachment, or a step into the unknown, which opens natives up to new unspecified spaces of heteronomy and autonomy (Fanon 2001/1961: 253-4). As Fanon explicates, "the human condition, plans for mankind and collaboration between men in those task which increase the total sum total of humanity are *new problems*, *which demand true inventions*" (Fanon 2001/1961: 252, *emphasis added*). Accordingly, as a renewal of forms of expression and imagination, Fanonian freedom is not a revival of some past authenticity, or "Negro civilization"—that is, giving "back to the national culture its former value or shapes" (Fanon 2008/1952: 176; Fanon 2001/1961: 198). As Fanon writes, "it is not enough to try to free oneself by repeating proclamations and denials": "nor is it enough to try to get back to the people in the past out of what they have already emerged" (Fanon 2001/1961: 182). Rather, freedom, as a condition of possibility for self-realization and self-constitution, is always something in the making: a risky endeavour through which individuals conceive their difference differently through disengagement, disintegration and non-corporation.

Indeed, decolonization requires "everyday drama"—that is, an ongoing battle "with series of local engagement," none of which are decisive (Fanon 2001/1961: 113), entailing constant questioning of one's own ways of being, seeing and thinking. Only through this constant battle, at the level of oneself, can the history of new humanism as an absolute beginning, beyond the Western universal, obligatory and necessary, begin to take place. Constituting freedom not an end, but an ethical and aesthetic practice that breaks down the hierarchical order of colonial representations by turning all certainties and truths into contingent ambivalences. Fanon writes eloquently on this matter (Fanon 2008/1952: 179):

> I am not a prisoner of this history. I should not seek there for the meaning of my destiny.
> I should constantly remind myself that the real leap consists in introducing invention into existence
> In the world though which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself
> I am a part of Being to the degree I go beyond it

As a practice of de-subjugation that establishes multiple imaginations and thought-worlds, freedom effectively requires alterity, innovation and openness at the level of self. Gesturing towards unspecified, unknown and non-affirmative existence, Fanon celebrates absolute violence as a practice of freedom through which the native establishes his "own foundation", a reality where he is "in-itself-for-itself" (Fanon 2008/1952: 170, 180). Contrary to post/colonial difference, positioned against or opposite, this new existence cannot be reduced to binary opposition. Nor does it place any responsibilities or

demands on others. Rather it is an existence in which sense, truth and reason belong to nobody, and where otherness is embodied, lived, recognized and celebrated; essentially, an alternative humanity, characterized by the freedom to create and represent oneself.

4.5 Conclusions

> Colonialism did not seek to be considered by the native as a gentle, loving mother who protects her child from a hostile environment, but rather mother who unceasingly restrains her fundamentally perverse offspring from managing to commit suicide and from giving free rein to its evil instincts
> • Frantz Fanon (2001/1961: 169-70)

Paralleling Foucault's critical history of the present, in his research on the colonial condition Fanon draws attention to the violence of Western humanism, reason and universalism through which the racial difference between the colonized and colonizer is constituted and maintained. Thus, as his historico-political analysis takes violence outside the realm of the spectacular and traumatic, the foundational violence of colonialism that operates through racialized humanism is made visible and thinkable.

Fanon embraces a critical rethinking of the relationship between racism and humanism, representations and violence, and freedom and self-governance. As he forcefully argues, for the native there cannot be freedom from above, nor can it be given from without in any way. Rather freedom is always relational to a specific historical reality, and therefore can only emerge through ongoing critical engagements with the present. As in Foucault's undefined work of freedom, this entails historically and socially situated criticism which is not transcendental, but critical in its method. Ultimately, defining and formulating decolonization as a relentless, exhausting battle against all inexhaustible normative singularity of thought itself, embedded in ways of being, belonging and becoming.

Aimed at thinking and encountering oneself and the world differently, decolonization for Fanon is thus closely interlinked with self-constitution through which the subject gives deliberate form to his own existence and essence. As a practice of freedom that strives towards existence where the native is not anymore ″potentially something″ but instead is recognized as ″in-itself-for-itself″ this necessitates hybridized cultural and political experience and expression - cultivation of critical attentiveness towards the conditions and limits of colonial intelligibility and imaginary (Fanon 2008/1952: 103; 170). As such, displacement and disruption at the level of thought through which a different intelligibility unfolds with unforeseen possibilities for the native to introduce ″invention into his existence″ (Fanon 2008/1952: 179).

Consequently, Fanon's conceptualizations of colonialism as a totalizing and normalizing thought-world that manages and administrates life-worlds with its racializing humanism resonates with Foucault's writings on liberal war

as grid of intelligibility of social relations. Indeed, by exploring the intertwined and overlapping relations between colonialism and Western humanism, Fanon problematizes post/colonialism not as a historical epoch, but as a contingent historical intelligibility and attitude that has affinities with Foucauldian biopolitics as a governmental rationality that is predicated with regulation, control and administration of bodies and life.

Fanon's and Foucault's insights regarding the intertwined relations between violence and representation, humanity and race and perpetual war as an intelligibility of life, evoke critical questions about the conditions of possibility that ground the progressive history-making of celebrity humanitarianism. As both thinkers maintain, thought is never representational but operates as a practice that needs to be encountered historically and politically. Indeed, Fanon's final wish to "be a man who questions" (Fanon 2008/1952: 181) and Foucault's invitation to grasp the foundations we are standing on by "making the cultural unconscious apparent" (Foucault 1996d/1971: 73) encourage responsibility of thought which culminates in self-problematization and self-refusal. Entailing an alternative reading of our modernity, liberty and humanity, this necessitates encountering who we are today, what is this "today" in which we live, and how we have become what we experience ourselves to be (Foucault 1991b/1984). In other words, engaging with a "critical ontology of ourselves", which, by rejecting all timeless truths that have been imposed on us for several centuries, strives toward a new, transformed subjectivity that culminates in new ways of thinking and being (Foucault 2002/1982: 336).

Thus, investigating and exposing how celebrity humanitarianism engages with Fanonian post/colonial governmental rationality, entails critical encounters with the historically conditioned subjectivities and mentalities that this activity conditions and effects at the level of intelligibility and imaginary. In particular, this thinking requires confronting the subjective characteristics and particularities that legitimize this activity, along with the aesthetic/affective representations of "the wretched on Earth" with which Africa's reality, as the West's universal mission and purpose, is constituted and legitimized. To begin with, as I will explain in the next chapter, critically encountering the self-understandings, subjectivities and agencies that the Western celebrity humanitarian discourses create, facilitate, justify and repeat.

5 CELEBRITY, CORPOREALITY AND EMBODIED HUMANITY

> … the one thing, on which we cal all agree, among all faiths and ideologies, is that God is with the vulnerable and the poor … God is in the slums, in the cardboard boxes where the poor play house … God is in the debris of wasted opportunity and lives, and God is with us if we are with them
> • Bono (2006: front cover)

> I am my own foundation
> • Frantz Fanon (2008/1952: 180)

5.1 Introduction

In the preceding two chapters, I examined Frantz Fanon's and Michel Foucault's descriptions of violence as an endemic part and practice of intelligibility, as well as their shared critique of universal Western humanism as an objectivising and totalizing thought-world predicated on notions of identity/difference. By thinking critically about the interlinked relationships between violence and representation, racism and humanism, freedom and self-governance in their thinking, with these investigations critical insights to the liberal humanist action, underpinned with violence and dominance at the level of thinking, being and becoming unfolded. In short, insights that distiguish how humanitarian intelligibilities and imaginaries—characterized by Westerners' superiority, certainty and truth—contribute to and are conditioned by violent geographies, cruel radiances and dominating subjugations.

Both Foucault and Fanon—in their respective critical interventions into Westerner's self-referential monopolized humanity, its self-knowledge and truth, governed through difference at the level of life—encourage attentiveness to the politics of ourselves and our present by unmapping the normative and institutional imaginaries and intelligibilities that govern and limit the possible relations between us and the World. In general, these practices of self necessitate a rejection of autonomous, original and ahistorical subjectivities, inorder to

carry out a historical critique against all that has been ”given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, [the] place [that] is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints” (Foucault 1991b/1984: 45). In particular, inasmuch as we are ”doomed historically to history, to the patient construction of discourses about discourses, and to the task of hearing what has already been said” (Foucault 2010/1963: xvii), this task entails investigating the conditions of possibility of our humanitarian actuality and agency in the aim to create different possibilities of being and thinking. In this regard, interrogating the violently conditioned and conditioning Western subjectivity and truth, asserted through displays of integrity, constancy, civilization and deportment, through which the Westerner identifies himself ”as explorer, the bringer of civilization, a man who brings truth to the savages” (Fanon 2008/1952: 114).

Approaching colonialism as a dominating Western self-intelligibility through which social, spatial and temporal distance between the “Westerner” and the “native” is established, maintained and governed, in aim to reveal how celebrity humanitarianism reproduces this overdetermining difference, requires investigations into how this activity is interlinked with techniques of the self. Indeed, as already discussed in the previous chapter, the presentation of the colonising Westerner as a man of history and its ”progress” required ongoing performances and assertions of duty, progress, self-authenticity and truth – masculine impositions of ones ”existence on another man in order to be recognized by him” (Fanon 2008/1952: 168). Consequently, in order for the Westerner to become representative of his race, nation, class and humanity, the constant deployment of his emancipated and empowered Western selfhood was needed. Or as Fanon argued, what was necessitated was “a permanent dialogue with oneself” through which “the prodigious adventure of the European spirit” was constituted (Fanon 2001/1961: 253).

In this chapter, by following Foucault’s critical ontology of ourselves which is preconditioned by self-reflexivity and curiosity, my aim is to shed light on the prevailing historical trajectories between colonial body politics and contemporary celebrity humanitarians’ “politics of suffering”. I will pursue this aim by exemplifying how contemporary humanitarian life-fostering discourses constitute and legitimize Westerners’ authority and agency in world politics, and by doing so, maintain the racial world order in which the white man is and remains ”the master of the world”.

In order to reveal how Western celebrity humanitarian subjectivity and agency reproduce the violently subjugative regimes of colonial intelligibility and imaginary, I will examine how, in Anglo-American media discourses, Bob Geldof and Bono, the two most visible contemporary Western celebrity humanitarians, are constructed, and how they construct themselves as legitimate humanitarian subjects acting on behalf of African people. Methodologically this reading entails detailing how celebrity humanitarianism is visualized and verbalized in the media, as well as explicating how through these categorizations, localizations and particularizations, historical subjectivities and worldviews are mobilized and legitimized. To paraphrase WJT Mitchell, this project involves

examining the intersections through which difference is constituted by contemplating the world-making of these celebrity imaginaries by asking: "what do these images want from us"? Where are they leading us? What is it that they lack, that they are inviting us to fill? What desires have we projected onto them, and what form do those desires take as they are project back at us, making demands upon us, seducing us to feel and act in specific ways?" (Michell 2005: 25).

By paying close attention to the textual/visual interfaces of Geldof's and Bono's subjective and subjugating particularities and attributes, from which their universal humanitarian agency, authority and legitimacy develops and derives, my analysis is structured according to two processes of becoming: firstly, the rationalities of contemporary celebrity humanitarian action, and secondly, the production of their celebrity subjectivities through which they are defined as authoritarian, legitimate and unpolitical humanitarian subjects acting on behalf of African problems.

I argue that the legitimacy of Geldof and Bono as humanitarian actors is underpinned by particular reproductions of class, race and gender - characteristics of authoritative masculinity (courage, self-sacrifice, benevolence) and notions of liberal emancipatory self-realizations. It is exactly these processes of subjectivication and the physical realisation of these performative roles which place Geldof and Bono into their superior subject positions, cementing them firmly into their logical and natural position of agency in the world and its affairs.

5.2 Bono & Bob Geldof The Embodiments of Global Humanity and its Progressive History

> We should look at what happens in Africa and what happens to the poor — the extreme violence visited upon them by poverty.

The above statement, spoken by the contemporary celebrity humanitarian Bob Geldof which called for world leaders and citizens to heal Africa's constant pain, it's suffering and poverty, by taking the biblical "Long Walk to Justice" to "Make [Africa's] Poverty History"—was made in July 2005, one day before the G-8 meeting in Edinburgh, where Africa's situation was at the forefront of the group's agenda.

This increased visibility of African issues should not be perceived as a sudden rupture; rather, it is simply one step in a gradual process that began at the turn of the century. Indeed, already in 2001, less than a month after 9/11, UK prime minister Tony Blair called for an international "Partnership for Africa," to address Africa's poverty and political turmoil, which he described as "a scar on the conscience of the world" (BBC 22.5.2003). Dealing with Africa's poverty, as Blair forcefully argued, was "our moral duty," continuing that if action to "heal" Africa through international military and humanitarian intervention was not taken, the continent, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, "would

breed anger and frustration which would threaten global stability" (BBC 2.10.2001).

This call to heal, tame and normalize Africa through moral humanism was soon turned into action. In 2004, Tony Blair launched his "Commission of Africa," which—by taking "a fresh look at Africa's past, present and future"—aimed to work out a realistic plan to help to "resuscitate" the continent (BBC 26.2.2004; BBC 27.2.2004). In 2005, recommendations for this new partnership, constituted with "mutual support," were published in a report entitled *Our Common Interest*"(2005). Western countries, the report argued, had a moral duty—and a powerful motive of self-interest—to help Africa facilitate economic growth through increased aid as well as an improved capacity to trade. In turn, Africa had to improve its accountability, strengthen its democratic institutions, and combat prevailing corruption on the continent (http://www.commissionforafrica.info). In this regard, the report stated that the goal to address "African poverty and stagnation" was "much greater, more noble and more demanding than just [our] shared needs, and linked destines." Indeed, helping Africa constituted a "common interest" between all nations to make the world a more prosperous and secure place for "our common humanity." A task that for Geldof meant "to extend the hand of sympathy and shared humanity to reach above the impenetrable roar and touch the human beings *on the other side"* (Commission on Africa 2005: 1, 68 – *emphasis added*).

According to Geldof—who was (and still is) a nominated member of the Commission—this initiative provided the first opportunity since the end of the Cold War to reframe the terms of the relationship between the richest and poorest countries in the world (BBC 6.10.2004). Subsequently, to eliminate Africa's poverty, or to "offer a new start" to Africa, necessitated a more radical involvement and way of thinking on the part of Westerners. As Geldof asserted, "we [the developed world] have never really stopped to ask them [Africans] questions, and when they have told us things we haven't really listened, because we [Westerners] had all the answers" (ibid). Instead of talk, it was time for a different sort of Western action.

Historically, celebrity involvement, engagement or participation in national or global issues has not been so warmly welcomed, or celebrated by political elites. For instance, in the 1970s President Nixon tried to deport John Lennon from the United States because of Lennon's criticism of the Vietnam War. Similarly, the political activism of actors like Jane Fonda, Steve McQueen, Paul Newman and Barbra Streisand, had them placed on Nixon "Enemies List," with other major political opponents. The visible and blunt tactics of the powerful to silence celebrities might have softened, but celebrity activism is still limited. For example, in 2003 the country-group Dixie Chicks was pulled off the air because of their criticism of the war in Iraq. Similarly, actors Sean Penn and Susan Sarandon, after making comments about the illegitimacy of the war in Iraq, suffered widely-published attacks in the US media, which called them unpatriotic and even treasonous.

Today, several Western celebrities involved in African issues—Geldof and Bono among them—have nevertheless moved from counterculture to mainstream politics, where they share stages with politicians and businessmen at various official political conferences, events and panels, and accompany them on travels to Africa[6]. As prominent members of the new humanitarian class, both of them, for example, have received Honorary Knighthoods. In addition, their actions on behalf of the African poor have granted them, respectively, an extensive list of honors and awards, from honorary doctorates to orders of liberty. Both have been nominated several times for the Nobel Peace Prize: Geldof in 1986, 2006 and 2008; and Bono in 2003, 2006 and 2007. Moreover, TIME magazine has regognized Geldof as one of its "European Heroes" (2005), and named Bono twice as one of the "100 Most Influential People" in the world (in 2004 and 2006). In 2005, TIME named Bono along with Bill and Melinda Gates "Person of the Year" (TIME 19.12.2005b), "for being shrewd about doing good, for rewiring politics and re-engineering justice, for making mercy smarter and hope strategic and then daring the rest of us to follow". "In different ways", as TIME's managing editor Jim Kelly reasoned their decision "it is Bill and Melinda Gates, co-founders of the world's wealthiest charitable foundation, and Bono, the Irish rocker who has made debt reduction sexy."

Alongside these multiple honors, both Geldof and Bono have also received the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates' "Man of Peace" award, granted to individuals who have offered an outstanding contribution to international social justice and peace. Against this backdrop, it is not that surprising that they have become two of the most media-visible Western male celebrities acting to end the "extreme" poverty in Africa, and are frequently depicted in the British media as men of truth and moral integrity. Originally these two men met in 1984, when Bob Geldof initiated the Band-Aid project in order to raise funds for famine relief for Ethiopia, a campaign that was followed by the Live Aid concerts in London and Philadelphia in 1985. However, it was only in 1999 when they reached their current state of visibility through their involvement in the Jubilee 2000 campaign, a worldwide movement designed to eliminate Third World debt. Since then, they have been increasingly involved in various campaigns and events to help ease African suffering. These included, for example, establishing a lobby group, DATA (Debt, AIDS, Trade, Africa), and launching the Product RED-campaign, which aims to help African AIDS sufferers through commercial means.

This change in celebrity involvement reflects a general trend in the field of contemporary humanitarianism. Today's humanitarianism "is no longer the cry of dissidents, campaigners and protesters but rather a common vocabulary that brings together the government, the army and erstwhile radicals and human rights activists" (Douzinas 2007: 7). In other words, a new professional class,

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6 Bono's and Geldof's close relationships with Western politicians have not escaped criticism. However in the analysed media, the criticism is predominantly targeted at the politicians' (perceived) vain efforts to build a favourable and "cool" political image through associating themselves with Bono and Geldof (see Telegraph 20.1.2008a; Telegraph 14.7.2007; Telegraph 21.2.2007).

the "humanitarians" or "internationals", has emerged whose goal is to make the world more just (ibid: 9). This task culminated in 2005 when Geldof and Bono organized the Live 8 concerts in G8 countries and South Africa, to support the Make Poverty History campaign to pressure G8 to erase the debt of the world's poorest nations. Bono's and Geldof's success, aided by the wider civil society, in persuading G8 leaders to cancel the US$40 billion debt owed by 18 highly indebted countries (14 of them in Africa), and negotiating 100 percent debt cancellation for 38 countries, was a widely celebrated achievement. As a turn towards a fairer and more equal world, according to then UK Chancellor Gordon Brown, Live8 concerts were proof that "people can have power if they make their views felt". Similarly, then United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan argued that the event had "united nations." Through this powerful event, he continued, "the whole world had come together in solidarity with the poor", ending with "on behalf of the poor, the voiceless and the weak I say thank you" (BBC 3.7.2005).

Finally, as Geldof himself asserted, Western politicians had listened to the will of the people, who had "roared on behalf of those who were mute, […] moved power for the powerless, […] walked that long walk for many who cannot ever crawl and how billions of us stood up for the beaten-down and put-upon. "The long walk " for the future of the poorest and weakest people in our world" was finally over and the "promise of twenty years ago was realised". Articulating the "language understood by all humanity … of our longing for universal decency" Geldof continued "people had finally changed the world" (Geldof, 2005a). Bono was more reserved. Reflecting Winston Churchill's WWII rhetoric he concluded: "I wouldn't say this is the end of extreme poverty, but it is the beginning of the end" (BBC 10.7.2005).

Even though neither Geldof nor Bono formally participate in decision-making processes regarding African issues, they play significant roles as producers of knowledge, truths and facts about Africa's reality. Indeed, with their renowned attempts at eliminating extreme poverty and preventable diseases in Africa, they have emerged as visible, celebrated centres in the world of humanitarianism as "political activists," "celebrity diplomats" and "global Samaritans", actors who, to quote former World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz,"rock the establishment" (TIME 13.11.2006).

Today, this positive view regarding the necessity and importance of celebrity humanitarianism in Africa—defined as ethical action aiming to create a more human, co-operative and peaceful global world—is also shared by Western NGOs and politicians. For instance, previous UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has argued that celebrity humanitarians "help instill in young people the values of understanding, solidarity, respect and communication across cultures … so that those values come to them naturally for the rest of their lives" (UN Chronicle 27.6.2002). Furthermore Phil Bloomer, head of advocacy for Oxfam UK, has said that "celebrities give a face and voice to all those people with no faces and no voices. When a celebrity talks, people listen; there is no better messenger" (Ford and Goodale, cited in Cooper 2008: 114). As such, it is

not surprising that for many citizens in the United Kingdom Bono and Geldof have become present-day anti-hegemonic heroes, charismatic truth-tellers who act against Western power elites by bringing truth and reason out on display.[7]

As discussed below, it is precisely because Bono and Geldof are represented as outsiders—or even challengers— of conventional Western politics in Africa, that they can be seen to enjoy a high degree of mass support as apolitical nonpartisan humanitarian actors.

5.3 Bob Geldof: Uncompromising Pioneer

In analyzed media articles reporting on Bob Geldof's actions to alleviate Africa's poverty – to "Make its Poverty History"— he was framed through one particular dominant discourse, one which repeats and draws on the overdetermining colonial intelligibilty of the supreme qualities and essential values of the Westerner which supports the project of bringing humanity, civilization and progress to Africa. Within the intelligibility of *The Judge,* Geldof became constituted as man of justice and equality, righteousness and moral authority. Akin to the colonial masters, the men who made Africa's history (Fanon 2001/1961: 40), thi subjectivity and agency was constructed with descriptions of Geldof's ability to make clear independent judgements with outstanding courage and conviction.

These personal assessments were interpreted to indicate his high standard of knowledge, enabling him to evaluate African problems and identify with skill the correct policies to solve them. This neutral subjectivity, removed from politics, was constructed predominantly by contrasting Geldof's actions with the immaterialized and empty promises of Western politicians to help Africa (see image 1; BBC 31.5.2005; BBC 6.7.2005; BBC 29.6.2006; BBC 10.6.2005). In BBC news headlines—assessing the extent of the crimes against and progress of Africa by Western political elites—Geldof was, on occasion, reported to "push,"

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7 According to Oxfam's research (2005) on celebrity endorsement of charitable causes, 78 percent of the 1,200 respondents felt that celebrity-endorsed campaigns *"get the message to people who might not otherwise care"* and 63 percent declared that celebrities can *"raise awareness of important issues*." Today, not only do people appreciate celebrities' actions, for causes seen as legitimate, but they also tend to understand such celebrities as powerful actors in the global political agenda, alongside "traditional politicians" (Oxfam, 2006). When asked who people thought could end global poverty, the top-ten list came out as follows: 1) Me 2) George Bush 3) Bob Geldof 4) Bono 5) Tony Blair 6) Gordon Brown 7) Nelson Mandela 8) Bill Gates 9) Pope Benedict XVI 10) Oprah Winfrey. United Kingdom's ex-prime minister Tony Blair came in at number five—behind Live8 and Make Poverty History ambassadors Bob Geldof and Bono—indicating a distinct change in the role of celebrities in contemporary political agenda setting. These research results indicate that certain celebrities, especially Bono and Geldof, have established a special position among UK citizens: they have become people's representatives, truth-tellers and moral guides. The answers reflect this trust in their authenticity: Bono and Geldof are often described as genuine, passionate, sincere, truthful people who represent people's collective voices against politicians (ibid).

"set out" and "urge" Western politicians to help Africa (BBC 11.3.2007; BBC 30.6.2006; BBC 20.12.2005; BBC 31.5.2005; BBC 6.7.2005; BBC 29.6.2006). Admired for being free of favours and obligations, he was, as BBC described him "an outspoken campaigner" and "ragged-trousered pragmatist" whose "credibility [was] intact" (BBC 4.6.2003).

As a neutral and apolitical cosmopolitan world citizen with an ability to make sensible, truthful and personal evaluations about Western policies—Geldof acquired, as the BBC reported, "a reputation most politicians can only look on with green eyed envy" (BBC 2.7.2002). Indeed, as the Telegraph explained, Geldof and Bono were "a dynamic duo of African aid"—individuals who were not "hemmed in by narrow national interests and party policy" (Telegraph 2.7.2005). Hence when Geldof speaks of "problems of famine in Africa and the possible solutions," BBC wrote, "he is widely believed and almost universally respected" (BBC 2.7.2002).

References to Geldof's working/lower-middle class and postcolonial Irish background strengthened the claims for these African representations. His scruffy and outlandish dress sense, his unkempt hair, his foul language and the life-long perseverance of his rock star dreams, made him, as BBC reported, "anything but an establishment figure" (BBC 2.7.2002). Subsequently, from being thrown out of Canada as an illegal immigrant in his youth, to his father's job as a travelling towel salesman, Geldof's courage became celebrated as his "most defining quality," making him peerless in his passionate commitment to "rock the establishment" (Telegraph 29.11.2003; TIME 13.11.2006).

This anti-established stance framed Geldof as a moral authority, based on his principled consistency in questioning and challenging political and economic authorities as well as rewarding them through praise (BBC 10.3.2007; BBC 27.9.2006; BBC 8.7.2007). As a man with "such extraordinary access to presidents and premiers that his profanities echo through the halls of power," the Telegraph detailed his "deep frustration" with the "bad guys—the leaders who slide away from their promises of more aid to Africa," and described his "full praises for Gordon Brown and George W. Bush" (Telegraph 8.7.2008).

Through these media reports Geldof was framed as impartial, neutral and apolitical, that is, a man possessing the same qualities as traditional humanitarian actors, whose legitimacy is based on their ability to guide, measure and produce humanitarian deliverables as agents and embodiments of universal humanity. This neutral image was further constructed by news stories reporting on his actions as a consultant for the Tory policy group on globalization and global poverty, as well as for the Labour government's Commission of Africa (Telegraph 29.12.2005; Telegraph 28.12.2005; BBC 27.2.2004). As a detached mediator in the service of global justice, it was Geldof, BBC reported, who after private conversations with Tony Blair had come to the conclusion that the British PM "was passionate about helping Africa" and as a result suggested the Commission for Africa (BBC 27.2.2004b). Joining this Commission, Geldof explained, was not however an indication that he himself was "tamed" (BBC 4.5.2004). Rather as he added, self-confidently, "I'm the one who asked for the

[African] Commission, so it could be that the prime minister and the chancellor are the ones who came inside our tent, the activist tent if you like" (BBC 4.5.2004).

This notion of Geldof as a visionary arbitrator was reinforced by David Cameron, the current UK prime minister, who argued that Geldof's role in the Tories' poverty forum was "entirely non-partisan" [and hence] "he will bring his influence to bear, in order to help us to go in the direction that he and we both want to go" (Telegraph 28.12.2005). Depicted as man capable of reasonably assessing the extent of the crimes against, or progress of, Africa Geldof was, as BBC continued "the clearest example of a modern day hero … (p)olitical and empathetic, but not a politician" (BBC 2.7.2002)—a position that Geldof himself agreed with by arguing that"he was not politically partisan but it was his job to be used" (Telegraph 29.12.2005).

This outsider status, which cemented Geldof's credibility and his legitimacy as *The Judge*, was again confirmed by his participation in live interviews at summits, UN or UNICEF missions, and at G8 and EU-Africa meetings (BBC 8.7.2008; BBC 30.11.2007, BBC 16.5.2005; Telegraph 28.5.2003; image 2). This first-hand knowledge of Western political leaders and their policies enabled Geldof to act as an impartial judge who stood above politics and could criticize it. At a UN summit in New York, he was reported to comment that he was "not thrilled" with the progress made; graded the UN summit with "a mark of four out of ten for failing to make monumental pledges on debt, trade and development aid" (BBC 16.9.2005).

Indeed, as the BBC wrote, Geldof's actions were "passionate" and "groundbreaking"; his words regarded "with the same weight—if not more—as big name politicians from Clare Short up to Tony Blair" (BBC 2.7.2002). Geldof's knowledge and his fearless attitude can be seen yet again in his answer to President Bush, who questioned the "international best selling" status of his *Geldof in Africa* (2005) book. TIME reported Geldof's confident and scathing reply to the President: "That's right. It's called marketing. Something you obviously have no clue about or else I wouldn't have to be here telling people your Africa story" (TIME 28.2.2008). Indeed, Geldof, like his fellow activist Bono, was reported to have "a real grasp of African development issues", and hence, he "will not retreat to the comforting simplicities of blind protest" (Telegraph 9.6.2007). As a principled individual who was "widely believed and almost universally respected," Geldof was a "political animal who is trusted and whose views are respected" (BBC 2.7.2002). "Clearly identified with causes which are inevitably political but scorning the Westminster merry-go-round," BBC observed, "it is certainly true that when Geldof speaks out on an issue, he makes headlines" (BBC 2.7.2002).

Drawing on the "most up-to-date academic research in his campaigns" and "armed with a keen sense of moral outrage", Geldof's actions, BBC wrote had "endeared him to the public and earned him the moniker of Saint Bob" (BBC 4.6.2003). Indeed, it was Geldof, the BBC concluded, "who helped put Ethiopia on the map over two decades ago" (BBC 10.5.2007). Similarly, TIME

commented on Geldof's long career in Africa by noting that he had "spent much of the last 25 years stressing to world leaders the importance of Africa" (TIME 28.2.2008). His accumulated knowedge on the realities of Africa was so impressive, that then World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz called Geldof "an inspirational man" with a "wide surprising breadth of knowledge and intellectual curiosity", concludinh that Geldof was a "volcanic force of nature", a man who performed "visionary acts" (TIME 13.11.2006).

In news stories depicting Geldof's personal relationships with and access to politicians, he was portrayed as a man on a mission which he would complete at any cost, even if it meant battling political demons (BBC 26.2.2004; BBC 27.2.2004; BBC 27.2.2004b, BBC 11.3.2005). The Telegraph reported on his willingness to "take it up with the devil on his left and the devil on his right if it would help Africa" (Telegraph 9.6.2007). This uncompromising subjectivity was also something that Geldof constructed and performed himself. At the Live 8 concert, he raised his fist in the air like an archetypal man of justice (image 3). Expressing solidarity with the oppressed and invisible people in Africa, he constituted himself symbolically as an anti-hegemonic activist in opposition to Western governments' policies in Africa. This intelligibility of a heroic and uncompromising Western man was further constituted in news stories about his "passionate" and "determined" actions for Africa, his frequent travels to the continent and his reportings on Africa's worsening starvation (BBC 4.6.2003; BBC 30.5.2003; BBC 26.5.2003; BBC 1.6.2003). For example, TIME magazine assigned Geldof to travel with President W. Bush to Africa: an allocated task that reflected and further developed Geldof's status as a wise man, a neutral and respected observer whose words were honest and virtuous (TIME 28.2.2008). This intelligibility of an independent and thoughtful man on the political front lines, was further strengthened and validated through various news images: of Tony Blair listening to Geldof seriously during Geldof's speech to the United Nations (BBC 16.9.2005); of President George W. Bush explaining America's African strategy to Geldof onboard Air Force One (TIME 28.2.2008); and of Bill Clinton sitting relaxed next to Geldof during the launch of the Clinton Hunter Development Initiative (CHDI) in London (image 2 and 4).

The photographs of Geldof attached to the news stories reporting on Geldof's actions are self-referential and repetitive. Not only are these same pictures repeated from one story to the next, constucting a further story of the Westerner's eternal task of healing Africa, but moreover in them Africans are rarely depicted. At the Live 8 concert, this non-recognition of the continent's agency culminated not only in the total invisibility of Afrian artists in the line-up—a choice that elicited critiques that the concert was "hideously white" (BBC 10.6.2005b; BBC 2.5.2005) but also in the choice of the Africans who were allowed to climb to the stage. That is, the South African HIV orphan choir members, and an Ethiopian girl called Birhan Woldu whose image, ravaged by hunger, had symbolised Live Aid's 1985 plea for money for the victims of the devastating famine in Ethiopia (image 5 and image 6).

In 1985, at Live Aid, a video had declared that Birhan Woldu was likely to die in fifteen minutes. At the Live 8 concert, alive, healed and healthy, she appeared next to Geldof who introduced her to the crowds as "a beacon of hope and inspiration to millions, proof we can make a difference" (image 6). At Live 8, Birhan was the only African individual allowed to address the crowds with her own words. As a teenager who has graduated from university with a diploma in agricultural science, civilized, but not yet enough to represent herself without the presence of the white man, in her short speech, through an interpreter, she thanked the Western crowd: "It was Live Aid that helped to save my life—and now I believe together we can save the lives of millions more. We Africans love you very much. It is a great honour to be here at the start of the Live 8. Please continue to support the Live 8; we love you very much. Thank you."

Just like the docile, celebrated "Other"—the well-mannered, self-sufficient, responsible and responsive subject whose eternal duty and task, according to Fanon, is to show eternal gratitude to the white man (Fanon 2008/1952: 178)—Birhan, alongside the HIV orphans on the stage, became the epitome of Westerners' goodness and intelligence. As proofs of Westerners' sincere and eternally needed efforts to bring civilization, progress and humanity into Africa, with the imaginaries an infernal circle of Western self-recognition and celebration unfolds. As British singer Annie Lennox, who performed with the HIV-orphans at the concert described: "It's so moving, you see these little children, they're beautiful and clean and dressed nicely and singing. When you go to Africa, and you see children, they're usually barefoot, dirty and in rags, and they'd love to go to school" (BBC 5.7.2007).

As icons and embodiments of the West's much needed efforts on the African continent, it is in these "saved" and "healed" children that the story from non-existence towards normative life – that is, from nothingness and namelessness into existence and visibility – unfolds. As before, Africans are given only one role and purpose: to show their eternal gratefulness to the Westerner for the gift of their existence and future. Yet again, they are placed next to and for white men and women, who with their words, images and gazes frame, explain and scale their progress against white, universalized humanity. Always dependent on the presence of the white man, sealed firmly into an instrumentality, as a comparison, a question of value, of merit (Fanon 1952/2008: 163).

5.4 Bono: Passionate Revolutionary

In the media articles depicting Bono's humanitarian efforts, his authority and legitimacy was established through two interlocking intelligibilities which overlapped with Geldof, *The Judge.* This overlap is not surprising, considering the nature of their humanitarian activities, as well as their Irish backgrounds. However, when it came to Bono, new characteristics emerged which fractured the historical narrative of the knowing Western subjectivity in Africa, by adding new superhuman, global aspects into it.

Indeed, where Geldof's humanitarian subjectivity involves knowledge and truth, Bono's is action-based, moving between nostalgic superheroism and revolutionary entrepreneurialism. Bono, as TIME attested, was more "like Superman turning into Clark Kent" (TIME 4.3.2002) than vice versa, as if he were in reality a superhuman in the guise of a human. TIME's front cover of Bono intensified this perception (image 7) by showing Bono against a clear backdrop as if he were leaping up into the empty sky. In the picture, Bono's face was calm and determined, reflecting and constituting peacefulness and comfort. As if he were the Chosen One, called to preserve the future of the mankind, the headline, placed on top of Bono's body, asked "Can Bono save the world?" Only to reinstate the imaginary of Bono's ability and capability to restore global humanity, the headline continued: "Don't laugh—the globe's biggest rock star is on a mission to make a difference." This superheroism further was exacerbated when Bono—with Bill and Melinda Gates—was chosen as TIME's Person of the Year in 2005, for such extraordinary and dignified achievements as "being shrewd about doing good, for rewiring politics and re-engineering justice, for making mercy smarter and hope strategic and then daring the rest of us to follow" (TIME 19.12.2005b). Having "no rivals," TIME wrote, Bono had "transform[ed] himself into the most secular of saints" (TIME 4.3.2002).

This role of the good shepherd, who leads through godliness and righteousness, was a part Bono himself performed by further constucting his agency as a moral leader of the world, a man whose actions were blessed by higher forces. On the BBC, Bono—as if bestowed with special gifts by God to share his moral message with others—explained that the "moral force" of his argument was "way beyond his" (BBC 20.10.2005). And hence, Bono concluded he was not "feeling nervous" about meeting President Bush or other world leaders. Indeed, for Bono, Africa featured not as a job, but as a vocational calling, "a cause for life," to fulfill God's purpose (TIME 19.12.2005). As a chosen agent of retributive justice in his rightful, uncompromising and relentless battle, it was Bono, TIME pointed out, who had "had bullied and morally blackmailed the leaders of the world's richiest countries into forgiving $40 billion in debt owed by the poorest" (TIME 19.12.2005b). Indeed, as if on a special mission called upon by higher forces, according to the Telegraph, Bono's anger aimed at Western politicians' unkept promises regarding Africa, was "genuine" and "righteous" (Telegraph 9.6.2007). TIME also reported that they had never heard a single suggestion that Bono's concern for the plight of the world's poor was anything other than genuine (TIME 4.3.2002b). Equipped with high morals, wisdom and courage, Bono was reported to have "dedicated his life to making sure that [Africa's] extreme poverty comes to an end" (TIME 26.4.2004). Leading with his words and by example, Bono was—as TIME called him—a "man of mission" - "a modern day Samaritan" who "commands attention like no other cultural figure alive" (TIME 4.3.2002; TIME 19.12.2005; TIME 19.12.2005b). "A televangelist persona", BBC clarified, who "was known for his ability to secure an audience with world leaders such as President George Bush and the late Pope John Paul II" (BBC 23.12.2006).

Indeed, as Bono himself explained about his work for Africa: "my job as a rock star and activist is to loudly applaud when politicians get it right and to make their lives a misery when they do not" (Telegraph 28.1.2005). As heroic as Superman on an assignment to save the World through Western social activism—Bono's epic "missions" and "grand tours" to Africa received wide coverage in the media (BBC 3.2.2002; BBC 22.5.2002; BBC 14.5.2002; BBC 25.5.2002; BBC 31.5.2002). In 2002, he travelled with then United States Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill to Africa, on a "fact-finding mission" aimed "at improving the impact of development aid" (BBC 22.5.2002). The BBC reported that this "unlikely duo" had met for the first time at the World Economic Forum, where Bono persuaded Mr O'Neill to join him on a "four nation tour," to visit hospitals, HIV/Aids clinics and schools in Africa. There was "little doubt," reported the BBC, that this trip—which aimed "to investigate conditions on the ground in Africa"—would "influence how a proposed $5bn US aid package [in Africa] was spent" (ibid). As Mr O'Neill explained further, although he had not been interested in meeting Bono, their original 30-minute meeting ended up as a 90-minute "brainstorming session," with O'Neill "coming away impressed at the depth of Bono's knowledge and commitment" (BBC 14.5.2002). Not only did Bono demonstrate that he "understood economic theory and […] the impact of colonialism," but according to O'Neill "he knew what it was like to go into an HIV-AIDS clinic and see three people in a bed all dying together and care about it and know it doesn't have to be that way" (ibid).

However, whereas for Geldof humanitarian agency related specifically to his dealings with politicians, Bono's agency had more to do with action and rationality. His arguments were described as "pragmatic, not preachy," as he refrained from treating Africa as an emotional issue (TIME 4.3.2002). This man who was described as "deeply spiritual, gentle, inspired and inspiring acts of grace," was not an idealistic dreamer, but a man whose action had "a clear, flinty-eyed purpose" (TIME 13.11.2006). In the TIME Person of the Year article, Bono's alliance with Bill and Melinda Gates was portrayed as "unlikely, unsentimental, hard nosed, clear eyed and dead set on driving poverty into history" (TIME 19.12.2005b). Bono's conviction and self-assurance about his African mission was reported to be so convincing that "it took about three minutes with Bono for Gates to change his mind" (TIME 19.12.2005b). "Such is the nature of Bono's fame," TIME continued "that just about everyone in the world wants to meet him" (ibid). The "force of Bono's personality certainly gets him noticed, but the force of his argument means he is also taken seriously", BBC resumed (BBC 25.5.2002). Indeed, instead of merely pursuing the "vanity project of a pampered celebrity … the fact is that Bono gets results", TIME concluded (TIME 19.12.2005).

As an epic hero of the mythic Christian tradition, blessed with an unusual ability to traverse into the African reality and to interpret the continent's pain into words, it was Bono who was able to "make facts [on needed actions to end extreme poverty in Africa] sing" (TIME 19.12.2005). As the BBC asserted, "Bono certainly knows how to push the right buttons" (BBC 30.9.2004). This

knowledge culminated in his "ability to secure an audience with world leaders": that is, "the ear of Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, George Bush" (BBC 23.12.2006) - intelligibilitity that was confirmed by several photographs of Bono mingling peacefully with these world leaders.

Through these discriptions of virture and vocation, characteristics that provide him with an unusual capacity for observing and bringing into visibility the latent evils running through Western policies in Africa, Bono became the paragon of stamina and commitment. According to the BBC, his humanitarian work in Africa "demonstrated leadership and vision in the pursuit of liberty," and proved that "the office of citizen is the most important in the world" (BBC 25.5.2007). Indeed, as TIME wrote, Bono's greatest gifts are "charm, clarity of voice [and] an ability to touch people in their secret heart" (TIME 19.12.2005). Marked by an uncommon ability to transgress political spaces, Bono was a "constant charmer," a quality which, according to TIME, "explained how [actor] George Clooney, Hollowood's leading lefty, and Paul Wolfowitz, president of the World Bank and an architect of the Iraq war," could end up in the same room with him (TIME 19.12.2005).

Through these media discourses on his valiant and courageous actions, "to build a public face to the agenda of the developing world," Bono was framed as the embodiment of the Western humanitarian ideals of truth, justice and moderation (TIME 4.3.2002b). Like Superman, Bono also honoured Western moral codes and social mores. As Paul Wolfowitz argued, "pomposity and arrogance are the enemies of getting things done. And Bono knows how to get things done" (TIME 19.12.2005). Indeed, TIME described how Bono, the omnicompetent leader capable of bringing about revelations and confirming expectations, had "dropped by" President Bush's suite during the G8 meeting "for a final nudge," to get the $50 billion in aid and 100% debt cancellation for Africa. "On so many issues it's difficult to know what God wants from us," Bono was reported to advice President Bush, "but on this issue, helping the desperately poor, we know God will bless it" (TIME 19.12.2005).

As an embodiment of the eternal battle against an ultimate evil, a man capable of achieving miraculous transgressive victories with his superior intellect and moral stamina (image 8) Bono, through his authoritative apostolic revelations, guided Western politicians towards a vision of a "brighter future for Africa" (BBC 28.5.2002). For instance, after his trip to Africa with Bono, Paul O'Neill paid his public "tributes" to Bono by describing him as "a great asset" (ibid). Several US Senators also expressed their respect for Bono by describing him as a truly "genuine" individual with "passionate devotion"—a man who understood the issues of global poverty "better than 99% of the members of Congress" (TIME 19.12.2005). The magnitude of Bono's abilities were such that President Bill Clinton praised Bono's commitment to keeping the issue of third world debt in the headlines: "when we get the Pope and the pop stars all signing on the same sheet of music, our voices do carry to the heavens" (BBC 7.11.2000).

However, Bono was neither a monk nor an ascetic: he was also a man of Earthly enjoyments who liked his fine wines and modern art and enjoyed the celebrity hotspots of the rich and famous (Telegraph 4.1.2008). Yet these reports of the hedonistic Bono were scarce and usually emerged outside the African context. If they did emerge, as with the case of Geldof, Bono's phenomenal moral strength emerged as the object of awe and applause. For example, TIME argued that in contrast to normal rock-stars, "designed to be shiny, shallow creatures, furloughed from reality for all time," Bono was a "busy capitalist" who "moved in political circles like a very charming shark" (TIME 19.12.2005b). TIME claimed that although Bono was "an egomaniac," he was not a "megalomaniac," for his preoccupation with power was not delusional (TIME 4.3.2002). Taking into account Bono's actions "to save a continent" and his pop-stardom—which, together, were able to capture a TV-audience of 130 million during the Super Bowl—TIME asked, "can you blame the guy for being a little full of himself?" Concluding: "the debate on global poverty needed a bit of Glamour and Bono [had] supplied it" (TIME 4.3.2002, TIME 4.3.2002b).

If the moral force of Bono's activities made him look like Superman, the nature and depth of the change achieved was deemed revolutionary. As TIME wrote, Bono was "not an advocate of pity or charity, but [of] passion and hope" (TIME 19.12.2005b). The BBC, as well, reported that Bono had made modern history through the Make Poverty History Campaign, which pushed the G8 summit "to take big steps" for humanity (BBC 31.12.2005). Moreover, Bono's whole persona—not just the changes he succeeded in bringing about— was seen as counter-cultural (image 9). For example, a connection to Che Guevara was captured in photographs of Bono wearing a green cap and army jacket. This connection to Guevara, and hence guerrilla warfare, thus became reflected on Bono's body, metaphorically paralleling it to his struggle against the suffering or even oppression of Africa.

In his speeches, like Che, Bono referred to injustice, oppression, poverty, hunger and disease. As with Geldof, Bono's references to his working/lower-middle class and postcolonial Irish background strengthened these claims to be able to represent Africans. At a development summit in Japan, Bono asked, "what on earth might I have to offer? Well, the first thing is I'm Irish" […] "We came out of colonisation, we had to deal with the British, we have a lot in common with Africa" (BBC 29.5.2008). This legitimacy as a representative of Africa that builds directly upon his Irish colonial experience, was further strengthen by performances of his working-class masculinity. Constructing his counter-cultural stance and his opposition to Western politicians, Bono described his actions as a physical struggle, a justified fight: "I'm throwing a punch, and the fist belongs to the people who cannot be in the room, whose rage, whose anger, whose hurt I represent" (BBC 20.10.2005).

As Zine Magubane (2008) has argued, Bono's narrative of Irish suffering, which focuses on Irish ethnicity, sidesteps the difficult question of race. Asserting that Africa and Ireland share a common history of death and suffering positions Bono as an "in-between" person, allowing him to connect to the tragedies

of Africa through his underprivileged Irish background. It should be noted that during the British Empire, the Irish were widely referred to as "Black" or "niggers"—a practice to which Bono, however, does not make reference (Magubane 2008: 102.6). In fact, the constructed difference between the British and the Irish did not emerge out of visible racial divisions, as it did in colonial Africa, but rather was based upon interpretations and observations about their cultural and economic characteristics through which their subjectivities were linked into unchanging hierarchically stacked cultures (see Garner 2009). Consequently, for the Irish, becoming "white" required that they overcome their "race" through hard work and perseverance: climbing up the economic and social ladders.

Although Bono's arguments can be read as anti-capitalist, a more convincing interpretation would be one that focuses on the struggles against colonial power relations that perpetuate economic inequality. Reflecting on Irish economic problems under British rule, he argued, "so bad management is in my folk history and I think if we have to gather around this [African] food crisis […] we've got to get good management" (BBC 29.5.2008). Through this problematization the ascendancy of the Irish from their poverty is linked to economic progress and self-management, connecting humanity to the pursuit of liberal values and economic development. Thus, Bono's rebellion was not against globalized capitalism, but against its unfortunate side-effects. Charity, as TIME asserted, was "not the model for the(se) current crusaders or the message for these extraordinary times" (TIME 19.12.2005b). These Western masculine ideals of rationality, competence and self-reliance through hard work, were also something Bono himself actively engaged with. In a TIME article, for example, Bono claimed that his favourite John Lennon song was "Imagine," because "at the root of it is some rigorous thinking about the way things could be, but people have stolen the idea and made it an anthem for wishful thinking. I'm against wishful thinking. I hate it" (TIME 19.12.2005).

Hence, if Africa for Geldof was a masculine voyage of Western self-discovery, mastery and destiny, for Bono—echoing anti-imperial thought—it was a daring frontier adventure toward a "result oriented world—democracy, accountability and transparency" (TIME 19.12.2005). When launching Product Red at the 2006 World Economic Forum in Davos, by summoning the attendees as "fat cats in the snow [or] I should say winners in the snow", Bono reminded his listeners that the war against poverty was not going to be won with traditional philanthropy, but rather through commercial ventures (BBC 26.1.2006). Philanthropy, as Bono insisted, was "like hippy music, holding hands," while Product Red was "more like punk rock, hip hop … [which] should feel like hard commerce" (ibid).

As TIME declared, "Bono knows he has to make the case for aid with his head, not his heart" (TIME 4.3.2002). Refraining sharply from (feminine) emotionalism and idealism marked by naive liberal thinking, for Bono saving Africa from its extreme poverty required realism, hegemonic masculinity and patriarchy. As he argued, "I really, really hate losing," going on to say that the Global Fund of Product Red, fighting Aids, TB and Malaria, could have made money

"in the slipstream" by cooperating with Western companies (BBC 26.1.2006). Thus, compared to the Che Guevara's vision that great revolutions were guided by a great feeling of love, for Bono to end extreme poverty in Africa required rational and strategic economics instead of emotional imagining. In other words, his rebellion was not against globalized capitalism, but rather as a "card-carrying capitalist," whose mission was to "market his ideas for Africa more like a sports-shoe or cigarette company" (Telegraph 27.1.2006). Or as TIME reported, he was the fighter "making mercy smarter and hope strategic" (TIME 19.12.2005b), for a new and clever type of humanitarian economics in which Western consumerism is framed as the key means of addressing the inequalities between the Global South and the North. Accordingly, Africa could only save itself by increasing trade and economic integration with the Western world.

Consequently, the problem of deepening poverty in Africa was framed not as a result of the system of global capitalism, but rather the non-existence of this system in Africa. Within this intelligibility, global capitalism became the only way for Africa to achieve emancipation and freedom: that is, a self-governing, independent and enthusiastic liberal self. Indeed, Bono was "a right man on a right time" (TIME 4.3.2002b), realizing his revolution within a business venture, instead through "misty-eyed or bleeding-heart helping emotionalism" (Telegraph 27.1.2006).

This imaginary of Bono the capitalist hero was yet again confirmed by news images of his visits to African factories, where he was pictured observing the work of African women manufacturing products for Western markets (image 10-11). These photographs did not evoke critique, or disruption. Rather they unfolded an imaginary of unity, stability, harmony and wholeness—aesthetic conventions that confirm and repeat narratives of Western supremacy, authority and ability to bring skills, knowledge and progress to the underdeveloped continent with commercial ventures—now argued to be the only ethical and "sustainable" means to win "the fight" against African sickness and poverty (BBC 26.1.2006).

It is indeed in these life-administrating and altering practices—aimed at helping Africans to realize their potential, productivity and self-reliance, or in other words their white liberal subjectivity and humanity— where contemporary celebrity humanitarianism thought intersects with colonial rationality. In these overdetermined intelligibilities, not only does the white man remain "the predestined master of the world", but, moreover, in this world where everything is "anticipated, thought out, demonstrated", Africans represent a "stage of development" (Fanon 2008/1952: 96-7, 91)

This colonial intelligibility can be seen in Paul Wolfowitz's descriptions of Bono and Geldof as European Heroes: "Yet in the end, it's what binds these two that matters most. Besides their passion, their commitment, one characteristic draws me to them above all: their optimism**.** Bob has described Africa as 'the illuminated continent.' He and Bono are peerless in their resolve to make us see it—and to make it so" (TIME 13.11.2006). This forceful desire to see an entrepreneurial self-sufficient Africa—an intelligibility and imaginary that dismissed

self-pity and encouraged Africa's own self-invention in Westerners' image— epitomized yet again the importance of "good deeds" in bringing economic activity and self-transformation to Africa. As TIME concluded:

> This is not about pity. It's more about passion. Pity sees suffering and wants to ease the pain; passion sees injustice and wants to settle the score. Pity implores the powerful to pay attention; passion warns them about what will happen if they don't. The risk of pity is that it kills with kindness; the promise of passion is that it builds on the hope that the poor are fully capable of helping themselves if given the chance. In 2005 the world's poor need no more condolences; they need people to get interested, get mad and then get to work.

5.5 Conclusions

In this chapter I have examined how, in Western media discourses, Bono and Bob Geldof were constituted as humanitarian subjects acting on behalf of African problems, and how through these divergent portrayals their legitimacy as global humanitarian actors was produced, activated and legitimized.

As Fanon argues, historically African imaginaries and intelligibilities have reflected changing Western objectives, reorientations and desires within which the popular notions of personal and civic identity, status, authenticity and colossal capacity to exercise influence – appropriations that today perpetuate the celebrity humanitarian subjectivity - have all constituted a central role (image 12). Indeed, the value base of today's celebrity humanitarian regime draws on the principle of humanity which inspires an allegedly apolitical commitment to alleviating the suffering of people still outside universal equality. The individual and global levels of neutrality, independence and impartiality that define how true humanitarianism is constituted were intertwined in the stories of Bono and Geldof as selfless Western individuals on their personal moral crusades to "make poverty history" in Africa. In the media extracts analysed here, both Bono and Geldof were portrayed as "above" or "outside" Western politicians, as individuals in total control of their private and public lives. Depicted as experts on development issues and the embodiments of Western ethics and morals, they became the ideals of cosmopolitan humanitarian individuals – altruistic, self-sacrificing, apolitical world-citizens – promoters of equality and empathy for Africans who were argued to exist outside the processes of development, progress, peace and human security belonging to the global North.

While the analysis may seem to offer mere abstract theorization, the definitions of what "humanitarianism" is, or who or what it entails, involve important ontological questions, normative commitments and entitlements that determine its substance and agency through constant negotion of identity/difference and simililarity/otherness (Douzinas 2007: 1). On one hand, celebrity humanitarianism is value-neutral and impersonal. Yet, for it to operate, the recognition and constitution of difference is central. Consequently negating

and cementing "Africa" into an assumed logical, commonsensical and natural positions in world politics.

Predicated on the racial superiority of westeners through their unarguable humanitarian existence and agency, it is indeed in this performed authority, autonomy and ability "to support the weight of a civilization" where celebrity humanitarian activity coincides with the colonial intelligibility of the white man as "predestined master of this world" (Fanon 2008/1952: 97). Concequently by dividing the world neatly into two, reaffriming and repeating dehistoricized and unpolitical intelligibilities of Westerners as eternal promoters promoters and protectors of justice, humanity and fairness in world.

6 THE ETERNAL PAIN: AFRICA AS CONTEMPORARY HELL

> If we see aid as investment, and the debt burden of these countries as unjust, and offer fairer trade conditions, Africa will be able to take charge of its own destiny. The reason for the T for Trade in DATA is, in the end, aid is not the way forward for the poorest people in the world. Trade is the way forward
> - Bono (2005: 102)

> During the colonial period the people are called upon to fight against oppression; after the national liberation they are called upon to fight against poverty, illiteracy and underdevelopment. The struggle, they say, goes on. The people understand that life is an unending contest
> - Frantz Fanon (2001/1961: 74)

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I examined the subjective particularities through which Bono's and Geldof's humanitarian agency, authority and legitimacy as representatives of "global humanity" was constructed in Anglo-American media discourses. I argued that it was through their peerless heroism, and moral and virtuous character – underpinned particular reproduction of race, class and gender – that the masculine world of protection for which these contemporary humanitarians stand for was asserted. Consequently, repeating and affirming a worldview of Western privilege, where the Westerner is sealed into his superior, normative "white" subjectivity and agency to help others to bring themselves as quickly as possible into his world (Fanon 2008/1952: 73).

A Foucauldian historical analysis of the critical ontology of ourselves, however, entails not only encountering the conditions and the limits of Western humanitarian subjectivity, it also necessitates scrutinizing contemporary reality itself by reflecting against the ways of knowing, thinking and doing through which modes of relating to oneself and one's present are governed and limited. This type of critical work on social reality requires an interrogation of how the

regimes of truth—operating through the organization of the temporal and spatial, seeable and sayable—operate as relations of normalization.

In other words, to enable alternative readings of our present, the truths we speak about ourselves need to be approaced as violence applied to spaces and bodies. Indeed, the inscriptions and assertions of Geldof's and Bono's indisputable heroism, self-discipline and mastery which constitute their virtuous liberal subjectivity, alongside their "emancipatory" market-driven incentives and project policies that dismiss self-pity and encourage personal responsibility and reinvention, go beyond articulating what qualities and types of personalities can legitimately and capably represent "Africa" in the world. They are also instrumental in constructing historically developed "violent cartographies" of identity-difference through which political bodies and agencies are constituted and allocated into their rigid separated zones (Shapiro 2009: 18).

In this chapter—by encountering the entwined relations between truth, reality and power—my aim is to reveal how Bob Geldof's and Bono's discourses elaborate the colonial imaginary and intelligibility through which "Africa" is problematized as "Hell," a place infused with suffering and imperfection. I argue that this imaginary of a catastrophic Africa, a place that fundamentally threatens Western "civilisation" and "progress", is effected through three specific discourses: the Holocaust, Cold War neo-liberalism and the contemporary "war on terror". With these re-articulations and re-memorizations, the contemporary war against African poverty becomes associated not only with the Holocaust, but also with the war against terror. Accordingly, evoking an imaginary of a "compartmentalized world" that is divided into good and evil, within which Africa is constituted "as a sort of quintessence of evil" and "deforming element," which as an exception to the liberal world order presents a grave danger to future stability (Fanon 2001/1961: 29, 32).

Cloaked in the messianic language of historical crusades, formulated with a "thousand details, anecdotes, stories" of history and "above all historicity" (Fanon 2008/1952: 84), Africa emerges through these fixing intelligibilities and imaginaries either as a helpless victim to be saved, or a potential enemy of the future. In consequence, amounting to the reproduction of the self-referential colonial intelligibility of an immature but potentially dangerous continent that, with its abnormal poverty and childish irrational mindset, calls out to the resourceful and moral Westerners to protect, help, guide and assist her to exist and become.

6.2 Rooting in the Temporal: Remembering the Past, Constituting the Present and Mastering the Future

The notion of Africa as a *"Contemporary Hell"*—in which the continent at present is depicted as an emaciated, sick, neglected or disordered place—was conceived predominantly through the words voiced by Bono and Geldof in the West in

relation to the prevailing and widening conflict, chaos, insecurity and poverty of the continent. As Geldof argued in his article in Le Monde, Africa had become a place of "despair […] whose evidence washes ashore daily on our southern beaches" – not "simply a potential time bomb of political nightmare," but also "unquestionably the greatest moral wound to the human corpus" (Le Monde 1.6.2005). Similarly, Bono, in his speech at a British Labour Party conference in 2004, argued that Africa was "bursting into flames" and argued that that "if we really accepted that Africans were equal to us, we would all do more to put the fire out" (BBC 29.9.2004). Linking the contemporary fight against poverty in Africa to Western experiences of WWII, he called upon Western governments to end world poverty by engaging in "the fight against world poverty [which is] a cause as noble as when their grandparents fought the Nazis during WW2" (BBC 29.9.2004). As with the Holocaust, he further argued, "Africa makes a fool of our idea of justice; it makes a farce of our idea of equality. It mocks our pieties, it doubts our concern, it questions our commitment".

These narratives of the holocaustic European past determining the African present were not only underpinned with Westcentric paradigm of linear progress of history. Even though Geldof and Bono engaged, in somewhat subtle ways, with the evilness of the West's own history-making in its memorizations, this evilness was externalized from the Western present into its historical past, as something transgressed and defeated. In effect, the holocaustic history of Europe was reframed as a historical exception, rather than as a tragedy of modern reason and humanity, which according to Foucault evolved naturally out of the disciplinary and biopolitical technologies of the twentieth century (Foucault 2004/1976: 253-63).

Indeed, it is these violent practices of life that have constituted Western civilization and its humanity that Fanon refers to when he argues that the extermination and cremation of the Jews was a "small family quarrel" compared to the breadth of colonial violence and oppression (Fanon 2008/1952: 87). However neither Bono nor Bob Geldof spoke of the bloody colonial wars, or the vast holocaustic Western histories in Africa. Rather, in their memorizations—constituted with universalism and particularism—the Holocaust was remembered both as a unique, transgressed episode in the Western past, and as a universal memory of the painful "world" history to which colonial trauma did not belong. In effect, rather than the historical pain, suffering and destruction caused by Westerners in Africa, what were remembered were the heroic actions Westerners against totalitarianism, tyranny and evilness in the world.

As Foucault argues, all reconfigurations of memory have history; history is an "operation of power, an intensifier of power," which is inseparable from political experiences, agencies and their legitimacy (Foucault 2004/1976: 66-7). Indeed, by identifying and fixing subjects into particular spaces and agencies, temporalities and histories, in these celebrity humanitarian propagations of righteous historical battles - the founding myths of "progress, civilization, liber-

alism, education, enlightenment, refinement" - the war against African abnormality was yet again waged (Fanon 2008/1952: 150).

In other words, these intelligibilities and imaginaries not only described Western historical agency, but rather through the memorizations it was again operationalized. Indeed, the end of WWII might have brought liberal peace to Europe, but it did not bring any immediate heroic liberation or prosperity to the African continent. Africa, as Fanon argued, rather than achieving self-determination, was caught up in the "middle of the whirlpool": that is, a new struggle between the West and the Soviet Union, both of which dictated its options and choices for economic independence and political sovereignty (Fanon 2001/1961: 60). However, instead of critically reflecting upon the destructive policies in Africa during the Cold War years, for Bono and Geldof these actions had been unfortunate, but necessary in order to protect and defend the "Free World" against the illiberal influences of "Sovietism." As Geldof explains in *You are History!* (Geldof 2005b), because of the Cold War deadlock that had constitued African poverty as a political question, "only the symptoms of poverty could be dealt with humanitarian action" (Geldof 2005b: xxix-xxx). Nevertheless, he concluded optimistically: "that was then" (ibid: xxix). Out of the Cold War, explained Geldof, a "haphazard and unpredictable" new world has emerged, finally able to begin dealing with the structures of poverty, "as an issue of justice rather than charity" (ibid: xxviii-xxix).

This interpretation of the present not only constructs contemporary Western humanitarianism as an apolitical practice, it is also underpinned by an intelligibility according to which the post Cold War era would provide some alternative, more liberating path for Africa to overcome the poverty that dominates its existence. As Geldof asserted in the Independent, the Cold War paradigm—where Western governments give aid not to countries most in need but to those they see as strategic allies—was finally over. Out of the Cold War ideological deadlock, a world which is "interdependent" and "fluid" has emerged, where "increased global trade allied to new technologies and cultural shifts […] have brought great opportunities along with confusion, change and anxiety" (Independent 11.3.2005).

These inscriptions and framings constituted a form of promise that globalization would bring modernization and progress into Africa. In other words, that with the development and humanitarian support provided by the Global North, poor countries in the global South could anticipate a rise into the liberal world. As Geldof argued, this new era with its increasing interdependence posed "a great possibility for us all and especially for Africa, that great giant finally beginning to stir itself from its enforced slumber" (Independent 11.3.2005). Hence, as he concluded "the great nations of the world, in alliance with their African neighbours, must now move together, in our common interest. How they may proceed will be determined by each nation's needs and desires. But all must immediately begin the journey that leads us to the ultimate common destination of a more equitable world" (ibid).

Through these references to Western history-making, Africa was formulated not only as a space without history, but moreover as an epoch and odyssey belonging to the West (Fanon 2001/1961: 39). Indeed, for both Bono and Geldof, the political will and capacity to help Africa to achieve commonality with the "great nations of the world" existed in the West, most notably in the UK and the United States. The BBC reported Bono's speech in which he asked Gordon Brown and Tony Blair to "finish what they started to end world poverty," and revealed how he had "hail[ed]" president Bush's "bold long term vision" on AIDS prevention in Africa (BBC 29.9.2004; BBC 29.1.2003). Similarly, Geldof was said to have praised Bush, who had "completely altered the landscape" of US policy towards Africa (Telegraph 8.7.2008), thus making Bush's administration"the most radical—in a positive sense—in its approach to Africa since Kennedy" (BBC 28.5.2003).

According to Geldof it was not only President Bush, but also Gordon Brown who "[had gone] in to bat big time on all this stuff" [negotiating more Western aid to Africa] (ibid). Indeed, because of Brown's efforts to help Africa he now had "an assured place in British history" (Telegraph 16.4.2005). Consequently not only had the British-led Commission for Africa been "radical and progressive" but as a rich country, Bono clarified, Britain, "with the reins of power in its hands," had a duty "to lead other countries along this path to equality" (BBC 7.10.2004; BBC 30.9.2004). Expressing his personal fondness of Blair and Brown by calling them "the John and Paul of the global development stage" he concluded that "the point is, Lennon and McCartney changed my interior world - Blair and Brown can change the real world" (BBC 29.9.2004). Indeed, overcoming poverty in Africa was possible. As Geldof explicated further "we have the plan: it is called the Commission for Africa…. We have the money [though] it is insignificant in global terms. The cost for each citizen of the rich world will be laughably and tragically equivalent to half a stick of chewing gum each" (Le Monde 1.6.2005).

These humanitarian calls to improve the material conditions of African life repeatedly re-establish and remind to whom the protection of global humanity belongs and what action its protection entails. By appropriating historical ways of seeing and sensing that predicate Westerners superiority, progressivity and capability to provide and protect 'Others', Africa is firmly fixed into non-existence as an object denied of individuality, agency or history. In consequence, by conceptualizing African present through the Western past, European civilization becomes characterized by presence.

However, in contrast to the colonial past, this Westerners' moral mission was no longer waged in the name of a specific nation, but is instead justified in the name of global "humanity," located and rooted in the foundational morality of the west and its grand histories of progress and greatness. As Bono argued in his speech for the National Prayer Breakfast: "I truly believe that when the history books will be written, our age will be remembered for three things: the war on terror, the digital revolution and what we did – or did not do – to put the fire out in Africa. History, like God, is watching what we do" (USA Today,

2.2.2006). Reflecting Fanonian rescue narratives, cloaked in the religious language of urgently needed moral crusades - a self-intelligibility where the Westerner remained the "predestined master of this world" (Fanon 2008/1952: 97)— "Africa" became yet again located outside Western modernity, freedom and civilization, rendering the continent as a central battleground between Good and Evil. Fixed into her space and time, into her non-existent history, in these intelligibilities and imaginaries the continent's evilness was interlinked with inhumanity or underdevelopment, constituted with a complex web of significations centring on increasing poverty, sickness, corruption and extreme outbreaks of war which hindered her capacity to "catch up".

Thus, while during colonialism the evil nature of the African was constructed through depictions of his total lack of values and morals, in the intelligibilities of contemporary celebrity humanitarianism this evil nature emerges from his incapability to achieve economic self-reliance. In effect, problematizing the '*Making Poverty History*' campaign as transformative and interventionist project of regulation, modulation and monitoring which aims to set up "correct" conditions for the continent to compete freely and equally in global markets. Accordingly, Africa became a place lacking politics, at least the right kind. Deeper integration, in the form of lasting partnerships between global North and South, was needed to overcome Africa's prevailing wretchedness. Not referring to colonial legacies or to Westerners' Cold War era economic policies that according to Fanon had "mobilized people into exhaustion" (Fanon 2001/1961: 77), Africa's current state as a "living wound" of the World was now argued to derive from the continent's inability to engage with disciplinary self-technologies

Indeed, reflecting on the reason why Africa had not developed since independence like her Asian counterparts, Geldof argued that Africa's increasing and deepening poverty since the 1960s was due to the fact that "African economies never really developed away from being based on single resource commodities like gold copper and diamonds", nor had they diversified their economies or enabled a free political atmosphere (BBC 13.7.2006). In effect, not only had Africa been incapable of producing "enough goods of the right quality," which resulted in an unfavourable "economic climate" for foreign investments, it also remained a somewhat lawless space, where its parliaments, newspapers and judges did not have the ability to hold the continent's governments "up to proper scrutiny" (Independent 11.3.2005).

However, a free market was not a straightforward solution for Africa. What the continent needed, Bono argued, was a "gradual journey into competitiveness" akin to South-Asian countries, which according to him would not have stood a chance to become successful economies without Western aid (Assayas 2005: 264). Enacting a hierarchical spatial structure of we/they conceptions in which the role of the Global North is to act for the "Others", this argument indicated that only with Western leadership and action, alongside African governmental engagement to fight their internal corruption, interpreted as moral degradation, could the poverty in Africa be ended (BBC 14.2.2006).

Echoing post-independence demands from the West that Africa improve its economic development, increase social modernization and create "political stability and a calm social climate" (Fanon 2001/1961: 82), in these contemporary celebrity discourses— which framed Africa's poverty as evil to be transgressed—freedom was equated with economic self-sufficiency and self-governance, an educational task for the progressive Westerners to take and to lead. Akin to the colonial intelligibility that constituted a definite present – a temporality in which the African was nothing but "a stage of development" (Fanon 2008/1952: 98) – in these intelligibilities it became Westerners' duty to transform the lives of millions of people in Africa: to help the unfortunate poor to survive, to give African children a future through basic education and to provide the HIV-infected with antiviral drugs. Furthermore, in Geldof's opinion, increased accountability from the continent was needed: "we need to know where [aid money] is being spend, how much of it has been delivered, is it working?" (BBC 19.1.2006). In order to end poverty in Africa, Westerners were called on "to change our debt, aid and trade policies and Africans to deal with issues of governance as above" (BBC 13.7.2006). Despite Geldof's acknowledgement that corruption also existed in developed countries, for him this was not a significant problem since it "didn't kill people," as it did in Africa (ibid). Applying different standards to the corruption in Africa and the "Global North", African corruption was depicted somewhat the continent's internal problem, rather than as a consequence or an effect of complex historical or present economic, political or military interests originating outside the continent.

6.3 The Never-ending War against Wretchedness

> Might it not be cheaper to make friends of potential enemies than to defend yourself against them later?
> • Bono (in Assayas 2005: 264)

With Geldof's and Bono's problematizations and repetitive demands to "improve" and "resuscitate" Africa back into normality (BBC 14.2.2006; BBC 19.1.2006; 3.6.2003), the tragedy of Africa's poverty was framed specifically as an economic and political failure, an outcome of inadequate engagement of implementation of liberal policies and practices on the continent. Within these intelligibilities the notions of normalcy and humanity were monopolized to the Western bodies as managers of African behaviour, labour, capital and health— the African Other was firmly constituted as a failed liberal subject, a lapsed member of the underclass who required constant auditing, reviewing and readjustment.

Indeed, by threatening liberal principles, values and assumptions – liberty, prosperity and peace - Africa's underdevelopment was perceived as damaging the liberal world order itself. Bono reflected this interpretation when he urged for urgent action against world poverty, to preserve "our idea of justice," which

Africa's worsening situation made "a fool of" (BBC 29.9.2004). Thus—to avoid ridicule—practical, rational and goal-oriented action was urgently needed. As Bono explained, "for the price of the war in Iraq the world could have been changed utterly, and the people who now boo and hiss America and Europe would be applauding us. This is not fanciful, this is not Irish misty-eyed nonsense! This is realpolitik" (Assayas 2005: 265).

Akin to the postcolonial intelligibility in which Africa's present was constantly problematized as "very serious!" (Fanon 2001/1961: 48), and through which compromise and solution were urgently called for, for Bono and Geldof the need to save Africa was not only a strategy to preserve the benevolent image of the Global North, but also a necessary action to protect and defend the liberal world order through the spread of the values of capitalism, freedom and democracy across the globe. Indeed, helping Africa became a question of survival and security, not only of Africa but, as Bono clarified, to international order itself:

> Think back to the Second World War, think back to the United States that liberated Europe, but when they rebuilt Europe … they were being strategic. It wasn't all out of the goodness of their hearts, through it was that too. The US were rebuilding Europe as a bulwark against Sovietism in the Cold War. This is what we need in Africa and in some parts of the Middle East – a bulwark against the extremist of our age in what I call the Hot War. This makes sense, not just as a moral imperative, but as a political and a strategic one. It is the right thing to do (Assayas 2005: 264-5).

Again, by tying African development to European post-war deprivation, geographical space was translated into historical time. Rather than "enforcing trade liberalization on the poor" or rushing Africa into "potentially unfair" trade agreements, Geldof argued, the Western countries needed to "protect" Africa with a similar "aid for trade" scheme to the one US had used in Europe after the WWII, in order "to ensure that Africa was able to grow through increased exports and regional trade" (BBC 30.11.2007). Similarly, Bono, in a BBC Radio Four interview, referred to the "Marshall Plan for Africa" to "liberate" and "build" the continent - a comment which further alludes to how this rebuilding project in Africa is interlinked with strategic Western goals to remove the obstacles which inhibite the healthy functioning of the global economy (BBC Radio 4, 9.9.2003).

In this moral imaginary constituted with unbounded confidence in Western market policies and pre-emptive interventions, Africa unfolded as an unstable and rowdy landscape of global danger that had to be stabilized with education and discipline. Indeed, as already discussed in the previous chapter, saving Africa required not classical "laissez-faire" liberalism, nor aid, but active disciplinary developmentalism - vigilance and regulation – was now needed to lead the continent to advanced liberal capitalism. In other words, these "new" policies aimed to intervene not in the mechanisms of the markets, but rather in their conditions, through brief and stark conformable actions (Foucault 2008/1978: 136, 138). As Bono argued, it was time "to get real on Africa" by formulating a "big, bold, properly-funded, well-thought-out plan," to bring "ef-

fective" and "enduring" results to the continent, which would also provide "grace" for the west by making people "feel proud for generations" to come (BBC 29.9.2004; Telegraph 23.5.2003; TIME 4.3.2002).

In effect, this humanitarian fight against poverty in Africa was triggered by anxieties about maintaining the inheritance of the neoliberal values and economic growth that the US had fought for since the Second World War, or even since the policies administered through the New Deal (Foucault 2008/1978: 216). Characterized by extending "fairness" to the rest of the world by promoting economic growth and social modernization in "underdeveloped" countries, this liberal internationalism, developmentalism and interventionism, akin to previous high-minded ideologies of Empire with their evangelical impulses "to free the world", was pervaded by "white liberty and white justice" - an absolute moral ethos of exceptionalism and self-righteousness (McCarthy 2009: 192-229; Fanon 2008/1952: 172). In short, it hinged on values and self-referential self-inscriptions of white history, morals and intelligence that according to Fanon constantly challenge the African humanity and constitute her white destiny (Fanon 2008/1952: 179).

Thus, not only were Western interventionist European post-war policies needed to facilitate reconstruction in Africa, liberal principles also needed urgent promotion. Indeed, for Bono and Geldof, the primary task of changing the world through alleviating poverty in Africa through new policy ideas, aid, debt-relief projects, AIDS prevention programs and trade initiatives was not an emotional issue involving sympathetic pity, but rather it constituted a decisive moral duty to protect the values of freedom and prosperity. As Bono asserted that "we don't argue compassion" but "we put it in the most crass terms possible: we argue it as a financial and security issue [for America]" (TIME 4.3.2002). In other words the values of liberty, justice and equality were not to be defended though passive measures, but rather secured by active and aggressive spreading of the liberal faith. Indeed, it was this urgent need to protect the liberal principles Bono referred to by asking: "do we have the will to make poverty history? Some say we can't afford to. Some say we can't afford not to" (BBC 30.9.2004).

Subsequently the bifurcated colonial world-view—split between liberators and liberated, emancipators and emancipated—remained firmly in place, providing justification and legitimacy for the West's victorious mission to advance development in Africa. As in past battles against evil and chaos in Africa, practical Western intelligence and pre-emptive action on the continent was fundamental. A failure to read warning signs was not only reckless, but could also lead to a total destruction. As Bono clarified further:

> This is a new era. We need tactical weapons in another sense. Take out hatred a different way. Destroy anti-American or anti-Western feeling by making sure they know who they are, working harder on the Middle East peace process, feeding people who are starving, bringing out pharmaceuticals to deal with the AIDS emergency. Africa is forty percent Muslim (Assayas 2005: 265).

With these self-referential claims to moral duty, stirred up with contemporary ”war on terror” rhetoric, Westerners were mobilized and legitimized to take moral leadership in the World: that is, to fight the unenlightened evil-doers, not for their own self-interest but for the good for all humanity (c.f. Weber 2006: 88). Firmly constituted with negotiations of identity/difference, achieving this common good and global justice in the world required Western sacrifices, adjustment and adaptability – tough moral stamina in the resistance to adversity that loomed ahead. By calling upon the United States and its Western allies to take urgent action in Africa, according to Bono there were “potentially another 10 Afghanistans” looming on the continent. Hence, as he continued, “in these distressing and disturbing times, surely it is cheaper, and smarter, to make friends out of potential enemies than it is to defend yourself against them…. Africa is not the frontline in the war on terror, but it could be soon. Justice is the surest way to get to peace” (BBC 30.9.2004; BBC 9.9.2003).

By converging development and security concerns, a circular form of reinforcement unfolded: development in Africa was ultimately impossible without stability, and security was not sustainable without development (c.f. Duffield 2001: 16). Entwining WWII rescue narratives and contemporary discourses on ”war on terror”, through which the World was spatially and temporally divided into Fanonian ”lightness” and ”darkness”, that is, progress and its opposite, a war against African poverty was constituted as a heroic crusade to safeguard the evolution of mankind against the barbaric and dangerous influences that latently prevailed within Africa’s borders.

With this conjuncture, which closely resembles postcolonial governance, which as Fanon argues was underpinned by forceful demands on peaceful coexistence, stability, security and humanity, the development of Africa became subordinated to Western security concerns. That is, the goal became supporting the status quo with containment and deterrence, rather than promoting radical or fundamental change in the historically overdetermined relations between “West” and “Africa.” As both Bono and Geldof insisted, acting now for Africa was wise, strategic, moral and economical. As Bono argued that it was “cheaper by a factor of 100 to prevent the fires from happening (in Africa) than to put them out” (TIME 4.3.2002), and therefore “any delay in increased funding means more lives lost and an even bigger cheque in the future” (BBC 29.1.2003).

By interlinking the celebrity humanitarian agenda with the war on terrorism, these intelligibilities capture the constitutive aspect of this revolutionary humanitarian agenda in which ”saving Africa” became framed as a battle of international politics, deeply invested in hegemonic (elite, Western male) humanity. Indeed, the insufficient interest on the part of European leaders towards Africa had already resulted in a troublesome outcome. As Geldof argued, “even with the undoubtable leadership” taken by the United Kingdom on Africa, “the vacuum of our [European leaders’] lack of fulfilment have stepped the Chinese, who do not care about the values of democracy, transparency and accountability … [who say] we’ll give you the money so long as we have influence over your resources and your politics” (BBC 11.3.2007).

The Telegraph reported, as well, that China's growing interest in Africa had started a "new Cold War between China and the United States", concluding that "all the efforts of Bono, Geldof, Oxfam, and a chastened World Bank, to stop African development going off the rails again [were] being undercut at a stroke" (Telegraph 5.2.2007). Indeed, as Geldof argued, it was the role of "advanced democracies" to promote democracy and improve the terms of trade, or else risk being "usurped by the unscrupulous Chinese" (Telegraph 26.4.2006). Not only was China threatening to blow apart the prevailing Western consensus regarding the assistance and good governance needed in Africa, but if G8 countries did not move fast, Geldof warned, "China would be all over Africa with its policies that will embrace any government." The Telegraph came to a similar conclusion: "Beijing has blunted UN efforts to bring to account the Islamist regime in Khartoum for its depredations in Darfur," and has, as well, been "happy to deal with Robert Mugabe's vile tyranny in Zimbabwe" (Telegraph 24.6.2006).

Not only did Bono's and Geldof's intelligibilities prefix Islam to "terrorism", China's increasing economic activities in Africa were also reported to spread murder, torture and starvation. Everything in Africa seemed to have gone badly wrong. As for the colonial settler who, according to Fanon, constantly argued "if we leave all is lost, and the country will go back to the Middle Ages" (Fanon 2001/1961: 40), for Bono Africa was already back in the Middle Ages because of Western colonialism, unfair trade agreements and debt burden (Assayas 2005: 83). If Africa's past was in Westerner's hands, so was Africa's present. Without the actions of Westerners, Africa would never be able to arise from its lacking existence, overwhelmed as it was with "barbarism, degradation and bestiality" (Fanon 2001/1961: 169). With these self-referential appeals to graceful and necessary hardships in the name of global humanity and its future, the white man called himself to return to Africa, to his home and duty. It was incumbent on him to reintroduce moral order, discipline, liberal peace and security into his historical household with his pre-emptive engagements and interventions, before it was too late. Not so much for Africa, but for the Westerners themselves.

6.4 Conclusions

> […] I'm representing the poor and the wretched in this world. And I promise, history will be hard on this moment.
> - Bono (in Assayas 2005: 124-5)

> But, too, I can recapture my past, validate it, or condemn it through my successive choices
> - Frantz Fanon (2008/1952: 177)

In this chapter my objective has been to reveal how Geldof's and Bono's critique mobilizes the historical geopolitical imaginaries of the self-sacrificing and superior West and the dependent and unworldy Africa, devoid of intelligence or

capacity to take care of itself. Consequently, I have aimed to expose how the contemporary celebrity humanitarian campaign to ”Make Poverty History” re-asserts a colonial World order in which Africa remains securely confined and captured into Foucauldian disciplining and regulating visibility and existence as “the object of information, never a subject in communication” (Foucault 1991/1975: 200).

On the basis of these moral geographies, where everything for Africa was ”thought out, demonstrated, made the most of” (Fanon 2008/1952: 91), it became specifically the role of Westerners to act as a moral force in the world, to push for the peaceful and prosperous future of global humanity and act as its heroic saviours. In effect, by asserting normative power which lent legitimacy to Western actions and actors regarding Africa, the colonial intelligibility which assumed the exceptionalism of Westerners and the inferiority of Africans remained in place.

Indeed, it is precisely in this non-recognition of the African subjectivity and agency, reiterated through forceful self-understanding and self-regard, where the continuities between colonial and contemporary humanitarian practices, which revolve around normative life and its properties, become thinkable and visible. Indeed, by drawing an analogy with historical discourses of foundational heroic stories in which Westerners make 'World history', that is, taking action against the Holocaust, battling against communism during the Cold War and punishing the evil doers in the contemporary ‘war on terror’, Bono’s and Geldof’s intelligibilities not only constitute a specific trajectory of Western morality from past to the present, but though them Africa becomes formulated as a state of emergency in urgent need of interventionist social and market transformations: an implementation of freedom, democracy, transparency and accountability.

Accordingly, by repeating and confirming Western mythologies of englightened Westerners in their fight against unenlightened evilness in the name of the global humanity and its future, these moral calls for urgent action to secure global humanity with pre-emptive justice in Africa end up celebrating, maintaining and silencing, rather than opening new ways of understanding Western history-making on the continent. In these imposing and fixing intelligibilities, the involvement of non-Western countries with Africa, alongside with the emerging ”uncertainties” and ”dangers” of incursive Islam, were framed not only as a grave danger for Africa, but also as threats to the liberal order and its humanity. Moreover, in these triumphant morality tales, contemporary Africans who arrive on Europe’s shores to share “global freedom and humanity,” only to be taken to refugee camps to await deportation, were nowhere to be seen or heard. Nor were there any references to the role of Western countries as the World’s leading importers of arms into Africa’s “burning” landscapes.

Indeed, these less celebrated stories of Western action in Africa are not part of contemporary celebrity humanitarians’ histories or truth games. On the contrary, both Geldof and Bono argued that the West’s interest in Africa was too minor, and called for increasing Western action and intervention in Africa.

As a consequence, Africa was recaptured and fixed into the violent world of anticipation and betterment, where the continent remains "potentially something", firmly locked into an existence as either the "poor relative, [or] adopted son" of the Westerner, in need of his parental protection and discipline (Fanon 2008/1952: 180).

7 THE LANDSCAPES OF DISCIPLINE AND DESIRE - THE ENACTMENTS OF AFRICA AS WESTERNERS' ETERNAL HOME

> And we, for our part, must alter our political and economic behaviour to assist them. Africa is not a poor continent: it is vastly wealthy, with its natural resources and creativity. And it will be this that will create its own wealth and development. And with that wealth Africa will be able to afford its own health and education, which in turn will allow it to produce and compete equally with on the world stage. This is where a continent as romantic and timeless and beautiful as Africa deserves to be. And it is where we need it to be.
> • Bob Geldof (2005: 316)

> There is no Negro mission: there is no white burden.
> • Frantz Fanon (2008/1952: 178)

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I analysed how through Bob Geldof's and Bono's historically-sedimented discourses on the West's exceptional and exemplary heroism and dutiful actions—ending the Holocaust, "winning" the Cold war and taking up the pre-emptive war against terror—Africa became constituted as a place of hellish failure and degradation, devoid of the humanitarian norms that underpin liberal, progressive and "modern" Western societies.

However, as Foucault argued, Western humanism, as a central practice of liberal war fought at the level of constructed intelligibilities and imaginaries, the level of the organization of the sayable and seeable, operated through the complex constitution of difference and sameness. It was this hellish temporal cycle of inclusion and exclusion at the level of life itself that Fanon also highlighted by arguing that colonialism, as a fixing intelligibility of the ahistorical otherness of Africans, was not only constituted through condemnation, exclusion and rejection – discourses infused with anxiety, will and fear - but also through manifestoes of intimacy and pleasure, fetishism and exoticism, evoked

through assimilating and sentimental descriptions that were underpinned with the willful desire of Westerners for self-recognition and validation. Indeed, as Fanon argued, colonial intelligibility and its logic was profoundly narscissistic, characterized by the Westerner's "spiritual adventure" which was constituted through his permanent self-referential dialogue with himself in which he constructed himself as a man who had the power to acknowledge, or deny the Other (Fanon 2001/1961: 252).

In this chapter, following Foucauldian and Fanonian critical line of thinking that by encountering the Western humanitarian thought aims to subvert, alter and unfold different relationship to ourselves by politicizing and historicizing our present, I turn to examine the alternative, paternalistic African imaginaries that emerge from Bono's and Geldof's travels, or "missions" into the continent. As with the previous chapter, in this analysis I concentrate on the aesthetic compositions of these representations, that is, the ways in which these thought-practices with their spatio-temporal framings produce, mobilize and assert normative historico-political imaginaries through which Africa's landscapes are converted into a source of comfort for Westerners – sites of desire and nostalgia.

I argue that in contrast with the previously analysed discourses of "*Contemporary Hell",* which constituted Africa as catastrophic and dangerous, albeit invisible, with white men representing its voice and reality in the Western media, Geldof's and Bono's observations and descriptions during their travels produce imaginaries of desirable, peaceful African landscapes, with no misery or hostility. Indeed, while Bono and Geldof are visiting the continent, and presumably for the duration of their visit, Africa becomes defined as a peaceful, spectacular and beautiful continent filled with untapped opportunity and potential.

With these complex and overlapping imaginaries and sensibilities of the continent's exemplary, exceptional difference, elemental potentiality and the solitude offered by its vast spaces, African landscapes and Western history become inseparably intertwined, configuring Africa as the timeless and indisputable Westerners home. This sense of Africa as home is infused with affective identifications with its landscapes, unfolding imaginaries of idealized shared pastness and a desired common future through which the Westerner's purpose in Africa is yet again confirmed and reaffirmed.

7.2 The Order of Things – Iconographies of the African Other

According to Fanon, colonial domination and oppression never operated solely through the constitution of Africa's dangerous difference, but rather her "Otherness" came into being through a "series of aberrations of affect" (Fanon 2008/1952: 2) whereby the continent was sealed into her ahistorical essence and the Westerner into his superior, masterful existence and overwhelming presence. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Four, Fanon sees the colonial world as

having been underpinned with a deeply narcissistic Western fantasy of Westerner "as a mother who unceasingly restrains her fundamentally perverse offspring from managing to commit suicide and from giving free rein to its evil instincts", and "protects her child from itself, from its ego, and from its physiology, its biology and its own unhappiness which is its very essence" (Fanon 2001/1961: 169-70). In other words, an intelligibility that not only ordered and governed Africa's present and future through constant evaluation and condemnation of her humanity and progress, but also rewrote her past as a narrative framing the Westerner as man of responsible for enabling the native to climb towards "whiteness and light" that is, civility, docility and self-control.

Indeed, it was this narcissistic desire for constant self-recognition and self-assertion, "a permanent dialogue with oneself" within the contact zones of "African Otherness", that according to Fanon constituted Europe as Africa's invention (Fanon 2001/1961: 253, 81). As discussed in previous chapters, Africa was not only instrumental to constituting the West's historical existence and agency in terms of economic well-being, historically established through the exploitation of the African continent. Equally importantly, the subjugation of Africa also entailed a monopolized corporeal and performed Western humanity and civilization towards which "African Other" remained either as barbaric outcast in need of paternalistic discipline and masculine authority, or as an exotic feminized other to be saved and protected.

These intelligibilities—of an ordered, peaceful and submissive Africa—make up an irrevocable part of the imaginaries emerging from Bono's and Bob Geldof's travels into "extraordinary" Africa, a continent filled with incompletion and potentiality. In the media material analysed in this thesis, a central part of this imaginary of pacified and peaceful landscapes was constituted with photographs of women or children,[8] who in these news stories remained voiceless and nameless "Others" – sealed into their positions as "objects in the midst of other objects" (Fanon 2008/1952: 82). Occasionally, also men were present in these pictures but, compared to the smiling and active women, or obedient children, they appeared more passive and emotionally restrained (image 13) – nevertheless peaceful, co-operative and calm under the domesticating and mastering gaze and presence of these two men[9].

This positional and performed Western authority was further emphasized and reaffirmed in photographs depicting Bono and Geldof standing, often in front or behind African children who are sitting and listening (image 13 - 14). In effect, these capturing Africans into a hierarchical historical position as followers and learners, submissive observers - objects that obediently and passively sit in rows, or reservedly on Westerners' laps while they paid self-referential tributes to themselves for bringing a better and brighter future to the continent (image 15 and 16, including the capture).

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8 See: "Bono rocks Africa", BBC News 25.5.2002; "Bono cheers best frontman Pope", BBC News 3.4.2005; "Africa in pictures: 20-26 May", BBC News 26.5.2006

9 See: "Geldof and Bush: Diary from the Road", TIME 28.2.2008; "Geldof cast as 'Mr Bloody Africa'", BBC News 31.1.2005; "Ethiopia heading for tragedy, Geldof', BBC News 1.6.2003.

Overall, the prominence of children—and the distinct absence of their parents or other adult Africans with them—was a prevalent feature of the photographs, especially the ones depicting Bono's "missionary" travels. This choreography and framing further emphasized Africa as a continent in need of the white man, who alongside with the representatives of God and White Knowledge – the Catholic sisters and white teachers, the embodiments of practices of a life of perfection - was able to bring a brighter and progressive history to the continent (image 14). Articulating and constituting imagines of order and harmony that the Westerners, as messengers of African hope, solidarity, wisdom and progress, were capable to bring into the immature and passive African continent.

Similarly, the photographs in Bono's and Geldof's books—*On the Move* (2006) and *Geldof in Africa* (2005), depicted only nameless Africans and the white male authors. Nowhere in these photographs of Bono's and Geldof's travels in Africa did other races or nationalities appear. The dangerous Arabs, exploiting Chinese, starving children or the burning landscapes, all of which had been constantly referred to in speeches in the Western media, were nowhere to be seen. Instead, within this imaginary of the empowered Western man and his capturing gaze, Africa emerged as a continent of stability: a peaceful, beautiful and rather stagnant place, where the people in the countryside lived as they did decades or centuries ago.

These images, represent Africa as a passive and peaceful continent, abandoned to stagnation and history; that is, a space which has not yet reached its full potentiality, or found its "stand in the field of history" (Fanon 2001/1961: 168). Both Geldof's and Bono's cameras get close to their objects, as if aiming to capture their smallest details and particularities: an apt metaphor for the colonial way of seeing, in which Africans were given culture but no history or individual subjectivity, existence or presence.

The colonial gaze in turn —which overdetermined, organized and divided African space into binary camps of massified African objects and individualized Western subjects—remained a prevalent practice within Bob Geldof's and Bono's imaginary. For example, Bono's book *On the Move* (2006)—opening with endorsements from Nelson Mandela, President Clinton and Reverent Billy Graham, contains only photographs of nameless Africans and the writer himself. In line with the colonial imaginary, which according to Fanon fixed the African his "constitutional depravity" and "lack of differentiation" (Fanon 2001/1961: 32, 172), the majority of these black and white close-up shots were of children (with the exception of one image of an older man), all of whom are left unidentified— unnamed and unplaced.[10]

The composition of Bono's photographs is reductive, closed: almost too finished, complete and commonsensical. The uncompromising frontality in the pictures implies amicability and co-operation, giving the impression of a trust-

[10] In total, Bono's book contains twenty photographs, including the cover. Five of the images are of Bono; the rest depict nameless African individuals or the continents' empty landscapes.

ful, hopeful and innocent relationship to the Western reader/viewer (image 17 and 18). Moreover, the use of black-and-white photographs instead of colour works to further construct the integrity and authenticity of these images - the exceptional uniqueness as well as particular timelessness of a helpless immature continent outside the Western liberal maturity, modernity, movement and security.

Compared to the majority of contemporary Western humanitarian photographs—these pictures do not portray children who are in pain or dying. Rather, their subjectivity builds on vulnerability, innocence and isolation, which is yet again confirmed and constituted through the absence of parents or family members in these pictures. The insecurity of the unprotected and unsupervised life of the African shifts, however, when the Western man steps into the frame. African children welcome the Westerner with smiles; action is shown through their clapping hands. A story unfolds: isolation creates misery and regression, yet togetherness brings happiness, fulfilment and action.

In *Geldof in Africa* (2005) as well, the individuals captured and made visibile through Geldof's camera are left unnamed.[11] Nevertheless, in contrast with Bono, in Geldof's snapshots of his travels through "the luminous continent" filled with "light" and "brighness" (Geldof 2005: 26), he titles Africans into their belonging and being by labelling them according to their tribes, countries or places of origin. As a consequence, rather than having their own historical subjectivity, they remain objects whose essence is textually built onto their bodies through captions: "city girl," "rubbish girl," "Congolese mod," "Nuer woman, Gambela," "Masai, Tanzania," "a mobile torso" and "happy drug dealer" (Geldof 2005: 89, 103, 163-164, 169, 120-121, 76, 48). Others are simply named after the places they come from: for example, two naked children are named "Sudan" (image 19), a man playing a guitar is "Kinshasa, Congo" and a boy in colourful clothes is "Timbuktu" (ibid: 11, 93, 134). On other occasions, the existence and essence of these bodies and faces are simply named after their resemblance to world famous pieces of Western art, like "Mona Lisa" (image 20), or to Western supermodels and pop-stars (image 24).

Geldof's imaginaries are underpinned with difference evoked through bodily inscriptions and their visualities. Indeed, in his book Geldof describes, situates and surveys— in short, possesses—African bodies through exhaustive textual details on their physical characteristics and movements:

> Consider an African walking. You will rarely see one do anything as provocative as run. There is an effortless, upright elegance. A huge poise against the endless whiteness of the sky. There is nothing superfluous in the action. No sudden rushes. No flurries. Rather, a slow, rhythmic steadiness of unhurried ease wholly different from the flustered, busy, jerky, spasmodic rush common to the European (Geldof 2005: 27).

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11 In *Geldof in Africa* (2005), none of the Africans appearing in the images are named. However, names are sometimes provided in the main body text of the book. In the vast majority of cases, these are middle-class individuals. Effectively identity becomes a mark of acceptance for the educated, active and modern Africans: the doctors, priests or NGO workers.

Consequently compared to ever-moving, constantly surging and alert Europe, in Geldof's capturing eyes, Africa remains a slow, naturalistic and monolithic continent which offers the Western observer a sense of stability and emotional fulfilment, nostalgic longing and belonging. This discursive landscape of sentimental pastness, enjoyment and familiarity is further constructed through photographs and objectifying, desiring descriptions of African women. As Geldof depicts: the women in Africa are "like models or ballerinas, gracefully upright, balance[ing] perfectly between sky and earth, their hips propelling them forward in a lullaby sway […] [which makes] them resemble beautiful black Statues of Liberty" (Geldof 2005: 27).

This celebration of the feminine and "natural" African Other—constituted with constant comparison and evaluation, fascination and its negation—was repeated again in Geldof's observations on the members of the Mursi tribe, who he condemned with an evaluating and authoritative male gaze:

> The women are bare-breasted but wear bits of hessian or animal hide round the waists, or something loosely from one shoulder […] Their lips are huge and pendulous. A great sagging flap of flesh hangs down like an old tyre from their bottom lip. Not a good look […] Some of them produce large plates of baked mud – four six inches in diameter—and insert them into their lower lips. They look like table-tennis bats dangling from their mouths. In Mursi culture these labial plates are signs—no one can explain quite why—of great beauty and wealth. Some say it began so as to make the women unattractive to the slave-raiding parties terrorising the idea. There's only one problem with that theory: the Mursi think they look cute (Geldof 2005: 53).

As violent practices of negation and evaluation, rejection and desire, these exotic and erotic descriptions and impositions – firmly anchored in racialized and gendered mental hierarchies – produce subjective dis/placements through which the Western idealized masculine self-image is constituted, concealed and confirmed. This reconstruction of the African exotic - albeit tamed and conforming – difference is related not only to the racial and gendering typification of women's bodies through the voyeuristic gaze (images 21-22), but also involved fetishising investments and inscriptions of African men.

Indeed, with his voyaristic and domesticating, capturing and classifying gaze, Geldof describes a warlord in Somalia as "beautiful, tall and immaculately dressed," and male Masai warriors, with their "curiously shaved heads and extraordinary hair-dos, jewellery and weapons," as "lean, tall and beautiful" (Geldof 2005: 67, 118). Alongside with this feminization through his desiring gaze, he also employs tropes of the hypermasculinization of African men, conceptualizations that are however folded back into imaginaries of the domesticated and controlled African existence.

This domestication culminates in a chapter called "Check Your Spear at the Cloakroom," in which Geldof describes Masai men's adventures with German women who travel to Africa in search of "a daring shag with the wild untamed" (Geldof 2005: 118). Rather than depicting these men as victims, Geldof confidently asserts that they "know exactly what's going on and don't really care about being beach gigolos for a few days" for these "anemic looking wom-

en" who appear nowhere among the images (ibid). Although these interpretations echo historical discourses of hypermasculine, sexually-potent, feral Africans, which Fanon described as "incarnations of a genital potency beyond all moralities and prohibitions" (Fanon 2008/1952: 136), the effects of these observations unfold quite an opposite imaginary of virile, but managed, African masculinity in service of "floridly sunburned sweating Mädchen, dumpy in their hideous purple and yellow diagonally pattern Spandex pants and disgraceful sandals complete with 'tribal' necklace" (Geldof 2005: 118).

Through these interpretations and observations—intelligibilities which are confirmed by the photographs—Masai masculinity becomes formulated as almost innocent, childlike lustfulness (image 23). Accordingly, Geldof's words condemn these relations between Western women and African men, but only on the surface. He is curiously silent about the power relations between the "extraordinary successful" and "thriving" Masais and their white and wealthy women travellers, that is, on the historical relations or the present forms of exploitation that exist between Africans and the privileged and flexible citizens from the Global North who can navigate the world with ease seeking affection, satisfaction and fulfilment from the Global South (Lu 2007: 5). It is in this regard firmly fixing Africans into their historical position as Westerners' domesticated and willing servants, ready to fulfil even their wildest desires and dreams (image 24, including the caption).

Indeed, as Fanon argues, colonial violence, operating through Westeners' penetrative knowledge and masterful, controling truth which subjugates African existence through paternalistic condemnation, is directly linked to the monopolized self-realization of Westerners - his embodied freedom which is performed through a constant narcissistic monologue of overcoming obstacles and fulfilling desires in the African landscapes. This fantasy of Western permissiveness and self-assertion also forms a central part of Geldof's encounters with the African officials throughout his trip. Writing about his experiences on the "stand alone" border—marked by only "useless" posts, near Lalibela, Northern Ethiopia—Geldof describes his experiences with "a scruffy, gun-toting militia guard":

> He laboriously traced the permit dates and signature [of Geldof's passport] with a stubby, bitten finger. These were the golden rules that would finally allow me to move over that imaginary line to the magical side upon which the guard now stood. It was all so real in his head. Here, it was clear, stood a Berlin wall of imaginary concrete. A virtual Maginot Line […] Failure to meet the required number of seals, stamps or, indeed, seriousness, would mean I would be stuck this side of the six-foot-wide gate in this nothingness until the next plane arrived back at the same point tomorrow. I tried to exude solemnity. I radiated respect. I tried to be helpful and to point things out. This was a mistake (Geldof 2005: 81).

Rather than doubting what he himself was doing in Africa, or questioning his own imaginary world-mapping—through which Africa is again produced as hostile, obstinate and pathological, pitted against the helpful and civil Westerner—Geldof self-confidently questions the presence of this African "lunatic," expressing his disapproval by wondering: "what was he doing here?" (ibid). In

keeping with the role of the eternally self-aware and rational Westerner, assured of his own legitimacy and right to travel wherever and whenever he wants—Geldof is not interested in constituting or participating in a dialogue with his unreasonable interlocutor. He doesn't need to, because he knows what this "scruffy, gun-toting militia guard" (ibid: 80) is all about, and even what he is thinking. Geldof continues as if reading the guard's irrational, rambling thoughts aloud:

> He was, when all was said and done, the first guard against this foreign virus [Geldof] standing impertinently before him. It was down to him now. No one could help him. There was no one to turn to now, This was what it was all about. All the training. The years of struggle. It was on his head and his head alone […] This was his job, his honourable but onerous responsibility. No one had a clue who he was or, indeed, where he was, or what it was, but sure as hell, he was going to do it. What ever it was. But he and he alone know that the 'it' was that if he hadn't been there, alert and ever ready this ferengi, this azerene from another country he'd never heard of, would simply have sauntered, bold as brass and twice as useless, up to this clearly visible border post and simply walked around it, cool as a bloody cucumber if you don't mind the how's yer fathers and kept fucking going! […] And what about him? What would he do, for a start? He would have no job. He'd be out of work, thank you very much (Geldof 2005: 82).

Firmly fixed into his unreasonable truth - an existence that has no ontological validity in the eyes of the white man (Fanon 2008/1952: 83) - the guard is sealed into his suspicious, irrational and rebellious nature by Geldof's over-determining gaze and his penetrative ridiculing thoughts. Indeed, Geldof knows that it is he who is in the right place, even if he does not know the name of that place. Moreover, Geldof is well aware of his entitlement to be where he is, as he is keeping an appointment with someone "who had allegedly killed quite a few thousand people in excruciating circumstances," a man who "was supposed to mean something in this dump" (Geldof 2005: 82).

As if this would be the "busiest immigration line of the largest and most attractive-to-immigrants-wise metropolis in the world", Geldof writes in the same ridiculing and irritated tone. Continuing with his mocking words: "had I made some awful mistake? Was Ireland in fact the sworn enemy of this outpost of north-east Africa?" (Geldof 2005: 81).

Eventually Geldof does receive the "Great Stamp of Entry"or as he ironically describes it, "the Hugely Important Ink Stamp of Immensity with the imperial eagle clutching a Marxist symbol in oak leaves, or similarly inappropriate to whatever barren shithole this place lay amongst" (Geldof 2005: 81). Finally given back his passport – after having experienced the "ballistic, slobbering and incoherent" rage of the guard – he becomes suddenly seized by "an unexpected air of appreciation and expectation." With conscious and rational deliberateness, an "elaborated pantomime of unconcernedness," he slowly walks across the "imaginary wireless, fenceless line," which "millions die for" (Geldof 2005: 82-3).

But Geldof is not one of those nameless millions without appropriate documents or identity papers, putting their lives at risk. Instead he is an affluent, well-connected, privileged Westerner who has all the benefits of the Global

North at his disposal, and can travel wherever and whenever he wishes, across the vast landscapes of the African continent. Indeed, without any hesitation, or a reflection on the conditions of his own privileged existence, or giving a thought to the nameless and faceless thousands of others who have been killed by his killer protégée, Geldof just picks up his rucksack and saunters over the border – continuing his travels to the "lone and level sands," which stretch far ahead of him, toward the empty pleasantness and solitude, the freedom and fulfilment, of the "land of plenty" (Geldof 2005: 83).

7.3 Corporeality, Aesthetics and Memory: Articulating Landscapes of Emptiness and Loss

As in earlier Western encounters with Africa characterized by wilful self-actualization, in Bono's and Geldof's appropriations and iconographies the white man remains the only subject "on the move", echoing colonial imaginaries in which the Westerner stayed in control as the subject who gazed, named and judged African existence. Exemplified with self-discovery through encounters with otherness, this trend crystallizes not only in the title of Bono's book *On the Move,* but also in its dedication to "the little boy on page 17" who "changed my life. I cannot remember his name" (Bono 2006, front cover text). Indeed, Bono's and Geldof's African encounters are deeply affective and intense, underpinned with a pervasive quest for self-actualization and rejuvenation that arises from powerful aesthetic responses within African landscapes. As a result of this affective engagement, Western agency and African topology become inseparably intertwined, formulating Africa as a kind of memory space for Westerners, emerging from a deep conscious connection and relationship with the continent's landscapes and people.

Drawing on precognitive knowledge embedded in the larger interior horizon of the Western subject's indistinctive autonomy and freedom in vast African landscapes (cf. Foster 2008: 128, 131), Geldof's relationship with Africa is specifically affective and corporeal, saturated with memories and sensibilities that are deeply embodied in the inner depths of his body and mind. As Geldof, in the beginning of his self-referentially titled book *Geldof in Africa* reflects:

> Here are things I saw. Or felt. Or things that popped into my head that may make sense or not. They ramble around like a TV show – which is the way it should be. Snapshots of the mind. I hope they will give you a sense of the experience and the place. If you ever get the chance, go there. It feels like … going home (Geldof 2005: 7).

Through these appropriations that mediate both continuity and depth of memory, blurring the line between interior subjectivity and exterior spatiality, unknowable Africa is captured into knowledge and incorporated as an undisputable part of Westerner's existence and essence. As if recording and constituting these corporeal forms of bonding experiences that arise from his powerful responses to African landscapes, Geldof continues:

> It is the odours and scents which are some of the most potent assaults on the senses of the stranger in Africa […] The smells of Africa. They are smells that never leave you, smell that haunts the nostrils forever, inhaled deep into the core of the imagination (Geldof 2005: 262).

This ability to recognize, feel and embody the presence of a place is never free from historical and cultural appropriations and memories, which emerge from intensive connections between seeing and remembering (Foster 2008) that by enacting imaginaries of spiritual wholeness functions as markings of Western privilege and authority, through which the continent's landscapes are infused into the Western body, activating and reconstituting memories of Western belonging and beginning.

Revivifying his sense, purpose and agency, the most satisfying experiences for Geldof during his travels emerge within Africa's remote and empty landscapes, where he senses "the deep, dense, hot forest nature" of the "sexy jungle," and dreams of having a girl "to do it too. Now" (Geldof 2005: 288). Dwelling on the stillness and other-worldliness of the Buji desert, an encounter that is deeply personal, affective and rejuvenating, with his almost pre-natural sensitivity to this still and pure environment, Geldof observes and accounts:

> We sat on the dune and looked out over the stillness. Everything is biblical. It is quite true that there is in this minimal nothingess, in this unnoisy, uncluttered, clarity a palpable sense of the sacred. One's significance in the Grand Plan is apparent, humbling and liberating. The ego diminishes in direct proportion to the enorminty of the cosmos. A great freedom flows from the insignificance of You (Geldof 2005: 203).

These pristine and rejuvenating experiences, arising out of the recognized and recuperated African otherness, augment imaginaries of being in control, mastering the world and oneself. In accordance with the romantic tradition—which stressed Westerners' emotional bonds with African topographies, through which rights and ownership to them become articulated—Africa is, as Geldof argues, "not the Dark Continent as so often described by writers of the gloomy northern skies of Europe. Not a Dark Continent at all [but a] Luminous Continent, which is drenched in sun, pounded by heat and shimmering in its blinding glare […] simply the most beautiful place in our world" (Geldof 2005: 26-7).

These arousing and bonding experiences in African landscapes, evoked through affectionate sensibilities and sensualities that arise from encountering African emptiness and nothingness, open up a broad historical field of significations and emotional and transformative encounters which emerge from earlier deep-rooted and embodied intellectual and emotional Western experiences in the vast and empty landscapes of Africa. In line with the previous tales depicting the experiences and journeys of Westerners into Africa – stories which were formulated with complex juxtapositions of the familiar and unfamiliar, exceptional and ordinary - or as Fanon described it "permanent confrontation on the phantasmic plane" (Fanon 2001/1961: 42) - with these encounters, the Westerner's authority becomes yet again inscribed into the continent's landscapes through emotional attachments and identifications that contribute to a sense of completion at the level of Western self.

However, contrasting with the previous historical epics on the identifications and journeys of the Westerner through which he renewed and legitimized his agency with his domesticated and desiring actions in African lands, the storyline in Geldof's book does not constitute a coherent linear narrative, but rather fluctuates through different places, observations and moments forwards and backwards. In concequence, by flouting the idea of travel as action from beginning to neat ending, this temporality in its complexity distrupts the linear style so common to the genre of Western travel writing and expansionist Western history writing (Lisle 2006; Pratt 1992).

Nevertheless, even though Geldof's narrative structure can be read as deconstructive, and while his insights are infused with a celebration of powerful African rejuvenating difference, in the imaginaries and intelligibilities that unfold from his interpretations and inscriptions, the Westerner stays firmly in his advanced and superior position as destined master who appropriates and rules African existence and essence with his capturing gaze, absolute truth and certainty. Thus, read against the backdrop of the historical explorations and surveys of African landscapes by Westerners, Geldof's representations - aimed for "truthfulness" and accuracy to display the "real Africas" - also end up reproducing imaginaries of Africa as an unfathomable, depthless place in need of opening up through Western knowledge and action.

Like the Live 8 concert[12] logo (image 25) which depicted Africa as an unplayable guitar floating against a blue background, beside a parentless, faceless, naked child who seemed to stands even outside his own homeland, the map at the beginning of *Geldof in Africa* illustrates Africa as next to the Middle-East, but outside the Western world (image 26). On it, Africa is depicted as a separate entity surrounded by flat nothingness, a blank landmass where black lines indicate the boundaries between named national states, cities, rivers and other places of interest. Random colours—yellow, red and grey—are used to highlight places familiar to Western readers, such as the Sahara desert, the Great Rift Valley and the Darfur region. Most of Geldof's Africa remains, however, white, implicating and illustrating Africa as an untouched continent, absorbed into one-dimensional, depthless incompletion.

Geldof's inscriptions constitute Africa as much as they record it. As dominating projections and practices, infused by will and interests that reflect the passions and anxieties of the people who make them, each mapping, as Foucault observed, consitutes its own reality, provoking perceptions and intelligibilities which not only force submission to, but also ingrain acceptance of par-

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12 The LIVE 8 concerts took place on 2 July 2005 in nine different countries – United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, USA, Canada, Japan, South Africa and Russia. Over 1,000 musicians from across the globe took part and an estimated 2-3 billion people around the world followed the events. The concerts were organized to push the '"world leaders", that is G8, to end "stupid, immoral poverty" by making "Poverty History". This history-making required constituting fairer trade policies towards African countries as well as cancelling the debts of poor countries in Africa (sources: http://www.makepovertyhistory.org and http://www.live8live.com).

ticular world orders, thought-worlds and sensibilities (Foucault 1982/1968; Foucault 2009/1966).

By mediating and constituting memories of a remote place untouched by modernity, for Geldof Africa is a "mysterious continent," where "the old spirits are strong," and where some "people have heard of white people but never seen one" (Geldof 2005: 52, 60, 66). Historically, this constitution of African landscapes as "empty" has helped to mediate a wide array of Western anxieties and fantasies, consituting erasure as an integral part of the white worldview (Foster 2008: 227). Geldof's imaginative freezing of the African landscapes, seeing them as unmoving and undomesticated spaces, visualized through stabilized and static images (images 27 - 28), furthermore unfolds a topography of sentimentality that not only repeats historical formulations of Africa as an extraordinary space filled with timelessness, but also through them indicates a continent without any political or economic will. As Geldof writes, in contrast to many places where "man has invariably altered the landscape", Africa's landscape "has forced man to adapt to it" … "the deserts, forests, rivers and mountains remain unchanged, immovable, inviolate" (Geldof 2005: 100).

These reconstructions of time and space foreground and inaugurate nostalgic imaginaries of incompletion through which the West's purpose and heroic agency on the continent is again revivified and recuperated. As if following the trajectory of the great 19th century Western explorers and colonial settlers, preoccupied with a desire to fill the world with their presence (Fanon 2008/1952: 176), Geldof, too, throughout his travels in Africa, is depicted as a free and knowledgable man, walking and talking alone, exploring and sensing the magical Africa.

Wearing khaki-trousers, a Stetson hat and RayBan sunglasses, Geldof becomes the epitome of liberal Western subjectivity: an autonomous, self-governing and constantly observing and auditing subject of attention, condemnation and control. As he explains, travelling in Africa is exhausting, tiring and difficult, as there are "hardly any roads" (Geldof 2005: 304). Moreover, these roads—originally built by colonial Westerners, whose tracks still remain in use—are in such bad condition that moving from place to place was constantly delayed by pit-stops caused by punctures, which he assures, in his confident tone, are "not a possibility" but "a certainty" (Geldof 2005: 38). Often tired, bored and irritated by having to stay in "beyond crap" hotels (ibid) and visiting "shithole places" (Geldof 2005: 290), all Geldof can dream of is escaping back to his world of normality. As he writes in a weary tone: "I am too old for this shit. Too many years in Rock'n'roll" [...] "Get me the fuck out of here" (Geldof 2005: 238). But Geldof—as if his travels were a personal test of his commitment and dedication to Africa, with his mental health and wellbeing on the line—is determined to continue his travels, and continue he does.

This constitution of mysterious, empty and inaccessible African landscapes— juxtaposed with the free, anxious, independent white man making a harsh, but always needed, journey through it—reproduces the historical imaginary of the autonomous European man travelling in empty "Africa." Like the

colonial master, who constituted his superior existence through complex processes of subjectification and subjugation, Geldof, too, as a cosmopolitan humanitarian with his ability to enter and exit places as and when he wants, remains highly self-conscious of his unique individuality, civility and self-worth. As an autonomous liberal subject—which, according to Foucault, culminated in the capacity to govern himself and thus others—Geldof, while travelling, generally despises any kind of authorities who set limits on his freedom, or obstacles that prevent his progress. Remaining highly annoyed with the inefficiency, incompetence and unintelligence he encountered, he describes his Somalian escorts, or his "private army," as "a pain. They were mad. All wired. All day they'd been chewing khat" (Geldof 2005: 34). He further explicates this difference though cultural fatalism. Describing Somalia's failed existence, or "permanent state of feud" he proclaims: "the truth, I suspect, is that in our world we only know how to deal with entities that resemble our own […] its kind of pointless insisting on statehood when the traditional state is anarchy and the gun. Sort of like Afghanistan without the heroin" (Geldof 2005: 35, 38).

Throughout his visit, Geldof—despite the prevailing chaos and disorder in Africa is able to freely and effortlessly walk and observe the "empty fields and bare hills of ruined land amongst a ruined people," and to write down his observations of the "uncountable misery of the poorest, most wretched people of our world" … "hungry people face down approaching death" (Geldof 2005: 312). With these descriptions an imaginary of total absence of authority, reason or civil order in Africa unfolds. As Geldof notes, compared to "our world",[14] "where irony and postmodernism has removed culture from the actual business of living," in Africa "life is still about staying alive … there is no abstraction here. No fun. No irony. Just struggle" (Geldof 2005: 308). This ongoing, neverending struggle culminates in the Congo, where "life has become intolerable" and "hunger is perennial", Somalia, where "everybody's got a gun and the law is the man with the biggest", or in Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cote D'ivoire, Liberia and Sudan where the "Four Horsemen of Apocalypse: War, Death, Famine and Plague" is not a nightmarish future, but daily reality (Geldof 2005: 191, 150, 38, 274).

Thus endangering the evolution of the species and life in general, Africa's misery, poverty and violence become constituted almost as a pathogenic condition that raises constant anxiety and concern in Geldof's rational mind. This fear culminates in agitated thoughts: "Fuuuuck, I am going to be bitten. Going to get malaria. Cerebral fucking malaria. Twenty-four hours and you're gone", or fears of being robbed and shot by out-of-control Congolese army members (Geldof 2005: 238, 186-7). The fear of losing control, or getting contaminated by the dangerous unknowable and unreasonable otherness, seems to lurk for Geldof everywhere and nowhere. Writing about the widespread AIDS epidemic in

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14 In his book, Geldof rarely refers specifically to the west or Global North, but uses terms like "us" and "we." However, what these plural pronouns mean, is left vague and unspecified and naturalized. Unravelling the constituted distinctions and diffences underpinning Geldof's text necessitates acknowledging his internalized Western world-view, where Westerners are depicted as a universalized "we".

Africa, he explains that "many Africans, always happy to believe rumour and conspiracy theories," believe that AIDS is a "white plot" to control and kill them under the guise of aid, vaccinations and AIDS medicine. For Geldof this suspicion and ignorance has led not only to further tragedies on the continent, but moreover to an outbreak that now preys at the borders of the civilized world, or is possibly already inside them. Geldof concludes his chapter called Death Highway with a vision of "That same jungle from which the Beast [AIDS virus] escaped, that same road that carries it now through the African night, stopping a little while on the shanties of Congo, Berundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya before meeting us some evening perhaps in the small bar in Madison Avenue, the Champs-Elysees or the West End" (Geldof 2005: 306).

This constitution of the "different worlds" of the reasonable, responsible and mature Westerner and the disillusioned, pestilent pathogenic African who seems to have got confounded by the modern world (image 29), is yet again repeated in his description about anxiously waiting for a policeman in a luxury hotel lobby. Without providing any context, not even to specifying in which African country he is in, Geldof, in his confidential manner, asserts that "this place is as alien to him as the anarchy outside is to me .... what's he doing? Who is he protecting or waiting for?" (Geldof 2005: 177). Self-evidently for Geldof the policeman is in the wrong zone, a place where he doesn't belong. After all, as Geldof says of his environment, this is a "calm" luxury hotel where the "carpet is soft" and the "air is perfumed and sweet", a complete contrast to "the threatening world outside the door," where the policeman is from and "where he is sure of [himself]" (Geldof 2005: 176).

Thus, in contrast to the outdoors, that "weird" world of "pink tongues, red throats and white, white teeth," filled with brutal habits and manners, a chaotic space of otherness where policemen are "arrogant in their certainty of power" inside this luxurious hotel filled with calm manners and security, Geldof knowingly asserts that "the policeman feels out of place". The policeman "must know", Geldof continues with masterful knowledge and condemning gaze, that this is the place "where the money is," "where the law comes from" and "power really lives" – a place where he "can't shout at anyone, can't use his whip," "molest or even approach you" (Geldof 2005: 176). Indeed, with his inflated superiority and authoritative certainty, Geldof concludes: "what is the point of him? If I beckoned him to me, he would come. Twenty yards away, out on that frightening street, he'd stare at me with dismay and contempt of my arrogance and assumptions and then, humiliatingly, I would have to approach him" (Geldof 2005: 176).

Not once does Geldof stop to consider his own existence or essence, or the self-righteous tone and arrogant manners through which he seals himself into his unarguable superiority (Fanon 2008/1952: 3). Nor does it occur to him that the reason for the policeman's boredom or anxiety could arise from outside this "white world" - this hotel which, with its exclusiveness, for Geldof represents monopolized wealth, power, civility and confidence. Rather, in his self-assured and commonsensical way, Geldof assumes that the policeman, because

of race and social standing, cannot feel at "home" in this clean, ordered and relaxed environment where he cannot, and will not, belong.

It is from this subjective, liberal self-certainty, or "being-for-self" – arising from his over-determined negations and objectifications which fix the Africans as "others" waiting for Western recognition and explanation —that Gedlof's humanitarian imaginaries fold into unaccommodating, affirmative, complex acts of exclusion. Indeed, by fixing himself into his superiority through constantly imposing his existence on the African "other," Geldof is not interested in encounters that would push him against his own imaginary limits. As such, different worlds—enacted with racial, gender or class-specific affiliations—remain firmly and unarguably in place between the civilized and knowing Westerner and the African other who is paralyzed into his irresponsibility or inability, or, as Fanon argued, an existence that was "not only inferiority, but also specific non-existence" (Fanon 2008/1952: 108, 106).

Addressing the failure of modernization in Africa, Geldof reflects: "why does modernity bring so many tears to this continent?" (Geldof 2005: 304). For Geldof, Africa is not at all like the west: on the continent, tradition and modernity live side by side (Geldof 2005: 96). Thus, contrary to the popular Western idea of development in Africa, he writes, in Africa there "is not a linear progression from tradition to modernity", but rather, tradition exists alongside modernity and "it is in the interaction between the two that in Africa will bring change and progress" (ibid). In his chapter entitled *"The Parade of Dying,"* Geldof further proclaims the validity of Western values, by outlining the conditions and effects of the AIDS epidemic in Africa:

> our [Western] morality is underpinned by the assumption that autonomous individuals make informed choices based on proper understanding of the facts. Our economics are based on the assumption that many people in Africa have alternative commodities other than sex that they can sell for school fees, exam results, employment or survival itself [...] Understanding of Africa cultures is crucial here (Geldof 2005: 294-5).

Instead of turning his own confident vision regarding "Africa" into one of unfamiliar strangeness, in Geldof's imaginaries "Africa" remains either as a romanticized place of pastoral pastness, or a troublesome space of failed modernity and security (image 30-31). Africa is, as such, totally different from the "Western" world of reason and civility; however, it is always intelligible, sensible and permissible—never too surprising or dangerous. As a liberal subject possessing individuality, agency and capability - freedom to be, think and choose—Geldof reflects: "so many of our Western assumptions are wrong here" (Geldof 2005: 294).

Despite these arguments and insights which do question the universal validity of the linear development of economics, the need for progress and change in Africa remain a normative objective, measured against Western standards. Consequently, for Geldof, progressive modernity and the West remain synonymous. He asserts that "the modernity imposed on Africa is of the shakiest foundation. Divorced from the Western culture that produced it and in conflict

with the culture that it inhabits, it is a recipe, like in Arabia, for cultural schizophrenia and the confusion and anxieties which follow from that" (Geldof 2005: 180).

As if mentally retarded and her body lethally infected, Africa is hence in a certain state of oblivion - it never became correctly modern, nor do any of its "traditional" values or cultures remain. Or, paraphrasing Fanon, Africa remains "not yet white, no longer wholly black" (Fanon 2008/1952: 106). As such, not only in these intelligibilities does Africa remain a somewhat uninformed, dependent and desperate place, but moreover compared to the individualistic West, where development is concerned with increasing choice, in Africa, as Geldof reasons "it is about human dignity—wellbeing, happiness and membership of a community" (Geldof 2005: 302). It is this loyalty and obligation to the clan, tribe and family, as Geldof confidentally asserts, which makes Africa different from us, because "individualism only works when the individual works collectively for the common good. The opposite is true in Africa. Everything is done through the collective" (Geldof 2005: 158).

It is Africa's ethnic, tribal and clan loyalties, traditional relations so integral and essential to its existence, that for Geldof are the central causes of the continent's failed modernity and extreme violence, rivalries that arise from rows over land and water, over migration and national identity, fuelled by modern weaponry and religious fundamentalism (Geldof 2005: 235; 278-9). And thus, nothing will change or "improve" in Africa before "people acknowledge that much of the [African] conflicts are between tribes or within them" (Geldof 2005: 235). Reflecting further on the Africans' unchanging mentality with his dominating words: "Oh the patience and fatalism of Africa" (Geldof 2005: 214).

This intelligibility not only frames African's problems as somewhat internally generated, but also constitutes their problems as psychological matter that needs to be healed by increasing Western interention. Indeed, in order to secure the future of life on the continent, surveillance and analysis are needed, or as Geldof argues, to stop "the scourge of AIDS and its deadly parade" on the continent, it is crucial that "we [Westerners] deepen our understanding of African culture" and "local cultural norms and values" including facts about "gender relations and power hierarchies or about African cultural fatalism" (Geldof 2005: 295).

In line with the colonial intelligibility which despaired at the colonial "native's" eternal inability to agree on the basis of reason, in these new interpretations and imaginaries "African tribal" societies are problematized as inherently violent and destructive, as if incapable of resolving their differences and disputes through peaceful collaboration. In failing to achieve the self-consciousness and individuality so central to liberal subjectivity, Africa remains in a primitive state where individuals do not recognize a "common" good or shared national existence. On this continent—"full of ghosts," "witchcraft" and "death," as Geldof explains—nothing "occurs without a reason and this is the most likely explanation for the unremittingly awful things that are happening to them and all around them" (Geldof: 2005: 172; 190; 152 192). Apparently, the

only reason employed in Africa involves uncontrollable violence, which has become an internalized part of Africans' mentality and psychological composition. As Geldof wonders and asserts: "What stops the nightmares? What stops the memory? What will ever stop the madness?" (Geldof 2005: 226).

These circular notions echo Fanon's insights on how violence becomes a constitutive part of postcolonial African existence and essence. However, if for Fanon, ending this internalized violence requires detachment – "going beyond one's immediate being" (Fanon 2008/1952: 169) – in Geldof's intelligibilities, the white man has no need or urgency to move anywhere. As Geldof writes: "What a mess. And somebody's got to keep the show on the road" (Geldof 2005: 275). For Geldof, this "somebody" who can guarantee peace and stability on the continent refers to a "parallel world of functionality" in Africa—that is, the "UN, NGOs and international institutions of the wealthy world—the IMF and the World Bank" (Geldof 2005: 274). Reflecting on how humiliating it must be for Africans that these Western bureaucrats provide advice, constantly condemning and criticizing, Geldof— the only time in his book, or in his public speeches for that matter—refers directly to Africa's postcolonial condition: "isn't this just a different form of colonisation? […] haven't they [the UN] and their NGO satellites in truth become the twenty-first century colonialists?" (ibid). Without any recognition of his own constantly condemning or criticizing words, or the conditions of possibility for his global celebrity humanitarian agency, which is deeply embedded in the structures of this "other world," Geldof however swiftly moves on to another question: "And if they (the United Nations) are not to stay, what happens to these people?" (Geldof 2005: 275).

Geldof provides no answers to either of these questions, but leaves them floating in the air for the reader to ponder. His ambiguity does not, however, mean that he does not have an opinion regarding the necessary role of Westerners in Africa. As he writes in a paternalistic manner, as if answering his own question: "still, I suppose those that are helped feel only relief, sometimes possibly gratitude. The humiliation and resentment they should direct towards their own woeful governmental incompetence. But then again, many Africa governments are not inadequate or incompetent. They are simply poor" (Geldof 2005: 274).

In effect, the prevailing poverty in Africa is not only a danger to life in general, but it also causes incompetence that culminates in confusion and the inability to differentiate sincere Western helpers from the evil wrongdoers who live within the continent. According to this rationale, Africa needs to quickly rehabilitate and heal its intellectual incapacity and its inability to think rationally, to become – at last – a normalized liberal subject capable of self-governance and the correct type of self-constitution. Indeed, Africa is not an incompetent childlike continent, but an incomplete continent out of control, run by Conrad's "Roms"—warlords, generals, commanders that rape, torture, brutalise, mutilate and kill (Geldof 2005: 298). Thus the "darkness of Africa" is, for Geldof, no longer the burden of Westerners, but Africa's own burden. "You tell me"— Geldof says, referring to the African generals placed on house arrest in five star

luxury hotels, where they continue to order savage violence via telephones—"your darkness or mine?" (Geldof 2005: 299).

Although Geldof's photographs also feature modern aspects of Africa, mobile phones and satellite dishes, his words and images construct and frame African landscapes as predominantly immature. As he argues, African countries, regardless of the diversity of people and environments, "all share one common factor: survival is a constant struggle against disease, drought, predators and heat" (Geldof 2005: 270). This vision of struggle, pain and lack—of development and its progress—is reinforced by his photographs of borders which are still marked by timber posts, collapsing universities (image 32), deserted mines (image 33), and rusty old trains disintegrating in jungles. While city life is occasionally shown, none of Africa's mega-cities, motorways, urban slums, middle-class houses, luxury cars, and supermarkets appear in his photographs. The signs of economic growth some African nations have experienced over the past few years are similarly omitted, as are political institutions, parliaments, political parties and politicians. Indeed, as Geldof asserts to these "friendly, warm and brave people," the Western world is as "utterly unimaginable as the latest scifi-movie is to us" (Geldof 2005: 312). Compared to the West, Africa truly is and remains, as Geldof names one his book chapter's in his book, "A Different World" – a place where the Western subject constantly asks himself reflectively: "What am I doing here? I don't know, I really don't know" (Geldof 2005: 312).

Rather than turning into self-denunciation or criticism, Geldof's momentary hesitancy turns quickly into confidence and certainty: a self-referential sense of purpose that also involves reflections of the horrific legacy caused by Western colonialism and slavery in Africa, of which Geldof is well aware. As he notes in his chapter called "The Complex, Unexpected Story of Slavery", before Westerners arrived in Africa, "the Arabs and Chinese and Indians had been visiting the east cost of Africa for hundreds of years" (Geldof 2005: 138). Indeed, as Geldof knowingly writes, "everybody was in it", constituting the horror of slave trade as not only the white man's burden, but a dishonour shared by many, including Africans themselves. And thus, "the terrible truth is," as Geldof asserts, "that when the Europeans came to do business with the Africans, to their undying shame all they had to sell were their own people and to our undying shame we bought them" (ibid).

In fact, as Geldof clarifies, Europeans arrived in Africa not because of the slaves but because of gold. Indeed, at the beginning, rather than buying slaves, Europeans "bizarrely" acted like "the middleman" between African slave traders (Geldof 2005: 139). Completely neutral to the slave trade itself, they had no interest in creating any havoc in the continent. Rather, it was Africans themselves "who saw the European guns and wanted some of those" (Geldof 2005: 139). It was only later, Geldof clarifies, when the European world expanded and the demand for more people increased, that colonialism and the unimaginably brutal western slave trade ensued, leaving the continent in a state of lingering fatalism and poverty that remains even today (Geldof 2005: 141-2).

Thus compared to Westerners, who have managed to overcome their past with their progressing humanity, the horrors of the slave trade remain firmly engraved in the contemporary African conscience and existence (image 22). Not once does Geldof apologize for the West's terrorizing of Africa, for slavery or colonialism. Although he acknowledges the regretful actions of the West against Africa in the past, for him these remain occasions in the past, conditioned by their specific historical contexts, "things that had to be done" which everybody else was doing at the time as well. As a result, Geldof's arguments and interpretations regarding the historical actions of Westerners in Africa involve tactile reconstructions of history in which the slave trade becomes everybody's shared sin, and colonialism is yet again rendered as a temporal marker of the transcended Western past.

Indeed, in Geldof's intelligibilities, the horrific crimes against African existence remain exceptions, rather than part of a long succession of racist Western histories, histories of the West's management of life, of bodies and race: "negations of the man, and an avalanche of murders" (Foucault 1998/1976: 136; Fanon 2001/1961: 252). For Geldof, not once apologizing for horrific Western crimes or historical wrongs committed in the name of civilization and humanity, there seems to be no need for reconciliation or transformative change at the level of Westerners' subjectivity or self-imaginary. Rather, like the colonial master who championed compromise, stability and calmness, in his chapter on the "unexpected" history of slavery, Geldof ends up celebrating the masterful placidity of Africa to which Westerners remain indebted: "How have they withstood this? How are they so resilient? How can any society continue and be so full of grace and dynamism? So sure of themselves? Not cowed. Unbowed. Dignified. Proud […] What amazing people. We owe them a lot" (Geldof 2005: 142).

Indeed, Geldof's memorizations of the West's past in Africa are not marked by regret or remorse. Nor do they involve the memorization of brutal (de)colonial wars or the subsequent Western military activity and political losses that ensued. Rather, in his photograph the Slave Cost is an empty and peaceful place (image 35) where outside the gates of old slave houses, now operating as a heritage museum, men work peacefully around their wooden fishing boats. Even the last remaining and haunting sign of colonial rule—a feetless statue of Henry Stanley and his engineless steamboat—can be now found in the backyard of the disused museum, left behind to rust and deteriorate (image 36).

Filled with decline, emptiness and silence, these images of places haunted by colonial violence and its spirit, constitute an imaginary of a closure, a permanent end to the violent histories of Westerners in the African lands. Finally the Western colonial master collapsed, his feet cut off, helplessly lying on the ground, as if unable to continue his terror and conquering. But his eyes are still wide open, as if awake and present. As if still commanding and judging the African landscapes with his penetrating gaze.

7.4 The Horizons of Potentiality and Homely Sameness

Mediating the tensions between nostalgia and modernity, Geldof's African encounters are haunted by a Western fantasy of experiencing the continent's difference, as well as a desire to confirm a set of expectations. Constituted with constant comparisons, attraction and repulsion, most of the time for Geldof Africa remains simply locked into "an economic ditch" (Geldof 2005: 290-1) where a "parody of Western form of democracy" prevails, corruption and guns are blatant and things occur that "no human should ever, or ever have to, see" (Geldof 2005: 215, 250, 290). At other times it is however "a very different" place, a continent with vast untapped wealth, full of a "sense of flux and of opportunity," an air of "dynamism," "change," "ownership," "commitment" and "entrepreneurship" (Geldof 2005: 266).

While Geldof mourns the changes modernity has brought to the African continent, he nevertheless complacently celebrates the emerging signs of globalization that have brought security and well-being to individuals by connecting them to the ideas, values and aims of the liberal world order. Indeed, Geldof celebrates the signs of progress, especially in the form of emerging lines of communication: the satellite dishes perching everywhere like "totems of globalization," the "thriving internet shops and cafes" and the cell phones through which Africa is connected to rest of the World (Geldof 2005: 282). These telecommunication technologies and their virtual infrastructures which enable interconnectedness between individuals, currencies and ideas across continents, thus not only represent great opportunities for Africa to finally experience economic growth, but as Geldof argues they also "raise possibilities of dramatic transformations in African culture, infrastructure and politics" (Geldof 2005: 284). In other words, they encourage qualities and abilities that will enable Africa to adapt and conform to a secure, peaceful, content and wealthy existence and essence, as if following in the footsteps of the "matured" Western countries and their mythical histories of progress and civilization.

Geldof writes that "in Africa we must learn to expect the unexpected" (Geldof 2005: 284). Framed this way, the continent becomes an eternal exception to be explained and captured, firmly sealed into her historical existence as a "potentiality of something" (Fanon 2008/1952: 103). Indeed, as Geldof forcefully and confidently states in the final pages of his book, Africa is "not a poor continent: it is vastly wealthy with its natural resources and creativity" (Geldof 2005: 316). And it is through these resources, Africa will create its "own wealth and development," by investing in health and education, which will then allow it to "produce and compete equally on the world stage" (Geldof 2005: 316).

It is this prosperous, peaceful, happy or progressing Africa (image 37 - 40), with "a large, educated and increasingly influential middle class, new entrepreneurship with political and governmental changes" that will lead towards a more democratic and peaceful existence, which for Geldof constitutes Africa as "a beautiful continent" (Geldof 2005: 316). With his celebratory tone, Geldof

praises the signs heralding an affluent and efficient Africa, highlighting the emerging middle-classes that send their children to Western universities to bring "new practices and technologies" back to the continent (Geldof 2005: 283). It is these "citizens of the globalised world," as Geldof states, who have made the continent "an engine of change" (ibid).

Consequently for Geldof the question of increasing equality in Africa correlates closely with Africa's ability to compete and improve, to climb up the historical queue towards advancement and affluence by forming closer relationships with the West. Indeed, development in Africa does not mean "increasing choices," but, as Geldof confidently describes, "increasing human dignity" which can only emerge by constituting closer emotional relationships, where "we need each other and have a stake in each other" (Geldof 2005: 302). Thus, what Africa needs is not independence or being left alone, which in Geldof's imaginaries seems to lead into violence, poverty and destruction. But rather communality or "ubuntu" which, according to Geldof, an unnamed African philosopher defined as a relationship where "a human being is a human being through the otherness of other human beings." What is needed is an existence which according to Geldof Bono had expressed "neater" as "I am because we are" (ibid).

Consequently, for Geldof, shared humanity can only take place through interconnectedness. This communal existence, however, requires that everyone can voice their own opinions and express their subjectivity in a variety of forms. Or in other words, human dignity is much more than a status or communality, or even recognition of the otherness. As Fanon argued, dignity could never emerge from rationality, or from a "a treatise of the universal" (Fanon 2001/1961: 31). Rather it requires absolute rejection and negation, opening up a space for radical difference. Hence, for Fanon, achieving freedom requires a radical rejection at the level of one's intelligibility of oneself through ongoing, exhausting and relentless problematization that aims not towards increasing communality, but towards opening up possibilities for autonomy and alterity – an existence which is never finished or knowable, but something always in becoming. It is, as Fanon writes a "real leap" that introduces invention into existence (Fanon 2008/1952: 179).

However, the communality Geldof dreams of and desires is not difference but rather co-dependence. Rather, Geldof—with his self-reflective and self-deprecating projections—might recognize sameness or difference in the African Others, but throughout his travels he remains the one who recognizes, describes, judges and confirms their existence and essence in dichotomous terms, in contrast to his Western self and its world.

Reflecting on his own existence and actions in Africa, Geldof writes: "I don't like being in the picture. I am outlandish in this landscape. Why do I keep having to put my stupid face into every frame? […] I'm not meant to get in the way. But I do. I am supposed to be there to root the audience in the moment" (Geldof 2005: 254). Within this intelligibility, whiteness is associated with progressive humanity, constituting the fixed gap between the purposeful and con-

fident white man and the non-existent, but potentially something, African other. It seems, then, that Africa cannot represent itself, but rather it needs to be represented – effectively repeating the colonial intelligibility of the white Western subjectivity located inside history and its making.

Explicating further his own feelings as a white man in Africa Geldof continues: "I really do want to meet the people we see, but the unalterable, unavoidable central fact and condition of myself in Africa is that I am white. White puts all sorts of notions into the locals' heads and makes me feel embarrassed and alien. Not apologetic, unwelcome or guilty, just out of place" (Geldof 2005: 254). Privileging difference and its singularity, not becoming one of "them" but rather "them" being part of him, Geldof concludes:

> No matter how long I stayed here I would always be 'ferengi.' Don't get me wrong. I don't want to be them or pretend I am one of them, I just want to disappear into them. To see what they are. To listen and hear what they are. But I cannot. I am as marked out here as they would be in my world […] Like a black man in the snow, I am a white man in the coalfield. Sanding out bizarrely […] A visitor always welcomed but always, disappointingly the object of quite justified hilarity and curiosity (Geldof 2005: 254).

As a self-constituted welcomed outsider who always stands out in the vast landscapes of Africa - a man who never apologizes for his own or his white ancestors failures or sins - through these imaginaries the Western subjectivity unfolds as primary and particular: rather than transforming, it is compelling and confronting. "Forever black, forever white," Geldof reflects, effectively cementing and naturalizing the differences into a common sense (Geldof 2005: 254).

And so the Westerner's need to expose himself to the African other, for him to recognize him and only him, repeats itself. Indeed, as a man for whom "everything is anticipated, thought out, demonstrated and made the most of" (Fanon 2008/1952: 91), during his travels Geldof never questions the higher purpose of his humanitarian enterprise in Africa, nor problematizes his own self-certainty, truth, knowledge or rationality. Effectively, by failing to consider any of the historical conditions that enable him to see, hear and represent the African others globally, or to desire any encountering or rupturing dialogue with them, Geldof's projections and revelations remain violative, unconditional and absolute. As Geldof asserts, his existence is unalterable - a self-imaginary and intelligibility that rejects the need to search for an alternative existence or essence, different beings or becoming. The only ones who are in need of new possibilities—understood broadly as opportunities to progress towards the Western notion of individual dignity—are the "African Others."

Consequently, Geldof does recognize the otherness in the "others," but not in himself. This difference is quickly denied if it does not accord with his global humanitarian and cosmopolitan world-view. For him, only a certain kind of difference is acceptable, that is, otherness that is not overly disturbing to his thought-world, and does not threaten his existence or essence in any way. In other words, as long as peace prevails and Africans take responsible care of themselves, difference is desired, enjoyed, permitted, and even encouraged.

Hence what Geldof is searching for, with his desiring gaze, is the equivalent of Western self-discovery, that is, he wants to recognize his Western self in the "African" other, to sense things being peacefully "in place". Indeed, what is confirmed through Geldof's photographs is an Africa that is looking keenly towards Western trends, products and advice: David Beckham, English Premier League football, BBC World Service, Coca-Cola and AIDS education (Geldof 2005: 61, 96, 154, 164-65, 218). Africa is, as Geldof writes, "gripped by the Blond Beauty" [David Beckham] who has become "without doubt the biggest brand in Africa" and whose T-shirts and posters "everyone has" (Geldof 2005: 60). Indeed, as he clarifies, in Africa "Beckham isn't white: he is a star footballer" through which the modern world joins together in "shared emotion" and "fandom," bridging the chasm and enabling people to "talk as equals a common language of understanding and appreciation" (Geldof 2005: 62).

Constituting and repeating a deeply rooted colonial intelligibility of the need for togetherness, formulated by way of calls for equality and common appreciation, shared peace and prosperity, it is indeed this peaceful and civil Africa Geldof desires and dreams of. As a place where the Western man is always identified with respect and praise, Geldof writes about his coronation as a King in a local bar: "As I entered, the bar rose and respectfully murmured 'Nana' and the women bowed and when walking in front of me walked backwards in a low bow. Even in the street. Cool" (Geldof 2005: 153). Beautiful Africa – a continent where Westerners are still crowned and celebrated Kings of Development (image 41), where Westerners can return for occasional visits to examine their African subjects' progress and rehabilitation, and act as authorities whose orders and advice, as a "stern and proxy parent," African children listen to without any questions or resistance (Geldof 2005: 216). A place where, when a white man is around, things do work, peace prevails and with whom even the "mad" and "wired" Somali private-army soldiers turn into peaceful smiling individuals (Geldof 2005: 34, image 42).

So the African story once again repeats itself. In the name of humanity and global justice, to give voice and vision to Africa, the blank white African map becomes filled with Western emotions, wants, fears and desires. Through her textual pain and luminous beauty, absolute and natural difference, the white man invites himself to make his eternal return to his eternal home, his origins, where he will always belong. Geldof writes, "At Africa. At its totally beauty. Spiritual and Physical […] How the ancient memory and smell of it draws you back. Draws you home" (Geldof 2005: 115).

7.5 Conclusions

In this chapter I have examined the complex imaginaries that surface from Geldof's and Bono's travels into Africa's luminous and incomplete landscapes, encounters that permeate powerful affective responses and memories of belonging and becoming. I have argued that this subjectivity of being at home in Afri-

ca is fostered by imaginaries of the personal freedom of Westerners, their autonomy and ability to navigate freely and without constraints across Africa's vast borderless landscapes, as well as by corporeal and sensory participatory experiences that, through stressing roots and longing, mediate and nurture imaginaries of harmony and hominess.

With these encounters with the African exceptional beauty, characterized by ethnic localism and signs of "progress," these contemporary celebrity humanitarian imaginaries unfold into a colonial grid of intelligibility, underpinned with a complex inauguration of difference that never collapses into sameness. This communality—in which Africa remains either a domesticated and desired exotic curiosity, or a responsibly but slowly advancing other—shifts quickly, however, into condemnation, anxiety and grief for an African dream gone bitterly wrong when things do not follow the historical path planned and paved by mastering, self-assured Westerners.

Indeed, between Geldof's and Bono's thoughts and reflections written into the pages and under the surface of the peaceful domesticated images that formulate a desired communality, an invisible fear lurks that everything could turn into hellish nightmare if Western life-making and life-shaping humanitarian action is not taken: the wars could expand throughout African landscapes flooding homeless refugees into the "feeding camps", spreading destruction, poverty and misery through the continent. Or even worse, the deadly, silent beastly African AIDS virus—a kind of chaotic madness—could spread and infect not only the beautiful and progressing African other, but the "healthy" Western civilization itself.

Consequently, these imaginaries, enacted through Geldof's and Bono's African representations, are not only desiring and conforming, but are also infused with the fear of losing the foundational humanitarian identity so central to legitimizing Westerners' agency in Africa and in the world. Marked by a pervasive elision of sentimentalities and desires, confirmation and condemnation— with these projections having been removed from any visible aggression or conquest—Africa is constituted as an ahistorical "white man's land," a continent in constant need of Western paternalistic guidance, benevolent future-oriented protection and provision.

Indeed, when Bono and Geldof are on the continent, Africa opens up as a conforming and passive landscape where the white man remains a warmly welcomed and celebrated visitor. Formulating one more chapter to Fanon's mythical fairytale of the lauded and benign Western developmental mission and superior agency that is everywhere identified, desired and celebrated.

Generated and sustained by violent rejection of African subjectivity and agency without the presence of the white man, effectively rewriting and repeating the old colonial tale of a continent whose difference is warmly celebrated and desired, but always denied. Listened to, but never heard. Seen, but not recognized. Overdetermined by white gazes, white morals and white intelligence—effectively locking the continent into an unarguable existence without foundation, history, future, voice or the capacity to represent herself.

Never enough, or ready for the present. Always coming too soon, or too late. Sealed into here-and-now, into her never-ending mission of gratitude and duty to catch up with the white man, to be and become—reminding us painfully of Fanon's last wish: "O my body, make of me always a man who questions!" (Fanon 2008/1952: 181).

8 CONCLUSIONS

> The negro is not. Any more than the white man
> • Frantz Fanon (2008/1952: 180)

Drawing on the critical insights of Michel Foucault and Frantz Fanon regarding violence and intelligibility, and freedom as self-governance, the purpose of this thesis has been to articulate a politicized and historicized reading of Western celebrity humanitarianism in Africa. As a critical intervention into existing research, the most important contribution of this thesis to scholarship on celebrity humanitarianism in the context of international relations has been to address celebrity humanitarian representations not as neutral openings onto African reality, but as practices of governance infused with deeply historical ways of thinking, seeing and knowing. To this end, by approaching thought as a violently differentiating practice, and defining colonialism as a grid of intelligibility, my focus has been to discuss and demonstrate how celebrity humanitarian representations contribute to the reproduction of violently overdetermining colonial intelligibilities and imaginaries in relation to African subjectivity, reality, life and history.

By turning away from the prevailing academic debate on the truthfulness or correctness of the developmental or economic policies that contemporary celebrity humanitarians promote, this project has entailed both a theoretical contribution and an empirical one. The theoretical contribution entailed examining insights from Foucault and Fanon on violence and freedom, through which a broader historical imaginary of the dominating force of Western humanity, humanism and humanitarianism unfolded; conceptualizing colonialism as an overdetermining intelligibility and imaginary that governs African existence and essence through constant conditioning involving negation, rejection and repetition.

In order to grasp how celebrity humanitarianism engages with postcolonial governance, it was necessary to turn towards the aesthetics of celebrity humanitarianism in terms of its representation, visualization and reasoning. Effectively, this investigation unfolded a new historicized and politicized reading of how Bono's and Geldof's discourses articulate a colonial imaginary of

Africa that not only supports hegemonic Western activity in Africa, but also constructs a consensus for the existing world order in which the global South is, and remains, subordinate to the West.

In Chapter Two, I discussed contemporary research on celebrity humanitarianism, focusing on the debate on whether celebrity humanitarians are instrumental or detrimental to African development. Accordingly, I argued that in concentrating solely on economic policies or seeking to uncover the universal truth about this activity, the research was at an impasse. Not only has the role of aesthetics, representations and emotions been ignored in this scholarship, moreover, the theorization has at times been complicit in repeating the binary colonial imaginary through which Westerners are sealed into their whiteness (civilization, rationality, progress) against which Africa's presence is located and measured.

Rather than seeking nostalgic comfort and security in familiar interpretations—in which the West's truth is perceived as "neutral," "universal" and "eternal"—I called for new critical thinking through which celebrity humanitarian truth is encountered historically and politically. Aided by critical insights that have emerged outside political studies, this exploration entailed moving beyond narrow conceptualizations of the "political" toward deeper historical trajectories of the conditions and effects of this humanitarian practice, thought and subjectivity. I argued that only through these ruptures—which cultivate attentiveness to the limits of the Western humanitarian intelligibility and imaginary—can the journey into un-affirmative, non-violating and open-ended scholarship beyond the overdetermined colonial intelligibility and legacy begin. Onto the less travelled streets which, by encountering celebrity humanitarian thought itself from a critical and historical perspective, lead into alternative thought-worlds and imaginaries of this activity. Into the world that is nobody's good deed or debt, but is constituted with recognized radical humanity that is always uncertain and imperfect, evolving, unfinished and undefined.

To construct my critical perspective on celebrity humanitarianism, in Chapter Three I examined Foucault's problematizations of violence and freedom within his theorizations of power/knowledge. In considering Foucault's writings, where violence and freedom are problematized as practices of thought, the aim of this chapter was not to constitute a straightforward theoretical contribution to his work. Rather his intertwining of violence and freedom with imaginaries and intelligibilities, became my critical tools to encounter and approach celebrity humanitarian representations politically. To recapitulate, for Foucault liberal violence operated through intelligibilities and imaginaries—inscriptions, truths and interpretations—through which possibilities are conditioned and governed at the level of thinking, being and becoming. Moreover—by posing humanity as a grid of intelligibility both emerging from and maintained by an ordering gaze and burrowing language—for Foucault liberal violence constituted the warring structure of liberal modernity through which life is conditioned, managed and governed at the level of thought. Effectively, ex-

posing liberal humanity as war at the level of intelligibility against alternative forms of living, being and becoming.

It is against these insights into violence as a relational practice of dominating, normalizing and governing thought, I argued, that Foucault's conceptualization of freedom as self-constitution and self-representation had to be situated. For Foucault, freedom entailed not liberation or transgression of power, but ongoing detachment, resistance, renunciation and disjunction of normalized thought, thought that is perpetuated through ideals of universal human worth, value or progressive essence. Postulating freedom not as emancipation or cooperation, but as a difficult and painful de-subjugating practice of critical self-reflection aimed at radically displace and challenge the imposing limits that regulate and govern the truth of ourselves and our present.

By interlinking criticism, freedom and self-constitution, Foucault did not intend freedom to be understood as a project of radical global transformation, or as a concrete destination of stable existence. Rather, freedom necessitated an ethos characterised by perpetual critique, whereby an individual detached himself from his mimetic essence and existence by opposing normative imaginaries and intelligibilities which operate as articulated, detailed and subjugative human control and domination. Accordingly, only by breaking the vicious cycle of dominating intelligibilities and imaginaries could alternative ways to be and belong in/to the world unfold.

In the Chapter Four, I examined Frantz Fanon's conceptualization of colonialism as an overdetermining intelligibility, conditioned and effected through the penetrative and capturing gazes and forceful discourses of universalized Western humanity. With these insights—echoing Foucault's formulations of violence as an ever-present practice that conditions the possibilities of thinking and being through racializing humanity and its transcriptions of livable life—Fanon revealed colonialism as a spatio-temporal practice in relation to African subjectivity and reality. These arguments not only exposed Western humanism as a rationality of identity/difference, they also problematized post/colonialism as a form of biopolitical discourse, inscribed and infused with the subjugative language of constant improvement and betterment of African life.

In Fanon's thinking, the political and the ethical are closely intervowen. For him, overcoming the colonial condition entailed not transcendence towards White humanity, but self-government and self-creation. By calling to bear witness to the dominant and reductive intelligibilities that materialize in Western hierarchical ways of seeing, knowing, being and sensing, decolonialization necessitated, he argued, a total rejection of the Westerner's overdetermining humanitarian imaginary and intelligibility within which the native's subjectivity was always inferior, lacking, non-existent. In this regard, consituting decolonialization as a practice of "absolute violence" against all ordering, dominating and inscribing intelligibilities and imaginaries that for centuries governed and conditioned African reality and existence through rejection and condemnation, that is, non-recognition.

Both Fanon and Foucault embraced to rethink the relationship between violence and thought, racism and humanism, freedom and self-governance. In the work of both thinkers, controlling and managing life through descriptions of human difference was exposed as vital for liberal as well as colonial governance in which colonialism was situated as a grid of intelligibility bound up with liberal thought and its bio-political and disciplinary practices in which inferiority and otherness was constituted, affirmed and fixed through contingent appropriations and arrangements of "livable" life. Through these insights, freedom was problematized. Freedom, as they both argued, did not unfold from universal truth, knowledge or reason. Instead it entailed courage and a wilful battle against all ordering, dominating and inscribing meanings, inscriptions and visibilities of humanity that, as spatiotemporal practices, limited the possibilities for self-constitution and self-transformation.

In Chapter Five—having engaged with Foucault's and Fanon's insights on violence and freedom as practices of thought associated with subjectivity and reality—I analysed how Bob Geldof's and Bono's global humanitarian agency and subjectivity were grounded and constituted within Anglo-American media discourses. Paying close attention to the rationalization of their humanitarian action and to their subjective particularities, I argued that their legitimacy was underpinned with particular reproduction of race, class and gender. In media discourses, both Bono and Geldof were defined as impartial, neutral and independent Western individuals, on selfless crusades to "Make Poverty History" in Africa. They become ideals of cosmopolitan humanitarianism—altruistic, self-sacrificing, apolitical world-citizens—promoting equality and empathy for Africans, who were perceived to exist outside the processes of development, progress, peace and human security of the North. By reassessing and constructing an imaginary of Western humanitarianism as free from power politics, the underlying hierarchical relationships of this activity were naturalized. Accordingly, repeating the dominant world-view of the autonomous agency of Westerners and their universal mission and political purpose in the World.

As I argued in Chapter Five, the discourses on Bono and Geldof not only shed light on the different ways in which political agency is distributed and permitted among different subjects, they also inform a broader construction of North-South world relations through their intertwined discourses of compassion and condemnation. In Chapter Six, I detailed these moral geographies of Africa's present, arguing that by repeating and propagating the vocabulary of humanitarianism as the West's moral duty – formulated through assessments on the Holocaust, Cold War and the contemporary War on Terror —Africa became firmly located outside Western modernity, freedom and civilization, as a "Contemporary Hell", that is, a central battleground between Good and Evil. Consequently, African poverty was framed as an omnipresent menace and danger not only to the continent's peaceful future, but also to the current global liberal order itself.

Like colonial rescue narratives, cloaked in the religious language of crusades and the inscriptions of Western self-mastery, with these imaginaries of

the needed liberal humanitarian intervention in the name of world history were initiated and reinstated. Guaranteeing the security of the "civilized world" against the forces of Evil required active engagement, creativity and courage - a hard-headed, warlike approach to resolve the possible threats that Africa's poverty could pose to the global order in the future. By dividing the world into winners and losers, the advantaged and disadvantaged, it followed that the global winners had to help the global losers through treatment, prevention and care, to turn them into winners too. Accordingly, for the African Other to achieve his freedom, interpreted as economic equality and the ability to trade "equally" with the Global North, what was needed were deepening and widening "partnerships" – increased monitoring, adjustment, intervention and surveillance from Western governments. In this reading, exposing the contemporary celebrity humanitarian task to "Make Poverty History in Africa" as part of the wider aim to pre-empt post Cold-war threats to the liberal world order and its future.

From these intelligibilities of "Hellish Africa" as a dangerous exception to the liberal world order and its future, in Chapter Seven I turned to examining the peaceful and spectacular imaginaries that emerged from Bono's and Geldof's travels and missions on the continent. I argued that while Bono and Geldof were in Africa, the misery, chaos and death gave away to peaceful, spectacular and beautiful imaginaries of a continent filled with untapped potential and opportunity. Through these imaginaries and sensibilities, African landscapes and Western history become inseparably intertwined, configuring Africa as Westerners' timeless and indisputable home, filled with comfort and appreciation, desire and nostalgia.

With these imaginaries and intelligibilities—constituted with the continent's at once exemplary and exceptional difference, her elemental potentiality and profound isolation and solitude—Africa's celebrated difference was unfolded into commonsensical and nostalgic familiarity, inscribed with depoliticized and romanticized observations and inscriptions that yet again exemplified and privileged the empowered subjectivity and unique agency of Westerners in ahistorical Africa. This shift generated imaginaries of the Westerner's foundational humanity which still called many to join in its global dignity—its sincerity and honour—but in the end always chose and celebrated only the few who were willing to conform to and imitate Man, who in these intelligibilities was and remained the Westerner. Unfolding a peaceful imaginary of shared "pastness" in which everybody remained securely and surely in their historical places – unquestioned, naturalized, reasoned and destined.

As Fanon so forcefully argued, for Africa, decolonization, as a practice of freedom, necessitated total replacement: an eradication of the Westerner as the model of comparison. This required a dismantling of the fixed, ordered and pervasive colonial world, constituted and mediated through stereotypical and commonsensical imaginaries and intelligibilities of Africa. For Westerners, this entailed shattering their world of humanity and its history, underpinned with self-referential confidence, subjugative truth and superior justice .

This struggle goes on today, at this very moment. To be able to act differently, one needs first to think of one's own difference differently. Freedom—understood as hybridized cultural and political experience and expression—can only emerge from an ongoing critical engagement with one's own existence in its present and time. It is all the above, as a practice of freedom that leans towards different ways of being and knowing, that this thesis has aimed to achieve. As history has shown, there are many "true" Africas to be made out of words and images. These images reflect changing Western objectives—reorientations and desires regarding political myth-making—in which popular notions of national identity and humanitarianism have all played a central role. The critique of how Western celebrity humanitarianism polices, maintains, produces and displaces the barriers of race, gender and ethnicity through its charitable performances is a crucial task for political scientists to take.

As I have argued elsewhere, celebrity humanitarianism/diplomacy is not a homogenous affair, but operates in ambiguous ways (Repo and Yrjölä, 2011). These variations and contradictions should be explored further with detailed empirical research. Moreover, as important as it is to continue to examine the conditions and effects of Western celebrity activism at large, it is also crucial to explore how such humanitarianism operates elsewhere. Till today the contemporary research on celebrity humanitarianism/diplomacy has predominantly examined the global humanitarianism of Western celebrities. Accordingly, to bring complexity and depth to contemporary academic research in this field, further examination of how celebrity politics is practiced elsewhere in the World, both nationally and globally, is urgently needed.

I hope that this thesis is a contributive step in this direction.

TIIVISTELMÄ

Viime vuosikymmenien aikana länsimaalainen julkkishumanitarismi, jonka tavoitteena on kiinnittää länsimaisen yleisön huomio Afrikan syvenevään köyhyyteen ja "alikehitykseen" on noussut keskeiseen osaan mediasoitunutta Afrikka-kuvastoa ja maanosan todellisuuksien tuottamista. Tämä mediasoitu humanitarismi on myös kasvavissa määrin noteerattu politiikan tutkimuksen parissa, jossa on korostettu julkkiksien tärkeää roolia Afrikan ongelmien esiintuojina tai kritisoitu heidän ajamiensa kehityspoliittisten linjausten, ratkaisujen ja tavoitteiden täsmällisyyttä, vastuullisuutta, oikeellisuutta tai oikeutusta.

Tämä keskustelu, jossa julkkikset on nähty joko Afrikan hyvinvoinnin edistäjinä, tai sille vahingollisina toimijoina on ajautunut tietyntyyppiseen umpikujaan. Kun keskustelu on keskittynyt julkkishumanitarismin "totuuden" löytämiseen, kriittiset näkökulmat julkkishumanitaristien totuuden tuottamisen ehdoista ja vaikutuksista ovat jääneet huomioimatta. Tämä epähuomio liittyy olennaisesti niihin tapoihin, joilla julkkishumanitarismin representaatiot ehdollistavat, muovaavat ja tuottavat Afrikan "todellisuuksia" länsimaisen humanitaristisen maailmanpolitiikan laajempien diskursiivisten rakenteiden sisällä. Tällä hetkellä empiiristä tutkimusta julkkishumanitaristien Afrikka-representaatioista, kuvastoista ja käsityksistä ei ole tehty. Näyttääkin siltä, että koska julkkishumanitarismin kampanjoita pidetään perustavanluonteisesti moraalisina ja oikeutettuina, tämän toiminnan totuuden tuottamisen vaikutuksia tai sitä määrittelevien historiallisten sääntöjen kyseenalaistaminen on ollut vaikeaa ellei mahdotonta, ei vain suurelle yleisölle, vaan myös suurimmalle osalla itse politiikan tutkijoista.

Ottamatta kantaa vallitsevaan akateemiseen keskusteluun julkkishumanitaristien ajamien toimenpiteiden hyödyllisyydestä vai vahingollisuudesta Afrikan kehitykselle, tämän tutkimuksen tarkoitus on politisoida ja historisoida julkkishumanitarismin representaatiot itsessään ja tuoda esille kuinka julkkishumanitarismin ymmärryksiä (intelligibility) ja kuvastoja (imaginary) määrittelee binäärinen, dikotominen, poispyyhkivä ja hierarkkinen kolonialistinen ajattelumalli. Tutkimuksen metodologisessa ja teoreettisessa keskiössä ovat Michel Foucaultin ja Frantz Fanonin hahmotelmat väkivallasta/representaatiosta ja vapaudesta/ajattelusta. Ensiksi, yhtyen Foucaultin näkemykseen kritiikistä historiallisen tutkimuksen metodina, representaatiot ja ihmisyyden diskurssit samaistetaan monimutkaisiksi ajassa ja paikassa tapahtuvaan normalisaation, väliintulon ja hallinnan teknologioiksi. Toiseksi, tutkimalla Fanonin kolonialismin käsitteellistämistä puhtaana väkivaltana, joka toimii monopolisoituna ja universalisoituna länsimaisena humanismina, siinä lähestytään postkolonialismia diskurssiivisenä käytäntönä, joka rakentaa ylimääräytyvää erilaisuutta ja eroa Afrikan subjektiivisuuden, toimijuuden ja todellisuuden tasolla.

Työn tapaustutkimukset ovat Bob Geldof ja Bono – kaksi tunnetuinta ja juhlituinta tämänhetkistä julkkishumanitaristia läntisessä mediassa. Tutkimusmateriaali koostuu tammikuun 2002 ja joulukuun 2008 välillä julkaistuista Telegraphin, Timen ja BBC Newsin artikkeleista. Näiden uutisartikkeleiden lisäksi

analyysiin sisältyy kolme teosta: Geldof in Africa (2005), On the Move (2006) ja Bono on Bono (2005). Päämääränä kyseenalaistaa se epähistoriallinen tapa jolla julkkishumanitismia on tutkittu ja käsitteellistetty, tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan kahta kysymystä. Ensiksi, miten Bob Geldofin ja Bonon humanitaarinen toimijuus ja oikeutus rakentuu angloamerikkalaisessa median diskursseissa ja toiseksi, miten ”Afrikka” paikkana ja maailmanjärjestyksen päämääränä ja tarkoituksena muovautuu näiden diskurssien kautta.

Tutkimus argumentoi, että Bonon ja Bob Geldofin humanitaarinen toimijuus ja subjektiivisuus pohjautuvat länsimaalaisten kyseenalaistamattomaan ja historiattomaan ylivertaisuuteen, joka rakentuu rodun, luokan ja sukupuolen keskinäisiin suhteisiin. Mediadiskursseissa Bono ja Geldof määritellään puolueettomina, vaikutusvaltaisina, uhrautuvina ja itsenäisinä maailmankansalaisina, jotka edistävät yhdenvertaisuutta ja myötätuntoa afrikkalaisia kohtaan, joiden nähdään elävän kehityksen prosessien, rauhan ja inhimillisen turvallisuuden – ”pohjoisen” ulkopuolella. Yksilötasolla nämä subjektiviteetit vahvistavat myyttiä länsimaalaisten ylivoimaisesta kyvystä, rohkeudesta ja velvollisuudesta toimia maailmanlaajuisen ihmisyyden suojelijoina ja edistäjinä. Globaalilla tasolla ne määrittävät erityisen näkemyksen siitä, kuka voi edustaa maailmanlaajuista ihmisyyttä, kuten myös sen, miten ja kenen varaan oikeutettu humanitaarisuus rakentuu. Sementoiden ”lännen” ja ”Afrikan” kyseenalaistamattomiin ja tarkasti rajattuihin maailmanpoliittisiin rooleihin, toimijuuksiin ja oikeuksiin.

Bonoon ja Geldofiin liittyvät ja heidän tuottamansa Afrikka-diskurssit valottavat niitä erinäisiä tapoja, joilla maailmanpoliittista toimijuutta jaetaan, sallitaan ja rajataan eri osapuolille, mutta niiden kautta myös tuotetaan erityistä suhdetta ”lännen” ja ”Afrikan” välille. Yhteenkietoutuneiden myötätunnon ja paheksunnan diskurssien kautta Geldofin ja Bonon kuvastoissa ”Afrikka” on yhtäaikaisesti sairas, jälkeenjäänyt ja katastrofaalinen ”helvetti” jossa edistyksellisten ja modernien länsimaiden liberaalien humanitaarisia arvoja ei sovelleta, ja länsimaalaisten passiivinen, rauhaisa ja kaunis ”koti” jota leimaa ajattomuus ja muuttumattomuus.

Geldofin ja Bonon diskurssit eivät ainoastaan toistuvasti legitimioi länsimaalaisten toimijuutta Afrikassa, vaan vahvistamalla ymmärryksiä humaanista, sivistyneestä, vapauttavasta ”lännestä” ne myös vaalivat myötätuntoa nykyistä maailmanjärjestystä kohtaan, jonka kautta ”lännen” asemaa, roolia ja vaikutusvaltaa maailmanpolitiikan toimijana vahvistetaan. Osoittamalla, miten Geldofin ja Bonon representaatioita leimaa kolonialistinen dikotominen maailmankatsomus, tutkimus esittää kriittisen näkemyksen julkkishumanitarismin emansipatorisesta potentiaalista, joka siihen yleensä julkisessa ja akateemisessa keskustelussa liitetään.

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Image 2: Geldof interviews the President en route from Ghana to Rwanda. "Whoever is President next,' Bush said, "must understand that Africa is in our nation's interest".
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Image 3: Geldof called for justice not charity for Africa, BBC 3.7.2005
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Image 4: Do you think I am sexy?, BBC 27.6.2008
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Image 5: Audio slideshow: "It is all happening here", BBC 5.10.2010 (3:26)
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Image 6: Audio slideshow: "It is all happening here", BBC 5.10.2010 (3:32)
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Image 7: Front cover, TIME 4.3.2002
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Image 8: Where business meets stars meet politicians
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Image 9: Geldof, Bono and Italian singer Jovenotti were in Genoa
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Image 10: Bono visited a factory making T-shirt for major labels
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Image 11: What is the best development path?
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Image 12: The Good Samaritans, TIME 19.12.2005b
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Image 13: Ghana. Bush's achievements in Africa, Geldof writes are "the unannounced, unheralded good legacy of (his) administration."
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Image 14: The same experience – but different views
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Image 15: The rock star makes his voice heard in Ghana
Article: Bono rocks Africa, BBC 25.5.2002
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Image 16: Mr O'Neill paid tribute to Bono
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Image 17: Untitled
Bono. 2006. *On the Move*, 13.

Image 18: Untitled
Bono. 2006. *On the* Move, 17.

Image 19: Sudan
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa*, 11.

Image 20: A Muslim Mona Lisa
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 117.

Image 21: Grumpy Mursi teenager
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 59.

Image 22: Mother and baby, Kapoeta, south of Sudan
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa*, 95.

Image 23: Masai, Tanzania
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 120-1

Image 24: Down at the bar, Lalibea. A bar is indicated by an unturned can at the end of a stick, otherwise it looks a normal house. The beer is home-brew, i.e. disgusting. The liquid content is in inverse proportion to the material at a ration of about 1: 9,650. It is almost solid stem of twigs, bits of burnt bits, leaves, is lands of mud-churned foam, swirling amidst a dense, muddy, grey colour served in a used tin as above. The barmaids resemble Tanita Tikaram and Yasmin le Bon, respectively. Hmm. Two pints, please, and two more for the ladies.
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 92.

Image 25: The front cover of Live 8 DVD

Image 26: Untitled
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 6.

Image 27: Djanne, Mali
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 42.

Image 28: Mali. Man in invariably altered the landscape wherever he has trodden. This is less true in Africa where the landscape has forced man to adapt to it. There are no imprints of man's passing here, except perhaps by accident. The deserts, forests, rivers and mountains remain unchanged, immovable, inviolate.
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 100

Image 29: Wired Green Spittle
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 36.

Image 30: Untitled
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 289.

Image 31: One of my guards
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 251.

Image 32: Medical Faculty at Kinsangani University
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 248.

Image 33: Lubumbashi mines, Katanga
Geldof, Bob. 2005. Geldof in Africa, 188

Image 34: The slave bows before the Lords of the Desert
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 24.

Image 35: The Slave Coast
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 8-9.

Image 36: At the back of a disused museum on a hill overlooking the river lay Hendy Stanley. He had been ripped of his feet like he had been shot. Executed. His stern features gazing at an empty hand that had once gripped a country. Or like he was permanently trying to war of the pitiless sun in the empty sky that only troubled him now in death. Down an alley in a backyard lay his steamboat. This narrow hull had been carried by steel plate, rivet by rivet, cast-iron boiler and massive engine through impenetrable malarial forest and resembled in the centre of a continent and then navigated down the second biggest river in Africa. Stanley would open up 'Darkest' Africa to the 'light' of trade and commerce, to the light of God rooting out the dark forces of savagery, to the light of education banishing ignorance and primitivism. A great opening and letting in of light to the dingy jungle groom. A great opening to the cruellest period of African and world history.
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 24.

Image 37: City Girl
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 89.

Image 38: The afternoon rehearsal dance, Kinshasa, Congo
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 119.

Image 39: Lokichoggio, North Kenya
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 97.

Image 40: Nuer teenager attitude
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 237.

Image 41: The coronation of nana Kofi Kumasah I (King Bob) with King John of Acton
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 157.

Image 42: My Private Army
Geldof, Bob. 2005. *Geldof in Africa,* 37.