

# **Key Witnesses**

**(sharing a taxi with the main suspects)**

**The Self-Perceived Professional Roles of the German Journalists  
Covering the Eurozone Crisis.**



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Attachment 1: Comparison between Germany and the UK, summary  
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*”In many ways, the consequence of the crisis has been that the common financial politics and the common currency have brought the destinies of different people and different countries together. That’s why EU-journalism is more and more in the middle of everyone’s attention.”*

- A journalist interviewed for this project

## **1. Introduction**

The European integration process is in front of historical challenges: The rise of unemployment in many European countries and the other social consequences of the austerity-politics, poverty-driven immigration and the general uncertainty about the economic future of the entire continent. These phenomenon are just some examples of how the economic and political turmoil called Eurozone Crisis has made the European Monetary Union and the European Union come ”true” in the everyday lives of millions of Europeans. For many, this has been the first time that the actions of the European institutions have had understandable and rather dramatic consequences to their lives.

The crisis has inspired a variety of opinions and debates on different levels of society, from the politicians participating election debates to the ordinary people afraid for losing their jobs. Most of these debates have taken place between national actors, not between the politicians or people from different EU-countries. This was also the case in an institute called Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, where yet another national panel discussion about the current situation and the future of Europe took place in the beginning of February 2013. The topic of the discussion between five German professors was ”Vereint durch Streit: Macht die Krise Europa stärker?” (Unified through disagreement: Does the crisis make Europe stronger?)

”Nobody was interested in the youth-unemployment of Spain a few years ago. Now it’s in everybody’s interest”, said professor Thomas Risse in the panel discussion and managed to sum up not only the lack of political integration in the EU but also the lack of a European-level public debate and democracy. The original question in the title of the panel discussion, ”does the crisis make the Europe stronger”, was mostly left unanswered, which was anything but surprising, since hardly anyone can claim to know how the EU or the European Monetary Union looks like in ten years or so.

”They didn’t have many answers, now, did they? If there hadn’t been that much empty talk, we would have been able to come and drink this wine sooner”, chatted an elderly German man to me after the panel discussion, as the audience was invited to drink some wine and eat some prezels in a lounge outside the panel discussion hall. I had no choice but to agree with him.

In this scientific-journalistic research project I’m not aiming to answer any questions about the future of the EU as a political project, either. Instead, I’m trying to find out, if the earlier ”Europeanization” of the public debate in nation states and the recent experiences of the Eurozone crisis could teach us journalists something about our own rapidly changing professional role in a globalized world, where more and more important journalistic stories deal with topics which are only rarely limited by national borders. Such topics are, just to name a few, the climate change, politics of immigration, monetary politics, the ethics of the production of goods, industrial politics and the global economics in general.

One could even say that the future of professional journalism depends on how well can it make complex, international phenomenon like the Euro crisis understandable. At the same time it’s also the future of functioning European democracy that’s at stake. It’s commonly understood that public debate, which at least so far has usually taken place in the mass media, is the instrument which connects the citizens and political institutions together and involves the citizens into the process of decision making through discussion and through the expressions of support or opposition to the politics made (e.g. Wessler et al. 2008, 2).

As the European integration has progressed during the last decades, there has been a lot of debate about the legitimacy and transparency of the European politics and European institutions. It’s widely accepted that in order for the European democracy to exist and work, a certain amount of identification towards Europe and perception of Europe as a political community is essential. (e.g. Herrmann & Brewer 2004, 2-3; Castano 2004.) This is especially true during the time of Euro crisis, since all of us Europeans already are a part of this community, whether we like it or not or whether we’re aware of it or not.

Because the mass media has such a crucial role in the public debate and thus in the democratization and legitimation of the European integration, it can be said that the professional journalists who create, host and possibly also advocate this public debate, have

an essential role in defining the Europeanization of the national public spheres through the choices and practices in their everyday work. At the same time the whole media branch is going through a profound change and is desperately trying to find new revenue generation models as the rapid change of the advertising markets and the digitalization of the publishing business are shaking the old ones.

I believe that there are many ways for the journalism to survive, but maybe the most important one is the ability of the professional journalists to increase their professional value by being able to offer understandable and interesting explanations and analysis of important phenomena in an ever more complicated world. In order to draw a map leading to the future of journalism, it is, however, necessary to make at least some kind of estimation of where journalism is at the moment in regard to complex, global phenomenon. That is what this project is aiming to do. My research question is: **How do the German journalists perceive their professional role as they write about the Eurozone Crisis?**

In order to answer this question I have interviewed fourteen prominent German journalists, who write to the most distinguished over-regional newspapers or magazines of the country. On the basis of their answers to my questionnaire and the additional telephone interviews done during the spring 2013, I have tried to recognize the most important themes, discourses and perceptions regarding their professional roles and then used these insights to create an understanding of the personal and organizational challenges and possibilities of professional journalism as it's covering global phenomenon such as the Euro crisis.

The perceptions of German journalists on the EU-journalism are interesting, especially from the Finnish point of view, because Germany as one of the founding members of EU and as politically and geographically central European nation has a longer tradition of EU-journalism than Finland. Also from an un-scientific perspective of an everyday media consumer, the public debate about European issues in Germany is more versatile and active than the average debate in Finland.

The theoretical basis of my work is constructed on numerous earlier studies regarding the Europeanization of public spheres and on the media sociological studies in which the professional identity and role of the journalists is under scrutiny from various different perspectives. The studies on the Europeanization of the national public spheres are

constructed around the concept of public sphere, which was originally developed by a well-known German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. The concept refers to a public space in which the political debate takes place through the claims made by different political actors. At least since the beginning of this century, the concept of public sphere has also been used for numerous different analyses on the Europeanization of the political communication in the national public spheres (for example Koopmans & Erbe 2004, Wessler et al. 2008).

The second theoretical perspective used in this work can be called the "media sociological" perspective, which focuses on the analysis of different professional discourses through which the journalists give meaning to their work (for example Offerhaus 2011; Hanitzsch 2011; Statham 2010, 2008; Siaper 2004, Weaver 2011; 1998). These studies usually concentrate on the self-perceived roles or professional identities of the journalists. In this paper I use the concept *role* instead of *identity*, because I try to keep this short analysis as pragmatic as possible and in this regard the concept "role" covers the mission, means, style and the goals of journalism and is therefore adequate for the purpose of this paper. This paper attempts to bring these two perspectives, the one of Europeanization and the one of the journalists' views of themselves, together and use this synthesis for the analysis on the interviews done for this project.

According to an extensive analysis on five different newspapers in five different EU-countries between the years 1982 and 2003, on average only five percent of all the articles concentrated solely on EU-policies compared to 33 percent that concentrated solely on national policies. In the year 2003 the amount of articles on EU-policies was about ten percent. (Wessler et al. 2008, 43.) Therefore it's no wonder, that many scholars, politicians and activists have suggested, that the EU suffers from a "communication deficit", which means that European topics are not sufficiently publicly discussed considering their political relevance. More recent studies on the Europeanization of communication give reason to presume that, in general, the amount of articles on European politics has not increased since 2003 (Kleinen von Köningslów 2012, 451-452).

This may have, and probably has, changed during the years of the Eurozone Crisis, but before more current research data is available, the estimates regarding this phenomena are no more than a speculation. And no matter how the development of the Europeanization of the national public spheres have turned out, the current political plans to increase the European

integration on for example financial politics, make the need for legitimate and democratic European decision-making as urgent as ever.

The standing point of this project paper is that it can't be journalism's task to make the legitimacy of the European institutions stronger or make the atmosphere in different European countries more euro-enthusiastic. It would, however, be important to create such an amount of European identity among the public that it would have the means to understand the European-level decisions and politics that are de facto already affecting the lives of all the citizens of the EU-countries.

This would also give people a better chance to make informed decisions about the ways to affect those decisions and give them power to decide for themselves, whether they want to be a part of the integration process or not and how should the process proceed. This could be a significantly more democratic scenario compared to the current situation, in which the ordinary people are directly affected by European-level decisions but not actively involved in them.

On the basis of regular Eurobarometer researches the European peoples' attitudes towards the integration has been mostly positive during the last decades. There are however some contradictory results relating to the identification towards Europe and the European institutions. Furthermore, according to the Eurobarometer released last year, the amount of European people who are satisfied with how the democracy is working on the EU-level had fallen by 10 percentage points between autumn 2009 and spring 2012 and at the same time the amount of dissatisfied respondents had increased by 12 percentage points (Standard Eurobarometer 77, 63).

Already before the current crisis many scholars have stressed the need for stronger European identity in order for the EU to obtain its legitimacy. For example Emanuele Castano has pointed out that the EU ought to be perceived as *entitative* community in order for the people to identify themselves as being part of it. Castano wrote his analysis before the Eurozone Crisis, which sheds interesting light on his words. "Improving the legitimacy of the EU would require fostering a sense of belonging among the citizens of the national member states. But this is not guaranteed by economic policies alone, however successful they might be." (Castano 2004, 41.)

I believe that understanding the cultural and professional differences between the journalism in different EU-countries advances the understanding of the European public debate and therefore also helps to understand the challenges of European democracy. This is also one of the sources of inspiration of this paper. As I'm constructing my theoretical framework and aiming to understand the self-perceptions and challenges of the German journalists, I'm also laying ground for possible further research, which could be executed as a comparative study between the journalists in different countries.

This is also why I have written the theoretical parts of this work partly around the comparison between the EU-journalism in Germany and in the UK. I believe that it's easier to gain a clear idea of almost anything if you can compare it's qualities with something and then pick up the possible differences. The chapter two of this work is built around an overview on the earlier studies on Europeanization of the national public spheres the focus being on Germany and on the UK. The different amounts, forms and styles of Europeanization are interesting and important from this work's point of view, because they reflect concretely the everyday work of the journalists writing about EU-topics.

Because the mere amount of the domestic and foreign claim makers however only tell us about the results of journalism, alas the stories written, in the third chapter of this work I'll focus on the choices and challenges behind those articles as we'll take a look at the self-perceived professional roles of the journalists according to some earlier studies on the subject. In the third chapter we'll also take a look at the latest studies on the professionalization of the German EU-journalism.

In the chapter four I'll briefly introduce the design of the interviews made for this project and explain the focus of my analysis. In the fifth chapter I present the results from the interviews and attempt to analyze the results on the basis of the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapters. In the final chapter of this project paper I aim to put my analysis into a wider context. In the end, on the basis of the research literature, daily reading of the German newspapers and on the interviews made for this project I've gathered a short tip-list for any journalist who writes about and who is pondering on the ever-so-difficult question on how to write about important and global issues interestingly.

*”Zeitungen – mit einem Gefühl von Ehrfurcht schreibe ich dieses Wort nieder. Zeitungen sind eines der großen Kulturmittel durch wir Europäer Europäer geworden sind.”*

- August Ludwig Schlözer, Historiker und Publizist, 1805 (Gutenberg Museum, Mainz)

## **2. Europeanization of Public Spheres – What Do We Know So Far?**

It’s commonly understood that one of the functions of journalism is to give the public information and therefore also means to control their own life and understand the surrounding world. This means that the journalists must be active, critical and willing to analyze the scale of different phenomena and to understand which things are more important than others. In this project I aim to find out, how German journalists see their role as they cover European issues and, on their part, construct or don’t construct the European identity of their audience. By doing this I also hope to see if there’s something to learn from the experiences of the German top journalists.

The so called Europeanization of political communication can be determined in many ways, and there is still disagreement among scholars, on which aspects of the complex phenomena should be stressed more than others. On a general level it is however accepted, that the European public sphere should not be seen as a equivalent to the national public spheres. That means, that the European public sphere should not be conceived as one, unified public sphere, but, as Wessler among with his colleagues put it, ”a transnational communication compound, that emerges out of the Europeanization of various national public spheres”. (Wessler et al. 2008, 25.)

A short definition of the Europeanization of the national public spheres would be, that it refers to the communication flows between European countries and between different European and national political actors. These communication flows usually take place in mass media. This kind of Europeanization of the national public spheres has been mostly measured by analyzing the political claims made in the stories made and published by mass media.

A claim is usually seen as “an instance of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of the expression of political opinion through some sort of physical or verbal action, regardless

of the form this expression takes (statement, violence, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.) and regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGOs, individuals, etc.)” (Koopmans & Erbe 2004, 98.) Europeanization is usually measured and analyzed by observing the origins of the claim makers, the targets of the claims and/or the discursive nature of the claims made.

There are at least three different forms of Europeanization that are essential to the perspective of this research paper: *Supranational* public sphere constitutes from the interaction between European-level actors, which are for example the European Commission, European Parliament or The European Central Bank. *Vertical Europeanization* takes place, when the claims are made between the national and European level, for example between the Commission and a government of a EU-country. Vertical Europeanization can be either bottom-up or top-down, depending on which way the communication flow goes. The third form of Europeanization is *horizontal Europeanization*, in which the communicative relations are formed between actors from different EU-countries. (Koopmans & Erbe 2004, 101.)

On the basis of previous studies, we have good reason to think that different forms of Europeanization can tell a lot about the general perspectives that journalists and the national media in different countries have on the EU, Euro and the whole integration process of Europe. For example, if the public sphere seemed to have a large amount of vertical Europeanization instead of horizontal Europeanization, it’s likely that the most common perspectives of journalism have something to do with the challenges or advantages that the EU as an institution has brought to that particular country. It’s also likely that the views of the EU as an union or a “family” with 27 member countries are left to more modest attention. The same thing goes with the attention paid to the politics in other EU-countries.

A good example of vertical Europeanization would be a debate between the European Commission and EU-country about a certain proposal for EU-directive that would in a way or another affect the legislation of this member country. According to this logic, a higher amount of horizontal Europeanization would indicate, that the journalism is also interested in the businesses and people of other EU-countries and probably also attempts to put the domestic news into a larger, European context.

In the following parts of this project paper I take a look at some of the previous studies on the Europeanization of national public spheres by trying to compare two very different EU-countries in regard to their relationship and attitudes towards the European integration: Germany and the United Kingdom. The discursive differences in the public spheres of these countries can clearly be seen in the claim making analysis. For example the share of European level actors of all the claim makers in the national public sphere is much higher in Germany (about 13 percent) than in the United Kingdom (seven percent). The same kind of phenomena can be seen on the share of claim makers from other European countries (Germany about 21 percent, UK 12 percent). (Koopmans et al. 2010, 72–73.)

The reason for this comparison is to get a reference point for the German EU-journalism. It's easier to get an idea of anything when there are at least some points of reference and therefore also the possibility to make comparisons. Comparison between different journalistic cultures and practices is also useful for the sake of developing the understanding and co-operation between different European actors.

In general, comparative research is argued to refine theories of political communication research, give a larger perspective and countering the general tendency of thinking that the findings in one's own country also apply for other countries and to enable us contrast the features of one system to another and thus seeing for example the prevailing political communication arrangements more clearly and critically (Esser & Pfetsch 2004, 384-385). By doing this I also lay ground for my own possibly upcoming comparative research.

## **2.1 The Social-Psychological View on the European Identity and the “Key Witnesses”**

Why is the Europeanization of the national public spheres and the different kinds “Europeanizations” important? Why should we bother to sit down and think thoroughly about the EU-journalism that has been made and will be made by the journalists in different EU-countries? My claim is that for most people the EU foremost exists, or doesn't exist, through journalism. Ordinary people are seldom faced directly with a political and economic creation called the European Union, even though it has numerous indirect effects on their lives.

The idea of EU, as we know it, is for a large part created and constructed by journalists, who write, talk, report and analyze the representation of the EU as a result of numerous conscious and unconscious choices, which on their part reflect e.g. their personal values, professional routines, the requirements of their employer and the political and journalistic culture of the country they're from.

Because of this process, I've decided to examine the journalists as the "Key Witnesses" of the European level politics and, for example, Euro crisis. This means that it's through the interpretations and through the expression of these interpretations (the journalistic stories) that the public forms its opinions on the European-level politics. With this comes great responsibility: it means that the journalism and journalists should be able to explain the relations, the scale and the general meaning of the events it's reporting. The same goes naturally on journalism about any other global or international phenomena or topic, whether it's the climate change, global food crisis or the poor working conditions of the textile workers in Bangladesh.

In my opinion the Euro crisis raises questions about the failure not only of the European politics but also of a failure of the European journalism. At the moment it seems clear, that there's been too few critical questions along the way which has led from the establishment of the European coal and steel community (1951) through the treatment of Maastricht (1992) to the current crisis-ridden currency union. Critical journalism would probably not have prevented the political mistakes made during the way, but it could have brought the grievances to the public debate and under the public scrutiny and in this way make the EU-citizens bigger part of the project and therefore made the ongoing, top-down-driven bureaucratic process more democratic.

In the case of the Euro crisis, there's reason to believe that the journalists could have questioned the pace and style in which the currency union was put up. Perhaps even more importantly the journalism could have created public spheres in which the readers and citizens could have gotten better means to create their own opinions. The European public spheres and the opinion-building about the European issues do however require at least some level of identification to "being European".

One can only be interested in the issues that he or she feels at least at some level

comprehensible and important. People rarely buy and read the news out of obligation. I argue that one of the most important factors that's decisive for better political legitimacy and true democracy of the EU is the way its citizens identify themselves as European and as a member of a larger community.

What's said before, doesn't have to mean that the EU should be developed towards culturally and politically homogenous union, which doesn't approve pluralist opinions and national differences (unless someone comes up with a democratically legitimate way of deciding about such a direction). From the perspective of the public debate, the EU should however be strong enough a community, so that it would become "real" in the minds of the regular people in the member countries.

Only this way can the European-level decision making ever hope to become more democratic and legitimate, no matter if this democratic decision-making would mean tightening the integration or loosening it. The most important factor, at least from this paper's point of view, is that the Europeans, who are very much affected by the EU-level decisions, should also be part of them or at the very least be aware of them. Being an essential representation of the EU, journalism plays an important role in this identification process.

One can't identify him/herself with something that's not there. Numerous social-psychological studies have shown that psychological existence of a group and identification to it go hand in hand. It's also noted that for a psychological existence to emerge, at least some kind of *enteativity* of the community is required. The *enteativity* here means that the community is perceived as an existing community, which has, at least to some degree, four features: common fate, similarity, proximity and boundedness. (Castano 2004, 41-43.)

As presented in the previous chapter about the Europeanization of the national public spheres, there seems to be remarkable differences in the amounts and styles in which this *enteativity* might be represented in different countries (For example Kleinen von Königslöw 2012, 451, Wessler et al. 2008, 41-42). This does not, however, have to be a major problem for the establishment of European identity, since unlike in the past decades, it's no longer thought that the identification to a particular group would require that the person sees this group as homogenous and its members mostly similar as him/herself. (Castano 2004, 41-43, 56.)

In Castanos study, as in many other studies, it's also noted, that the European and national identity seem to go hand in hand. That means that in most cases, strong national identity was correlated with a strong European identity. Therefore these two identities would not seem to be incompatible with each other. (Castano 2004, 50-51.) I think that this observation also speaks for the argument I made before, that the traditional news criteria of geographical nearness or closeness of the things reported can and should be re-considered: the journalism should not be afraid to report European or Global events because of their supposed distance from the readers, rather the quality journalism should be able to make the connections between the global events and the everyday-life of the reader visible and understandable.

The effects of the four features, in regard of the European citizens' identification with the EU, has been tested in different test settings by social psychologist Emmanuele Castano (2004, 2003) and his colleagues. He built up different sets of experiments, in which he and his team aimed to manipulate the perceived entitativity of the EU with four different tests. In each test, one of the dimensions (common fate, similarity, proximity and boundedness) was manipulated and the level of identification with the EU was measured. (Castano 2004, 44-45.)

The results of the tests gave a clear message that especially among the ones with moderate attitude towards the EU (not among the Euro-sceptics nor the Euro-enthusiasts): The increase in perceived or experienced common fate, salience and boundendess resulted in an increased identification with the EU. At the same time the decrease of perceived common fate, saliance and boundendess resulted in the decrease of identification. Castano himself sums up the results of his studies this way: "In light of these experimental results, the hypothesis that the lack of a psychological existence for the EU in the minds of the Europeans may be one of the factors responsible for their weak level of identification with it seems even more plausible." (Castano 2004, 53.)

What does all that's said before give to our analysis of the journalism about Euro crisis? As Castano puts it, "the challenge for the EU is not so much for the member states agree in all contexts (or that they agree to disagree), but rather for them to be able to close ranks when acting *as Europeans*." (Castano 2004, 56.) At the same time as this is challenging for the politicians, it's certainly challenging for the journalism to explain complex EU-level decisions - which have recently usually been some sort of poor compromises made after difficult negotiations between the different member countries or different EU-institutions -

as *European* decisions, which would make the EU go into some particular direction as an union.

It's hard to say, how the Euro crisis has affected the perceived entitativity of the EU, but it seems reasonable to think that the unforeseen crisis has had multiple effects on the way EU-affairs are reported and in the ways EU is perceived. The boundeness and the common fate of the EU-countries, or at least the Eurozone countries, to each other have become clear during the crisis.

The same goes with the salience of the EU, although it's likely that especially in the economically striving southern Euro-countries, the importance and prominence of the EU is experienced more negatively nowadays than before. The perceived similarity of different EU-countries on the other hand may have decreased during the crisis. One indication of this could be the intensified stereotypical division to "the hard working northern nations" and "the lazy southerners".

I will aim to analyze these aspects further in the results & analysis-chapter of this work. There I will also attempt to come up with practical examples of the elements of EU-journalism derived from these features and try to assess, which traits of the self-perceived professional role of the German EU-journalists could be useful in laying ground for the possible identification with the EU and which are not. In the next chapters I'll take a closer look at the journalism and public debate on European issues on the basis of earlier studies on the subject.

## **2.2 Europeanization Trends 1982-2008 – A Broken Promise of Journalism?**

The European integration has deepened in the past decades. Not straight forward and not on all areas of politics, but in general the EU has become a tighter construction. How has the increased political power of the EU-institutions in relation to the national institutions reflected in the national public spheres? Have they become more "European" and has the public debate thus followed or even preceded the integration of politics? At least two major trends of transnationalization and Europeanization of national public spheres can be recognized in the time period from the year 1982 until 2008.

First, it would seem clear that there was a general trend towards Europeanization in many European public spheres at least from the year 1982 till 2003. Secondly, from the year 2003 till 2008 this general trend of Europeanization seemed to have decreased a bit, but in overall the amount of European elements in the national public spheres seem to have settled at least some sort of "basic level" of europeanness. (Kleinen von Königlöw 2012, 451, Wessler et al. 2008, 41-42). What also seems clear, is that this basic level of europeanness has been relatively low, but it has probably risen during the extraordinary circumstances of the Euro crisis as the media in different countries has been more or less forced to pay more attention both to the EU-level politics and to the politics in other European countries.

According to the earlier studies, the integration of politics and the Europeanization of public spheres would seem to go at least partially hand in hand. According to earlier studies, the most "Europeanized" issues in the public debate, that took place in 28 European newspapers and was under scrutiny during the years 1990-2002, were European integration, monetary politics and agriculture. These are also the areas in which the decision-making process can be seen as the most "European". (Koopmans et al 2010, 64-65.)

In the comparison by Koopmans et al. (2010) we can notice, that the domestic claim makers play a bigger role in the public debate of the UK (68 percent) than in the public debate of Germany (50 percent). The British coverage of the EU also seems to be more critical than the German one. (Koopmans et al. 2010, 73, 90–91.) On these basis it can be said, that the public sphere of Germany seems to be (or at least seemed to be 1990–2002) more Europeanized and more pro-European of the two countries.

The results of the studies presented here show that the EU-issues are (or at least were, during the time period under scrutiny in these studies) still strongly perceived through national perspective or left totally unnoticed. This is rather natural, since one of the traditional news criteria is the proximity of the events reported. On regard of the European issues this criteria can however be implemented in many different ways, for example by connecting the EU-level events and decisions to the everyday life of the audience or by all together ignoring the EU-level events as too abstract and complicated to be explained in the limited news space.

To my knowledge, there aren't yet new studies published, at least not in Germany, on how has the Europeanization of the national public spheres developed during the first years of the Euro crisis. Since we don't have the data, we'll merely have to speculate, that it's unlikely

that the amount of neither horizontal nor vertical Europeanization would have decreased during the crisis, at least not in the Eurozone-countries. On the other hand, it's hard to predict what kinds of practices the media field has adopted during the crisis, since the media organizations, alongside with the national and European politicians, seem to have been caught more or less by surprise as the crisis emerged. This is one of the things I aimed to find out by interviewing the German top journalists.

The possible ad hoc-style of the crisis journalism means that the practices adopted in the last few years aren't necessarily a result of a long-term planning or journalistic strategy, but rather reactions to a swiftly changing political and economic situation. But even though the data and the studies we *do* have about the Europeanization of the national public spheres can't directly give us any clues of the developments of the last few years, they do tell us something about why did we end up in our current situation. One of such studies is a study by Ruud Koopmans (2010, 97-121), in which he aimed to find out which actors get to have a say in the European issues and which actors don't.

Without going too deep into the details of Koopmans study, the results were clear: the European integration development has shifted the discursive possibilities to influence public debates for the European level executive actors such as heads of state and government, cabinet ministers and central banks at the same time as the possibilities of actors who are directly responsible to the electorate, such as parliaments and political parties, have declined. At the same time the less resourceful civil society actors as the consumers' groups, environmental groups, and pensioners, seem to have had even less to say on the European level issues. (Koopmans 2010, 120.)

These findings reinforce the impression that the European integration in general has been led by "the elites", and only little attention has been paid to the democratic legitimacy of the processes. It's reasonable to presume, that the developments described here have become ever stronger during the Euro crisis, since the exceptional crisis situation has, according to many commentators, increased the political powers of the heads of the states, the European commission and the European central Bank.

On the other hand it can be said that the Euro crisis has brought the European level decision making closer to the national parliaments, since the different debt mechanisms and funds

created during the crisis are operated with national money that comes from the pockets of the tax payers. If the national public spheres are still not “Europeanized”, it might be because the national politicians or the national media have not been willing or able to take a stand and comment on European issues, since it’s been traditionally considered that with constructive EU-politics it’s easier to lose votes than to win them. Euro crisis has probably not changed this. In any case this means that not all the blame for the “democracy deficit” or the “communication deficit” of the EU should be put on the European institutions alone. I believe that the journalists could have been more active in bringing the European topics forth.

To put it short and a bit simplistic: on the basis of the studies on the low levels of Europeanization of the national public spheres and on the basis of the experiences from the Euro crisis, the journalists seem to have at least partially betrayed the inherent promise of quality journalism – that of informing and explaining the public the relevant happenings of the world around them, since they apparently have not paid enough attention to the EUs political development, or – and especially – to the lack of it. How else could have it been possible, that for example the apparent structural problems of the currency union, the member nations disregard towards common rules and the bureaucracy-driven decision making weren’t put into their context and given the right proportion?

One indicator of this “broken promise” is the modest level of the Europeanization of the public spheres, which were shown in the claim-making analysis presented before, compared to the pace of the deepening integration. If we take a closer look at the different kinds of Europeanization developments on the monetary politics, in the 28 European newspapers that were observed in the study by Koopmans et. al., we can see that as the new currency euro was planned and finally introduced, the share of claims made by the European-level actors rose from nine percent to 15 percent between the years 1990 and 2002. At the same time, the share of foreign European actors decreased from 19 percent in the 1990 to the 18 percent in the 2002. (Koopmans, Erbe, et.al. 2010, 69.)

This means that as the monetary union was being set up, the attention paid to the other countries’ monetary politics and actors temporarily increased from 21 percent in the 1990 to the 31 percent in 1995 but then, in the process of the Economic and Monetary Union convergence toward the introduction of the euro and the establishment of the European Central Bank, the interest to follow what’s going on in other countries again decreased to 19

percent, which is somewhat below the level of 1990. (Koopmans, Erbe, et.al. 2010, 69.)

Having said this, it's worth noting that there are different opinions among the academic field, on whether the levels of Europeanization have been "low" or "adequate" for the European democracy to work. There are also different opinions on whether it's reasonable to merely measure the amount of European claims or if the evaluation should stress the content and the quality of the journalism. For example Hans-Joerg Trenz (2008, 291-309) has argued that the media should be seen as an active actor in the Europeanization of the national public spheres, not as an infrastructure that either delivers the politicians' messages to the public or doesn't.

In this paper I aim to follow Trenz's guideline of perceiving the media and the journalists as active actors who make conscious and unconscious choices in their everyday work, which for its part may greatly influence on how the public see for example the European Union and how well the public is able to understand complex and international phenomenon. Therefore I also don't see any reason to separate the often used concepts of EUs "democracy deficit" and "communication deficit" from each other, because I see them as part of the same problem.

To sum it up: On the basis of economic development in the recent years, it seems clear that politicians have made many mistakes. At the same time, on the basis of the studies on European publicity, it's also apparent, that the journalists have not been able to illuminate the structural, European-level, bubbling-under-kind-of developments and explain their meaning to their publics and thus make the connections and interdependencies between different EU- and Eurozone countries visible before the Euro crisis has brought them in front of our eyes. Journalists can't replace politicians, or neither should they, but in this case both the professional groups should have done their job better.

### **2.3 Main Differences Between the Quality Newspapers**

Journalism is not a unanimous cultural product, and especially on global or European issues there are various alternative ways to present the complex reality for the national public and within the national public sphere. A large study by Wessler et al. (2008) gives us a little more detailed view to differences of the public spheres in Germany and the UK. In his study the

scope of the observation was narrowed, so that there was only one quality newspaper per country from five different EU-countries. From Germany the paper analyzed was *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and from the UK it was *The Times*.

Although far-reaching conclusions about the journalistic culture of a single country, even if we assume there can be one, can't be made on the basis of observations made on a single newspaper, the results could give us some guidelines for further analysis in this paper. Interestingly, the general results of the study show both a general development towards the vertical Europeanization in the newspapers from different countries as well as a development in which the variance between different newspapers from the different countries is bigger in the year 2003 than in the year 1982 (Wessler et al. 2008, 62).

For the comparison made here, that of the Europeanization of the German and British public spheres, the most notable results were that in *The Times* there was a rather strong *parochial* public sphere, which means that it devoted 12 percent points more articles on the domestic, exclusively British issues than the other newspapers in the study did on average on their home countries' issues. At the same time the coverage and debate about the EU in *The Times* is not much weaker compared to other newspapers in the study, but the focus of these EU-related stories is mostly on the British actors commenting on EU-institutions. At the same time, the British public sphere indicated only a very low interest in other European countries and towards the opinions of the political actors from other countries (Wessler et al. 2008, 67–68).

In the same study the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (FAZ) showed rather different forms of Europeanization. In the FAZ the vertical Europeanization, that is monitoring the EU-institutions and governance, was below average in the study. Despite of this, the horizontal Europeanization, alas discursive interaction between other EU-countries flourished. Interestingly, the horizontal Europeanization in the FAZ took place aloof from EU, which means that the perspective of the EU was often not mentioned. At the same time the actors from the other EU-countries were only rarely quoted. (Wessler et al. 2008, 65–66.)

The same study also aimed to explain the differences in the Europeanization of the public spheres in different countries. According to the findings, for example the amount of EU-correspondents in Brussels did not increase the amount of stories about EU that a particular

newspaper published. As Wessler et al. (2008) put it, "apparently, the total number of references to the EU depends much more on the attitudes of all political journalists employed by a paper". The editorial mission of the paper would seem to matter more. The attitudes of the political journalists and the papers' mission would also seem to have a great affect, since the results show that the general attitudes of the people towards the EU in a country do not affect the probability of vertical nor horizontal Europeanization taking place in a newspaper in a certain country. (Wessler et al. 2008, 71, 74.)

In addition to the results presented so far, it's also worth noting, from the national journalisms point of view, that there are major differences in how the newspapers present the EU in their editorials. The editorials in the UK were found to be by far the most critical towards the EU (Pfetsch et al. 2008, 32). Since the editorials represent the official views of the newspaper, it's likely that the opinions in them at least somewhat correlate with the general attitudes of the writing journalists and may therefore also affect the perspectives and frames of the other story types of the newspaper.

How often and how consciously this happens, if it happens, would however have to be investigated by interviewing journalists writing about EU. This is why I also brought this issue up in the interviews made for this project and present the results in the chapter 5.4, "Organizational challenges during the Euro crisis". Also for this purpose, the perceived differences between German and British editorials give us an interesting perspective on the differences of journalistic culture in these countries.

Whether the forms of Europeanization of the national public spheres and it's possible practical implications are a result of general journalistic values and journalistic and political culture in a certain country or not, can't be seen from the kind of claim-making analysis briefly presented before. That doesn't mean, that there couldn't be different hypotheses and theories on these differences, even though some of them may be based more on intuition than scientifically proofed facts. For example, it is suggested, that the reason why the UK wishes to keep a certain political distance from the European Union, is that it seeks to retain some of its "former imperial influence by cherishing a privileged relationship with the anglophone superpower on the other side of the Atlantic". (Koopmans et al. 2010, 73.)

This may well be true, but it doesn't really explain, why the British journalists would be so willing to adapt this discursive frame in their everyday work, as the claim-making analysis would suggest. Nor do these quantitative analyses tell us, if the traits of Europeanization in a certain EU-country are somehow the result of the special features of the whole media system in this country or if they have something to do with the specific organizational circumstances or the self-perceived professional roles of the journalists within this system.

In order to know more about these structures, it's important to take a look at the professional roles of the journalists, the professionals who practically the European public sphere. To find answers to these questions, we'll have to see how the professional journalists have perceived themselves in the previous studies on these topics and also interview them ourselves. This is what we're going to do in the upcoming chapters three and five of this project paper.

*”As German politicians are more or less unable to explain their strategies in saving the Euro and stabilizing the EU it is my first objective to explain the Euro crisis and to defend Europe.”*

-A journalist interviewed for this project

### **3. Professional Roles of Journalists**

In this part of this paper we take a look at how journalists perceive themselves, their work and their role in the society. As before, I will carry on making comparison between the journalists in Germany and in the UK, since in this way we'll get a better idea on the self-perceived professional role of the German journalists. In this chapter I attempt to recognize and understand the ways journalists give meaning to their work in these countries, but I also aim to point out the rather apparent weaknesses and contradictions between different theoretical and conceptual approaches in the earlier studies on this issue field. By doing this, I aim to argue for the need of further, comparative and cross-scientific research on the professional roles of journalists in different countries.

In order to get a more profound idea of the mechanisms of Europeanization of the national public sphere, it's important to understand the journalists' point of view. In the western societies with a free press and freedom of speech, it should be the journalists who make the decisions - consciously or unconsciously - about the selection, framing and perspectives of a news story. They also choose the claim makers who get to have their say in these stories. It's also pointed out, in several journalism studies (for example Skovsgaard et al. 2011, Shoemaker & Reese 1996, Kim & Hunter 1993 according to Van Dalen et al 2012, 905), that the professional self-conceptions and attitudes of the journalists do have an impact on the news stories they write (Van Dalen et al. 2012, 905).

In this paper the concept of professionalism is understood in the way e.g. Mark Deuze (2005, 444–445) has defined it, as being an "ideology of journalism", a system of beliefs characteristic for a particular group. This group, in this case the journalists in the western democracies, share the core values but can give them different meanings in their everyday work. These meanings can guide the way the journalists write about different issues, which becomes apparent in the latter parts of this project paper.

Journalists don't make their decisions about the content they create without being influenced

by the society and organization(s) around them. That's why we'll take a short look at the surrounding structures in which the journalists work in Germany and the UK. A popular but also a rather rough differentiation of the media systems in different countries is the division of the media systems into *Polarized Pluralist*, *Democratic Corporatist* and *Liberal* systems. In these ideal types the Polarized Pluralist model refers to the media systems most common in the southern Europe, for example in Italy, France and Spain. (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 220.)

The two models that are under scrutiny in the theoretical parts of this paper are the Democratic Corporatist (Germany) and the Liberal model (the UK). In both of these systems the professionalization of journalism is high. Democratic Corporatist model is characteristic to the countries in northern and central Europe (Germany, Belgium, the Northern Countries) whereas the Liberal model is connected mostly to the north Atlantic region (the USA, Canada, the UK). In both systems the commercial press with mass circulation has developed relationally early and in both systems the freedom of the press and the objectivity of journalism is in general highly valued. (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 220-230.)

There are also a few main differences between the theoretical media systems of Germany and the UK. One of them is the general market orientation of the media, which is often thought to be stronger in the liberal model of the Anglo-Saxon countries (This view has also been criticized, e.g. in Donsbach & Patterson 2004).

Another difference between the two systems is the history of the politically-oriented journalists and a strong party-press, which is said to be typical for the democratic pluralist model but not for the liberal model. (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 220–230.) As it will be shown in the upcoming parts of this paper, this division is really more system-theoretical construction than something that can be perceived in the real life and every-day work of the journalists, at least if they're working in countries that are culturally relatively close to each other.

Having said that, I still believe that these models can also give us valuable perspective for the more detailed observation of the professional identity and role of the journalists in Germany and the UK. In addition, as Van Dalen et al. (2012, 906) points out, it's worth remembering that the vast majority of newspapers still compete for readers within national borders and especially the political journalists work very tightly close to each other around

the national government and parliament. These traits would support the presupposition that the differences in journalists' role conception are bigger between different countries than within a certain country, although the exact differences may be difficult to point.

### **3.1 Self-perceived Professional Roles According to Earlier Studies**

During the recent years there's been many different ways to categorize the professional roles that the professional journalists around the world have adopted for themselves. The findings and conclusions of these studies are for some parts contradictory. There are also a variety of ideas and academic opinions on whether there actually are big differences between the journalistic cultures in different countries or are the differences rather the result of different media organizations and individual traits. But there are also some general trends that can be taken as the basis of this paper.

For example Thomas Hanitzsch (2011) has tried to define the social function of journalism on three dimensions: interventionism, power distance and market-orientation. On the basis of these dimensions and his research results he has made a distinction between the journalistic milieus of "populist disseminators", "detached watchdogs", "critical change agents" and "opportunist facilitators". This model finds differences between for example in the way the journalists perceive their relations to the decision-makers, how actively the journalists try to push their own agenda, through which they try to change the society, and whether the journalists perceive the public primarily as citizens or consumers. (Hanitzsch 2011, 481, 484-486.)

Hanitzsch's study included 18 countries, among them Germany but not the UK. From this papers point of view it's however worth noting, that there weren't major differences between the self-understanding of German journalists and the journalists from another Anglo-Saxian, liberal-model country USA. Both in Germany (69 percent) and in the USA (64 percent) the journalists interviewed perceived themselves foremost as "detached watchdogs". This means, that they think that their role is to be detached observers, critics and watchdogs of the government and other elites. (Hanitzsch 2011, 484-487.)

This group of journalists thinks that politics is important, but it also has to be presented in an

interesting way, so that the news about it would sell well. What's interesting especially from the aspect of Europeanization of the German public sphere, is that the journalists in this milieu see themselves a lot less interventionist than journalists in other milieus. Therefore they think that they're less willing to advocate social change or try to influence public opinion or the political agenda. (Hanitzsch 2011, 484–487.)

The UK is not the USA, but on the basis of other earlier studies, in which as much as 88 percent of the British journalists said that being “watchdog of government” was extremely or very important, it's reasonable to presume, that the journalists in the UK see their role at least somewhat in the same way as do other journalists in the countries that are thought to belong to the “liberal model”. (Weaver 1998, 466.)

Another kind of division of “journalisms” is the one used by Van Dalen et al. (2012), who aimed to find differences between national professional cultures of political journalists in Germany, the UK, Spain and Denmark on the dimensions of pragmatic-sacredotal, impartial-partial and information-entertainment. Of these dimensions the pragmatic-sacredotal made distinction between the journalists, who saw the national politics as important, news-worthy and respectable on its own (sacramental) and to those, who looked at politics more pragmatically through the “usual” news criteria, which were also used on other topics than politics. Of these two the pragmatic journalists tended to write about politics through conflicts and through the frame of a game. (Van Dalen et al. 2012, 907–908.)

On the dimension of impartial-partial, the impartial journalists stressed objectivity and took distance from the possible political orientation of their employer. The partial journalists on the other hand were expected to be found in the countries, where the whole media system is more biased according to different political lines of the media system. The third dimension, information-entertainment, refers to whether the journalists perceive the purpose of their work as the enlightenment of the public so that the people can make informed democratic decisions or if they pay more attention to scandals and personal life of the politicians in order to make the news more wanted among the buying public. (Van Dalen et al. 2012, 908–909.)

According to this study, the clearest difference between the self-perceived role of the German and British journalists is that the journalists in the UK are more market-oriented

than their colleagues in Germany. Even on this regard the differences were not huge: on the scale from 1–5 (1=information oriented, 5=entertainment oriented), the British journalists scored on average 3,34 whereas the Germans scored 2,94. Even this difference was however also noted on the content of the newspapers: The British papers had more scandal-related articles in them than did the German papers. When it comes to the style of reporting on domestic politics (sacradotal-pragmatic) and to the neutrality of reporting (partial-nonpartial) there's no notable difference between the journalists in Germany and the UK. (Van Dalen et al. 2012, 913–916.)

The presumed stronger market orientation of the British journalists in relation to German journalists is at least partially supported by the results of a study by Paul Statham (2008, 411), in which the British journalists were more concerned about the necessity to capture the audience attention than the German journalists when reporting about European affairs. This study, too, shows that in many other areas of the professional culture, e.g. on the concerns about pressure on deadlines, access to important public figures and availability of news space, the concerns of the journalists in these two countries were more alike than different.

Perhaps the most interesting comparison between the journalistic cultures of the two countries, at least from the standpoint of this paper, is the one presented by Donsbach & Patterson (2004, 265-267), who made a rather simple but convincing comparison of the self-perceived political roles of the journalists on the dimensions of *active-passive* and *neutral-advocate*. The results show clear and also a bit surprising differences between the journalists in Germany and the UK.

In this study the passive journalist is understood to be the one who gets his/hers information from the outside, for example from the government, and then transports it to the public. An active journalist, for his part, gathers the information more independently, makes more interpretations out of it and seeks to share his/hers own version of the politics or political actors that are discussed.

The other dimension, neutral-advocate, tells us about the political positioning of the journalists. Neutral journalists see themselves routinely not taking any sides on a political debate whereas advocate journalists have their own values or ideology that he or she furthers systematically and aggressively. The results of the study showed that the German journalists

perceived themselves clearly more active and advocacy-oriented than did their British counterparts. (Donsbach & Patterson 2004, 265–266.)

The view on the differences becomes more precise, as we also consider the different views on the professional motives of the journalists that the same study shows. For the German journalists the “Championing values and ideas”-motive was clearly more important than to their British colleagues whereas the ”Influence Politics”-motive was much more important for the Brits than for the Germans. One possible explanation for this is that the German journalists are more eager to write their own views in the news whereas their British colleagues were more likely to try to influence the politics by digging and reporting ”objective information” that would influence the politics and the public debate. (Donsbach & Patterson 2004, 260-264.)

### **3.2 Comparison between journalism in Germany and the UK**

#### **– Championing the ideas or influence on politics?**

In the previous parts of this project paper we have seen that there are clear differences between the amount and style of Europeanization of the national public spheres in Germany and Britain. We have also noted, that the professional roles of the journalists in these two countries are maybe more alike than different, but that there are also some very important differences in the way the journalists perceive their own roles and that on the basis of the large claim-making analysis these differences may also make a difference in what kind of journalism is done in different countries.

In this chapter I take a look at the possibilities and limitations of the concepts and research results presented before. Here I aim to find out, **what kinds of observations can be made on the relations between the Europeanization of the national public spheres and the self-perceived professional roles of the journalists in a particular country, and which can't be**. The summary of the differences between the two countries can be seen in the Appendix 1.

By doing this I hope to highlight the possibilities and limitations of the common concepts used in the earlier studies and therefore also argument for a more precise research

perspective from which this phenomena could be studied in the future. In order to see how well we can combine or compare the results from the earlier studies, I have sketched three hypotheses, which deal with important aspects on the European journalism and which I try to verify by using the results from studies mentioned in the earlier chapters of this paper.

The first hypothesis derives from the presumed confrontation between the national interests and the European integration: **1) *The more neutral or objective actors the national journalists see themselves, the more the public sphere reflects the general national attitudes towards the European integration.*** The second hypothesis is **2) *"The more strongly the national journalists perceive themselves as the "watchdogs" of the government, the more attention will be paid to the European affairs.*** This hypothesis is based on the fact that in the last decades more and more legislative power of the nation states is moved to the EU and therefore the journalists, if they perceive themselves as the watchdogs of those who have the power, they should be interested in the European affairs as well as in the domestic politics.

My third hypothesis is based on the common idea pointed out by e.g. Brüggeman and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2009, 2011) that in certain countries the EU has become a "good source" of the "bad" or critical news. Bad news on the other hand are usually considered to be easier to sell to the public than "good news": **3) *The more market-oriented the national journalists see themselves, the more sceptical is the average tone of journalism regarding the European affairs.*** A common perception supporting this hypothesis is also the sceptic-populistic EU-journalism that would seem to be characteristic for the so called boulevard press in comparison to so called quality papers in different countries.

In regard to my first hypothesis it has to be noted, that there are without doubt many ways to measure the attitudes of the public towards the European integration. I will, however, rather simply use the results of a often referred Eurobarometer-research on whether the people in different countries identify themselves as "European" or do they alternatively prefer their own national identity. The Eurobarometer I chose for this purpose is made in the year 2002 so it would deal with about the same time period as the data in many studies on the Europeanization of the public spheres that are referred to in this paper.

According to the Eurobarometer from the year 2002, people in the UK were most attached to

their national identity (62 percent) instead of seeing themselves as at least to some extent or fully "European" (36 percent). Previously we've noted, that the British journalists saw themselves more as "passive and neutrality oriented actors" than did the German journalists (Donsbach & Patterson 2004, 266), and therefore, if my hypothesis holds water, it's presumable that the peoples' strong sense of the national identity would be at least somehow visible in the Europeanization of the British public sphere.

According to practically all the studies about the Europeanization of the public spheres, that really is the case: as noted earlier, the Europeanization in the UK is, in comparison to many other EU-countries, extremely parochial and concentrates mostly on what the British political actors have to say about the EU-institutions. At the same time there are only few mentions about the actors from other EU-countries. Noting that the editorials in the British newspapers were also relationally critical towards the EU, it can be said, that the neutrality-driven and passively-oriented British journalists do seem to produce a public sphere that does, at least to some extent, reflect the general attitudes of the people.

In Germany 39 percent of the people saw themselves purely through their German identity whereas 59 percent saw themselves as at least to some extent "European" (Eurobarometer 2002). Therefore we can presume that the German public atmosphere is generally speaking significantly more European than the British one. The German journalists on the other hand saw themselves as more active and advocacy-oriented than their counterparts in the UK, which makes the evaluation of the relations between the journalistic culture and the public sphere interesting: in what ways can this kind of journalistic self-perception reflect to the journalism about the EU as the public opinion is already rather positive towards the European integration?

On the part of the Europeanization of the German public sphere, the answer would seem to be that there are no big differences in the amount of vertical Europeanization compared to the British one. The scope and style of European communication is however much wider in German public sphere. As noted from the study regarding the newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, there are relationally strong signs of horizontal Europeanization that's however aloof from the European Union as an institution. Since there's no reason to presume that FAZ would be totally different from the other German media on this regard (although in Germany, it's considered to be rather conservative and Euro-sceptic), we could make the

supposition that the general pro-European attitude and the European identity of the Germans is at least partially reflected on the Europeanization of the German public sphere just as it is reflected in the UK too.

The fact that the editorials of the German newspapers are in general pro-European compared to the UK (Pfetsch 2004, 265–267), would suggest that the media in Germany has adopted the same positive attitude towards the Europe as has the national public. In this case the differences in the self-perceived professional roles of the journalists in regard of passive-active and neutral-advocacy in Germany and in the UK don't seem to have, at least at a very general level, any major effect on how the national attitudes are reflected on the national public spheres and therefore the answer to the hypothesis number one would seem to be “no”. This is however a very rough observation, which would require a more precise research data in order to be developed further.

The second hypothesis is ***”The more strongly the national journalists perceive themselves as the ”watchdogs” of the government, the more attention will be paid to the European affairs.*** This hypothesis was based on the claim made in many studies, that the ”Watchdog”-orientation of the journalists is one of the most common self-perceptions among the journalists in the western democracies. This argument is made for example by Thomas Hanitzsch (2011, 486–487), who states that “the milieu of the detached watchdog clearly dominates the journalistic field in all western countries with the exception of Spain. This result confirms previous findings according to which this type of journalist – characterized by non-involvement, detachment and a perception of journalism as the Fourth Estate – constitutes the professional mainstream of news people in most parts of the western world”.

A closer look at different studies regarding the watchdog-perception shows however, that the concept can be determined and understood in many ways and that there are major contradictions between the results of different studies. For example, in the study by Hanitzsch (2011, 487) 69 percent of the German journalists perceived themselves belonging to the professional milieu of ”detached watchdogs” whereas in the global studies by Weaver (1998, 2011) only 3–7 percent of the German journalists answered ”being the watchdog of the government” as extremely important for their professional role. This means, that in order to estimate the relation between the watchdog-role and Europeanization and make conclusions about it, the watchdog-role would have to be defined more precisely.

Even if the general watchdog-orientation of journalists in traditional western democracies would be taken as more or less for granted, and the “changing variable” in the hypothesis would be amount of the vertical Europeanization or “monitoring governance” in a national public sphere, the comparison between Germany and the UK would not tell us a lot about the attention paid to European institutions. This is because the results from different studies, especially the ones focusing on the leading quality newspapers of these countries, suggest that the level of vertical Europeanization remained relatively low in both countries.

The main difference between the two countries was that in the German quality papers under scrutiny, there was a significantly bigger amount of horizontal Europeanization that is that the German papers paid a lot more attention towards other EU-countries. If we still take the general watchdog-orientation of journalists in both countries for granted, this would suggest that the journalists in the two countries simply perceive the territory of the watchdog somewhat differently. For the British journalists the critical journalism about the EU would seem to mean that they want to give room for the domestic critical voices towards the EU, but are less eager to give room for the institutions and actors that are being criticized.

At the same time the German watchdog-journalists create European publicity by bringing forth the domestic actors as well as the actors from other EU-countries without necessarily even mentioning the EU itself. One could see this as a sign of rather different ideas of the EU among the professional journalists in the two countries compared here. One has to remember, that journalists are people, too, and they may also be merely reflecting the general attitudes of their home country’s people and political actors.

That’s however something that has to be studied further by asking the journalists directly about their ideas about the EU and the watchdog-role and by then analyzing how these views may or may not be reflected in the journalistic content they produce. Before that’s done, and without any other additional data about the issue, the answer to the hypothesis number two would have to be “no”, since there’s no clear relation between the watchdog-role and attention towards Europe at least in the studies that have been used for this paper. I have added a question about the self-perceived watchdog-role to the questionnaire I sent to the German journalists who were interviewed for this project. I will present their answers in the beginning of the results & analysis-chapter of this paper.

My third hypothesis is based on the observation by e.g. Brüggeman & Kleinen-von Königslöw (2009, 31), that in certain countries the EU has become a kind of good source of the bad news. "Bad news" and scandals are usually considered to be easier to sell to the public: **3) *The more market-oriented the national journalists see themselves, the more sceptical is the average tone of journalism regarding the European affairs.*** Here, too, the vagueness of the concept "market-orientation" is something of a challenge for this particular comparison. Traditionally it's thought that the media systems of the so called Liberal model (The UK, the USA) are more competitive and market-oriented than the media systems of the democratic pluralist systems of for example Germany and the Nordic Countries.

Having said that, there are however several studies in which the journalists from the USA and the UK don't seem to see themselves any more market-oriented than their colleagues in other countries. For example in a recent study the British newspaper journalists didn't feel any more commercial pressure than did their colleagues in Germany. In the contrary: The Democratic-Pluralist-German journalists found commercial pressures as a stronger limitation to their freedom than did the journalists in the UK. (Van Dalen 2012, 475–478, see also Donsbach and Patterson 2004, 262.)

At the same time it's worth noticing, that the British journalists are clearly more concerned about reaching the audiences' attention when reporting about the European affairs than are the journalists in Germany (Statham 2008, 411). In the scope of this paper this could be interpreted as "market-orientation" in a sense that the journalists give more value to the publics' needs and preferences as they write their stories. That could indicate that the market-orientation is rather tightly embedded to the role-conception of professional journalists. Hanitzsch (2007, 375) takes the thought further as he says that "when market orientation is high journalism gives emphasis to what the audiences want to know at the expense of what they should know. Journalism cultures on this pole of the [market] dimension champion the values of consumerism; they focus on everyday life issues and individual needs."

On this regard the differences in the professional self-perceptions of the journalists in Germany and in the UK seem to go in line with the differences in the measured Europeanization of the public spheres. As noted before, in overall there seems to be less coverage of the European affairs in the UK, and the coverage there is, seems to be more

negative and parochial than the corresponding coverage in Germany. Therefore on the basis of the research data from the former studies, the answer to the hypothesis number three would seem to be "yes".

To sum up the general impression that stems from the hypotheses presented here, it would seem clear, that it's very hard to make any well-grounded observations nevertheless conclusions on the relations between the Europeanization of the national public spheres and the professional roles of journalists by comparing material from the earlier studies. To do this would require questionnaires designed specifically for the purpose of this comparison and more precise definition of concepts like "watchdog-journalism" and "market-orientation".

Perhaps the most interesting observation regarding the professional roles of German and British journalists and the Europeanization of these countries is the difference in the source of work motivation, which for the Germans was "championing values and ideas" and for the British journalists "influence politics". This means that the German journalists are more eager to find the "facts" and "truth" through digging different interpretations and versions of the truth and then coming up with the version of "the truth" they think is objectively evaluated the right one. The British journalists on the other hand seem to think a bit more pragmatically, that they seek to influence politics through gathering relevant information that's there to gather, not by making their own interpretations based on their individual values and evaluation. (Donsbach & Patterson 2004, 260–264.)

This observation opens the door for some theoretical speculation: could it be, that on average more interpretive and somewhat structuralistic worldview of the German journalists would somehow give more room for the abstract and theoretical concept as the European identity? As we noted, there doesn't seem to be much more vertical Europeanization in the German public sphere compared to the UK. Instead, there are clearly more signs of the horizontal Europeanization and of the positive general attitude towards the whole process of European integration in Germany. The question arises, whether the European affairs and for example different visions of the future of the EU are on average too distant and abstract for the fact- and audience-oriented British press? I will return to these considerations in the analysis of the interviews I made for my own project.

To sum up what's said in the previous pages, it seems clear that the concepts regarding

Europeanization and the professional role of the journalists are in many ways unambiguous and therefore it's difficult to make any far-reaching arguments or conclusions on their relations or possible inter-dependencies. This was shown for example by comparing the different meanings and research results regarding the "watchdog" role or the "market-orientation" of the journalists in different countries.

This does not mean that there wouldn't be room or need for comparative journalism research of this sort, on the contrary. In the last five years especially the Eurozone Crisis has shown, that there has been and probably still is plenty of room and need for more European democracy, publicity and critical journalism. In this regard there would also be plenty of room for additional understanding of the professional roles of the journalists as they are one of the decisive factors by which the European public debate either grows or dies.

Having said that, it also seems clear that on the basis of the studies used for this paper, nothing indicates that the journalists in Germany or the UK would be especially eager to pick up a professional role in which they would present alternative perspectives or challenge the main stream attitudes towards the European integration or the political processes and decisions regarding, for example the Euro crisis. One of the most interesting questions that arouse from these observations is, whether the Europe and/or the EU as an abstract political phenomena fits better in the German journalists' perception of knowledge and truth as matters of interpretation.

### **3.2 Professionalization of EU-journalism in Germany**

One of the reasons why I originally became interested in the professional role of the German journalists as they cover EU-topics, was that Germany as one of the founding members of the EU and as politically and geographically central European nation, probably has one of the longest traditions of journalism on European integration. Therefore I found it interesting, especially from the Finnish point of view, to take a look into how the German journalists perceive their role in the European Integration and especially during an extraordinary crisis like the Euro crisis.

Comparing the EU-journalism and EU-journalists in different countries is also interesting because of political and cultural differences. At least my own every-day perception and some

earlier studies would suggest that the European integration is perceived more critically and it raises more controversy in Finland and for example in the UK than in Germany. In the middle of Europe the integration process would seem to be more natural course of development than in the northern parts of the continent. In this chapter I'll take a short look at the professionalization of the German EU-Journalism and also on some general developments that can be traced in the way German journalists perceive themselves.

According to most – if not all – studies made on the Europeanization of the national public spheres, EU-issues are still primarily perceived through national perspective in all the EU-countries. Germany is no exception in this regard. There are, however, strong signs, that as the European integration has deepened, also the EU-journalism as a professional field within the general field of journalism, has become a more specifically defined field of it's own in Germany, although there are also signs that at the same time the German EU-journalism is moving closer to the traditional field of general journalism (Offerhaus 2011, 267–290).

In her large, unique and rather detailed study on the effects of European integration on German EU-journalism, a German communication sciences researcher Anke Offerhaus (2011) aimed to answer three questions through the concepts of profession sociology and system-analysis: 1) What are the characteristics of professional practices and circumstances of EU-journalism? 2) Has the EU-journalism become more professional during the European integration process? 3) Where are the boundaries of professionalization of EU-journalism? (Offerhaus 2011, 268.)

One of the key concepts in analyzing the professionalization of EU-journalism is the possible *institutionalization* of the field. Institutionalization, as it's defined here, comprises of two dimensions: 1) of the specialization of the professional expertise of the EU-journalism 2) of the differentiation of the professional field through the increase of competence and independence of the interpretational sovereignty on the EU-topics. In Offerhaus' study these possible developments are analyzed primarily through EU-journalists' opinions on their professional profile, on their professional activity within the current working conditions and on their professional attitudes. (Offerhaus 2011, 268-269.)

In order to answer these questions, Offerhaus went through various different sources of information, for example the educational and professional background of the EU-journalists, the organizational solutions regarding EU-journalism, the development of the education

organizations on EU-journalism, the interviews of German Brussels-correspondents on their views and work conditions and the development of the professional organizing of the international EU-correspondents. (Offerhaus 2011, 23-24.)

The fundamental philosophy of Offerhaus's work was the same idea that has guided the writing of this paper: the EU-correspondents are an "elite audience", which gets to make the first interpretations about EU-politics and has well-working channels to transmit their interpretations forward. Though Offerhaus defines EU-journalists as all the journalists who work with the EU-topics, no matter if they are located in Brussels, or if they are working as freelancers or work at the newsroom in the media's home country, in her study she concentrates on the German EU-correspondents and editors in chief for practical reasons (Offerhaus 2011, 14, 21-23.)


So how does the German EU-journalism do according to Offerhaus? Are the current German EU-correspondents institutionalized, highly specialized, independent and distinct professionals within the larger professional field of journalism? The answer would seem to be "not quite yet, but...". There are many signs that suggest that they may very well be on their way to that position. Here I will briefly summarize the main results of Offerhaus's study and also try to interpret them a bit further in the context of this paper and the Eurozone crisis. I will also argue that although the far-reaching institutionalization of EU-journalism can be seen in many ways as a positive development, it can also be seen as a potential threat with negative consequences for the Europeanization of national public spheres.

The clearest and self-evident example of the growing specialization and acknowledgement of EU-journalism are the EU-correspondents working in Brussels and the fact that news media is publishing their stories. The fact that the EU-correspondents have their own offices in Brussels and that the correspondent posts in these offices are organizationally clearly separated from the other foreign correspondent posts, is also interpreted as a sign of increased appreciation towards EU-journalism and towards its particular function in the society. (Offerhaus 2011, 270.)

It also became clear, that EU-journalism can be seen as a specialized problem solving system in a sense that the actors (EU-journalists) are facing specific professional requirements that separate them from other journalists. One example of this development was the uncertainty

experienced by the journalists who did not regularly deal with EU-affairs when they had to write stories on EU-topics. It's also noted that in order to keep up the expertise on EU, many kinds of European educational programs have been established. According to Offerhaus, in Germany most of the EU-specific journalism studies are however still integrated in the general journalism education.

(The amount of German journalists accredited in the Brussels. Offerhaus 2011, 119.)



In general it seems that in the German journalism education the European integration is still seen as a field in which a student can specialize in, not as something that's integral part of the journalism profession. Especially many EU-journalists who represent the older generations have gone through a "learn-by-doing" professional process. (Offerhaus 2011, 270-272, 280.)

In the last decades, the German EU-journalism has come closer to the general logic of the mass media in regard to the news criteria and the increased commercial competition between different media actors. In comparison to the 1980s, the German EU-journalism is nowadays more independent: the journalists decide which events they cover and which perspective they choose. The different media actors are also following each other more closely on EU-topics than before. (Offerhaus 2011, 271.)

This intermedial agenda-setting as well as the general commercialization of the media system has increased the competition on the attention of the audience. This has also resulted in increased competition for the exclusive information from the political actors. For the EU-journalists who were interviewed for Offerhaus's study, this was a good and crucial reason to maintain close relations to the prominent political actors. (Offerhaus 2011, 271.)

Still, it seems that the characteristics described before are still just characteristics of journalism and especially characteristics of political journalism in general, not especially on EU-journalism. Are there any signs of German EU-correspondents having a professional profile or self-conceptions of their own? In Offerhaus's study it was seen, that the EU-correspondents had different goals and strategies to achieve them than did other journalists writing about EU-themes. (Offerhaus 2011, 271-272.)

The non-correspondents were more eager to write according to the interests of the public and according to the public opinion whereas the EU-correspondents tried to get their stories through by stressing and creating connections between the national perspective and the EU-politics. As Offerhaus puts it, "although it's too early to speak about the specific meaning structure of the EU-journalism, there are signs of a actor-specific, role-related differentiation of the meaning structure". (Offerhaus 2011, 271-272.)

It should be remembered that EU-journalism has a lot in common with national political journalism. Especially the correspondents working in Brussels are in many ways in a similar situation as are the journalists working in the national parliament: they are a tight group working very close to the ones whose decisions and actions they are reporting. Therefore it's no wonder that the third research question in Offerhaus's study was about the system-theoretical boundaries of the professionalization of the EU-journalism. Offerhaus (2011, 273) defines boundaries in two different ends of the professional EU-journalism: A) the system

boundary to the outside means the boundary between the journalists and their "target", alas the politicians and the system of the EU. B) The boundary towards inside, on the other hand, means the professional boundaries between the EU-journalists and other journalists.

The main result on regard of these boundaries is that nowadays the boundary between the EU-level politicians and EU-journalists has become clearer than it used to be. As the result of increased competition and inter-media agenda setting, the daily routines and agenda of the EUs political system, although they still play a relevant role, do not get to dictate the media and the journalists, who increasingly work on the basis of their own news criteria. And although the networks of the journalists can be essential in getting the exclusive information and winning the competition between the media actors, they can't be maintained at the cost of journalistic sovereignty. As stated in the Offerhaus study, the line between professional distance and improper closeness can be thin. (Offerhaus 2011, 273-275.)

This is also in line with the general development of the self-perceived professional role of the Press Corp in Brussels. Whereas in the 1980s the first group of correspondents perceived themselves as the mediators of information about the European integration and having worked tightly together each other and the politicians, tended to end up having similar political analyses and a rather tight social control. Nowadays, as the amount of correspondents has increased and therefore the work in the Brussel press corps has become more anonymous in the way that it's no longer clear, where does some particular journalist get his or her information. (Offerhaus 2011, 286.)

At the same time the boundary towards other professional fields within journalism is not without problems, either. According to Offerhaus, the views of the Brussels correspondents and the views of the journalists working in the national newsroom of the media differ significantly from each other in regard to the relevance, perspective and quality of EU-related stories. In a typical setting, according to Offerhaus, the EU-correspondent would like to have more space and visibility for his/hers stories and possibly also with a somewhat different emphasis than the central newsroom of the media he/she works for. According to the correspondents who Offerhaus interviewed, the journalists working in the news rooms or editing offices in the correspondents' home countries tend to undermine the work of the correspondents and don't really seem to understand the news value of EU-issues. (Offerhaus 2011, 283-284.)

The general conclusion of the study is that from the perspective of system and actor theories, the German EU-journalism has indeed become more professional. As a result of this development the outer boundary of the EU-journalism, that is the boundary between journalists and EU-politicians, has become stronger and the inner boundary of EU-journalism, that is the boundary between EU-journalism and other fields of journalism, has become weaker. One of the main causes for both of these phenomena is the rotation of EU-correspondents, which has enabled the journalists to create effective relations with the EU-politicians without becoming too close with them. At the same time the rotation practice has increased the newsrooms' understanding towards the EU-issues and towards the perspectives of the correspondents. (Offerhaus 2011, 275-276.)

From this papers' and from the Euro Crisis' perspective perhaps the most important question that arises from the Offerahauses study is, *how much specialization in EU-journalism is enough or optimal for making the EU-issues more visible, understandable and interesting for the audience?* The conclusion offered by Offerhaus is that the deepening of expertise and further specialization of the EU-correspondents would require more resources for the EU-coverage, more correspondents, increased special education for EU-correspondents and a long-term attendance of correspondents instead of the rotation system that's used by most of the news media nowadays. She also concludes, that from the perspective of further developing of EU-journalism this would be a wrong way. (Offerhaus 2011, 289.)

Since the EU-politics and themes are ever more closely knit to the national politics, the conclusion is clear: there should be more co-operation between EU-journalists and "other" journalists, not less. Offerhaus also suggests that the European perspective should be stronger in general journalism education. The co-operation within media organizations should be more active and effective than it's been so far. The rotation should be constructed as a structural system within all the bigger media organizations (why not also in the smaller ones?). The new possibilities of digital communication should be used more efficiently, so that different kinds of journalistic expertise could be involved when reporting on complex and international phenomena such as EU-themes. (Offerhaus 2011, 289-290.)

What could this all mean in practice and what can these perceptions on German EU-journalism give for my analysis on Euro Crisis-journalism? It's reasonable to think that the newsrooms and the media organizations in general are nowadays technically better equipped

to truly work efficiently together than ever before in the history of journalism. Different texts, photographs, videos, ideas and discussions can be more easily transmitted from office to office and from country to country than ever before and at the same time the office of an journalist can be practically anywhere. Still many working routines of journalists, at least to my own experience and knowledge, are rather traditional instead of innovative.

#### **4. Design of the Interviews**

The main idea of this project is simple: to find out how the German top journalists perceive their professional role as they write about Eurozone crisis. My basic idea and presupposition is that the alternative roles that the journalists take, have a significant effect on the way that complex and global phenomena like the Eurozone crisis are presented in the public and therefore they also affect the way that the public discussion about these phenomena takes place.

In the previous chapters I have taken a look at the studies made on the Europeanization of national public spheres, on different kinds of self-perceived professional roles of the journalists and how they have developed over time. Furthermore I've presented short summaries on different kinds of possible professional identities of the EU-correspondents and taken a look on some of the aspects of the professionalization of the German EU-journalism over the past decades.

All the studies I have referred to so far have one thing in common: they were made before or during the Eurozone crisis, which has been more or less "on" ever since the USA-originated financial crisis of the year 2008. Most of the research data used for the studies on Europeanization of the national public spheres dates back to the beginning of the 2000s. Therefore it's only natural, that none of the studies takes the current crisis into consideration. Wisdom after the events is always easy, but still it has to be said, that the lack of transparency, the lack of democratic legitimacy through public discussion and the lack of European journalism all seem to be partially responsible for the current Euro Crisis.

In this project I aim to utilize these previous studies and use them as theoretical back rest as I interpret the answers I have gotten from the German journalists on their own ideas of their role as the mediators, creators and facilitators of the public debate about the Eurozone crisis. For this project I have interviewed 14 top journalists from the German newspapers and magazines with the largest circulation in this politically, economically and geographically central European country.

The interviewees were chosen randomly from the most prominent German media companies like Der Spiegel, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Tagesspiegel, Stern, Handelsblatt and Berliner Zeitung. The interviewees vary in age, gender and professional position in their organization. Three of the interviewees work as correspondents in Brussels, others work either in Berlin, Frankfurt or their home newsrooms.

The only two criteria why these journalists were chosen were that they have worked for a German "quality" print media with a large circulation and that they had written various articles, editorials or columns about the Eurozone crisis in the recent years. The electronic newspaper archives of the Freie Universität Berlin were used to find the journalists who have been writing about the Eurozone crisis in the past years. All of the interviewees answered a two-page questionnaire designed for this project (Attachement 2) via E-mail. An essential inspiration for the questionnaire used in this project was the questionnaire made by Paul Statham (2008) as he studied the role-conceptions of the journalists in the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland.

The questions in the questionnaire can be divided into four different themes, although there's some intentional and natural overlapping between the four: 1) the self-reflection of the journalists, also how they perceive their professional role, 2) the self-assessment of the work that the German journalists have done in general as they've covered the Euro Crisis, 3) the biggest personal and organizational challenges when writing about the crisis and 4) the perceived professional/personal identity when writing about the crisis.

Half of the journalists were also interviewed by telephone in order to deepen the answers that were given on the questionnaire. The interviewees were promised anonymity so that they can for example tell more about the challenges and difficulties they have faced while writing about the Euro Crisis. It enabled them, so they told themselves, to be more open about the organizational pressures and lack of resources that may have had an impact on how well and thoroughly the crisis has been covered.

In the following Results & Analysis-chapter I present the main results of the interviews on the basis of the thematic division made already in the original design of the questionnaire. First I will present the general impressions of the answers on a specific theme and then I'll attempt to find some general discursive patterns between the different answers, analyzing these patterns through the theoretical back round presented before and attempting to make broader connections between the interviews and the earlier studies.

*"I'm not a nationalist, but I believe that the European people deserve to be ruled by someone they voted for."*

- A journalist Interviewed for this project

## **5. Results & Analysis**

The general impression of the German journalists working in national quality newspapers and writing about the Euro crisis could be summed up with these words: Germany-oriented, loyal to the traditional professional roles of the journalists as information-gatherers and interpreters of reality, hindered to fulfill these roles because of the intransparent processes of EU-institutions and because of unofficial professional consensus and critical towards the "prejudiced" or even "racist" EU-journalism practiced by the boulevard press during the Euro crisis. At the same time there are clear signs that the crisis has increased the co-operation between journalists located in different posts and it has forced many journalists to learn the secrets of international financing and monetary politics very quickly.

The quotations of the interviews presented in this chapter are chosen on the basis of them being either a typical answer to the question among the interviewees or them bringing up some interesting aspect or detail from the answers. At this point it's necessary to mention, that on the basis of these 14 interviews it's not possible to make any far-reaching generalizations on the German journalism or journalists, and that has not been the aim of this research project. Instead the interviews give an interesting overview on the professional challenges and thoughts of a particular group in the middle of an rather extraordinary political and economic circumstances.

I will start unraveling the answers I got to my questionnaire (see Appendix 1) from the fundamental question number one, in which I asked the interviewees about the different professional roles of a journalist covering the Euro crisis or the topics relating to Euro crisis. The proposed roles were "being a watchdog of the government", "being a watchdog of the European Institutions", "gathering and disseminating information", "interpreting reality, e.g. explaining politics and putting it into its context", "influencing the public opinion and politics" and "educating the public e.g. on

the European integration or on the European monetary politics”. The interviewees were asked to put these roles in order from 1 (most important) to 6 (least important).

The results show that the journalists who participated in this project have a rather unanimous idea of the importance of different professional roles. To sum up the answers, the proposed roles can be divided in three pairs according to their perceived relevance: the most important ones were “Gathering and disseminating information” and “Interpreting reality, e.g. explaining politics and putting it into its context”. These roles received total scores of 24 and 25 points respectively as their rankings in all the 14 answers are summed up together.

The second most important pair of professional roles are “Being a watchdog of the European institutions” and “Being a watchdog of the government”, which received a total of 44 and 45 points respectively. As the least important perceived professional roles were clearly the “Educating the public e.g. on the European integration or the European monetary politics” (51 points) and “Influencing the public opinion and politics” (61 points).

The interviewees were also asked to argue for their answers freely. The explanations clearly show that the “gathering and disseminating information” is appreciated as most important, since it’s seen as a pre-condition for “interpreting reality and putting politics into its context”, which was very often mentioned to be increasingly important task for journalism when reporting about a complex global phenomena like the Eurozone crisis.

One of the interviewees described his role as a “translator”, who tries to pick up the important pieces of information and translate them in a form that’s understandable for the readers. All in all most of the journalists interviewed saw that the crisis has not considerably changed their professional role compared to the time before the crisis, but it has made the traditional tasks of gathering information and interpreting the world on the basis of this gathered information more important than before. This opinion came up both in the answers to the questionnaire as well as in the telephone interviews.

In the open answers to the questionnaire there were only few comments about the watchdog role of the journalism in the Euro Crisis. The answers were contradictory:

some journalists saw, that since the European issues are complex and the audience knows less about EU politics, the journalism should stick to gathering information and making the basic EU-politics understandable instead of being a (investigative) watchdog of the EU-institutions and politicians. One of the interviewees however noted that there's still plenty of room for more critical and watchdog-oriented EU-journalism.

***"Since the European institutions are very remote from the European public(s) and tend to be very intransparent, I think the most important aspect of critical journalism should be to be a watchdog of the EU institutions – national politics is under much more scrutiny than Euro politics."***

It's worth noting, that the informative role and the watchdog role of a journalist do not exclude each other in the real life, in the contrary. In this case it can be the nature of the question, the request to put the different roles in order that produces the exclusivity. Other reason for that would seem to be the perceived complex nature of the EU-issues compared to the national topics. Only very rarely did the journalists see themselves as active advocates. Many of the interviewees mentioned that their work probably does influence the EU-politics, but that's more or less a side effect of the EU-journalism, not it's goal per se. Only one interviewee saw himself professionally as a direct counterweight of the politicians:

***"As German politicians are more or less unable to explain their strategies in saving the Euro and stabilizing the EU it is my first objective to explain the Euro crisis and to defend Europe."***

On the basis of these answers it seems clear that the German journalists interviewed here represent the typical "detached watchdog" perception of journalists role, which for example Thomas Hanitzsch (2011, pages 22-23 in this paper) found out to be the most common role perception among the German journalists. According to Hanitzsch, the journalists in this group saw themselves as a lot less interventionist than the journalists in the other possible groups. This means, that they are not very interested in advocating social change or trying to influence the public opinion. Because the watchdog role, especially in relation to European institutions, was rarely mentioned and ranked clearly below the informant role, the role conception of the German journalists could be even described as "detached observers".

This is interesting and somewhat contradictory to the results in some of the earlier comparative studies, where the German journalists were found to be more advocative than for example their British colleagues. The same pattern was seen in the study by Donsbach & Patterson (2004, pages 25-26 in this paper) where the German journalists were perceived more active and more advocate-oriented than their British counterparts. In the interviews made for this project the German journalists seemed to be more conservative and showed even some signs of “sacramental” approach to the EU-politics (page 26), which means that they see the EU-level politics important and newsworthy per se, and may therefore put lesser weight on the watchdog orientation of EU-journalism.

On many aspects the answers do however seem to be in line with the earlier results on Europeanization of the public spheres presented in the chapter two of this paper. The journalists interviewed for this project feel that before the crisis there has not been enough coverage on EU-related themes in general and that the national politics are far better and more extensively covered than the European politics.

The earlier studies also suggested that in the public sphere of Germany there may be more horizontal Europeanization than vertical Europeanization so that the focus of public attention has been more on other European countries and less on European institutions. Something from this phenomenon may have reflected in the interviews, too: almost all the journalists considered the “watchdog role” in regard to the European institutions as less important than the same role in regard to the national institutions and a lot less important than “gathering information” and “interpreting reality”.

All the interviewed journalists also believed that the Euro crisis has clearly increased the amount and visibility of the EU-themes. Until there are new quantitative studies on this subject, we’ll have to rely on the evaluation of the interviewees. In the following chapters I’ll introduce different perspectives to the perceived professional role and challenges of the German EU-journalists both on individual and organizational level. The answers introduced here are from the questionnaire that all the interviewees answered and from the further telephone interviews done with seven of the interviewees.

## **5.1 Personal Challenges and Role Conceptions of the EU-journalists**

In the questionnaire question number five the interviewees were asked to name the biggest challenges for them personally when writing stories about the Euro Crisis. The journalists were asked to rate the given challenges from 1 (most difficult) to 5 (least difficult). The proposed challenges were: 1) availability of news/reportage space, 2) necessity to capture audience attention, 3) access to important public figures or important information, 4) lack of one's previous knowledge on the issues and 5) pressure from management or organizational pressure. Summing the answers together, the most difficult challenge should therefore come up with least points.

The answers show that the two most difficult challenges for the journalists covering the Euro Crisis are the access to the public figures or important information and their own lack of knowledge on the EU- and Eurozone-issues. This was also confirmed in many of the written answers as the interviewees had a chance to explain the challenges they chose.

Many of the journalists also confessed that the coverage of Euro Crisis had forced them to adopt new information and knowledge about the financial markets and financial politics very quickly. This may hint that the Euro Crisis has brought forth political and financial mechanisms that were previously outside the scope of journalism, probably outside the scope of many politicians, too.

The access to the important information was also described in many answers to be problematic. One of the interviewees said that it's much harder to get access to the responsible decision makers on the European level than on a national level. Even the ones who didn't see the access to relevant information as a problem, said that's it's sometimes hard to know how to utilize this information and stress the right aspects.

Some journalists also mentioned the abstractness of the information and decisions made as being an obstacle for clear and interesting reporting. Many of the interviewees saw the whole decision-making style of the EU-summits problematic with the over-night meetings in which decisions are made relationally quickly and not even the politicians, who participate these meetings, always seem to know, what they have decided.

***”The whole process in the crisis management is extremely intransparent and the opposite of democracy. Particularly the decisions and actions taken by the ECB [European Central Bank] are completely out of democratic control, check and balances urgently needed.”***

On this question it’s also interesting to take a moment to take a look at what was not mentioned in the answers. All the journalists who stressed the difficulties to get information, referred to the ”official” sources, such as the top politicians and European institutions, which is understandable, since these actors are right in the middle of the decisions made to solve the crisis. This may also mean that at least the journalists interviewed for this project viewed the Euro crisis mostly as a crisis of the institutions and as a crisis of the Monetary union and European financial markets. When the crisis is perceived this way, and there’s every reason to do so, especially for the Brussels or Frankfurt correspondents, it’s natural to think that all the valuable information on the crisis comes from these institutions.

None of the interviewees mentioned anything about the actors of the civil society or the people directly affected by the crisis, not in the open answers to the question about the biggest challenges and not in the answers to any other question asked for this project. The journalists saw themselves first and foremost as the information carriers and interpreters, who try to make the actions of the European- and national-level actors understandable for their readers. The answers given for this project draw a picture of a communication flow going top-down, not the other way around.

The reason for this may simply be the professional positions of the journalists who happened to end up interviewed in this project: three of them are Brussels correspondents and most of other interviewees work in the economics department of their paper. The pondering of the crisis’ consequences to the common people or the interviewing of the national or international civic society actors may simply not fall under their job description. This wouldn’t need to be problem from the democracy’s point of view, if this would fall under someone else’s job description, but on the basis of the earlier studies, this does not seem to be the case on the European topics.

As mentioned in the chapter 2.2. (pages 13-17), various studies in different scientific fields as communication sciences and political science have shown that the European

integration has increased the political power and visibility of those actors who have already earlier been the most influential. On the basis of interviews made for this project, it seems that the German journalists don't consider it to be their task to bring the upper level decision-making of the "Euro-elites" and the views or the worries of the ordinary people into the same public sphere. This could, however, be valuable in making the EU-topics more interesting and the EU more "real" or entitative community (as Emanuel Castano would say, see pages 9-13).

In regard to the other professional challenges proposed in the questionnaire question number five, only one interviewee experienced organizational pressure in the sense that there wouldn't be space or interest for the Euro crisis stories. This is an opposite result to some previous studies made on EU-journalism (for example Offerhaus 2011, pages 33-39 in this paper and Statham 2010, 139), in which especially EU-correspondents have complained the lack of interest and respect towards the EU-issues in the newsrooms in their home countries. Overall almost all the journalists interviewed said that there has been a lot of interest towards the stories on Euro crisis. Some of them experienced that there's been almost too much interest in a sense that at times there's been too little time and too many happenings and stories to cover.

This would also suggest that the earlier studies on the "market-orientation" of the journalists in different countries (see pages 24-25 in this paper) don't play a significant role in the choices made on the coverage of the Euro crisis, at least not among the journalists interviewed for this project. The Euro crisis thus seems to be a particular and at least times so dramatic topic for the quality papers that the journalists haven't had the need to think about how to sell their stories.

Many interviewees also didn't experience the lack of space or the need to capture the audiences' attention as being relevant to them or it being "their problem" at all. From their perspective it's someone else's job in their news organization to decide how to get the audience interested in Euro crisis-issues or how the available space is divided between different topics. One of the interviewees did not recognize any of the proposed challenges in his organization.

***”I have not answered the previous question because most of these items have not been a real issue within our media group. Of course it is always a challenge to get access to all information we are interested in – but all of the rest I would not call a problem.”***

The presumed commercial pressure to catch the audience’s attention (see e.g. Chapters 3.1 and 3.2 in this paper) did not come up directly in any of the answers of journalists writing about the Euro crisis. On the basis of these interviews it thus seems that the Euro crisis, being at times an especially newsworthy EU-topic with rather dramatic and unexpected turns, has been easier to ”sell” to the public than the regular EU-issues. On the other hand, the journalists interviewed for this paper all represented the ”quality papers”, whose readers are probably in general a lot more interested in the Euro crisis than the average people. Therefore it’s wise not make too much conclusions or generalizations on this topic on the basis of this (small) interview material.

In the questionnaire the journalists were also asked “to whom do you feel most accountable when writing about the Eurozone Crisis or issues relating to it?” They were given four alternatives from which they could choose their answer: The German public, The European public, readers of your paper and the ones with political power. The rather unanimous result was that the journalists felt foremost accountable to the readers of their paper, who also pay their salaries.

***”I work for the readers of course. They need to understand what’s going on, so I try to explain it in understandable words and give clear answers to my lead questions: Cui bono and from where to where flows the money?”***

Many of journalists were sceptic towards the concept of “European public”, since they hadn’t noticed any strong signs of the existence of any common, European public. Three of the interviewees are correspondents in Brussels, and one of them said that although his accounted to the German readers of his employer, he feels obliged to put on ”European glasses” in order to tell people what’s going on in Europe.

This, as many other answers too, would suggest that the journalists interviewed for this project still feel first and foremost German as they write about the European issues. I

will take closer look at the journalists' national/European identity in the next chapter. Before that I would however make one more notion on sense of accountability of the journalists interviewed: only one of them questioned the question itself as not being relevant for the journalist's professional identity, which in his opinion should be based on the matters of truth, not on presumed accountabilities:

***"From my point of view, me as a journalist am not accountable to any of these groups. My responsibility is to report true facts and to interpret them in a serious way. Sometimes e.g. the German public will like my conclusions, sometimes it will not."***

This one exception among the answers is interesting because it brings up the different values on which the journalists base their work and how they see their role in relation to other actors of society and the EU. This particular journalist saw himself as a independent actor not directly accountable to anyone or anything but to the "truth" or "facts". Basically all the other interviewees saw themselves as rather independent actors but also as representatives of their German readers. This can be especially relevant as we're analyzing the journalism on regard to a complex, international phenomena like the Euro crisis, which can be approached from many different angles, for example from the national, European, financial or social point of view.

In regard to their own preferences, the journalists were also asked about their basic values in the question number eight of the questionnaire, which was: "When writing a commentary (e.g. an editorial or column) on Eurozone Crisis, what are the basic values, political or in general, on which You build Your opinions/analysis?" This was an open question, so the interviewees could name any values that they came up with. In the answers to this question many of the journalists mentioned a "pro-European" perspective or that they preferred to look at the Euro crisis from the European instead of German perspective. Some of the journalists also stressed the long-term perspective when evaluating a short-term solutions of the politicians (usually made in the middle of the night in the marathon-meetings).

***"Our basic value is an absolute support for democracy and social market economy. Regarding Europe, our main guideline was: There has to be a fair balance between the interests of those demanding the solidarity and those who are paying for it."***

Many journalists also mentioned peace in Europe as a basic value on which they build their opinions on. Honesty, pan-European solidarity, social sustainability, justice and preciseness of investigative journalism were also mentioned. One of the journalists said that the “fundamental” question for his opinion are the effects the decisions made have on his readers. A couple of journalists working for papers that are focused on economics also mentioned economic liberalism and social market economy as basic values. All in all some kind of general “pro-Europeanism” was mentioned in many answers.

*”The common ground for any opinionated or analytical piece would be a definitely pro-European (or pro-EU) stance, not by no means uncritical towards institutions’ policies or politicians.”*

## **5.2 National / European identity of the EU-journalists**

As I mentioned in the introduction of this paper, one of the original motives for me to do this research project and to find out about the professional role-conceptions of German journalists, was the fact that Germany, as one of the founding countries of the EU, with its central location and a proportionally big political power, has a long history of journalism regarding the European integration. I wanted to find out, in what amount do the German journalists perceive themselves as national actors or if they see themselves as European or Global journalists with a larger perspective on the Euro crisis. As was shown in the previous chapter, a certain ”pro-European” mindset can be seen in the answers to the question about the basic values which guide the writing of opinion texts like editorials and columns.

Whether the journalists perceive themselves as ”German” or ”European” was directly asked in the questionnaires question number seven: ”When choosing the perspective of Your story on Eurozone Crisis, how often do you think about whether You’re writing the story as a German journalist or a European journalist? Do you think that there’s a significant difference between the two identities?” The theme was later taken further in the seven telephone interviews with the journalists, in which I asked them if they had experienced situations in their work covering the Euro crisis, in which they had to acknowledge whether they were stressing the German interests or the interests of the whole EU in case there would have seem to be a conflict between the two.

In the answers to the questionnaire many of the journalists questioned or denied the suggested “European identity” all together. Their main argument was that as long as there really isn’t a “European publicity” there cannot be “European journalism” or “European journalists”. Almost all of the interviewees saw themselves above all as German journalists, who write their stories to the German public. However they did not see this as a problem in reporting the European issues.

*“...for reasons already outlined my perspective would always be that of a German journalist. But that doesn’t necessarily mean there is no European angle in the reporting. I see it like this: Of course the reporting is addressed to a German public, but it is not limited to national interests, it also has to consider the development of Europe as a whole – at least avoid a kind of bias that only seeks to look at things from a perspective of what’s best for Germany.”*

Some of the interviewees mentioned that sometimes they bare in mind that their texts are read in other countries than Germany too. There were also a couple of answers, in which the journalists admitted that at times they actually have to work against their own perception of their personal identity because of the requirements of their employer and of the expectations of the German public.

*“Because mainstream follows strictly national lines (and resentments) and because my readers are only German (and some Austrian or Swiss), I must at least reflect the national perspective, even if I feel much more as a European as a German.”*

It was noteworthy that some of the journalists stressed the physical, geographical location of their office as a more decisive factor for their chosen perspectives than their own identity-related perceptions. The German correspondents working in Brussels said that from their location the crisis seems to look a lot different than, for example, from the perspective of German journalists working in the national parliament, Bundestag in Berlin. The answers also give reason to think that the expectations towards the reporting vary according to the place where the journalist is situated.

This is in line with notions of Offerhaus (2011), who found out that there’s been considerable differences in the way the EU-correspondents in Brussels and the newsrooms in the home country tend to stress the coverage on EU-issues. According to

the interviews made for this project, these differences have not vanished during the Euro crisis, though it's been rather unique and unforeseen topic in the rather short history of EU-journalism.

*"I normally write my stories from a Brussels perspective. This means, e.g. that my coverage on the German finance minister is restricted to his role in events at Brussels. I don't cover the consequences of decisions taken in Brussels for domestic policies. An indeed, experience tells that the Berlin and the Brussels perspectives on the crisis differ considerably But that has little to do with different journalist identities' but rather with differences in the "functioning of media here and there."*

This result gives reason to think about the influential factors to the role-conception of the journalists covering the Euro crisis: Do, for example, the tradition of practices of the German correspondents working in Brussels have more influence on the self-perceived and practiced professional role of the journalist than does the current situation (e.g. Euro crisis) have? And if so, what kind of benefits or disadvantages could such a behavioral model bring with it?

The obvious advantage is the speed that comes along the routines: it's possible to report more swiftly if the reporting is done as it's always done. The political agenda and the weekly schedules of the EU-institutions also support the routines (and the other way around). On the other hand, the Euro crisis has shed light on the weaknesses of the system: as the crisis has developed quickly and unexpectedly, many journalists have had difficulties, at least according to the interviews made for this project, getting the information they wanted from the "intransparent" European institutions. It has also become clear, that the crisis cannot be reported or analyzed solely from the Brussels' or from the national point of view.

The telephone interviews made for this project deepen the insight on the relation of the perceived German and European identity of the journalists. In these interviews the interviewees were asked, whether they've accounted situations in which they had to consciously think about whether they stress the Germanys national interests or the interests of the EU as a whole. In the answers basically all the interviewees underlined that the interests of the EU are the same as the interests of Germany, at least in the long run. According to the interviewees, the same goes with the German journalists, who should avoid picking sides.

***”If we as journalists would end up in a situation where we would have to choose sides between the German interests and EUs interests, we would already be a part of a game, and not neutral observers anymore. We can’t afford that. ”***

Another interviewee acknowledged the differences between the European and German perspective, but reminded that no matter how the journalists identifies him/herself, there aren’t de facto any differences between the ”German” and ”European” interests, the destinies of different EU- or at least the different Euro-countries are intertwined. Another interviewee stressed the objectivity of the analysis but also the national perspective when considering what things should be brought up and how should the stories be presented. From his point of view, there’s no contradiction between the two.

***”In the analysis of politics I try to take both perspectives into consideration and paint the whole picture. But because I write for the German public, I automatically write in another way than I would write if I wrote to the Spanish or Finnish public, because the interests of these people.”***

Interviewee X

In the chapter 2.1 (pages 9-13) we took a look at the concept of enteativity by Emmanuele Castano (2004), who argued that in order for a community ,e.g. The EU or Europe, to be real and therefore somewhat possible to identify with, four features are necessary: common fate, similarity, proximity and boundedness (Castano 2004, 41-43). As already mentioned in the theoretical part of this paper, Castano sums up the results of his studies this way: ”In light of these experimental results, the hypothesis that the lack of a psychological existence for the EU in the minds of the Europeans may be one of the factors responsible for their weak level of identification with it seems even more plausible.” (Castano 2004, 53.)

What’s said before, do not mean that the European countries or the members of the Eurozone should agree on everything, but that they should make their decisions, even decisions to disagree on something, as Europeans, not as competing national states, who all try to get as much advantage to themselves as possible. The answers from the interviews made for this project verify the presumption that the Euro crisis, regardless of the more or less chaotic political processes it has created, has probably deepened the

perceived common fate, similarity, proximity and boundlessness of the EU-countries in the eyes of different actors. By now it should be clear for the politicians, journalists and also the European people that a common currency intertwines the destinies of very different countries together, probably more tightly than many had previously thought.

Many of the interviewees said that by now it should be clear to everyone that the interests of Germany can't be separated from the general interests of the whole EU, at least not in the long run. On the basis of the interviews the Euro crisis has also made the EU-politics more integral part of the domestic politics in Germany. This may also have changed the position of EU-themes in regard to the traditional news criteria, in which the nearness of the events is often stressed.

Therefore the Euro crisis seems to have connected the every-day life level through the level of the national politics to the level of European politics in a way that gives the journalists a good chance to represent the connectedness of the three. Ironically, the Euro crisis may have given the journalists a better chance to do their work better, i.e. explain the complex interdependencies between different levels.

On the other hand, the strong professional identification of the journalists to Germany and to the German audience would suggest, that such an influence from the outside was necessary for the journalists themselves to see these connections or to understand the importance of this connectedness. This presumption is strengthened by the previous studies on the Europeanization of the national public spheres presented in the chapter two of this paper, which showed that until the current crisis, up until the year 2008, the levels of both vertical and horizontal Europeanization remained relatively low in all European countries under scrutiny.

### **5.3 The Economic Challenges of Euro crisis-journalism**

This project paper concentrates more on journalists and journalism, and less on the business models of the media organizations. Therefore this article, within its limited amount of space and resources, aims to understand the every-day challenges of journalists and leaves the re-inventing of business models to others. In real life these

two areas, the publishing business and the creation of the content, naturally cannot be separated as easily. That's why I have also asked my interviewees, how has the ongoing economic turmoil effected on their personal possibilities to cover the Euro crisis.

The perspective of business is also essential for the practice of journalism, because the professional field of journalism may be looking very different already in the near future. As many media visionaries have noted (for example Rasmus Kleis Nielsen from the Reuters Institute, Brian Kress from the Richards Group, Alan D. Mutter with his blog 'Reflections of a Newsosaur, see additional sources), the media audiences are becoming more and more scattered into special nichés, the journalists will increasingly have to create their own audiences and find new ways to create their own professional identity or "brand" and all this is also going to affect the business models of the media companies profoundly.

The general economic situation of the media branch has declined across different European countries in the last years as the conjecture of the world economy has stumbled. At the same time the traditional print media is going through historical structural change with the digitalization of the press and the profound change in the advertising markets. This has created increased pressures for the whole media-branch to re-invent itself.

In this regard Germany is no exception, although the general economic conjecture of the country has been relatively strong in the past few years, at least in comparison with many other European countries. However, in the year 2012 for example the traditional newspaper Financial Times Deutschland was closed down and also the well known daily papers likes Frankfurter Allgemein Zeitung and Frankfurter Rundschau have had major economic difficulties. The discussion on the future of journalism and on the future of publishing is going on throughout the western world.

During the financial crisis originated from the USA, in the years 2007-2009, the worldwide advertisement market shrank for 44 billion euros. In Germany the decrease of ad-money was about one billion euros. The experts evaluated that these years were the hardest ones for the German press since the beginning of the Federal Republic of Germany. The crisis hit the daily papers especially hard. In the year 2011 the German daily papers earned all together about 3,6 billion euros from the adverts. In the

beginning of the millennium the amount was still about 6,6 billion euros. (Die Zeit 21.11.2012)

Thus, ironically, it would seem that the Financial crisis of 2008 may have paced up the economic decline of the media companies, which has put the resources of the newsrooms in jeopardy, which for its part might make it harder to practice the kind of quality journalism which could help us understand the reasons and mechanisms of the economic crisis and to avoid the mistakes that have led to this situation.

The possible effects of the economic crisis to the everyday work of the journalists writing about the Euro crisis were asked in the question number three in the questionnaire. The question was: "How would You describe the ability of Your own newspaper to do investigative journalism on Euro crisis and topics relating to it? Are there for example organizational economic pressures to save money and time that have limited the reporting on Euro crisis?"

The general impression coming from the answers to this question is that the economic circumstances have not yet greatly influenced the working conditions of the journalists interviewed for this project, at least not directly, though there were some general references to the lack of resources. One interviewee said that since there's not enough time to do actual investigative journalism, he concentrates on putting the daily news and event into their context in his own stories. The majority of the interviewees said that their possibilities to write about Euro crisis were generally speaking good, although only one of the interviewees said that the resources to write about EU-topics have been increased instead of decreased during the Euro crisis.

*"Investigative journalism always is a question of resources which are sometimes influenced by economic pressures. But I would definitely not say this has been a problem during the Eurozone crisis in our case. The reason might be that the crisis has been and still is ranging amongst the topics both we ourselves and our readers would define as top priority."*

Considering the high-profile nature of the interviewees and their employers, it's not that surprising that the economic circumstances for the work for the journalists interviewed for this project have been at least satisfactory. Another explanation is that the Euro crisis,

especially in its most chaotic turns, has been such an important topic and the coverage on it has been so extensive, that more journalistic resources has been directed to its coverage. It seems that during the crisis more and more journalists have been writing about EU-issues or issues relating to them. This perception is also confirmed by the interviewees, who probably have quite a good idea of the style, means and amount of Euro-related coverage in their own media company as well as in other newspapers.

So that the picture about the possibilities of the journalists to do investigative and thorough journalism on Euro crisis wouldn't be too rosy, it's worth noting that many of the interviewees complained that at least during the most hectic times of the crisis here's been too little time and too many stories to write.

*"Time is money – and we're short of money. The newspapers are competing enterprises, they work under the demand of profit. That's why the money is being saved – especially because of the tight competition with the online-media. Along with the money disappears also the time to research or to study a certain content-area well. The latter must be done in the journalists free time. To sum it up: Time, certain content-areas or the possibilities to really understand certain relations are not there. In regard to these things one's dependant on so called experts (economical research institutes, governmental organizations, banks)."*

What's said in the quotation above, goes in line with the journalists' answers to the question number five, in which they named the difficulties to get information and to have access to the sources as one of the biggest personal challenges in reporting about the Euro crisis. The limited time to study the complex topics and the intransparent practices of various EU-institutions seem to have intensified some problems of the EU-journalism that were already acknowledged before the crisis. One of these problems was and is the lack of journalistic independence in relation to the top-level EU-sources, which was well presented in the large study conducted by Anke Offerhaus (2011, see chapter 3.3 in this paper).

The journalistic independence and financial resources go hand in hand: the more time a journalist has, the more alternative sources of information he/she can find. The lack of money and time gives the "official", most powerful sources sitting on top of the "official" information even more power and possibilities to shape their publicity.

This leads back to the basic problem regarding the journalistic independence that's common to all journalism and especially to all political journalism: how tight relations can a journalist have with the politicians so that he or she can have access to important, exclusive information but at the same time maintain his or hers professional integrity and critical tone towards the decision makers?

It seems, according to the interviews made for this project, that the difficulties to get important information regarding the decisions made during the Euro crisis, may have decreased the journalistic independence of the journalists working on these themes, because the political decisions have been made more or less past the traditional decisions-making routes, and thus the decision makers have had even more possibilities to keep the back round information of the decisions and the decision-making processes to themselves.

Knowledge is power, and as one of the journalists interviewed for this project rather bluntly says, the top politicians have, naturally, used this power in their own advantage during the crisis. This may cause difficulties especially for the correspondents working in Brussels, very close to the politicians on which they're reporting. The main problem with the correspondents working in Brussels is that they can't afford to "burn their fingers and break their contacts".

*"A correspondent who gets to have a short interview during a taxi drive with [Manuelo] Barroso and therefore gets exclusive comments on the current situation, can't necessarily criticize the politics of Barroso or his qualities in the way he/she would deep down want to. That's why it may have to be the correspondents colleague from Berlin or München or even the editor in chief, who tackles the politician."*

Answers like this confirm the notion of Anke Offerhaus (2011, chapter 3.3 in this paper) relating to the traditionally complicated relations between the journalists, especially EU-correspondents, and the politicians. As Offerhaus says, the interest of the public and the ideals of objective journalism are probably best served by reasonable rotation system of the Brussels-correspondents, which gives them possibilities to build up their own

expertise on the themes they're covering and a good network but at the same time allows them to have a certain distance to the politicians on whom they're covering.

Relating to the "knowledge is power"-theme it's worth mentioning, that many of the interviewees said, that they had to become "experts on financial markets" very quickly, as the global finance crisis and the following Euro crisis escalated in the year 2008. That knowledge had apparently not been a part of the basic tools of the journalists writing about EU-themes before the current situation.

The previous quotation and the Offerhaus results also bring forth another interesting question: if it would be necessary for the journalists to have "tight enough" relations with the politicians, why did the top professional journalists interviewed for this project rank the difficulties to get information as the biggest challenge for them as they cover the Euro crisis? Do these good relations only work at good times and are no longer valid in the politically uncomfortable times like the Euro crisis?

The research material gathered for this project rather raises these questions than gives answers to them. If this thought would be taken a bit further, one could even ask which is more important: to get exclusive but only rarely really earth-shaking comments from the prominent and executive EU-politicians or to hold on to the freedom to express the things the way they seem to be?

It would also seem that the top governmental politicians working for different EU-institutions already dominate the publicity on the European issues, compared to for example the members of national parliaments and EU-parliament, not to mention the civic society actors (Koopmans 2010, 120, page XX in this paper). Such actors are for example heads of state and government, cabinet ministers and central banks. This means that the actors who are not directly democratic responsible to the public or work in close relations with the civic society get to have their views and their opinions on their own decisions on European integration delivered to the public discussion more efficiently than many other actors.

To sum up these findings, one can argue that the prominent EU-leaders have managed to make themselves hard to get, and at the same time successfully increased their "market-value" in the eyes of the journalists. This seems to have been a successful strategy from the politicians point of view, but the Euro crisis has underlined the problems of the system that's also very intransparent and hierarchic: from the citizens' perspective the European integration process has been a distant political process which does not have had a lot to do with an every-day life of the European people. The Euro crisis has made the integration real in the form of Economic turmoil in the Eurozone, but the decision processes are still far away and have, at least until the spring 2013, escaped the true public debate about the alternatives for the development of the current system.

#### **5.4 Organizational Challenges During the Euro crisis**

This project is not aiming to evaluate whether the German press has done a good job in covering the Euro crisis. That would require both content analysis on what's written and probably also a few years of distance from the current situation so that we would have a better understanding on what kinds of changes the Euro crisis has brought and will bring upon us. I did, however, ask the journalists themselves, how they evaluate their own performance so far and what do they think about the performance of the German press covering the Euro crisis in general, since in my opinion this is also an interesting part of the self-perceived role and performance of the German journalists.

As mentioned before, in the first question of the questionnaire the journalists were asked, which professional roles did they think were most important in covering the crisis. The answer was quite unanimous: Gathering information and interpreting reality so that the public could better make sense of what's going on. In the second question of the questionnaire the interviewees were asked "how well has the German press succeeded in the two roles that you find the most important while covering the Eurozone Crisis?"

The answers varied rather strongly between the "Sehr gut" answer of one the journalists to the "Very bad" of another. Many of the interviewees argued that just as there's no

“European press” or “European audience“, there really isn’t one, unified “German Press” either that could be evaluated as a whole. Although such a general evaluation was seen problematic, many interviewees saw that the German press has succeeded in explaining the complex crisis better than the German Television.

One of the reasons for these various evaluations on the performance of the German press could be, as some of the interviewees said, that there has been many different phases in the Euro crisis and in the general European integration and along with these phases also the general attitude of the press towards the EU and European integration has varied. One of the interviewees estimated that in the 1990s there was plenty of critical coverage on the treaty of Maastricht as well as on the planned currency union. Then, after the currency union was put together, the critical voices quieted down.

This kind of pattern can also be seen in the claim-making analyses presented in the chapter 2.1 of this paper; the horizontal and vertical Europeanization of the national public spheres on a certain political sector seem to decrease instead of increasing as soon as some decisive step in the integration in this political sector is taken. For example on monetary politics, as the new currency euro was planned and finally introduced, the share of claims made by the European-level actors rose from nine percent to 15 percent between the years 1990 and 2002. At the same time, the share of foreign European actors decreased from 19 percent in the 1990 to the 18 percent in the 2002. (Koopmans, Erbe, et.al. 2010, 69.)

This seems to mean that there could be some kind of trade-off between the vertical and horizontal Europeanization: as the monetary politics was taken to the European level with the monetary union, the medias’ interest in following the businesses of other European countries (horizontal Europeanization) decreased. As we now know, through the Euro crisis, there probably should have been more attention paid to other countries’ economic politics, not less.

This would also suggest that on the European level, as well as on national level, the media tend to be lazy in following the long-term results of slow and undramatic processes. This could be a result of traditional news criteria, which stress the unexpected, fast and easily understandable incidents instead of slower but in many cases

more important historical developments. (See for example an excellent essay on the topic: Dobelli 2011)

According to the interviewees for this project, there has also been fluctuation in the German medias' approach to the crisis during the five years of the crisis. As the Euro crisis broke out and the seriousness of the situation became clear, according to one interviewee, "there were some critical voices again, for a while". According to the interviewee this critique was however quite soon overridden by the rhetoric of chancellor Angela Merkel and her government, which underlined that there has been no alternatives for the politics practiced during the Euro crisis.

As the interviewee puts it, some kind of a group pressure to stand behind the chosen national politics seems to have affected the editorials and columns of most of the papers in Germany up until now. During the first half of the year 2013 the criticism towards the German Euro politics seems to be increasing especially in the southern European countries but also in Germany.

Most of the journalists interviewed for this project noted that in general, the coverage of the crisis has been plenty and that the amount of coverage has not been the problem, but, in some cases, the quality of the coverage. This perception was strengthened in the telephone interviews: during the crisis the demand for journalism on the EU and the Euro has increased and more stories on these topics have been made than before. Many of the interviewees also believed that this would be a permanent change of priorities: if and when the Euro crisis someday will be "over", the European topics will, believed the interviewees, remain as a high-priority topics.

*"In many ways, the consequence of the crisis has been that the common financial politics and the common currency have brought the destinies of different people and different countries together. That's why EU-journalism is more and more in the middle of everyones attention. If the crisis will one day be over, I believe that EU-issues will continue to play a lot bigger role both in my paper but also in other German media. "*

Some sort of distinction between the journalists working in different places, or even in the different sections of a large newspaper, can be seen in the answers to question about

the general performance of the German press. This became apparent as one of the interviewees stated that “we who are working in the economics section of this paper tend to be a bit more critical towards the Euro than are the journalists working in the politics department. In some of the answers one can see criticism towards the ones who are writing about the politics that take place in Brussels. In this case the critique is probably aimed at Brussels-correspondents:

*”What I miss is a more critical way in the coverage of Brussels statements, i.e. their political behaviour as if we had an elected commission that rules the EU instead of the national parliaments. The EU as institution is sometimes treated as a kind of mantra to repeat not to doubt. I’m not a nationalist, but I believe that the European people deserve to be ruled by someone they voted for.“*

Some of the interviewees saw that the German press had done a good job in explaining the international mechanisms of the crisis. The others on the other hand criticized the German media for not explaining the winners and losers of the EU-politics driven by the German government. One of the interviewees even said that “the German media have a direct responsibility for the recent rise of national resentments and the new North-South division in Europe”.

*”Very bad. Only rarely it is explained that first and foremost German investors, banks and corporations and even the state (and its coffers) are the winner of the crisis and all the rescue undertakings. Instead people are told that the poor German taxpayers are forced to take risks on other nations debts and nearly never it is been reported that this happens in order to protect German financial interests in the affected countries.“*

Relating to this, there was one thing that basically all the interviewees agreed on and brought up independently, when asked for especially bad examples on journalism regarding the Euro crisis: The way the boulevard newspaper *Bild Zeitung* has reported about “the lazy Greek”. This reportage was described by the interviewees as racist, oversimplified and simply false information and analysis of the complex situation and therefore also very damaging and dangerous for the possible solution of the crisis.

The perspective of the reporters of the *Bild* would have been interesting also from this papers point of view, but was limited out of this paper, because in this small study we

concentrated on the national quality newspapers. The Euro crisis coverage of the Bild would however definitely be worth a study of its own, since it's the largest newspaper of the country and therefore also has a great influence as well as responsibility of the public debate.

Another organizational challenge, or possibly strength, could be a clear and consistent journalistic policy through which for example the Euro crisis would be covered and which would give the newspaper or magazine its own, particular voice. As we noted in the chapter 2.3 (pages 15-16 in this paper), at least Wessler et. al. (2008, 71-74) came to the conclusion that the total number of references to the EU depend not so much on the amount of correspondents but much more on the attitudes of all political journalists employed by the paper and on the editorial mission of the paper.

In the telephone interviews made for this project the journalists were asked whether their work has been in any way affected by such editorial policies or if they have to think about the general political views that their employer represents as they write about the crisis. Some of the interviewees admitted some very general guidelines, such as believing in democracy, in free market economy or in the European integration on a general level, but none of the interviewees said that there would be any kind of detailed demands on how they should write on a certain topic.

Many interviewees did however admit that there had been, and still is a lot of debate within their organization about how the paper should perceive different situations during the crisis. One of the interviewees hoped that there would be some kind of general, outspoken perspective to the crisis for his paper, which would give him something to lean on in case there are various possible aspects to the issue he's covering.

One of the interviewees, a freelancer working for various different employers, said that it's quite easy to change the perspective of the stories depending on the interests of the newspaper/magazine: some stress more the interests of the companies, other the social aspects of the crisis. One of the interviewees, working as a freelancer for many different employers, put it this way in a telephone interview:

*”This varies according to the paper. For example in Handelsblatt they naturally have this policy of writing business-friendly and politically rather liberal. They also don’t see the European issues as part of foreign politics of Germany but rather as a part of domestic politics. That shows for example in that way that we Brussels-correspondents often participate in the important telephone conferences with political correspondents in Berlin. The correspondents in USA or in France don’t usually do that.”*

Another interviewee told that the most important guideline that his paper has followed has been staying calm: not to exaggerate the panic, not to make hasty interpretations and to take the risk of making things worse. In general this kind of attitude among the German quality press was brought up several times. One of the interviewees saw the calmness of German press during the 2008 financial crisis originating from the USA as the best achievement of the German press so far, since it minimized the risk of ”bank run” and its consequences.

### **5.5 Organizational Changes and Innovations During the Euro crisis**

As everything written before indicate, the Euro crisis has been a very new kind of challenge for EU-journalism and for the media in general. The crisis seem to have underlined the weaknesses of both European level transparency and the European level journalism, since the politicians as well as the journalists seem to have been surprised more or less ”off the guard” by the crisis. Looking back this seems a bit awkward, since the possibility for such a crisis should have been apparent at least for the more experienced journalists specialized in finance markets or EU-issues.

Many journalists interviewed for this project said that they had to learn new expertise on for example international financial system and on the monetary politics very quickly as the crisis escalated in 2008. The journalists also ranked the lack of their own previous knowledge on the Euro crisis-related topics and the difficulties in getting new information on Euro crisis as the biggest challenges in their work. This may hint that these areas of expertise, the expertise on financial markets and expertise on EUs integration, have been mostly separated so that only rarely has a single journalist had a more broader vision on the developments in the monetary union or if they did, they didn’t get larger attention to their stories.

Here in the end of this paper I take a look at whether the Euro crisis has changed the organizational practices of the newspapers and magazines. One would, for example, presume that nowadays there would be more co-operation between different departments within a large media organization, as the Euro crisis as a topic have many different dimensions: it can be seen at the same time as EU-politics, foreign politics and domestic politics and its as much politics as economics. Most but not all of the interviewees see that the crisis has indeed increased the interaction between different journalists and brought the ideas of the domestic politics reporters and the ideas of the Brussels-correspondents closer to each other.

*”In Germany we’ve also usually had an public debate and argument every other year about the EUs netto payers and receivers, and that has also caused tensions and arguments between the journalists in Germany and the correspondents in Brussels, who have had a very different approach to the issue. Today that would be unthinkable, because the national crisis politics and the European crisis politics are now seen as two sides of the same medallion. That has been a fundamental change.”*

Covering the Eurozone crisis hence requires many different kinds of expertise, even though it’s not possible or even suitable to try to get all the possible perspectives in every story. As part of the co-operation, most of the Interviewees saw that in their organization the exchange of knowledge and coordination between different kinds of journalists was working well and had improved during the Euro crisis.

Relating to this, as one journalist said, now also the correspondents in Berlin are experts on European debt mechanisms and European integration, and the general knowledge of EU-politics among the journalists has increased. At the same time EU-politics has become even more tightly knit to the domestic German politics and perceived as an inseparable part of it by the journalists than before.

*”One can say that the crisis has brought out the best of us in different relations.”*

For the biggest German quality newspapers a coordination between three different posts seem to be most important as they cover the Euro crisis: the co-operation between the Brussels-correspondents, Berlin-correspondents and Frankfurt-correspondents. These

posts bring the perspectives of EU-institutions, German parliament and government and the European Central Bank together. Most of the interviewees said, that the Brussels correspondents have been writing clearly more stories than they used to at the same time as the co-operation has become more common.

*"It's always been rather fluent by us. But lately I have made more interviews in co-operations with my colleagues in Berlin or in Frankfurt, where the European Central Bank is, but also with colleagues that are in Washington and follow the IMF. This kind of co-operation has become more common and we've strengthened it, but one can't say that we would have invented some completely new journalistic approach".*

There was however also signs of another kind of development, in which more and more attention is being shifted to Berlin, especially as the crisis has prolonged. One of the interviewees said that there's a more or less public expression among the Brussels-correspondents that Berlin is actually the capital of Europe and the EU now, as Germany plays the most important role in all the scenarios for rescuing the euro. The same interviewee said that at least one prominent German paper specialized in economics has reduced the amount of its Brussels-correspondents from three to two and also in other ways shifted its attention From Brussels to Berlin.

The reason for such decisions is the same that has already been expressed in earlier parts of the results of the interviews: it's very hard to get information from the EU-institutions and for example many crucial documents on the decisions made in the crisis summits become public only as they are brought to discussion in the national parliaments, for example in Bundestag in Berlin. This may also be a result from the prolonged nature of the crisis, which has become more and more also a national question, as most of the important decisions have been made between the heads of the EU-states and for example the European parliament has so far played a rather marginal role.

Within "the strengthened co-operation" there were very few completely new ways of making journalism inspired by the uniqueness of the Euro crisis. There were, however, some interesting examples of creative problem solving and traces of new, more flexible thinking on how to make more innovative journalism during special conditions. One of

the interviewee for example told that in his new organization journalists were divided into different groups who were each responsible of the following of a certain aspect of the crisis. As time went on and the situations changed, the assembly of the groups was changed accordingly so that there would be enough resources to investigate and analyze the most current issues or maybe even reflect the upcoming events.

Another kind of innovation was made in the newspaper Handelsblatt, which moved 20 journalists temporarily to Athens in autumn 2011, as the Monetary Union was going through maybe the most critical phases of the crisis so far. This was done so that this “research team” would see with their own eyes how the crisis affected the everyday-lives of the Greek people. On the basis of this experiment the paper published an entire special issue on Greeks problems, mechanisms behind them and their effect on the whole Eurozone.

On a smaller scale many interviewees told, that for example interviews made by a working pair of journalists, for example so that another one comes from Brussels and another one from the newsroom of the organization have become more common in recent years as well as forming teams, which include Brussels-correspondents and Berlin-correspondents, who, for example, observe the doings and sayings of the German financial minister in Brussels and in Berlin.

All in all it seems, on the basis of interviews made for this project, that the Euro crisis has not inspired any completely new journalistic innovations whether in the way the stories are told or in the journalistic practices of how they are made. Rather the newsrooms have tried to adjust their scale of coverage and their pace to the ongoing situation by combining the national and European perspectives more tightly together by increasing the co-operation between different journalists and by trying to be more flexible in the allocation of resources according to the quickly changing situation.

In a way it’s understandable that during an unexpected crisis like the Euro crisis, it’s easier to work somewhat according to the usual routines. At the same time it has to be said that it may not have to be so. In the last years, there have been some very good examples of journalists creatively breaking the conventions of telling the stories and

interacting with their audience under special conditions, for example during some real-time and real-world nature disasters.

One example of such a journalism-oriented innovativeness was brought forth for example by the journalists working at *the New York Daily News* did during the Hurricane Catrine, as they very quickly re-organized the front page of the their papers website, implemented themselves to the different parts of the city and created a new way of reporting the current events. (Bellin, Shirky, Anderson 2012, 84.) Why couldn't political journalism, both on national and European level, at least time to time step down from its pedestal with this attitude too?

The interviewees gave some answers to this question. In many interviews there were references to certain cautiousness, political correctness and consensus that journalists working in the prominent newspapers were expected to keep up as they write about Euro crisis. This was also seen as at least partially the reason why there hasn't been more critical stories on the lack of political alternatives in the way the government of Germany has dealt with the crisis. It seems, no one wants to be the first one to rock the boat, at least no too hard. This would suggest that the media and the journalists covering the EU-topics may have integrated to well to the establishment and, probably more or less unconsciously, forgotten the reality and interest of their audience, even though the journalists interviewed for this project stressed their accountability to their readers.

One thought-provoking example was brought up by German journalist Georg Diez in his Media-column "Und nun die Scheinnachrichten" in Spiegel Online (10.5.2013), where he blamed the German media for only repeating the comments of the establishment instead of explaining and interpreting the consequences of the politics and giving the politics understandable meanings. Diez thinks that the media should not only tell what's already happened but also aim to reflect the possible trends of the future and aim to active the audience, not to treat it as a group of passive message-receivers.

He says that "the new journalism" should be openly subjective, find the problems and demand for the solutions to them, be investigative instead of making announcements and in general test our sense of comfortably "until to the limits of activism". On the basis of this project, it seems that the German EU-journalism could have room to be

more active and more empowering instead of just repeating the holy words of those in power.

Of course there have also been plenty of good examples, both in Germany and other European countries, of Euro crisis-journalism that has gone beyond the official truth and numbers and the politicians' vague comments. As the journalists interviewed for this project were asked to name especially good examples of coverage on Euro crisis, all of the examples given were longer articles that gave background information and at least tried to give some kind of new perspective to the mechanisms of the complex situation. This may, for its own part, give reason to think that as the world around us gets more and more complex and different countries get more interdependent with each other, the explanatory, thorough and "slow" journalism is the most natural way to make this world understandable, not necessarily the real-time, 24-hours news-feeds, which may serve other valuable purposes.

## **7. What's there to learn? (And short tip list for a Global Journalist)**

In this project we have noted that in the 2000s European topics were still mainly covered from the national perspective by the media. According to the claim-making analyses, the amount of EU-coverage still remained relatively low, although in the political sectors in which the integration has proceeded more quickly, like the monetary politics and the agriculture politics, there seems to have been more coverage. We also noted that in order for a political community like the EU or the Eurozone to become real in a sense that people can at least somewhat identify themselves with it, the European actors should be perceived acting as "Europeans" and for "Europe", not just for their own interests.

In the chapter three it became clear that the self-perceived professional roles of journalists vary in different countries and so does the way in which they report on the European issues. It was also shown through experimental hypotheses, that the relations between these perceived professional roles and the differences in the coverage are very hard to point, among other things because of the loosely defined concepts used in

different studies on the subject. This would speak for the need of further, comparative research on the topic.

On the basis of the results of the interviews made for this project it seems that the German journalists covering the Eurozone crisis are rather traditional in seeing their own role as information-gatherers, information distributors and the interpreters of this information and reality at the same time they seem to want to rely on the common sources of information: the leading EU-politicians and institutions, and if they're not available, the banks and different economic research institutions. The journalists also named the intransparency and the difficulties to get important information as the biggest challenge for them as they have covered the Euro crisis.

There weren't any mentions regarding the need to increase the variety of the sources to a more alternative voices like the civic society actors or to the national parliamentary actors, even though earlier studies on the subject give reason to think that there would be plenty of room for more controversial and more grass-root level public debate on the abstract European themes. This would probably also give the European Union more enteativity in the eyes of the public in the way e.g. Castano (2004) means it ( pages 9-13 in this paper), and this way make the EU more understandable for the readers.

The German journalists perceive themselves first and foremost as German, not European journalists, who are mostly accountable to their own, German audience. Instead of nationality, more important variable affecting the self-perceived role of the German journalists was their physical location, their post: the three journalists working in Brussels as EU-correspondents seemed to feel more obliged to apply the European perspective and wear "European glasses" than did the journalists who work in Berlin or in the main newsrooms of their employer.

It thus seems that the perceived professional role or the practical routines of the German journalists interviewed for this project have not been greatly influenced by the Euro crisis, at least not in their own opinion. What seems to have changed, is that the journalists writing about the Euro crisis don't have to fight for the news space for their

stories, although some of them didn't even seem to think that it was part of their job to negotiate visibility or to try to catch the attention of the audience for their stories.

The majority of the journalists interviewed for this project had not experienced economic pressures or the lack of resources that would have directly limited their possibilities to cover the Euro crisis. This is probably at least partially explained by the prominent nature of the interviewees and their employers: The top journalists of Der Spiegel, Die Welt, Die FAZ, Die Zeit, Die Süddeutsche Zeitung or the Handelsblatt are not the first ones to suffer from the stumbling conjuncture of the whole media branch in the western countries.

As a general notion it can be said that as the Euro crisis has brought more attention to the intertwinedness of the European countries and national politics and economics, it has also affected the way the journalists think about national and domestic topics. All of the interviewees said, that the Euro crisis at the latest has shown, that the national interests and the European interests are not separable and this has also produced new kind of co-operation between the journalists working in different posts within the media organizations.

At the same time the crisis has shed light to the weaknesses of traditional EU-journalism as the EU-correspondents may have had problems taking the critical approach towards the politicians they are supposed to be watching. This notion brought us to the question whether the traditional German EU-journalism and political journalism have formed too close relations to the establishment they're supposed to oppose and analyze critically.

If this is the case, it might be fatal development for the professional journalism that's already facing the challenges of the profound changes in the advertisement markets and the swift digitalization development. In the time of numerous direct communication channels used by the politicians and other actors, the mere quotation of the political comments will not do for analytical political journalism, for which the people would be willing to pay something. The Euro crisis may have also presented that the on such a

complex topics the "slowness" of journalism might be advantage as complex topics are very hard to analyze in the time and space reserved for the traditional news stories.

With this research project on the German journalists, I'm laying ground for my possible future research, in which I would be interested in making some comparisons between the way EU, Eurozone Crisis and the European integration are perceived among the journalists in Germany and Finland. As opposed to Germany, Finland is a comparatively remote Nordic country, which became an EU-member in 1995. Nowadays Finland is also a member of a Eurozone and therefore very tightly knit to the development of the European integration.

This is why it's reasonable to presume that at least some of the political and cultural developments that have taken place in other European countries as the integration has deepened during the last decades, are taking place or will take place, in their local forms, in Finland too. In my opinion the comparison between the professional roles of journalists in different countries could give us important and interesting information on the conditions and possibilities of more European and more global national public spheres. This would also be essential for the development of the European democracy that the citizens of the European countries deserve, since their lives are already directly affected by the European-level decision making and by numerous global phenomena too.

## **A Short Tip List for a Global Journalist**

**(On the basis of the books read and the interviews made for this project)**

1. Know the topic you write about. If You don't understand the topic, neither do Your readers.
2. Make the intransparency public! If an Institution or a company is keeping secrets, let Your readers know it. Test the limits of transparency with juridical means, if necessary. It should at least bring the topic to a larger public discussion.
- 3 Use alternative sources. The civil society actors can be better experts on the possible effects of political decisions than the politicians themselves. This would also bring the European or Global topics closer to Your readers.
- 4 Have the courage to go very close to the people who are affected by the European-level political decisions and tell their stories.
- 5 Have the courage to make interpretations, alternative conclusions and draw the big visions: what does this or that mean for the future of Europe?
- 6 Share expertise, if necessary. On complex, European or global topics one journalist can't have all the knowledge there is to the topic. Form teams within Your organization or with other freelance journalists, internationally, if possible.
- 7 In relation to the tip number six: Use every possibility to connect with colleagues abroad. Global networks are an increasingly valuable resource and merit for journalists trying to make the world more understandable.
- 8 Choose Your sport: In the future the division between real-time reporting through various channels and the "slow" journalism (also through various channels) with analytical and interpretive touch is likely to deepen. The worst case scenario is for You to be a little bit too slow.

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# Summary of the Comparison between Germany and the UK

Attachement 1.



## Europeanization of the public spheres

(Koopmans & Erde 2004, Pfetsch, Silke & Eschner 2010, Wessler et al. 2010, Kleinen-von Königslöw 2012)

\* Strong horizontal Europeanization which is however not attached to the EU

\* Share of the European level claim makers relatively high: 13 percent

\* Share of claim makers from other European countries: 21 percent

\* The amount of stories with purely domestic claim makers: 50 percent

\* Relatively positive approach to the European integration in the editorials

\* Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:  
Vertical Europeanization below average,  
horizontal Europeanization aloof from the EU

\* Vertical Europeanization, mostly bottom-up (the domestic actors addressing the EU-institutions)

\* Share of the European level claim makers relatively low: 7 percent

\* Share of claim makers from other European countries: 12 percent

\* The amount of domestic claim makers: 68 percent

\* Relatively critical approach to the European integration in the editorials

\* The Times:  
Strongly Parochial public sphere,  
actors from other EU-countries rarely mentioned

## Self-Perceived Professional Roles of the Journalists

(Van Dalen et. al. 2012; Hallin & Mancini 2004; Hanitzsch 2011; Weaver 1998, 2011; Donsbach & Patterson 2004)

\* Democratic-pluralist model

\* The role of "Detached Watchdog"

\* Less concerned about the attention of the audience on European affairs

\* Focus for most part on the issues more than scandals

\* More active and advocacy-oriented self-perception

\* Motivation to work: "Championing Values and Ideas"

\* Liberal model

\* The Role of "Detached Watchdog"

\* More concerned on getting the attention of the audience for the European affairs

\* More entertainment-orientation, more articles about scandals & personal life of politicians

\* More passive and neutrality-oriented self-perception

\* Motivation to work: "Influence Politics"

**Questionnaire on the journalists' perceptions of their own professional role while covering the "Eurozone Crisis"**

1. Which of these roles do You find to be most important to a journalist covering Eurozone Crisis or topics relating to Eurozone Crisis?

(Please put them in order from the most important (1) to the least important (6))

Being a watchdog of the government ( )

Being a watchdog of the European Institutions ( )

Gathering and disseminating information ( )

Interpreting reality, e.g. explaining politics and putting it into it's context ( )

Influencing the public opinion and politics ( )

Educating the public e.g. on the European integration or on the European monetary politics ( )

Explanations/arguments for your answer in Your own words (either in English or in German):

2. How well has the German press succeeded in the two roles that You find the most important while covering the Eurozone Crisis?

3. How would You describe the ability of Your own newspaper to do investigative journalism on Eurokrise and topics relating to it? Are there for example organizational economic pressures to save money and time, that have limited the reporting on Eurocrisis?

4. In Your opinion, what are the best achievements of the German press in the coverage of Eurocrisis? What should have been done better? Why?

5. What has been the biggest challenges for You personally as You've been writing stories regarding the Eurozone Crisis?

(Most difficult=1, least difficult 5)

Availability of news/reportage space ( )

Necessity to capture audience attention ( )

Access to important public figures or important information ( )

Lack of Your own previous knowledge on the issues ( )

Pressure from management or organizational pressure ( )

Explanations/arguments for your answer in Your own words (either in English or German):

6. To whom do you feel most accountable to when writing about the Eurozone Crisis or issues relating to it?

a) The German public b) The European public c) The readers of Your Paper d) The ones with political power ( )

Explanations/arguments for your answer in Your own words (either in English or German):

7. When choosing the perspective of Your story on Eurozone Crisis, how often do You think about whether You're writing the story as a German Journalist or a European Journalist? Do You think that there's a significant difference between the two "identities"?

8. When writing a commentaire (e.g. editorial or column) on Eurozone Crisis, what are the basic values, political or in general, on which You build Your opinions/analysis?

9. Could You name one or two examples of a particularly good or bad coverage (journalistically) on Eurocrisis? Why do You find these examples especially good/bad?